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2ABSTRACT
Few domestic issues in Great Britain during the 
First World War proved more politically sensitive or more 
difficult to resolve than the question of how to deal with 
the generally perceived threat posed by enemy alien 
residents. At the beginning of the war they numbered more 
than 70,000, excluding British-born women who had acquired 
enemy nationality through marriage, and children under the 
age of 14. Ultimately over 32,000 enemy alien men, mostly 
of military age, were interned, more than 20,000 men, 
women and children repatriated, and the remainder allowed 
to remain at liberty but subject to numerous restrictions. 
The latter group consisted mainly of women, children, 
elderly men or men who, although technically enemy aliens, 
were members of races, such as the Poles, Czechs and 
Alsatians, deemed friendly to the allied cause.
This thesis is concerned with the origins, 
development and implementation of the policies of wartime 
governments in relation to enemy aliens, taking account of 
the aims of the decision makers, the factors which 
influenced them, and the principle results of their 
actions. The historic precedents and pre-war contingency 
planning of aliens controls to be introduced in the eveni 
of war are briefly considered and an assessment is made 
of the emergency legislation, most notably the Aliens 
Restriction Act, introduced in the early days of the war 
and subsequently extended and strengthened.
3The study traces the fluctuations of internment and 
repatriation policy and the operation of the internment 
camp system. Also examined are the key measures 
affecting those enemy subjects who retained their freedom; 
the way in which the property and business interests of 
enemy aliens were dealt with; the attempts by the 
authorities to find work of 'national importance' for enemy 
subjects or, in some cases, to place them in military 
service, usually with a non-combatant labour unit; wartime 
naturalisation policy; the operation of port controls and 
the work of the Aliens Branch of the Home Office.
4CONTENTS
' Page
Abstract 2
Contents 4
Preface 5
Abbreviations 7
Introduction 8
Chapter One Emergency Measures 19
Chapter Two Internment Policy
i. August 1914-May 1915 50
ii. May 1915-December 1916 97
iii. December 1916-November 1918 120
Chapter Three Enemy Aliens in Custody 13 5
Chapter Four Repatriation 174
Chapter Five Enemy Aliens at Liberty 2 00
Chapter Six Nationality and Citizenship 231
Chapter Seven Aliens Branch and Port Controls 255
Chapter Eight Employment and Military Service 270
Chapter Nine Business# Trade and Property 306
Conclusion 324
Appendices 327
Bibliography 348
PREFACE
This study of the way in which Great Britain dealt 
with its enemy alien population during the First World War 
is based primarily on material held at the Public Records 
Office and the Home Office, Hansard reports of 
parliamentary debates and official publications. Contemporary 
newspapers and periodicals were also a useful source, 
particularly as an indication of popular reaction to 
government policies, or lack of them, but relatively modest 
returns were derived from the private papers of leading 
politicians involved in the events described, or from 
memoirs, biographical material and secondary sources.
In thanking the many individuals and institutions 
who have helped me during my research, I would first like 
to record my gratitude to Professor James Joll, Stevenson 
Professor of International History at the London School of 
Economics, for his unfailingly wise counsel and encourage­
ment.
as a Home Office civil servant during the first 
three years of my research, I must acknowledge a special 
debt to those colleagues•who gave generously of their time 
and expertise to assist me. The staff of the library were 
constantly helpful, and those of the Departmental Records 
Officer and the Immigration and Nationality Departments 
always responded promptly and unstintingly to my requests 
for aid. I am particularly grateful to Mr. W.R. Perks, CBE, 
and Mr. c.J.P. Ruck, CBE, both retired Chief Inspectors of
6Immigration and to Mr. J. M. Ross, CBE, former Head of the 
Nationality Department, for our interesting and valuable 
discussions about aliens controls and nationality 
regulations during and since the First World War. Mr. Ross, 
whose unpublished study, 'A History of Naturalisation, 1252- 
1970' (1970), is a rich source of information on a rather 
neglected topic, was kind enough to read and comment on my 
chapter on nationality and citizenship. I am also indebted 
to Mrs. Henrietta Roche for permission to look at some of 
the papers of her late husband^Mr.T.W.E. Roche, a former 
member of the Immigration Inspectorate and author of 'The 
Key in the Lock: Immigration Control in England from 1066 
to the Present Day' (196?).
I must acknowledge the assistance given by 
librarians and archivists at the Universities of London, 
Birmingham and Warwick; the British Library of Economic and 
Political Science; the Bodleian Library, Oxford; Churchill 
College, Cambridge; the British Library Newspaper Library; 
the Institute of Historical Research; the Ministry of 
Defence; the Imperial War Museum and the Royal United 
•Services Institution. I am grateful for permission to 
consult private papers held at some of those institutions. 
Similarly my thanks are due to the Keeper of the Public 
Records and the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationary 
Office for use of material in the Public Records Office and 
in official publications.
Finally I must thank my wife and family for .their 
forebearance and support during a period in which they were 
entitled to expect far more of my time and attention than 
they received.
7ABBREVIATIONS USED IN REFERENCES
Adm. Admiralty
AP Asquith Papers
ARA Aliens Restriction Act
ARO Aliens Restriction Order
BNSA Act British National and Status of Aliens Act
BT Board of Trade
Cab. Cabinet
C ID Committee of Imperial Defence
DORA Defence of the Realm Acts
FO Foreign Office
HC House of Commons
HL House of Lords
HO Home Office
HOR Records held at the Home Office
KP Kitchener Papers
PP Parliamentary Paper
SP Simon Papers
WO War Office
8INTRODUCTION
In the vast corpus of scholarship devoted to Great 
Britain's involvement in the First World War one of the 
more intriguing byways of domestic policy which has 
previously attracted little more than cursory attention 
from historians is the treatment of the small minority of 
the population - estimated at between 70,000 and 75,000, 
excluding British-born women and children under the age of 
14^ - who found themselves classified as enemy aliens.
This study examines the evolution and application 
of the policies of wartime governments designed to nullify 
the danger to national security thought to be posed by enemy 
alien residents,and considers the social and political 
forces which helped shape those policies. The scope of the 
powers assumed by the authorities to regulate the entry, 
departure, movement, employment, business activities and 
many other facets of the lives of aliens were unprecedented 
in war or peace.
Many of the enemy nationals living in Great Britain 
when the war began had been domiciled in the country for 
decades, some since infancy, had British-born wives (who 
through marriage also acquired enemy nationality) and 
children, and retained few, if any,ties with the state to 
which they nominally owed allegiance. Their failure to
1. The basis of the figures )V> discussed in ch. 1.
9obtain British nationality before the war, undoubtedly in 
many cases because there seemed few compelling practical 
reasons to do so, was for many to have harsh and far 
reaching consequences. They were to become subject to a 
level of parliamentary attention, press coverage and 
popular controversy out of all proportion to their numbers 
and their potential threat to the state. And they were to 
face internment, deportation, restrictions on their civil 
rights infinitely more severe than those imposed on the 
general population, and become the target of vilification, 
harassment and sometimes violence. The popular suspicion 
that the enemy alien population was dedicated to the 
disruption of the British war effort and the provision of 
clandestine assistance to the enemy helped give rise to the 
remarkably virulent spy mania which gripped the country, 
particularly during the early period of the war.
The climate, of anti-alien feeling which existed in 
Britain during the war with varying degrees of intensity 
undoubtedly owed much to the intemperate and xenophobic 
propaganda poured out by self-proclaimed patriotic 
organisations, extremist politicians and some sections of 
the popular press. The government's propaganda machine, in 
that part of its output directed at maintaining national 
morale and support for the war effort, probably helped to 
inflame hatred of enemy alien residents by focussing public 
attention on the alleged 'frightfulness' of the enemy, or 
more particularly the Germans, their sole responsibility
10
2
for the war and its consequences. Whatever the 
government's intentions, the hatred and prejudice which 
its propagandists helped foment turned upon the 'enemy 
within', the easily accessible and vulnerable members of 
the enemy alien population. Propaganda, both official and 
unofficial, undoubtedly played a part in inspiring the 
anti-alien riots in the East End of London and elsewhere, 
which were related to events or conditions attributable to 
the enemy, such as the sinking of the Lusitania in May 
1915, air raids on British cities and food shortages. The 
propagandists found a receptive audience as frustration and 
weariness with the war mounted in the face of restrictions, 
hardships and a growing realisation by the public of the 
scale of carnage at the battle front.
The hostility of British attitudes towards aliens 
during the war was partly rooted in history. The admission 
of alien immigrants had been a source of recurring 
controversy for centuries and the relatively heavy influx 
of Eastern Europeans in the late 19th century had given rise 
to fears of an 'alien invasion' and led to the passage of 
the Aliens Act of 1905^ which formed the.basis of aliens
2. For a modern assessment of the uses of propaganda 
during the war see C. Haste, Keep the Home Fires 
Burning (1977). Earlier works which provide useful 
insights are H.D. Lasswell, Propaganda in the World 
War (19/^ 7) and J.D. Squires, British Propaganda at 
Home and in the United States from 1914-1917 (1935). 
An insider's account of some aspects of official 
propaganda operations is contained in Sir Campbell 
Stuart, The Secrets of Crewe House (1920).
3. 5 Edw. 7, c. 13.
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control policy up to the war.
The 1905 legislation was largely superseded by 
the Aliens Restriction Act4 rushed through parliament on 
the first day of the war, which, with an accompanying 
comprehensive order in council, became the cornerstone of 
Britain's wartime aliens control policy. The act had its 
origins in the pre-war deliberations of the Aliens 
Restriction Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence. Further powers to regulate the activities of 
enemy aliens were provided by the Defence of the Realm 
Acts and other wartime statutes.
The most fundamental and contentious questions of 
aliens policy which wartime governments faced were those 
concerned with the criteria to be applied in deciding 
which enemy aliens should be interned, which repatriated 
and which allowed to remain at liberty. While a vociferous 
body of opinion called on the government to 'intern them 
all', such an indiscriminate policy was always resisted on 
the grounds that it would be both unjust and illogical.
Many who were technically enemy aliens were not only long 
standing residents with British-born wives and children but 
had sons fighting in the British Army. Others who on paper 
owed allegiance to enemy nations, such as Czechs, Poles, 
Alsatians and members of the Ottoman subject races, had 
powerful nationalist reasons for opposing the countries 
of which they were subjects, and were firmly committed to 
the allied cause. But not all members of these so-called
4. 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12.
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'friendly' races were able to satisfy the authorities of 
their pro-allied sentiments and many were interned.
During the first nine months of the war, in so far 
as any semblance of an internment policy may be identified, 
it was concerned with removing from circulation enemy 
aliens who were considered likely to pose a danger to the 
state. From May 1915, under a stricter aliens control 
regime introduced by Asquith, with some misgivings, 
internment policy became based broadly on the premise that 
an enemy alien should be interned unless he could show cause 
why he should not be. Apart from women, who were not subject 
to internment (although some hardliners argued that they 
should be), most of those exempted were either not of 
military age or were members of the friendly races, usually 
vouched for by officially recognised committees made up of 
their compatriots. The rest were long-term residents with 
strong British family ties,and the infirm or mentally ill.
Despite the ostensibly stringent measures 
introduced by Asquith in May 1915 internment policy under 
the first coalition government was often ambivalent and 
underwent numerous changes of direction which sometimes 
caused confusion both in parliament and among those 
responsible for implementing policy. The second coalition, 
which assumed power under Lloyd George in December 1916, 
did not, as many had anticipated, introduce a 
significantly harsher and more indiscrimate internment 
policy.
The more than 32,000 enemy alien civilians who were
13
interned during the war# the vast majority for no other 
reason than .their nationality# were in the main treated 
humanely and reasonably well fed# although the quality of 
their diet deteriorated markedly in the last 18 months of 
the war. While some prisoners were able to obtain better 
food and accommodation by virtue of their wealth or social 
standing# few escaped the pervasive problems of boredom# 
frustration and apathy. Many also had to reconcile them­
selves to the fact that their families were not only 
suffering from the severe social pressures of being enemy 
aliens in a hostile community but were living in destitution.
Of the more than 20#000 enemy subjects who were 
repatriated# mainly women# children and men over military 
age# most left voluntarily# but some were compelled to go. 
Protracted negotiations took place in a series of attempts 
to arrange mutually agreeable terms for the exchange of 
British civilians interned in enemy countries and subjects
I A
of those countries heldAcivilian internment camps in the 
United Kingdom. The British government# strongly influenced 
by the advice of the War Office# resisted German proposals 
for a general exchange. The War Office argued that such 
an arrangement would give too great a numerical advantage 
to Germany# who could receive about 10 men for every one 
returned to Britain and her empire. While repatriation was 
in many cases a more humane and more economical policy than 
internment# military considerations and later transport 
shortages placed considerable limitations on its 
application.
14
Those enemy aliens who were not interned or 
repatriated had signifcant restrictions placed upon their 
liberty. In addition to curbs on their legal rights, they 
were subject to wide-ranging limitations on their movements, 
place of residence, employment, possessions, and on many 
other facets of their every-day lives. Certain restrictions 
also applied to aliens of allied and neutral nationality. 
From the beginning of the war enemy aliens were required to 
register with the police at prescribed intervals and were 
unable to travel more than five miles from their homes with­
out a police permit. They were in principle barred from 
living in strategically sensitive areas designated as 
'prohibited areas', and, in some cities, most notably 
London, were subject to curfews,
Stringent controls were imposed at the ports and 
the powers of the Aliens Branch of the Home Office were 
greatly expanded during the war. Initially controls at many 
ports, particularly London, fell far short of what the Home 
Office and the intelligence authorities believed was 
necessary to secure them against illegal entrants. A series 
of measures were introduced to improve security arrangements 
and the growing ranks of aliens officers were backed up by 
members of the Special Branch and the security service.
Enemy aliens could enter the country only through 
•authorised ports' and the main strategic harbours were 
declared 'prohibited'.
Attempts by the government to place enemy aliens, 
whether interned or at liberty, in work beneficial to the 
war effort met many difficulties, not the Least of which
15
was the initial resistance of employers and trade unions. 
Relatively few internees were found worthwhile work but 
some were able to follow their pre-war occupations in the 
camps or were released on parole to work in agriculture or 
other industries short of labour. Most unintemed enemy 
aliens were ultimately faced with the alternatives of 
either undertaking work of 'national importance' or 
fulfilling some form of military service, usually in a non- 
combatant infantry works unit. A few enemy subjects of the 
'friendly' races, almost all Czechs, were permitted to 
enlist in combatant units.
At the outbreak of the war many British businesses 
were managed or financially controlled by enemy aliens 
resident either in the United Kingdom or abroad. Most of 
these companies were placed under the supervision of Board 
of Trade managers or their assets liquidated and placed in 
the safe keeping of government-appointed custodians until 
after the war. But in attempting to excise enemy influence 
from British business, the government had to weigh the 
potential effects on shareholders, employees and, in the 
case of large organisations, on the nation's economy. It was 
such considerations which resulted in the survival of the 
large German controlled merchant bank Schroders despite 
bitter criticism in parliament. Attempts by enemy aliens to 
continue in business by changing the names of their 
companies were discouraged by legislation enforcing the 
registration of all name changes from the firsr day of the 
war.
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Many enemy aliens attempted to obtain British 
nationality after the war began, but few were successful. 
After November 1916 no enemy subjects were naturalised 
except British-born widows applying for re-admission to 
their original nationality. The status of naturalised 
subjects proved to be a mixed blessing for those born in 
enemy countries. While they were not subject to the same 
stringent restrictions or to the internment and 
repatriation policies imposed on enemy aliens, they were a 
target of popular suspicion and abuse. Some politicians and 
newspapers insisted that such subjects were a greater 
danger to the state than enemy nationals because of their 
much greater freedom to engage in subversive activity. Some 
naturalised subjects were, however# interned under article 
14b of the Defence of the Defence of the Realm regulations 
which applied to persons of hostile origin or association.
This study places special emphasis on the role of
the Home Office because of its central responsibility for
aliens matters. Its work in this area proved the largest and
most complex of its wartime tasks and its operations were
often the subject of controversy. No Whitehall department
had to endure more criticism and abuse from politicians and
the press, much of it patently undeserved. Senior officials
of the department, headed by the powerful figure of Sir
5Edward Troup, Permanent Secretary from 1908 to 1922, were
5. Joined Home Office 18S0 through open competition. The 
first man to enter the department as a clerk and rise 
to Permanent Secretary, he was an outstanding 
administrator whose innovations left a lasting imprint 
on the department. An absence of private papers has 
hampered attempts to make a full assessment of his work.
17
generally of a high calibre and almost certainly exerted a 
significant influence on the four wartime Home Secretaries, 
McKenna, Simon, Samuel and Cave, in the development of 
aliens policy. But while the Home Office was generally 
recognised as the department most closely concerned with the 
broad spectrum of aliens affairs, a number of other 
departments, including the War Office, Foreign Office, Local 
Government Board, Board of Trade, and the Ministries of 
Labour and National Service, also had responsibilities for 
different aspects of the subject.
The position of the War Office was particularly 
significant because enemy aliens were considered to pose a 
military threat to national security, as potential spies 
and saboteurs, and civilian internees were classified as 
military prisoners of war subject in the same way as 
combatants to the terms of the Hague Conventions. Some of 
the consequent responsibilities of the War Office for 
certain aspects of internment policy and the operation of 
the civilian internment camps were eventually transferred 
to the Home Office. Throughout the war the military 
intelligence authorities, working closely with the police, 
were concerned with the 'screening' of enemy aliens and the 
movements and activities of those allowed to remain at large. 
Relations between the War Office and the Home Office were 
sometimes strained, particularly during the early war 
period when there were a number of disagreements and 
misunderstandings over aspects of internment policy. Some 
of the difficulties arose over the dearth of senior staff
\18
at the War Office with experience of aliens matters.
In addition to considering inter-departmental 
relations, the study pays careful attention to the treatment 
of aliens issues in parliament and, to a lesser degree, the 
press since they not only reflected the developing pattern 
of government policy, but also the fluctuations of popular 
opinion.
19
CHAPTER ONE 
EMERGENCY MEASURES
Long prepared contingency plans to deal with the 
potential danger from subjects of enemy states living in 
Great Britain were ready for immediate implementation on the 
outbreak of the First World War. A brief but highly flexible 
measure# the Aliens Restriction Bill# was rushed through 
parliament on the first afternoon of the war# 5 August 1914# 
and followed immediately by the signing of an order in 
council, giving practical effect to the legislation, and the 
issue of operational instructions to the police and port 
authorities responsible for enforcing the new regulations.
A round-up of aliens suspected of espionage had begun even 
before a formal state of war existed.
The passage of the Aliens Restriction Act (ARA)^ was 
a notable landmark in the history of British aliens controls 
since it finally swept away the vestiges of the traditional 
laissez faire approach which had generally prevailed during 
periods of peace# had flourished during the 19th century# 
and was not wholly destroyed by the ill-conceived Aliens Act 
of 1905.
The ARA# based on a blueprint prepared by the
2
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID)# was the keystone of
1. See appendix I.
2. The CID was formally established in May 19 04. Chaired by 
the Prime Minister# its membership included cabinet 
ministers with particular responsibility for aspects of 
defence and senior departmental officials. The CID was 
suspended during both world wars and finally wound up
in 1946.
\20
Britain's aliens policy throughout the war. It largely 
superseded the 1905 Aliens Act and, together with powers 
under other legislation not primarily concerned with aliens,
notably the Defence of the Realm Acts (DORA)^ and the
4 5Official Secrets Act of 1911, and also the common law,
provided the government with a formidable armoury of legal 
weapons to restrict or remove the liberty of aliens. Both 
the ARA and DORA were framed in very general terms to 
provide flexibility in making orders, and each spawned a 
flood of regulations as controls over aliens, and also the 
general population, progressively increased during the war. 
Other wide-ranging restrictions and obligations were also 
imposed on aliens under legislation concerned with 
nationality and citizenship, employment/ military service 
and trade. The practical applications of these various 
measures will be examined at appropriate points in 
following chapters.
This chapter is in the nature of a prologue, being 
primarily concerned with the evolution and imp]ications 
of the critical emergency measures introduced at the 
beginning of the war,'and the historical precedents and 
influences which helped shape them. A consideration of the
3. 4 Sc 5 Geo. 5, c. 29.
4. 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28.
5. The common law was sometimes obscure on the subject of
admission of aliens, but gave the government wide powers 
in time of national emergency which could be applied to 
the control of aliens.
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historical aspects of the aliens question, particularly 
with regard to the decades immediately preceding the war, 
is also important to an understanding of the hostile 
attitudes and reactions of the British people to enemy 
aliens during the war.
If the essential details of wartime aliens control 
policy were worked out in the years immediately preceding 
1914, its fundamental philosophy was much more deeply 
rooted in history. The entry, assimilation and control of 
aliens has been a subject of recurring conflict and 
controversy for centuries and British policy has ranged 
between harsh restrictions in times of war, international 
tension or severe economic difficulties to almost casual 
indifference during periods of peace and prosperity.
The principal motivation of most immigrants has been 
to seek economic betterment, or to find a haven from 
religious persecution. Sometimes, depending on his origins 
and skills, the alien has been welcomed; at others, as 
during the First World War, he has found himself a virtual 
outcast. But the economic and cultural contribution of the 
alien immigrants to British society has clearly been 
incalculable and there can be little doubt that they have 
made their adopted country 'a richer, economically more 
advanced, more cultivated and livelier place.'  ^ The gradual 
process of assimilation has meant, however, that the skills 
and labours of the majority of immigrants have gone largely 
unnoticed and unappreciated, and have sometimes even been
6. Charles Wilson, introduction to w. Cunningham, Alien 
Immigrants to England. (1^97:* p. xxii.
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treated with disdain.
When we consider how much we have gained 
from aliens# we cannot but admire the calm 
sense of superiority which Englishmen have 
always exhibited towards their teachers.^
It is probably true that the native Briton's attitude to 
the alien has always been tinged with apprehension if not 
fear# which has sometimes turned into unreasoning hatred and 
violence. For a nation whose people are 'clearly among the
0
most ethnically composite of Europeans' the British have 
sometimes shown themselves# as they did in 1914-18# to 
possess a remarkably virulent strain of xenophobia. Yet the 
most dedicated xenophobe is virtually certain to be
descended from alien stock# and more than one historian has
pondered the question of when the invader or settler of the 
past might be said to have ceased to be an alien and become, 
a native. If it was thought to have any value to select an
arbitrary date before which alien arrivals might be
considered natives# it would 'surely precede the Norman 
conquest# when there was already a dim sense of nationality
9
among the people.'
As an island nation Britain has been in a strong 
position to impose immigration controls# and most of the 
familiar aspects of control - passports# visas# registration# 
naturalisation and deportation - wer° applied long before
7. Cunningham, op. cit.# p. 264.
8. J. Geipel# The Europeans: An Ethnohistorical Survey 
(1969)# pp_. 163-4.
9. Cunningham, pp. cit.# p. 3.
they became enshrined in the various aliens statutes.^
The subject of wartime aliens control did
receive some attention in a number of treaties between
Great Britain and other countries from the seventeenth
century onwards which attempted in the main to deal with
aliens fairly and humanely.^ Generally they were allowed
to continue their residence unmolested or to leave if
they wished, taking their possessions with them. A
period of grace was usually allowed to enable them to
12wind up their affairs before departing. It became
almost a rule of international law to allow departure
to their own countries of all enemy aliens who were not
combatants, either active or reservists, in the enemy 
13 1forces. With the notable exception of Napoleon's 
detention of Englishmen in the French Empire after 
England's declaration of war against France in 1803, 
wholesale internment of enemy aliens was not a feature 
of wars during the nineteenth century. These historical 
precedents were taken into account by the sub-committee 
of the C I D  which was established in March 1910 under 
the chairmanship of the then Home Secretary, Winston 
Churchill, to draw up contingency plans for control of 
aliens in time of war or national emergency.
10. L.F. Field, 'Ten Centuries of Aliens Control', 
unpublished collection of notes, undated, HOR.
11. • Unsigned article, 'The Treatment of Aliens?,
Quarterly Review, vol. 224, 445, Oct. 1915, pp. 415-25
12. See C.F.C Oppenheim, Internation Law (1950), pp. 306-7.
13. Lord McNair and A.D. Watts, The Legal Effects of War,
(Cambridge, 1966), p. 76.
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Probably the most useful precedents from the sub­
committee's point of view were the aliens control measures
imposed under legislation enacted during the War
14 15The important 1793 Aliens Act, passed at a time
when the threat of invasion by the French hung over England,
gave the Secretary of State the authority to expel aliens,
imposed on each foreigner the legal responsibility to
register with the authorities and provide good and
acceptable reasons for their presence, and established a
formal passport system. Even after the Peace of Amiens in
1802 Britain did not allow the wartime controls to lapse.
Following the resumption of the war in May 1803 the
government stepped up' the severity of the restrictions and,
in August, with invasion a distinct danger, measures were
introduced to provide wider powers to deport and imprison
aliens and to impose stricter registration requirements, a
ban on the possession of firearms, and powers to search
the homes of aliens.But these measures and a battery of
controls over the landing, departure and movement of
aliens within the country, were essentially temporary and
were rapidly eased after 1815. The final vestiges of the
wartime control legislation were removed by the Registration
17of Aliens Act of 1836. Penalties under that measure were 
relatively minor; there was no power of expulsion in peace-
14. CAB 17/90.
15. 33 Geo. 3, c. 4.
16. 43 Geo. 3, c. 155.
\ 1 .  6  6c 1 Will. 4, c. 11.
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time, except on specific criminal charges, and little 
supervision of alien residents. Later measures brought a 
further easing of controls, and even during the Crimean 
War Russian subjects were permitted to continue living and 
working in Great Britain without disturbance. British 
nationals were similarly allowed to remain in Russia if 
they wished, although those living in the vicinity of 
strategic ports were compelled to move inland.
Even if a host country is initially generous in 
its treatment, however, the enemy alien in wartime remains 
highly vulnerable to the caprice of politicians and the 
vagaries of public opinion. The alien's first reaction is 
often to try to secure his position by applying for 
naturalisation. Even that status, however, failed to protect 
many people of enemy origin from harassment and abuse in 
Britain during the First World War.
Thousands of European refugees became British
subjects in the decades before the war under the terms of
18the Nationality Act of 187 0, but the sheer size of the 
influx of foreigners quickly began to undermine the liberal 
climate in which the act had been conceived. The subject of 
immigration became a progressively more emotive political 
issue with powerful anti-semitic undertones. The xenophobia 
and racialist attitudes which helped foment the violent 
reaction against enemy aliens during 1914-18 were nurtured 
in the decades before the war when fears of an 'alien
18. 33 & 34 Vic. c. 14.
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invasion' and of 'dumping' of 'undesirables' by other
European countries were rife. The public outcry against
unrestricted immigration, which rapidly gained momentum
after 1880, was based partly on the genuine concern of
British workers that their livelihoods were being
threatened by 'cut-price' alien workers, partly on
misinformation based on a dearth of accurate statistics, and
inflamed by anti-alien propaganda, much of it racially
inspired.Defenders of the traditional liberal aliens
policy frequently got the worse of the propaganda battle,
and it became clear towards the end of the 19th century that
the government would almost certainly be forced to impose
radical legislative restrictions on immigration. While
international law seemed clearly to give a nation the right
2 0to bar the entry of large numbers of aliens, the leading 
restrictionists were less concerned with world opinion or 
legal niceties than with what they saw as the economic, 
social and even biological objections against alien 
immigration.
The restrictionists remorselessly exploited the fears 
of British workers that mass immigration threatened their 
jobs, depressed wages and held back improvements in working
19. See B. Gainer, The Alien Invasion; The Origins of the 
Aliens Act of 1905 (1972); J.A. Garrard, The English 
ahd Immigration, 1880-1910 (Oxford, 1971), and L.P. 
Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870-1914 
(1973).
20. A valuable study of the alien in relation to 
international law is contained in G.S. Goodwin-Gil1, 
International Law and the Movement of Persons Between 
States' (Oxf ord, 1978) .
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conditions. There were undoubtedly some cases where foreign
workers were prepared to tolerate low pay and poor working
conditions, but it seems clear that the problem was
substantially exaggerated by those seeking more stringent
immigration controls.
Perhaps the most insidious argument of the
restrictionists was the Social Darwinist contention that
allowing in 'inferior stock' would lead to degeneracy of
the native population, which was often coupled with warnings
against 'mixed marriages' and calls for sterilization of 
21unfit aliens. The biological arguments were often
associated with sociological objections that alien
immigrants fostered lower moral standards in the communities
in which they settled.
The alien, notwithstanding many virtues, 
seems to bring a sort of social contagion with 
him which has the effect of seriously 
deteriorating the life of those who are 
compelled to be his neighbour... the neighbour­
hood in which he settles speedily drops in tone, 
in character and in morals. 2 2
Even Sir Edward Troup, the generally moderate Permanent
Secretary at the Home Office during the First World War,
whose career in the department began in 1880, believed that
the habits of alien workers 'had a demoralising effect in
2 3the crowded areas in which they settled. ' But clearly the
21. See Gainer and Garrard, op. cit., for discussion of 
the activities of such Social Darwinsists as Arnold 
White, Robert Reid Rentoul, Francis Galton and F.W. 
Headley.
22. Rev. G.S. Reaney, 'The Moral Aspect', in A. White (ed.), 
The Destitute Alien (1892).
23. Sir Edward Troup, The Home Office (1925), p. 142.
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aliens did not create the social conditions for which they 
were popularly blamed? their accusers confused cause and 
effect. Despite the absence of proof it became a widely 
accepted generalisation that aliens were at the root of 
most of the nation's vice. It was a myth that died hard, 
and as late as 1919 a member of parliament could assert,
Vice .' Why aliens are at the bottom of one 
half, at least, of the vice of this Metropolis 
and of this country. The white slave traffic, 
unnatural vice, the exploitation of English 
girls whom they marry, and then live upon the 
proceeds of their prostitution? the brothel 
keepers who are too clever to be caught, 
because they keep in the background? the people 
with gambling hells who lead young men to 
destruction, and who bring in such horrible 
practices as doping and unnatural offences - 
.that is the sort of atmosphere that has been 
introduced into this country by these people.24
The actual level of criminality among aliens is difficult,
if not impossible, to assess from statistics available up
to the early years of this century. The only relevant
figures are those relating to aliens imprisoned, and, as
the Home Office later admitted, these were 'in reality no
25more than a skeleton index. ' This source indicates that 
the number of aliens in prison rose steadily from 1893 (the 
first year for which figures are available) to 1904, when 
the total reached 4,396, or 2.2 per cent of all prisoners. 
If the population figures from the 1901 census are used 
in conjunction with prison statistics for that year, it 
appears that 1.22 per cent of the alien population served 
prison sentences compared to only 0.75 per cent of the
native population. On closer examination this, comparison,
24. Sir E. WiId,ll4HC 5s, 2778, 15 Apr. 1919.
25. HO 45/10641/206332/2.
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which provided useful ammunition for the restrictionists, 
can be seen to be significantly misleading. The percentage 
figure for natives who served prison sentences was based on 
the entire population, men, women and children; that for 
aliens was derived from the number of aliens returned as 
such in the census, which was not only incomplete for 
adults, but did not include children born to resident aliens. 
Such children were recorded in the census as members of the 
native population. After 1904 the number of aliens in 
prison declined consistently (with the exception of a 
slight upturn in 1908) due in large measure To the effects 
of the Aliens Act of 1905 under which many aliens convicted 
of criminal offences were expelled from the country.
While the lack of accurate evidence did not inhibit 
the propaganda of the restrictionists, it was a distinct 
handicap to the moderate politicians attempting to present 
a truer picture of the scale and effects of alien 
immigration. It was not known precisely how many aliens 
were living in the country or how many were arriving each 
year to settle permanently. The figures provided by the 10- 
yearly censuses must be treated with caution since, for a
variety of reasons, many aliens did not declare themselves
2 6as such. But apart from the somewhat rough and ready 
records of alien traffic into and out of the country 
compiled by the Board of Trade on the basis of information 
voluntarily provided by shipping lines, the censuses
26. HO 45/10641/206332/2. The Royal Commission on
Alien Immigration,which reported in 1903, viewed the 
censuses of 1881, 1891 and 1901 as incomplete and 
untrustworthy (Cd. 1741).
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were the only official guide to the growth of the alien 
population in the critical quarter of a century after 
1880. The number of foreigners enumerated in the censuses 
from 1871 to 1911 showed a consistent rise, with the most
dramatic surge in the decade after 1881.^
Foreigners born abroad
Census No. Increase
%
Per 1,000 of 
total pop.
1871 100,000 19.7 4 .4
1881 117,999 17.3 4.5
1891 198,113 67.9 6.8
1901 247,758 25.1 7.6
1911 284,830 15. 0 7.9
Whatever the precise increase in the alien
population in the late 19th century and its effect of the
social and economic welfare of the nation as a whole, the
government clearly could not ignore the popular fears of
an 'alien invasion'. The mounting clamour for controls
resulted in the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration,
chaired by Lord James of Hereford, which reported in 
2 8August 1903. The deliberations of the commission were 
the subject of heated debate in the country and two of its 
members, Lord Rothschild and Sir Kenelm Digby, Permanent
27. Census of England and Wales, vol. IX, table XI 
(Cd. 7017)
28. Cds. 1741, 1742, 1743.
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Secretary at the Home Office, wrote a minority report 
opposing the restrictions proposed by their colleagues. The 
controversial but not unexpected sequel to the James 
Commission was a bill designed to curb the entry and 
facilitate the removal of 'undesirable' aliens. Socialist 
groups condemned the measure on ideological grounds while 
the Liberal Party was divided both over its moral and 
practical implications. Many Liberal politicians, 
particularly those whose constituencies had high alien 
populations, adopted a cautious and often ambivalent 
position, but some, including Dilke and Churchill, offered 
uncompromising and eloquent opposition. Churchill saw the 
bill as an attempt by the Conservative government to 
gratify a small but noisy section of their supporters and 
to buy popularity in the constituencies by dealing harshly 
with a minority which had no voting power. In a letter to 
'The Times', Churchill wrote,
It will commend itself to those who like 
patriotism at other people's expense and admire 
imperialism on the ^ussian model. It is 
expected to appeal to insular prejudice against 
foreigners, to racial prejudice against Jews and 
to labour prejudice against competition; and it 
will no doubt supply' a variety of rhetorical 
phrases for the approaching election...2 Q
A fundamental aim of the bill was clearly to keep
out East European immigrants whose number included a
substantial percentage of Jews. Its passage, albeit in a
much revised form, gave the country a system of aliens
controls which was blatantly class and racially oriented.
29. The Times, 31 May 19 04.
31
The legislation not only represented a government bowing to 
popular prejudice, but a nation that had lost much of the 
confidence of the years of vigorous imperial expansion 
and prosperity.
The 1905 Aliens Act provided the formal basis of 
Great Britain's aliens policy up to the outbreak of the 
war and bequeathed much of the organisational structure on 
which the wartime system of controls was established. The 
act differed from* the last major aliens control legislation, 
during the Napoleonic period, in that it was concerned 
essentially with the entry and removal of aliens rather 
than with their activities and movements within the country. 
Also, unlike most previous aliens statutes - those of 1826 
and 1836 were exceptions - the 1905 act was a permanent 
measure rather than one introduced for the duration of a 
war or national emergency. The main avowed purpose of the 
act was to bar the entry of 'undesirable' aliens, ie 
criminals, persons suffering from mental or chronic 
physical diseases, and those likely to become a public 
charge. There were also powers to deport aliens who 
engaged in crime or were found to be destitute, and 
provision was made for the regulation of transmigrant 
traffic and the collection of statistics on alien 
passengers entering and leaving the United Kingdom. The 
legislation made one notable concession to liberal 
consciences by enshrining the principle of asylum;
...any arrival who proves that he is seeking 
admission to this country sole to avoid 
persecution or punlishment on religious or 
political grounds, or for an offence of a
32
political character, or persecution, 
involving danger of imprisonment or danger to 
life and limb, on account of religious belief, 
leave to land shall not be refused on the 
ground merely of want of means, or the 
probability of his becoming a charge on the 
rates.
In March 1906 Herbert Gladstone, the Home Secretary, advised 
immigration officers and the immigration appeal boards 
established under the act that,
...in all cases in which immigrants coming 
from parts of the continent which are at present 
in a disturbed state, alleging that they are 
flying from political or religious persecution, 
the benefit of the doubt will be given.^
Campbell-Bannerman's government inherited with little
relish the task of launching the new regulations, and as
one scholar has noted, Gladstone 'advanced upon the Aliens
Act with a demeanour that was at once resigned, contemptuous
32 itand patronising. ' Senior officials at the home office also 
had grave misgivings about the legislation and Troup 
condemned it as 'from the administrative point of view one 
of the worst Acts ever passed.'^ Whitehall civil servants 
and port officials never had any illusions that the new 
regulations would provide a realistic bar to an alien, 
however undesirable, who was determined to enter the councry. 
Only those arriving steerage class on vessels carrying more 
than 20 passengers were subject to inspection at the 14
30. Section 1(3), Aliens Act of 1905.
31. HO 45/10641/206332/2.
32. Garrard, op. cit., p. 103.
33. Troup, op. cit., p. 143.
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'immigration ports' designated under the act.^ Nearly 80 
other ports also received some immigrant arrivals but had 
no formal machinery for inspection, although statistics were 
recorded. Clearly the door was open to any alien who was 
able to raise the fare to travel in a class above steerage 
or who could find a berth on a ship with a passenger 
complement under 2 0, or who arranged to arrive at a port 
without inspection arrangements. The only alternative in the 
view of one Home Office official was
...the perfectly inconceivable plan...of 
subjecting every single passenger, or indeed 
every single passenger who may be suspected of 
being an alien, to a rigorous examination and 
process of identification on his arrival in 
this country.^
The imposition of the new regulations at the ports 
proved a frustrating task for the new corps of immigration 
officers, recruited mainly from the customs and excise 
service. Not only were the controls riddled with loopholes, 
but the officers found their decisions frequently overruled 
by the immigration boards established to hear appeals from 
excluded aliens. It was common practice for a board to allow 
aliens in on the strength of promises of employment by the 
aliens ' friends or relatives, even where an immigration 
officer had decided there were strong grounds for exclusion. 
There were inconsistencies in the rulings of the boards in 
different areas, variations in procedures, and frequently
34. The designated ports were Cardiff, Dover, Folkestone, 
Grangemouth, Grimsby, Harwich, Hull, Leith, Liverpool, 
London, Newhaven, Plymouth, Southampton and the Tyne 
ports.
35. Memo., J. Pedder, 2 Feb. 1911, HO 45/10641/206332/2.
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lengthy delays in dealing with cases. Where the decisions
of immigration officers were reversed by the boards the
Home Secretary had no power to intervene. In practice the
activities of the boards ‘made enforcement of the
restrictions almost impossible.1^  Despite its obvious
deficiences and their dislike of the act. Home Office
officials believed that it was instrumental in keeping out
a considerable number of destitute aliens and that it had
37‘a great effect in excluding disease.' The legislation 
also facilitated the expulsion of a number of aliens 
convicted of criminal offences or who became a public charge 
and made it possible to maintain more accurate records of 
the movement of aliens into and out of the country, although 
it was not until 1908 that a statutory duty was placed on
3Qmasters of ships to provide a return of passengers carried.
An excess of arrivals over departures between Great Britain 
and Europe was matched by an opposite pattern in movements 
between the UK and other parts parts of the world, 
principally North America. The majority of all arrivals were 
transmigrants en-route to other countries, visitors, 
tourists and alien residents returning from abroad. It has 
been estimated that the balance of alien immigrant settlers 
over alien residents leaving the country was between 20,000
36. Troup, op. cit., p. 143.
37. HO 45/10641/206332/2.
38. This duty was imposed under the Merchant Shipping Act 
of 1906. Before Apr. 1912 returns did not distinguish 
between immigrants and emigrants.
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39and 30,000. The absence of any formal system of
registration rules out any precise assessment of changes
in the size, geographic distribution and ethnic
composition of the alien population before the First
World War. There is little doubt, however, that,
notwithstanding popular fears of the country being fewamped '
by aliens, both before and after the passage of the 1905
Aliens Act, the proportion of aliens to the total population
was lower than in many other Western European countries and
a fraction of that in the United States. During the first
three decades of this century the number of aliens and
naturalised British subjects remained below one per cent of
40the total population.
Britain remained essentially a country of emigration
rather than immigration,4"*' and the general effect of the 1905
Aliens Act can hardly have significantly affected this
traditional pattern. Troup believed that ’undoubtedly some
effect was produced in the direction of stopping the mass
immigration of aliens, however easy it was for individual
4 2undesirables to evade requirements, and Gartner has
39. Return of passenger movements from and to the UK by
the Board of Trade, 13 Jan. 1915; tables compiled by
the Board relating to emigration and immigration from, 
and into the UK, issued 25 June 1914. See also 
HO 45/10641/206332/2.
4 0. See J. Isaac, 'The United Kingdom', in 0. Handlin (ed.), 
The Positive Contribution of Immigrants, UNESCO.
41. P.E.P., Population Policy in Great Britain (1948)
estimates that not less than 17 million people left:
the British Isles in the century up to the First 
World War.
42. Troup, op. cit., p. 144.
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suggested that the effect of the legislation was more 
psychological than legal with many potential immigrants 
being deterred from coming to Britain. The reduction in 
immigration during the decade before the war was, he
43believed, greater than the terms of the act warranted.
It was shown in practice to be a crude, badly designed
measure, which moved one former senior member of the
Immigration Service to write that the war,'which put a stop
once and for all to this tragic farce, came almost as a
44welcome relief.1 For all practical purposes the 1905 act,
4 5although remaining on the statute book until 1919, was 
supplanted by the Aliens Restriction Act passed at the 
beginning of the war.
In the short term the 1905 measure may have helped 
abate fears of an alien invasion, but it did little to 
diminish the racialist and xenophobic sentiments which had 
been a significant factor in. forcing the government to 
introduce the legislation. Anti-semitism and hostility 
towards German subjects continued to mount in the immediate 
pre-war years. Traditional cultural ties and the links 
between the British and German royal families were not 
strong enough to halt the deterioration in Anglo-German 
relations and the souring of British public opinion towards 
a nation seen increasingly as a threat and a potential 
enemy. The principle developments which contributed to this
43. Gartner, op. cit., p. 279.
44. T.W.E. Roche, The Key in the Lock: Immigration Control 
in England from 1066 to the Present Day (1969), pi 78.
45. The act was repealed by Section 16 (2) of the Aliens 
Restriction (Amendment' Act of 1919.
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dangerous trend were Germany's growing ambition as a trading
nation, its naval building programme, suspicions that it
was using Britain as a dumping ground for unwanted aliens
within its empire, notably Poles, and the belief, not
without foundation,that efforts were being made to establish
a German espionage network in this country. According to
Haldane, who served as War Minister from 1905 to 1912, the
Germans had 'a most highly organised and systematic
arrangement for obtaining secret information... not for a
46few months but for years before the war. *
The jingoisms and Germanophobes found a responsive
audience in the immediate pre-war period, and their shrill
warnings were encouraged and augmented by such popular
fictional works as William Le Queux's 'The invasion of 1910*
published in 1906 and 'Spies for the Kaiser: Plotting the
Downfall of England' (1909). The former book, serialised
by the 'Daily iv*ail', depicted German forces invading England
and being helped by fellow countrymen who had entered the
UK in earlier years, found work and established themselves
as members of the community. As one contemporary observer
noted, the dread of spies during that period came to be
'one of the commonest manifestations of the suspicious
neurotic temper of nationalism which took possession of the
,47
countries of the West.
The question of espionage both as a prelude to war
46. 1SHL 5s., 48, 11 Nov. 1914. See CAB 16/8 X/M 07297 for 
account of the work of the Committee on the Question of 
Foreign Espionage in the UK set up in 1909 under 
Haldane's chairmanship.
47. C.E. Playne, Society at War 1914-1916 (1931), p. 265.
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and after its outbreak, and the ostensib i y  related 
question of aliens control in wartime, were given increasing 
priority by the contingency planners of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence with the appointment of the Aliens Sub­
committee in March 1910. It was accepted that powerful new 
legislation would be required in the event of war because 
the 1905 act was principally concerned with exclusion of
'undesirables' and, in the view of the War Office, was 'of
48little or no value for the purpose of national defence.' 
Moreover the Crown possessed no statutory powers to deal 
with resident aliens who were considered a danger to the 
community unless there was evidence which would bring them 
under the provisions of the law of treason.
Reports were constantly being received by the war 
Office about alleged suspicious conduct of German subjects 
who appeared to be reconnoitring in minute detail those 
parts of Britain most suitable for landing invasion troops. 
Germans were to be found in places which afford 
facilities for obtaining early information on the movement 
of ships. The military authorities noted such examples 
as a German manager of a hotel which commanded the entrance' 
from the west to Spithead and the Solent; a German waiter, 
who was an artillery reservist, at a hotel overlooking
49Dover harbour, and a German photographer at Sheemess.
To provide what it considered adequate safeguards the War 
Office recommended that,
48. Memo., WO to CID, 20 Apr. 1910, CAB 17/90.
49. Ibid.
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i) The Official Secrets Act of 1889 should be 
amended to give power of arrest without 
previous reference to the Attorney-General, 
and power to search.
ii) All aliens arriving in Great Britain should 
be registered.
iii) Powers similar to those contained in the 
Aliens Act of 1803 should be provided for 
use in wartime.
Most of the War Office's proposals were in line wTith 
thinking at the Home Office, but an important question on 
which the departments diverged was that of registration of 
aliens. The Home Office view was that if, as the War Office 
suggested, all aliens were registered as they entered 
Britain it would impose 'an enormous and useless task.'
Only a relatively small proportion of the estimated 500,000 
- 600,000 arrivals each year settled in the country and 
registration would not enable the authorities to trace them 
afterwards since many of them did not know in advance where 
they would permanently settle. Moreover registration of all 
alien arrivals would hamper ordinary traffic to an 
intolerable degree, particularly at channel ports. The Home 
Office also believed that a general register of aliens for 
the whole country was unnecessary and that it would be 
impossible to compile wittaut incurring expense far greater 
than was justified by the potential value of such a list.
All that was required was for the government to have the 
power to order the registration of aliens or of persons of
a particular nationality if the circumstances warranted
, . . 51such action.
50. Memo., WO to CID, 20 Apr. 1910, CAB 17/90.
51. Memo., HO to CID, 23 May 1910, CAB 17/90.
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The Home Office considered that on the outbreak
of war 'There would be great advantage in getting rid at
once from the country all adult males belonging to the
enemy and capable of creating or taking part in
disturbances.' Failing this,it might/ in the event of
invasion/ be desirable to require enemy aliens to reside in
specially designated areas under police protection. It was
felt that the large concentration of aliens in London
would cause special problems, and that it would simplify
maintenance of public order in the capital if, within three
days of the outbreak of war, all adult enemy aliens were
required to leave the area. Permits could be granted in
special cases of persons of long residence who could obtain
52three or more British subjects to act as sureities. Sir
Edward Henry, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police,
vigorously supported the Home Office recommendations.'^’'
More than half of Britain's alien population lived in
London, with the heaviest concentration in the East End
boroughs. Outside the County of London aliens were located
mainly in the surrounding suburbs, the larger industrial
54
centres, major seaports and south coast towns." Russians 
(including Russian Poles) formed the largest single ethnic 
group, followed by Germans, French and Italians. These four 
countries accounted for two-thirds of the 285,060 foreigners 
in England and Wales enumerated in the 1911 census.
52. Memo., HO to CID, 23 May 1910, CAB 17/90.
53. Henry to CID, 3 June 1910, CAB 17/90.
54. See appendix III.
55. Census vol. IX, table XIV (Cd. 7017)
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No very accurate figure is available of the number
of foreigners living in the United Kingdom when the war
began who were subjects of Germany and her eventual
allies.^ There was no official or comprehensive system of
registering aliens before the war and after 1914
conflicting figures were sometimes given by ministers and
used by officials in departmental documents. The most up to
date official figures were those from the 1911 census,
which recorded the presence of 53,525 Germans, 14,750 Austro-
Hungarians and 2,428 Turks. The precise number of
Bulgarians is not known because they were grouped in the
census with residents of other Balkan countries, but it
57could not have exceeded a few hundred. Not all aliens 
included in the census were necessarily permanent residents 
and some undoubtedly left Britain during the immediate pre­
war period. Taking account of the figures announced 
periodically by the. government during the war of the number 
of enemy aliens interned, repatriated and at large, it 
seems probable that at the outbreak of the war there were 
between 7 0,000 and 75,000 Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Turks 
and Bulgarians living in Britain, excluding British-bom 
women married to subjects of tho$ countries (between 
10,000 and 11,000) and children under the age of 14. It is 
estimated that 75 per cent of the total were Germans and 
about 21 per cent Austro-Hungarians. k
56. Great Britain declared war on Germany 4 Aug. 1914;
Austria-Hungary 8 Aug. 1914; Turkey 5 Nov. 1914, and 
Bulgaria 19 Oct. 1915.
57. Cds. 6663, 7017 and 7163.
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The case for stringent wartime controls over aliens 
was readily endorsed by the CID Aliens Sub-Committee, and 
in July 1910 they recommended that:
i. A bill should be drafted to deal with
aliens in time of grave national danger.
ii. Regulations should be made regarding
registration and surveillance of aliens in 
certain naval and military centres in 
peacetime.
iii. The Admiralty and War Office should define 
those centres.
iv. The Admiralty and War Office should
formulate a scheme to carry out the sub­
committee's recommendations.co
The military departments did not, however, feel competent
to carry out the tasks suggested by the sub-committee and
59the work was done by the Home Office. The first draft of 
the proposed bill was unveiled on 3 March 1911 and it 
included provisions for the registration of aliens, 
inspection of all ships bringing aliens to the country, 
increased powers to expel convicted aliens, a ban on the 
possession of firearms without police or court permission, 
and the authorisation of house searches for firearms. These 
provisions formed the basis of the Aliens Restriction Act 
of 1914 and its accompanying order in council. Other bills 
drafted in 1911 and largely subsumed in the 1914 stature 
were an Aliens Removal Bill, which gave a general power to 
the government to expel all aliens from the country and 
prohibit them from entering during time of war or national 
emergency, and an Aliens (Restricted Areas) Bill designed 
to provide safeguards against possible dangers from
58. CAB 17/90.
59. Ibid.
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foreigners in areas where military and naval bases were 
located.
While the legislative ground work for wartime aliens 
controls was being prepared the War Office and the police 
concerned themselves with the work of counter-espionage# 
using the extended powers provided under the Official 
Secrets Act of 1911. An unofficial register of aliens was 
compiled by the Military Operations Directorate of the 'War 
Office with the assistance of the police# identifying those 
who were considered actual or potential spies. Suspect aliens] 
were kept under surveillance until 'cleared' or designated 
as likely to prove dangerous in wartime. In the latter case 
they were placed on a list of persons against whom 'special
action' would be taken when the need arose and their move-
6 0ments and activities continued to be carefully monitored.
The War Office warned the police that
...Continental Secret Service Departments 
spare neither trouble nor money in acquiring 
information and intelligence on all manner of 
subjects# and ... matters which to many might 
seem hardly worthy of consideration# are 
studied by them in the minutest detail.^
In addition to gathering personal information on aliens the
police were asked by the War Office to supply details of
foreign-owned or controlled factories or businesses in
which the majority of employees were foreign# specifying
the position of the works# particularly in relation to their
access to railways or other forms of communication and their ;
60. CAB 17/90.
• 61. Confidential circular# WO to chief constables# Oct.
1912# CAB 17/90.
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o 2general strategic value.
By July 1913, as a result of the unofficial
registration project, which had not been made public
because of the government's fear of offending sensitive
liberal consciences, the War Office (MO 5g) had details of
nearly 29,000 aliens in its records, including 11,000
Germans and Austro-Hungarians, and several aliens had been
brought to trial on charges under the Official Secrets Act.
Detailed recommendations, taking account of the
views of the Whitehall departments concerned, were presented
by the CID to the government in August 1913. The proposals,
drafted by the Aliens Sub-committee, headed by the Home
6 3Secretary Reginald McKenna, suggested that all enemy 
aliens except those definitely suspected of espionage should 
be allowed to leave the country in the event of war, and 
they should be given a period of grace in which to do so. 
Compulsory expulsion or internment were not proposed, but 
resident aliens would be registered and subject to 
restrictions as to their place of residence, their movements 
outside their home areas and possession of such items as fire-
52. Secret circular, WO to chief constables, Oct. 1912, 
CAB 17/9 0.
63. McKenna (1363-1943) was a Liberal HP 1895-1918.Served 
at Treasury, Board of Education, Admiralty before 
becoming Home Secretary in October 1911. He served 
as Chancellor of the Exchequer from Hay 1915 until 
December 1916 and lost his parliamentary seat at the 
1918 general election. He became chairman of the 
Midland Bank in 1919 and held the post until his 
death.
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arms and motor cars.^
Neither the CID nor Asquith's cabinet envisaged 
a punitive regime of controls but/ given the size of the 
alien population/ the pattern of Anglo-German relations 
during the pre-war years, and the strength of anti-German 
feeling in the country, it was perhaps inevitable that the 
fairness and moderation generally shown towards enemy 
aliens in the past would be difficult to sustain in the 
war which threatened. It was clear that the government 
would lack neither popular support dot strong legal powers 
to back whatever action it decided was necessary to control 
the alien population. In the event scant regard was paid to 
past international practice and, in addition to the 
imposition of wide-ranging restrictions on all enemy aliens, 
a policy of wholesale internment of enemy alien men of 
military age was eventually introduced.
The Aliens Restriction Act passed on 5 August lyl4, 
although it ignored the subject of internment, gave the 
Asquith government a virtual carte blanche in aliens matters, 
enabling
His Kajesty in time of war or imminent 
danger of great emergency by order in council to 
impose restrictions on aliens and make such 
provisions as appear necessary or expedient for 
carrying such restrictions into effect.
In the powers it conferred on the Home Secretary the measure
closely resembled the Aliens Act of 1793, which also was
designed specifically to cope with a period of national
emergency. The only significant points of difference were
65. WO 32/5368/0103/3757
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that enforcement of the earlier statute was, in the absence 
of an organised police service, left to magistrates, and 
an expelled alien who returned was liable on first
conviction to transportation and on a second to capital
. , 66 punishment.
The objects of the 1914 act were effected by an
6 7order in council (Aliens Restriction Order), which was 
divided into three parts; the first related to restrictions 
to be imposed on aliens entering and leaving the United 
Kingdom; the second was concerned with controls over alien 
residents, and third dealt with penalties for contraventions 
of the order, provided for the arrest of such offenders 
without warrant by the police or aliens officers, and 
contained supplementary provisions. Initially all subjects 
of the German Empire were designated as alien enemies and 
all other aliens, until otherwise notified, as alien friends. 
The Aliens Restriction Order contained different provisions 
for the two classes of aliens.
Despite the formidable powers it gave to the 
executive, the Aliens Restriction Act passed virtually 
without challenge through parliament. Only two MPs indicated 
concern at the implications of the legislation and no peers 
attempted to interrupt its progress through the House of 
Lords. Sir William Byles (Labour) interjected twice during 
the introduction of the bill by RcKenna to express 
reservations that dangerous powers would be placed in the
66. Troup, op. cit., pp. 21-22 and 142.
67. See appendix II.
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6 8hands of the Home Secretary/ and Joseph King (Liberal)
pointed out that there was 'a great deal of apprehension*
among German subjects with whom he was acquainted, some of
69whom had lived in Great Britain for many years. McKenna
assured the House of Commons that the legislation would
continue in effect only as long as the war or 'a state of
national danger or grave emergency'existed. The fundamental
aim, he said, was to restrict as far as possible the
opportunities for enemy aliens to engage in subversive
activities. There had been numerous cases of espionage in
the immediate pre-war years, and in the previous 24 hours
21 spies or suspected spies had been detained in various
parts of the country. The arrests occured chiefly in
important military or naval centres, and some of those
taken into custody had been known to the authorities to be
spies long before the war (As far as can be ascertained,
however, only one of those arrested was brought to trial
and it seems possible that lack of sufficient evidence
7 0deterred the government from prosecuting the others. ~) 
While the aliens restriction legislation was designed 
to impose stringent controls over those thought to pose 
a threat to the security of the state, McKenna said the 
government intended to cause as little inconvenience as 
possible to friendly aliens.
68. 65HC 5s., 1990, 5 Aug. 1914.
69. Ibid., col. 1989.
70. See D. French, 'Spy Fever in Britain 1900-1915', The 
Historical Journal, vol. 21, 2, 1978, pp. 355-70.
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Alien enemies against whom there is no 
reason whatever to suppose that they are 
secretly engaged in operations against this 
country will be subjected to nothing further 
than registration and provisions that they 
may not live in prohibited areas.^
McKenna's speech was interspersed with cheers and/ during,
his reference to the arrest of spies, one member shouted
7 2'theyought to be shot. '
The rapid and easy passage of the Aliens Restriction 
Act through both houses of parliament was matched by that 
of the Defence of the Realm Act which was passed on 8 
August. Like the Aliens Restriction Act, DORA was prepared 
before the war by the CID in consultation with the 
appropriate Whitehall departments. It was designed 
specifically
i. to prevent persons communicating with the 
enemy or obtaining information for that 
purpose or any purpose calculated to 
jeopardise the success of the operations 
of any of His Majesty's Forces or to 
assist the enemy; and
ii. to secure the safety of any means of 
communication, or of railways, docks or 
harbours.
The brief statute, which provided the foundation for more 
detailed successors, gave the government virtual powers of 
martial law and in effect suspended civil rights. The act 
was strictly a wartime measure which employed military 
principles. It provided for trial by court martial and 
punishment by penal servitude for life -(but not by death) 
of offenders against some regulations.
71. 65HC 5s., 1989, 5 Aug. 1914.
72. The Times, 6 Aug. 1914.
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There is little doubt that Asquith, McKenna and
most of their cabinet colleagues saw the emergency controls
over aliens as a regrettable necessity to be applied with
fairness and humanity in the national interest for the
duration of the war, after which, like similar measures in
the past, they would be discarded. Then, although
restrictions over the entry and powers to expel
'undesirable' aliens would remain, there would be a return
to something like the liberal and humanitarian policy which
had generally characterised Britain's approach to aliens
policy in past periods of peace and prosperity. The reality
was to prove harshly different, with considerations of
political expediency coming increasingly to dictate policy.
However sincere the Asquith government may have been in the ill
assurances as to the limitations of the emergency legislatiorl
and its temporary nature, future developments were to belie
their words. Thousands of harmless enemy aliens were interned;1
restrictions over aliens allowed to remain at liberty were
73progressively tightened, and, far from being discarded at 
the end of the war, the Aliens Restriction Act was adapted
r-j a
and strengthened.
73. The extension of controls is reflected in 27 
amendments to the original Aliens Restriction Order 
made on 5 Aug. 1914. Amendments to the order were 
supervised by the Aliens Restriction Sub-committee 
appointed by the CID under the chairmanship of Troup. 
Members included representatives of the Home Office, 
War Office, Admiralty, Board of Customs and Excise ana 
the Metropolitan Police. Lt. col. Sir Maurice Hankey, 
Secretary of the CID, was secretary.
74. The Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act of 1919 
continued and extended the government's powers under 
the 1914 act.
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTERNMENT POLICY
The Asquith government's initial approach to the 
question of interning enemy aliens was tentative and 
ambivalent. In so far as a policy can be said to have 
existed during the early months of the war, it was to arrest 
and intern only those thought likely to be a danger to the 
state. Later the Liberal administration approved
the general internment of male enemy aliens of military 
age, but before the first coalition government was 
established in May 1915 this policy was never seriously 
implemented'and the question of internment continued to 
be approached haltingly and in an atmosphere of mounting 
confusion and controversy.
A blurred division of responsibility for aliens 
matters between the Home Office and the War Office created 
considerable misunderstanding and sometimes abrasiveness 
between the departments and prompted a growing demand in 
parliament for a clear-cut allocation of powers. Such was 
the confususion that attempts by the police and local 
military authorities to implement policy guidance and 
directives from Whitehall led to inconsistencies in practice 
between one area and another, and many enemy aliens found 
themselves interned on totally unfounded suspicions. A 
substantial proportion were subsequently released only to 
be re-arrested as the government's internment policy 
became more indiscriminate in the face of growing
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public agitation and demands in parliament and the press 
for a more stringent internment policy.
The ill-defined and ad hoc nature of the government's 
early approach to the internment question served only to 
exacerbate well entrenched anti-alien attitudes in the 
country. The main focus of public prejudice and abuse was 
inevitably German subjects. They provided an easily 
accessible target for the antagonism of a nation towards 
what it regarded as the principle enemy and for the passions 
readily inflamed by a stream of hate propaganda which 
characterised the Germans as evil, ruthless, militaristic 
and singularly responsible for plunging Europe into war.
The clamour for a more comprehensive internment 
policy gained momentum rapidly after the early weeks of the 
war. More extreme critics of the government, among them 
a number of Liberals, demanded nothing less than the 
internment or expulsion of all enemy aliens, including men, 
women and children. Such a policy was consistently rejected 
by wartime governments on the grounds that it was both unjust 
and impractical. Many who were nominally enemy aliens had 
lived in Britain since infancy, had British wives, sons 
fighting in the British Army, spoke only English and had 
long since severed any links with their country of origin. 
Others who were technically of enemy nationality, such as 
Czechs, Poles and Alsatians, were for all practical purposes I 
friendly aliens with strong nationalist reasons for 
supporting the allied gause.
Most of the main ethnic groups in Britain whose
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members were of enemy nationality but had a claim to be 
regarded as friendly to the allies formed committees or 
established links through diplomatic legations to make 
representations to the British government for special 
dispensation for their compatriots. Committees were formed 
at the outset by the Poles,Czechs, Alsatians and Italians; 
an Armenian committee was set up later, and cases involving 
Serbs, Schleswig Danes, Roumanians and Greeks were dealt with 
by the London legations of those countries. Arabs were 
not directly represented but they were generally exempted 
from restrictions by means of amendments to the Aliens 
Restriction Order. The ethnic groups sought exemption 
from internment and compulsory repatriation, relief from 
the provisions of the aliens restriction regulations, 
opportunities for employment and more state aid for 
destitute aliens. The scope of this study does not allow 
space for a detailed examination of of the activities of 
the ethnic pressure groups but their work is considered at 
appropriate points in this and following chapters.'1'
The claims of the groups for favoured treatment for 
their members, morally justified as many of then, were, 
posed complex problems for the government against a back­
ground of volatile public and parliamentary opinion on the 
internment issue. McKenna, the Home Secretary, admitted
1. The activities of some of the groups are excellently 
documented by K.J. calder, Britain and the Origins of 
the Key; Europe 19-14-191? (Cambridge, 1976) .
53
that,
It is a matter of great difficulty to 
discriminate between races and to ascertain 
whether the sentiments of individuals are 
friendly or otherwise; but so far as is 
practicable, persons belonging to races 
friendly to the allies who are themselves 
friendly are exempted from internment; and 
every consideration consistent with the law 
is shown them in the enforcement of the 
Aliens Restriction Act. 2
The ways in which the heavy concentration of enemy
aliens in London were dealt with during the early weeks of
the war were recounted in a report by the Metropolitan
Police commissioner, Sir Edward Henry to the Home Office:
Serbians (Austrian-born): This group has been 
easily disposed of, the Serbian minister having 
made representations in favour of each individual, 
who has, is consequence, been released or 
exempted from internment.
Italians (Austrian-born): These are a more 
difficult group inasmuch as it might be deemed 
a breach of neutrality for the Italian 
ambassador to give guarantees in respect of any 
Austrian subject. A small committee of 
responsible men who claim to be able to vouch 
for or reject any particular case has, however, 
been formed, and I am provisionally relying upon 
their advice.
Czechs and Bohemians (Austrian-born): There are 
strong reasons why this group should be treated 
with consideration. Unfortunately no diplomatic 
guarantee is possible in this case.
Poles (bom in Austria or Germany): The Russian 
Poles present no difficulty; the large group of 
German and Austrian Poles admittedly do. A true 
Pole will be a friend, but Polish nationality 
might be claimed by mischiefmakers. I understand 
that whatever the country of their residence, 
the affinities between the whole Polish people 
are so intimate, and the family and other 
relationships so well maintained, that the 
Polish Information Committee is able and 
willing to assist the authorities in every case...
2. 6 8  HC 5s.,179 , 16 Nov. 1914
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Alsatians: The difficulty here is similar 
to that of the Poles, perhaps greater. The 
French Embassy asked us, before accepting 
assurances on behalf of Alsatians, to refer 
each case to them, but this may not prove 
practicable. In the meantime some Alsatians 
have been released or held exempt, and 
doubtless some are still interned, no 
definite procedure having been laid down.
Croats, Ruthenians, S e c. : Questions doubtless 
will arise sooner or later as to Croats,
Ruthenians and others, though there are 
probably few of these smaller nationalities 
in London.^
Henry's initiatives were approved by McKenna, whose handling 
of the internment issue was to arouse bitter criticism, both 
in parliament and the press. As head of the department 
traditionally associated with aliens matters he suffered 
much abuse bom of ignorance of the limitations of the 
Home Office role in respect of internment of enemy aliens 
in wartime, particularly under the arrangements in operation 
during the early months of the war. While responsibilities 
under the Aliens Restriction Act fell largely upon the 
Home Office, the War Office had primacy in the arrest, 
custody and release of enemy subjects. This arose from 
the fact that such aliens were taken into captivity for 
military reasons and were classified as prisoners of war 
and entitled to the same treatment as enemy troops 
captured on the battlefield. 4
If any minister could fairly be blamed for the lack 
of a coherent internment policy it should arguably have been 
Kitchener, as War Minister, rather than McKenna. But 
whatever the true extent of Kitchener's personal knowledge
3. Henry to Troup, 30 Oct. 1914, HC 45/10760/269116/15.
4. See Manual of Military Law 1914, p. 245, para. 60, and 
also HO 45/10760/255193/45.
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and direct involvement in his department's handling of
internment matters, it is clear that in the public mind he
was not associated with this ostensibly domestic rather 
than military area of policy. The notion that the 
charismatic war minister could be tainted by such faults 
as muddled thinking, lack of organisational ability and
reluctance to delegate to subordinates would not at that
time have readily commended itself to the majority of the 
population, but arguably such defects in Kitchener were a 
partial cause of the government's
failure to deal effectively with the internment question.
If McKenna had to bear an unfair share of abuse 
for the government's faltering internment policy, it was 
due to the exaggerated public fears of the danger posed by 
the enemy alien population, the relentless work of the 
anti-alien propagandists and his own failings as a populist 
politician and communicator. Although his integrity and 
intellectual gifts were beyond doubt he too often adopred 
a formal and legalistic approach to highly emotive issues 
and was over-sensitive to criticism. He was an admired and 
trusted confidante of the Prime Minister but harboured a 
powerful dislike of Lloyd George, which was fully 
reciprocated. Asquith has written of the two 'fighting like 
fishwives.' Lloyd George, in his memoirs, asserts that,
Mr K'Kenna's administration of the Home 
Office provoked much dissatisfaction, and not 
merely on the Unionist benches. His policy 
towards residents of enemy extraction in this
5. Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Memories and Reflections 
1952-1927 (2 vols.) (1928), p. 102, vol. II.
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country was thought to be too protective, too 
indifferent to the dangers which might arise 
from espionage... Mr. M'Kenna's rigid and 
fretful answers, though always technically 
complete, were provocative...While administer­
ing the letter of his trust he showed too 
clearly that he had no sympathy with its 
spirit...Subsequent events proved that 
intelligence of great value to the enemy 
percolated to Germany through the agency of 
persons living unmolested in England under Mr.
M'Kenna's indulgent regime.,.o
While Lloyd George's assessment must be regarded 
with some scepticism it is undeniable that McKenna's 
attempts to defend himself and his department against their 
critics, and his general performance in the House of 
Commons were hardly calculated to inspire confidence. He 
insisted, with justice but with little hope of sympathy, 
that any attacks on him and the Home Office over aliens 
policy should, if they were made at all, be directed at the 
government as a whole. But if McKenna deplored the 
personalised criticism he lost no opportunity of reminding 
his parliamentary colleagues of the primacy of the War Office 
in internment matters. In one typical riposte to criticism, 
he insisted that it was
...for the 'War Office to decide when, for 
how long and to what extent enemy aliens shall 
be interned... the responsibility for what may 
be termed policy rests with the War Office. The 
moment the War Office have decided the policy 
the Home Office places at the disposal of the 
War Office the whole of its machinery... there 
is but one final authority, and that is the 
military authority.^
6 . George, D. Lloyd, War Memoirs (1936), p. 132, vol. I
7. 70HC 5s., 853-4, 3 far. 1915.
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McKenna insisted that it was right that the ultimate
responsibility for internment should rest with the
military authority. Apart from the fact that interned
enemy aliens were prisoners of war placed in custody for
military reasons, the important intelligence work related
to the internment procedure was carried out by branches of
the War Office and the Admiralty. Clearly neither the Army
nor the Navy would be willing to surrender their
intelligence organisations and for the civil power to try
to establish an equivalent body on a nationwide basis
3
would be a formidable undertaking.
Although McKenna maintained that there was close 
co-operation between the Home Office and the military 
departments there were a number of clashes of opinion on 
internment policy, particularly in the early months of the 
war as departmental officials endeavoured to interpret the 
wishes of their political chiefs. Kuch of the difficulty 
arose from the lack of expertise on aliens matters in the 
War Office. Officers in the Directorate of 1 ilirary 
Operations who had worked with the Home Office on the 
preparation of wartime aliens controls were inexplicably 
transferred to other duties when the war began. The officers 
brought in to replace them had no previous experience of the 
subject. Major-General C.E. Callwell, who was crafted in 
as head of the Directorate, considered that he had been 
'virtually left in the lurch' by the posting of 
irreplaceable staff to the Expeditionary Force in France.
8. 7 0HC 5s., 855, 3 Mar. 1915
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He believed the situation
...illustrates with signal force how 
completely the relative importance of the 
Expeditionary Force as compared with the task 
which the War Office had to face had been 
misunderstood when framing plans in advance 
for the anticipated emergency. The arrangement 
arrived at in respect of this matter indicated/ 
in fact, a strange lack of sense of proportion.
It argued a fundamental misconception of the 
military problem with which the country was 
confronted. g
The ignorance of aliens matters at the War Office 
was illustrated by one of the department's first initiatives
on the subject. On 7 August a telegram was sent to area
military commanders directing that,
It should be clearly understood that all 
male Germans and Austrians between 17 and 4 2 
years of age are reservists. Therefore all 
apparently of this description should be made 
prisoners of war unless exemption from service 
can clearly be proved. You will make arrange­
ments for arresting all such reservists, 
calling on police to assist you. You will also
arrange to accommodate, feed and guard these
prisoners of war.^
The message, sent with the authority of the General Staff, 
was copied to the Home Office where it was received with 
incredulity and dismay. The order was contrary to the 
policy recommended by the CID and endorsed by the govern­
ment, and the directive to arrest Austrian reservists was 
illegal because Great Britain was not then at war with 
Austria-Hungary. Moreover the accommodation for which the 
War Office was ultimately responsible was not available 
to house the number of prisoners who would have been taken 
into custody. Troup promptly contacted Eyre Crowe, Under
9. Major-General C.E. Callwell, Experiences of a Dugout 
1914-1918 (1920), pp. 12-13.
10. Telegram, WO (AG 3) to area military commanders, 7 Aug. 
1914, WO 32/5368.
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Secretary at the Foreign Office, who was equally appalled 
by the War Office telegram, particularly its implications 
in respect of Austria. The Foreign Office were anxious 
that the Austrians should be given no reason for claiming 
that hostile action was being taken against them and using 
it as an excuse to call on the support of Italy under the 
Triple Alliance pact. Troup and Crowe were also worried 
about the possibility of reprisals against British 
subjects in Germany, particularly in view of the fact that 
a number of German reservist officers had already been 
prevented from leaving Britain, despite a seven-day period 
of grace ostensibly allowed to enable them to do so,^ 
and some had been confined in civilian prisons in 
contravention of the Hague Convention. Troup and Crowe 
made strong representations to Sir Reginald Brade,
Permanent Secretary at the War Office, who had little 
option but to concede his department's mistake and agree 
that the offending order should be withdrawn. Unable to 
contact any senior officer of the Directorate of i-.ilitary 
Operations, Brade sent a telegram on his own authority 
late on 7 August to-all area military commanders 
instructing them to suspend action on the arrest of 
reservists. At an emergency meeting held at the War Office
11. Provision for the proclamation giving enemy aliens
until 11 August to leave Great Britain was made under 
clause 10 of the Aliens Restriction Order of 5 Aug. 
1914. Those leaving had to embark at approved ports. 
Neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary allowed a 
similar period of grace for enemy subjects to leave. 
There was substantial agreement among contemporary 
writers on international law that it was permissable 
to detain enemy subjects who would otherwise return 
home and undertake military service.
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the following day it was decided that for the time being 
only enemy aliens regarded by the police as dangerous, 
either as potential spies or saboteurs, should be interned. 
Fresh instructions were sent to military commanders and 
chief constables, and the Home Office advised the police 
that they should
...arrest and hand over to military 
authorities enemy subjects who are reasonably 
suspected of being in any way dangerous to the 
safety of the realm. Show every consideration 
to prisoners compatible with safety. Be 
careful not to arrest persons whose known 
character precludes suspicion or who are 
personally vouched for by British residents of 
standing. Any alien arrested already should be 
released if known character is good or if 
vouched for by British residents of standing.
While subsequent accounts of the episode involving
the War Office telegram have been contradictory, they
provide an indication of the strained relations between
the War Office and the Home Office early in the war. The
inter-departmental meeting at the War Office on 8 August
has been described by Gen. Callwell, the senior military
officer present, as a 'somewhat comical incident' during
which he and one of his aides, Colonel MacEwan, received
a stern lecture from 'long faced' civil servants from the
Home Office and Foreign Office.
It appeared that we had been guilty of 
terrifying violations of international law. We 
had seized a number of German reservists and 
German males of military age on board ships in 
British ports, and consigned some of them to
12. Sir Edward Troup, The Home Office (192 5), p. 242.
13. Telegram, HO to police, 8 Aug. 1914, HO 45/10729/ 
255193/5.
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quarters designed for the accommodation of 
malefactors. This sort of thing would never 
do...The Foreign and Home Secretaries, the 
very distinguished civil servants declared, 
would not unlikely be agitated when they heard 
of the shocking affair. Soldiers, no doubt, 
were by nature abrupt and unconventional in 
their actions, and the Foreign and Home 
Offices would make every allowance, 
realising that we had acted in good faith.
But hang it all - and they gazed at us in 
compassionate displeasure.
Will it be believed ? My assistant and I 
knew so little about our business that we... 
took them and their protestations quite 
seriously. We accepted their courteous but 
uncompromising, rebuke like small boys 
caught stealing apples, whose better feelings 
had been appealed to. For the space of two or 
three hours and until we had pulled ourselves 
together, we remained content, on the strength 
of doctrines enunciated by a couple of 
officials fossilized by having dwelt in a 
groove for years, to accept it as a principle 
that this tremendous conflict into which the 
Empire had been plunged at a moment's notice 
was to be a kid-glove affair.^
Callwell's account published several years after the event
is challenged by some of the 'fossilized officials'
involved. Troup called the General's recollections 'absurd
and absolutely incorrect',^  a view supported by John Feeder,
head of the Home Office Aliens Division, ^  who also attended
the meeting.
The internal difficulties of the War Office in 
trying to cope with its responsibilities for internment 
matters were little known outside Whitehall, and Kitchener
14. Callwell, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
15. Memo., Troup, 22 Nov. 1921, HO 45/10729/255193/5.
16. Pedder joined the Home Office in 1S95 having
previously served at the Local Government Board and 
the Public Records Office. He became senior clerk 
in 1903, principal clerk 1904, assistant secretary 
1913, principal assistant secretary 1921-32. Knighted 
in 1919.
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continued to be regarded by most of his colleagues in 
parliament with a mixture of admiration and gratitude.
They forgave his scanty appearances in the House of Lords 
because of the manifestly heavy burden he and his depart­
ment bore for the military prosecution of the war. Clearly 
the War Office was immersed in issues of far greater 
immediacy than that of dealing with enemy aliens.
The Home Office, too, acquired a heavy additional
workload as a result of the war, but the duties were
generally of a less dramatic kind than those of the military
departments and earned few plaudits. McKenna continued to
be the focal point of public criticism over what many
saw as the government's casual unconcern about the
potential danger posed by the substantial number of enemy
aliens allowed to remain at large. In an attempt to
reassure the nation McKenna issued a statement to the press
on 9 August pointing out that during the previous two
days a considerable number of Germans, chiefly reservists,
had been arrested in various parts of the country. This
had been done as a precautionary measure but it was not
likely that the detention of most of the ‘prisoners would
be prolonged. Since aliens who were known to be spies had
been arrested earlier 'the public may rest assured that a
great majority of the Germans remaining in this country
are peaceful and innocent persons from whom no danger is
17is to be feared. 1 The statement did little to pacify the
17. The Times, 10 Aug. 1914.
63
anti-alien hardliners or to counter the b^geoning 
phenomenon of spy mania.
Despite growing demands for a more stringent
internment policy, most of the enemy aliens placed in
custody in the early weeks of the war were, as McKenna said
they would be, soon released. The impetus for the releases
came from the War Office which, on 15 August, issued
instructions to internment camp commandants to investigate
petitions for releases and in 'proper' cases, where there
was no reasonable suspicion that the individual was in any
way dangerous to the safety of the state, to discharge him 
18on parole. Kitchener's desire to discharge as many 
internees as possible with the minimum delay was motivated 
less by humanitarian considerations than by concern to 
alleviate the shortage of accommodation for orisoners, 
and his reluctance to assign soldiers to the task of 
guarding civilian prisoners. McKenna did not share the 
war minister's anxiety to clear the camps and neither did 
the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, whose area contained 
the substantial proportion of Eritain's enemy alien 
population.
McKenna and Henry felt that the heavy concentration 
of enemy subjects in the capital posed a special security 
problem, and the commissioner warned that large numbers 
of aliens who were being thrown out of work might become 
'desperate and dangerous. 1 He conceded that there was r.o
18. WO to internment camp commandants, 15 Aug. 1914, 
WO 32/5368.
64
definite evidence of any conspiracy to commit outrages but
he feared that individually enemy aliens might engage in
sabotage and 'other activities calculated to cause alarm 
19and panic.' The War Office agreed to McKenna's
recommendation that priority should be given to arresting
the 4/500 enemy reservists living in London as soon as
internment accommodation could be found for them, and that
enemy aliens of military age who, through unemployment
and destitution, were deemed likely to become a danger to
2 0the community, should be interned. Despite the new policy 
initiatives agreed by the War Office McKenna still had 
misgivings over whether sufficient was being done to stem 
the growing tide of criticism of aliens policy. On 4 
September he issued a further press statement claiming 
that a large number of German and Austrian men of military 
age had been arrested and all breaches of the Aliens
Restriction Order had been promptly prosecuted by the
, . 21police.
The pattern of arrests of enemy aliens in various 
parts of the country was far more erratic than McKenna 
would have had the public believe. While the Metropolitan 
Police, which was and is subject to the direct authority 
of the Home Office, was consistently diligent in rounding 
up aliens as and when this required by government policy,
A ^
19. Troup to Secretary, WC, 27 Aug. 1914, HO 45/10760/ 
269116/113.
20. Adjutant-General to Troup, 25 Aug. 1914, WC 32/5363.
21. The Times, 5 Sept. 1914.
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the locally controlled provincial forces sometimes 
responded with less alacrity. At the end of August 1914,
there was evidence of a patchwork of arrest policies in
2 2major population centres:
Manchester: The alien population included an 
estimated 3,000 Germans and Austrians but there 
had been a negligible number of arrests.
Lancashire and West Riding: Action by the police 
forces in these areas was in accordance with 
Home Office advice.
Leeds: About 7 0 aliens had been arrested but 
most had subsequently been released.
Hu11: There had been about 22 0 arrests of enemy 
aliens and few releases.
Liverpool: About 680 enemy reservists had been 
detained and arrangements were in hand to arrest 
a further 300. The police were rounding up 
reservists as quickly as the military could find 
accommodation for them.
Cardiff: A large proportion of the 140 aliens 
arrested were seamen. The Home Office considered 
that the police were 'dealing pretty firmly with 
alien enemies, particularly those who have shown 
a disinclination to remove from the prohibited 
area. '
Birmingham: few of the 700 Germans or 100 Austrians 
believed to be living in the city had been 
arrested.
Inconsistencies in the practice of different police 
forces and confusion over instructions emanating from 
Whitehall are perhaps less surprising when account is taken 
of the difference of view between the War Office and the 
Home Office over the degree of priority which should be given 
to the rounding uo of enemy aliens. McKenna consistently 
advocated general internment of enemy subjects of military
22. Survey by HO of arrests of Germans and Austrians in
provincial centres, 31 Aug. 1914, HO 45/10729/255193.
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age, subject to exemptions on strong grounds acceptable 
to the authorities, but Kitchener and his senior advisers 
were not convinced that large-scale internment was 
justified. That the War Office seemed more liberal on the 
internment question than the Home Office no doubt 
reflected to some extent the fact that the military 
department was not subject to the same direct pressure and 
criticism on the issue from parliament, the press and the 
public. The general belief in the cabinet during the early 
weeks of the war that there was no immediate probability 
of enemy invasion also probably encouraged support for 
Kitchener's opposition to general internment, although
accepting the case for the arrest of enemy reservists.^
The cabinet agreed to a War Office initiative in 
early September for a nationwide effort to round up German 
reservists. The police were instructed to arrest and hand 
over to the military authorities all Germans under the age 
of 4 5 who had undergone military training, with the exception 
of aliens engaged in industries vital to the war effort, 
or whose internment would involve the loss of jobs by 
British subjects,or who held public or educational 
appointments. The exceptions were to apply only where the 
police were satisfied that the aliers concerned had 'no 
hostile intentions or desires.' Such persons could be 
allowed to remain at liberty provided that they gave a 
written undertaking not to take part in the war or to
23. Secret CID report, 'Attack on the British isles from 
Oversea', 8 Sept. 1914, WO 32/5363.
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communicate information to the enemy. The police were
ashed to refer to the Home Office any othe.r special cases
where it was thought detention would be harmful to British
interests. Once all known reservists had been arrested or
given exemption, any German subjects between 17 and 45
years who had not declared themselves as having undergone
military training would be required to produce evidence
that they were not liable to military duty. The instructions
did not, for the time being, apply to Austro-Hungarians
although they remained liable to arrest if the police
2 4considered they were likely to become dangerous.
The decision by the War Office to sanction the
general arrest of enemy reservists proved an ill judged
one. With 6,600 civil and military prisoners already in
custody and extremely limited additional accommodation
available, room could not be found to house the sudden
increase in the number of internees. Hurried consultations
took place between the War Office and the Home Office and
on 13 reptember, six days after the round up of reservists
was ordered, the policy was suspended at the request of the
War Office. The police were instructed to stop arrests
pending the provision of further internment accommodation,
except in cases where aliens were considered an immediate 
25danger. For six weeks the enemy alien population enjoyed 
virtual freedom from the threat of internment and many
24. Circular, HO to chief constables, 7 Sept. 1914, 
HO 45/10729/255193/56.
25. Circular, HO to chief constables, 14 Sept. 1914, 
HO 45/10729/255193/69.
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enemy aliens considered 'safe' were released on parole to 
further ease the pressure on existing accommodation.
Special conditions were imposed on those discharged and, 
apart from exceptional cases, each prisoner had to find 
two sureties (British subjects of good standing) to put up 
a bond for his good behaviour for the duration of the war. 
The size of the bond in each case took account of the means 
of the prisoner, his sureties and the individual
circumstances, but in the case of poor aliens £25 - £50
26was generally considered sufficient.
In September 1914 the War Office established a
Directorate of Prisoners of War, headed by Lieuuenant-
General Herbert Belfield, to assume much of the department's
responsibilities for day to day internment matters and the
operation of the prisoner of war camps, both military and 
27civilian. While Belfield was conscientious to a fault and 
was gradually able to improve the War Office system of 
handling internment matters, his efforts to alleviate the 
shortage of internment accommodation were initially 
disappointing.
By mid-October nearly 10,000 enemy alien men of 
military age were in custody, but more than double that 
total remained at large. McKenna viewed the situation with 
consternation and on 16 October he wrote personally to 
Kitchener warning that 'the public is being worked up to
26. Cir-ulvr, HO to chief constables, 6 Oct. 1914,
HC 45/10729/255193/103.
27. Account of the work of Directorate of Prisoners of 
War is contained in an unpublished report sianed by 
Gen. Belfield on 26. Mar. 1920 and circulated 
internally, HO 45/11025/410118/5.
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2 8a state of frenzy and I fear we may have disturbances.'
Kitchener replied that there was not yet accommodation
for the large number of potential internees, but within
three months there would be a further 9,000 places. Many
of these, however, would be required for combatant 
29prisoners. The War Office’s problem in trying to provide 
more internment accommodation was exacerbated by the urgent 
requirement for camps to house the rapidly growing number 
of recruits to the new army.
The growing anger in parliament, agitation in some 
parts of the country and hostile press criticism over the. 
government's alleged 'soft' internment policy gave 
considerable additional force to McKenna's advocacy in the 
cabinet of the urgent need to resume arrests of enemy 
aliens of military age. On 20 October the Home Secretary 
warned the War Office that,
In consequence... of the altered military 
position on the continent, the increased 
possibility of a hostile raid and of attacks 
by aircraft, and the strong feeling against 
Germans aroused by the atrocities committed 
by German officers in Belgium...the point 
has now been reached when it is no longer 
safe to leave the great mass of enemy 
reservists at liberty in this country, and 
that, except in a limited number of cases 
where there are special reasons of a public 
nature, all-Germans, Austrians and 
Hungarians of military age should be at 
once interned.^q
28. McKenna to Kitchener, 16 Get. 1914, KP, 30/5775.
29. Kitchener to McKenna, 17 Oct. 1914, HO 45/10760/ 
269116/7.
30. Troup to Brade, 20 Oct. 1914, HO 45/10760/269116/1.
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The cabinet agreed to the resumption of general internment
of enemy alien men of military age, including Austro-
Hungarians as well as Germans.^ McKenna expressed the
hope that the arrests would be completed within a week,
but this proved impossible. In the provinces the new orders
were carried out fairly thoroughly but in London the
shortage of accommodation ruled out internment of all but
a handful of destitutes and unmarried men. Although the
War Office pressed into service a number of temporary
premises, including the Olympia exhibition hall, the
immediate availability of accommodation was hopelessly
inadequate. Such space as could be found was virtually
filled within 48 hours, and many aliens arrested after that
had to be released when the police found there was no room
for them. Moreover the temporary quarters which were
acquired proved in many cases to be cold, cramped and
lacking in basic sanitary facilities. There was a shortage
of bedding and warm clothing and those arrested (many being
taken into custody for the second time) were asked to take
blankets and greatcoats with them where possible. It soon
became obvious, at least as far as London was concerned,
that the decision to resume the general arrest policy had
been premature and ill advised. With 22,000 prisoners of
war, including 16,800 civilians already crowding the
available accommodation, the War Office was again compelled
32to call for a suspension of arrests. The cabinet had
31. Circular, HO to chief constables, 20 Oct. 1914,
HC 45/10760/269116/1.
32. Adjutant-General to Troup, 22 Oct. 1914, 'WO 32/5368.
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little option but to agree# although it was clear that
further delay in interning military age enemy aliens would
bring further criticism of the government's handling of
the situation# particularly at a time when the
possibility of invasion was beginning to seem more
credible. Even Kitchener formed the view that if there was
a stalemate position on the western front Germany might
contemplate invading Britain with a force of# say 150# 000
to 200,000 men.^ The general tenor of cabinet thinking on
the situation was probably best summed up by John Simon#
the Attorney-General# responding to an appeal by a fellow
34Liberal moderate# L.T. Hobhouse# for the government to 
try to calm the anti-alien agitation in Britain:
The position now with German troops at 
0 s.tend# and only a narrow piece of sea between 
them and this country# is strategically quite 
different from the position at the beginning of 
the war# when there was Holland and Belgium 
between the two forces. If any attempt was made 
at a raid or invasion the distance to be 
traversed is trifling, and the thing would come 
very quickly.
Experience has shov:n that the German Navy 
is extraordinarily well informed of our move­
ments# and though I have the greatest 
detestation of spy mania# I do not think it is 
open to doubt that there are a number of 
unidentified persons in this country who have 
been making treacherous communications and who 
were not known to us at the beginning of the 
war.
The stricter measures now taken do not 
portend the keeping of all German and Austrian 
subjects under lock and key# but are a necessary 
preliminary to weeding out and restoring to 
ordinary activities those who are altogether
33. Asquith to the King# 22 Oct. 1914# AP# 7/221.
34. Hobhouse to Simon# 22 Oct. 1914# SP.
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above suspicion. That is to say it is a plan 
which throws the burden of proof the other way 
round; instead of arresting those who are 
known to be disaffected it releases those who 
are known to be beyond suspicion... 3 5
Simon said the intention was to steer a middle course
and he and his government colleagues believed that 'all
available influence ought to be quietly thrown on the side
of reasonableness.' ^  Asquith advised the King that 'In
view of the nearer approach of the German forces ' enemy
aliens remaining at large would be 'dealt with, instalment
by instalment, as soon as, from time to time, the War
37Office authorities are able to provide for them. 1
With internment policy virtually dictated by the 
availability of accommodation and the general arrest of 
enemy alien men of military age once more in abeyance, the 
question of which aliens, apart from those considered 
dangerous, became comewhat academic. But at the end of 
October the War Office decided that general internment could 
be resumed. This time, however, the operation was phased 
to prevent a sudden flood of internees exceeding the 
capacity of available accommodation. Chief constables were 
instructed to inform the Home Office of the numbers they 
proposed to arrest, these figures were passed to the 'War 
Office v:ho -would, in turn, advise the police how many
35. Simon to Hobhouse, 26 Oct. 1914, SP.
36. Ibid.
37. Asquith to the King, 22 Oct. 1914, AP, 7/221.
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prisoners could be accommodated and where they should be 
sent. Each police force then made arrests in accordance 
with the number of internment places allocated to it. The 
War Office notified chief constables as additional places 
became available. In consultation with the War Office/ 
the Home Office advised the police that all enemy aliens 
of military age - 17 to 45 for Germans and 19 to 45 for 
Austrians - were to be detained as soon as accommodation 
was ready, subject to the following exceptions:
i. Ministers of religion and medical 
practitioners.
ii. Austrian and Hungarian subjects who were 
certified medically unfit for military 
service.
iii. Invalids, providing they had a medical 
certificate that they could not be 
interned without danger to life.
iv. Austrian and Hungarian subjects who 
belonged to races hostile to Austrian 
rule/ eg Poles, Czechs, Ruthenians,
Croats, rlovaks, Serbs, Roumanians,and 
Italians from Trentino or Trieste.
v. Special cases of aliens (a) who were 
engaged in industries valuable to 
Britain's war effort, (b) whose detention 
would involve serious loss of industrial 
employment to British subjects, and (c) 
who held public or educational appoint­
ments .
In doubtful cases or where there appeared to be special 
reasons not specified in the guidelines laid down,the pol: 
had instructions to consult the Home Office. Those already 
released on parole were not to be re-arrested except for 
special reasons approved by the Home Secretary and those 
in categories i. and ii. were to be allowed to return to
ice
their own countries under reciprocal agreements reached
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38between the belligerents.
The criteria by which enemy aliens could obtain
exemption from internment became a subject of recurring
controversy for much of the war and was raised in a number
of acrimonious debates in both houses of parliament.
Asquith admitted that 'certainly in my own mind, and
probably in the minds of many of my colleagues... there
have been fluctuations in opinions and views from time to
time' as to who should be interned and who left at large.
'Whatever the inconvenience there may be, even if there be
particular cases of hardship, the first consideration is
39the safety of the country.' " The government's critics were 
assiduous in producing examples purporting to show that 
far from ensuring the safety of the country, internment 
policy to date had allowed dangerous enemy aliens to remain 
free, but such allegations invariably lacked verifiable 
evidence, and in the main appeared to be derived from 
hearsay and gossip.
The government was often accused of concentrating 
on the internment of the poor, less cultured classes of 
enemy aliens while allowing more affluent and educated 
foreigners to remain free, although,it was argued, the 
latter posed the greatest potential threat. Lord Leith 
of Fyvie,' one of the most persistent critics of the 
government's internment policy, reflected the view of a 
number of colleagues when he charged that,
38. Circular, HO to chief constables, 31 Oct. 1914, 
HO 45/10760/269116/14.
39. 6 8 HC 5s., 19, 11 Nov. 1914.
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At present the poor alien and the wage 
earner are interned, but the rich financiers, 
the contractors, and the big men in the City 
of London escape. Those are the enemies; those 
are the ones you will sooner or later have to 
arrest. . - 4 0
Even the Unionist leader, Andrew Bonar Law, saw fit to 
warn of the threat of wealthy German nationals living in 
Britain:
They are a danger to this nation, and I say 
that, in my opinion, the higher the position 
they occupy and the greater their wealth and 
influence the more power, if they have the 
will, they have to injure us.^
While undoubtedly some wealthy aliens and some of
questionable loyalty to Britain remained at large, and many
innocent aliens were subjected to unwarranted harassment,
the government could justifiably deny any calculated policy
42of favouring the affluent and influencial.
One group in whose favour all wartime governments
did discriminate were enemy alien women, particularly
those born in Britain, although some proponents of the
'intern them all' argument asserted, perhaps with some
logic,that women were just as capable as men of spying
43
and were 'every bit as dangerous. 1 * Asquith and his cabinet 
colleagues remained impervious to such thinking and it seems 
likely that the idea of wholesale internment of v.’omen
would not have been acceptable to a substantial body of
40. 18HL 5s., 47, 11 Nov. 1914.
41. 7lHC 5s., 1345, 13 Kay 1915.
42. Ibid. col. 1872.
43. 18HL 5s., 274, 6 Jan. 1915.
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opinion in the country.
Whatever criteria the government may have wished
to apply in designating those to be interned, shortage of
accommodation continued to impose constraints. The
situation was described by one MP as 'the kind of thing
which one would expect to find in a Gilbert and Sullivan
comic opera rather than in a country like this, wThich is
44engaged in a war of such magnitude.' The accommodation 
position began to ease in the spring of 1915 but the rate 
of internment still lagged far behind the level demanded 
by the government's critics. In defence of its alleged 
complacency the government insisted that enemy aliens left 
at large did not constitute a danger to the state. Many 
had British-born wives and children, had lived in Britain 
for many years, and some had sons fighting in the British 
Army. While conceding that none of these factors was an 
absolute guarantee of an enemy alien's loyalty, the 
government made clear that in general they believed they 
provided good prima facie evidence of an alien's allegiance.
The dilemma of trying to establish just criteria 
for exempting enemy aliens from internment while at the 
same time allaying public concern over the continuing 
presence of the 'enemy in our midst' caused much heart 
searching in the cabinet. There were sharp clashes of 
opinion on the issue, especially between McKenna and 
Kitchener. The Home Secretary, sensitive to the constant
44. Mr. Lancelot Sanderson, 70HC 5s., 912-13, 3 Mar. 1915.
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personal criticism of him in parliament and the press# was 
anxious to complete the general internment of military age 
enemy alien men as quickly as possible. Kitchener# on the 
other hand, almost immune from personal abuse in the early 
months of the war, was more concerned with the practical 
problem of housing the growing number of combatant 
prisoners being sent back from the western front than with 
accommodating civilians whom he did not consider to be « 
perilous military threat to the country. If Kitchener had 
any qualms over the criticism directed at McKenna over 
internment policies often dictated by the War Office, there 
is little evidence of it. The political diarist Charles 
Hobhouse asserts that#
Kitchener, who is a coward when it comes to 
a tight place# wants as many aliens out of 
prison as possible# but tried to make McKenna 
responsible for their non-arrest. The fact‘*thst 
McKenna went on arresting aliens till the 
Adjutant-General asked him to stop# saying he 
had no place to concentrate them in# or any
means of guarding them. ^ 45
When# on 30 October# responsibility for decisions 
on exemptions and releases from internment was transferred 
from the War Office to the Home Office# it could# if 
Hobhouse's view is accepted# represent a rather squalid 
instance of 'buck passing' engineered by Kitchener. It 
seems more likely# however# that the war minister sought 
the change because he believed it would make for smoother 
administration and ease the burden on his heavily 
committed department. It is perhaps revealing that within 
two weeks he had a partial change of heart and persuaded
45. E. David (ed.). Inside Asouil-h 1 s cabinet: rom the
Diaries of Charles Hobhouse i(1977), p. 205.
the cabinet that responsibility for releases should be 
restored to the War Office. It seems probable that 
Kitchener was not only concerned at McKenna's zeal in 
pressing ahead with arrests despite the shortage of 
accommodation, but at his reluctance to sanction releases 
and thus ease the pressure on the crowded internment camp 
The War Office not only resumed control of releases but 
asked for and was given jurisdiction over a small group 
established in the Home office Aliens Division to handle 
administrative work connected with internment, releases, 
repatriation and related matters. Belfield, with the 
backing of Kitchener, had suggested the transfer because,
I have found considerable difficulty in 
carrying out the duties entrusted to me... 
in regard to alien prisoners of war, owing to 
the fact that the great majority have been 
interned by the police, and it is only 
through the police that information can be 
obtained when questions of release arise.
This information I can obtain only 
through.the Home Office, and reference between 
our two offices means delay, whereas our 
object is to expedite matters as much as 
possible.
The Home Office unit placed under Belfield's authority
47was headed by Maurice v;aller, a Prison Commissioner, * an
its small staff consisted of civil servants seconded from.
other branches of the Home Office and volunteers recruite 
48from outside. The unit assumed the task of aaministerin
46. Belfield to Troup, 20 Nov. 1914, HO 45/10760/255193.
47. 'Waller (1875-1932) was one of HM commissioners of 
Prisons 1910-13 and chairman from 1922-28. Kniohted 
in 1928.
48. 'The unit later became the Home Office Prisoner of 
War Division (more often referred to as Branch).
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the fluctuating release policy emanating from the War
Office and had to deal with an immense amount of
correspondence, telegrams, telephone calls and visits by
relations, friends and lawyers of internees seeking their
release. The appeals were usually on the grounds that the
alien in question was harmless, suffering ill health, his
services were needed for a vital industry, or his family
was undergoing great hardship and distress as a result of
his captivity. Waller and his staff found their task one
of 'great difficulty' snd the regular practice was in all
cares to consult MI 5 (or the Directorate of Naval
Intelligence in the case of ship's officers or seamen) and
4Cthe police before making recommendations to Belfield.
Kitchener's volte-face on releases in November 
undoubtedly reflected a concern to ease the pressure on 
scarce internment accommodation, but it also underline! 
his indecision and shortcomings as an administrator which 
were increasingly to impede his effectiveness as a 
departmental minister. His twists anc5 turns on internment 
policy in the early months of the war invariably gained 
the willing acquiescence of Asquith and the traditionalist 
Liberals in his cabinet since they harboured doubts about 
the efficacy and morality of wholesale internment of enemy 
aliens, and Kitchener, whatever his reasons, usually 
appeared to be following a more moderate line than McKenna.
45. deport by V.'aller on work of HO Prisoners of har
Branch for period Nov. 1914-Apr. 1919, HO 45/11025/ 
410113/2. See also appendix IV.
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General internment of enemy subjects had not been
proposed by the CID aliens s ub-committee and it was not
part of the government's control policy at the beginning
of the war. There was no express statutory right for the
wholesale arrest of enemy aliens other than those deemed
to be a danger to the state,^ but the crown had a general
prerogative under the common law by which it could deal as
it pleased with aliens in time of war. The laws of war
and the customs of nations did, however, impose certain
51conditions on the exercise of the prerogative. It seems 
likely that the main spur for the general internment of 
enemy alien men of military age came from the Home Office, 
where such strong-minded officials as Troup and redder 
undoubtedlyexerted a considerable influence over the 
direction of policy. According to one officer at the far 
Office who, in November 1914, attempted to trace the 
evolution of a general internment policy,
...the impetus, to arrest these enemy 
subjects was always given by the Home Office.
In no case can I find a document emanating 
from the v;ar Office requesting action 
regarding these arrests...I was unable to 
ascertain the authority which initiated 
these wholesale arrests but I can only 
presume it must have been a cabinet decision.
D £
If cKenna was the principle advocate in the 
cabinet for general internment, Kitchener was clearly the 
leading voice for keeping detention of civilians to a
50. Defence of Realm regulations, art. 13, and Aliens 
Restriction (Consolidated) Order 1914.
51. Treasury Solicitor to WO, 12 Nov. 1914, WO 32/5358.
52. Memo., Major J. Byrne, AG 3, to Belfield, 12 Nov. 
1914, WO 32/5368.
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minimum. Having formally regained control of releases on 
12 November the war minister not only obtained cabinet 
agreement to step up the rate of discharges of 'safe' 
enemy aliens, but to a further suspension of the policy of 
general arrests pending the provision of further 
accommodation. A War Office official noted that
...the Home Office are still desirous 
of continuing a policy of wholesale arrest of 
enemy subjects of military age but...the War 
Office, owing to the lack of accommodation, 
are temporarily unable to continue their work 
as custodians.^
At that time there were 12,381 registered enemy alien men
over the age of 17 in custody (excluding those taken from
ships) and 26,974 such aliens at large. The internees
included 8,612 Germans and 3,767 Austro-Hungarians, and of
the total, 5,494 had been resident in London when arrested.
McKenna was predictably dismayed at the renewed
suspension of general arrests and dubious about
Kitchener’s plans to expedite releases. Home Office
instructions to the police about the policy pointedly noted
that it was instigated by the war minister, who believed it
had ’now become possible, consistent with the safety of the
country, to release a certain number of persons now
detained in concentration camps.' Each police force was
asked, in accordance with Kitchener’s wishes, to furnish
the names of internees from their areas who were not believed
dangerous to the state and who could safely be released on
53. Ibid.
54. Summary of returns of registered enemy aliens,
HO 45/10760/269116/18.
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parole. The police were asked not to recommend aliens 
whose release would leave them unemployed and in such
55destitution as would be likely to make him dangerous.
It seems clear that McKenna's meticulous caution
irritated Kitchener. While he agreed, at the Home
Secretary's request, that the police should be consulted
in every case before an internee was released, he urged
McKenna that 'as I feel strongly that we must clear these
camps quickly of those to whose release there is no
objection, I must ask you to do all in your power to
56expedite enquiry by the police.' To speed up releases 
the War Office obtained lists from internment camp 
commandants of all prisoners taken into custody after 2 0  
October, when the nationwide round up of military age 
enemy aliens was launched at Home Office prompting. All 
men on the lists were, the War Office instructed, to be 
released unless they had been interned for some reason other 
than that of being of military age. 'While McKenna conceded 
that many 'safe' enemy aliens had probably been arrestee 
and that there was a case for reviewing the lists of those 
arrested after 2 0 October, he reminded the cabinet that 
there must have been
...a good many cases in which the police 
have grounds for regarding the prisoners as 
dangerous, eg persons likely in the event of
55. Circular, HO to chief constables, 12 Nov. 1914,
HO 45/10760/269116/47.
56. McKenna to Kitchener, 8 Dec. 1914, and the latter's 
reply,10 Dec., HO 45/10760/269116/89.
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invasion to act as spies or to commit 
outrages and otherwise assist the invaders 
and there are many prisoners among them 
who certainly cannot be released in safety, 
and whose release will cause public uneasiness 
and probably lead to a revival of public 
agitation against enemy aliens.^
McKenna’s apprehension over Kitchener's 'liberal' 
release policy was shared by the Scottish Secretary, 
McKinnon Wood, who warned the cabinet that there were 
'altogether exceptional difficulties' in dealing with 
released internees in Scotland. Because of the large areas 
which had been declared 'prohibited' to enemy aliens there 
was only a limited number of localities in which they could 
reside. Released aliens were also likely to face hostile 
public opinion.
The fact that there is strong feeling in 
Scotland on the subject, not merely among 
panicmongers, but among responsible officials 
and throughout the community, will add greatly 
to the other intrinsic difficulties of the 
re-settlement of a large number of discharged 
aliens... Those discharged will in many cases 
come to a new neighbourhood as enemy aliens 
and also as strangers; they will find it 
difficult, or impossible, to obtain employ­
ment, or even lodging, and, especially in 
Scotland, where the Poor Law does not permit 
relief to the able bodied, their condition 
must be expected to become such in a short 
time as to call for further action on the 
part of the State, probably by way of 
re-internment. Public comment on a policy 
which first arrests, then discharges, and 
subsequently re-intems must be expected to 
be severe.coD O
The Scottish Office were particularly concerned about the 
possibility of released internees gravitating to the
57. HO document for cabinet use, Dec. 1914, HO 45/1076C/ 
269116/89.
58. SO document for cabinet use, 9 Dec. 1914, HO 45/ 
10760/269116/81.
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Glasgow area with its high concentration of shipbuilding
59yards and workshops busy on war production.
Fears of the build up of large numbers of enemy 
aliens in Glasgow were similar to those of the Home 
Secretary and the Ketropolitan Police Commissioner about
V
the rising alien population in London, where, by early 
January 1915, there were 22,000 enemy alien men, including 
some 16,000 of military age. Henry expressed serious 
concern on two main counts; that of possible sabotage 
attempts on vulnerable targets, and that of possible acts 
of retaliation by the public on aliens if loss of life and 
property resulted from air raids. His second point proved 
prophetic. Urging government action to stem the flow of 
enemy aliens from the provinces into London, the 
commissioner pointed out that since the beginning of the 
war there had been a movement of Germans and Austrians 
to the capital, either because of the clearance of 
'prohibited areas 1 or in an attempt to find employment. It 
also appeared to have been the practice of some 
provincial police forces to offer no objection to the 
release of enemy aliens from internment providing they did 
not return to the area of the force in question. Henry 
warned that the build up of the enemy alien population in 
London, with many men unemployed, could cause serious 
trouble. The danger was not as great in small towns and 
country districts where aliens were more scattered, where 
their movements were more easily monitored and where they 
had less opportunity to act in concert. The commissioner
59. Ibid.
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asked the Home Secretary that
...the release into the London district of 
alien enemies interned from elsewhere be 
altogether abandoned; and that the Military 
Authorities and County Constabularies should 
be advised that London is not to be regarded 
as an Asylum for aliens the counties are not 
willing to keep.^Q
McKenna, as Police Authority for the Metropolitan Area,
shared Henry's concern and urged the War Office that
further releases should be 'very carefully guarded' and
none should be discharged to London without prior
61consultation with the commissioner.
Between 12 November, when the War Office resumed
responsibiility for releases, and 27 January 1915, some
2,700 enemy aliens were discharged from internment and,
according to McKenna, the situation was 'causing alarm; to
the public' both in London and the provinces. Further
releases, he believed, should be confined to cases where
there were strong or special reasons, such as ill health,
old age, or a report from the police showing that the
alien was in no way dangerous, supported by guarantees
from two trustworthy British citizens. Special arrangements
should also be made for enemy aliens of the 'friendly'
62races.
Kitchener and his advisers continued to hold the 
view that there was 'no reason to apprehend that the 
presence of this foreign element is likely to prove a
60. Henry to Troup, 12 Jan. 1S15, HO 45/10760/269116/113.
61. Troup to Brade, 16 Jan. 1915, HO 45/10760/269116/113.
62. Troup to Brade. 27 Jan. 1915, -HO 45/10760/269116/113.
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6 3serious military danger.' The department did, however,
acquiesce to McKenna's appeal for caution and consultation
with the commissioner before released internees from other
64areas were permitted to reside in London. The War Office 
also subsequently agreed to end the practice of seeking 
out interned aliens eligible for parole and instead to place 
the onus on the individual prisoner to make representations 
either personally or through an intermediary for release. 
Each release continued to be 'vetted1 by the police in the 
area in which the alien was arrested and by the 
intelligence branches of the War Office or the Admiralty.^ 
Few outside the departments concerned, however, 
seemed to have any clear conception of the government's 
fluctuating internment policy or precisely who was 
responsible for its implementation. The demand grew for a 
clear-cut policy and a proper demarcation of 
responsibilities between the 'Whitehall departments. In a 
heated debate in the House of Lords on the aliens question 
on 3 February, Viscount Galway reflected a view’ held by 
several Deers when he spoke of 'a great mystery and 
uncertainty connected with the release of enemy alien:- 1 
and declared that parliament and the country was 'tires 
of this evasion, this throwing of blame first on one 
department and then on another. Lord Heneage charged
63. B.B. Cubitt, WO, to Troup, 23 Jan. 1915, HO 45/1C7SC/ 
269116/113.
64. Ibid.
65. Correspondence between Troup and Belfield, 4 - 1C 
Feb. 1915, HO 45/10760/269116/113
6 6 . 18HL 5s., 421-2, 3 Feb. 1915.
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that 'From beginning to end this question has been a
6 Vshuttlecock of different departments...' and Earl
Curzon complained that 'really w h e r e  the responsibility
lies, what is the department to which I ought to go, whom
we ought to address, I venture to say there is not a
noble lord in this house who...has the slightest
6 Sglimmering of an idea. I confess I have not. 1 KPs spoke 
in similar vein, and while it is true that some members 
of the opposition were happy to make political capital 
out of perpetuating the aura of mystery and confusion 
surrounding internment policy, it seems equally clear that 
many parliamentarians were genuinely perplexed about the 
government's aims and intentions.
Ministers denied, though with no great conviction, 
that there had been any discord between departments or a 
divergence of action on implementing government policy, 
but argued, with justification, that a division of 
responsibility was inevitable since aliens controls 
related partly to civil and partly to military matters. 
McKenna's continued stress on the primacy of the War 
Office for internment policy was interpretted by some 
critics as a shabby attempt to shift his responsibiliries 
to an already overburdened department. Sir Henry Dalziel, 
a leading anti-alien hardliner, asserted that the Home 
Secretary's oosition was, in effect, 'I have no power;
•67. 18HL 5s., 431, 3 Feb. 1915.
6 8 . Ibid., col. 433.
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69I have no policy? I have no responsibility. ' Several 
peers and KPs argued that the War Office should be 
relieved of responsibilities for internment matters and 
allowed to concentrate on such vital tasks as recruiting, 
equipping and training soldiers. The Earl of Crawford 
observed that
When you place upon the War Office a 
quasi-civilian duty of this kind you subject 
the department to all the political 
controversy and pressure which the Home 
Office, a bone fide political department, 
is accustomed to and well knows how to deal 
with.7Q
b z
If, however, the responsibility was toAleft v;ith the ar
Office, Lord Crawford insisted, it should be wholly vested
in the department and not divided between several depart- 
71ments. The department ultimately responsible, argued 
William Joynson Hicks, another hardliner and a future 
Home Secretary, should be the Home Office. He failed, 
however, to find sufficient support in the House of 
Commons for a motion that
...it i.c desirable that the whole 
administration of the acts «*c!' regulations 
concerning aliens and suspected persons 
should be concentrated in the hands of one 
minister who should be responsible to this 
house. ^ 2
Alternatives to responsibility being placed wholly
69. 6 8 HC 5s., 1399-1400, 26 Jov. 1914.
70. 18HL 5s., 133, 2 Nov. 1914.
71. Ibid.
72. 7OHC 5s ., 833-916, 3 . a r . 1915.
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in one department/ some parliamentarians suggested, were 
the creation of a new organisation, perhaps on an inter­
departmental basis, or the appointment of a quasi­
independent 'overlord1 to take charge of aliens affairs.
An 'aliens bureau' comprising representatives of all 
interested departments could, it was suggested, codify 
and simplify government policy in addition to supervising 
its implementation. Those who favoured the 'overlord' 
proposal agreed he would need to be a man of considerable 
stature who would require civil and military advisers and 
authority over the police in aliens matters. The government 
acknowledged the apparent attractions of a special bureau 
or an 'overlord' to deal with aliens affairs but believed 
that in practice such innovations would be unlikely to 
improve on existing arrangements. In essence the govern­
ment's case against radical changes was that co-operation 
between departments had always been a feature of British 
administration and there was no reason why it should not 
continue to work well in the implementation of wartime 
aliens controls. Even if a special organisation was created 
to take charge of aliens matters it would still have to 
work through existing machinery at the local level, ie 
the police and the military. There was, in any case, a 
number of inter-departmental committees concerned with 
different aspects of aliens matters and regular
consultations between officials of the departments
j 73 concerned.
73. See, for example, debates in the House of commons,
12 Nov. 1914 and 3 Mar. 1915, and the House of Lords,
11 and 25 Nov. 1914 and 3 Feb. 1915.
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However logical its stance against innovations in
aliens control arrangements the government's stance was
seen by many backbenchers as evidence of a policy of
indifference and drift. It was not only the extremists of
the 'intern them all' lobby who endorsed Lord St. Davids'
assertion that 'All countries in time of war have to be
hard' in the uncompromising manner of Cromwell or the
French revolutionary government. In the case of the Asquith
74administration no class was opposed to it. Such
arguments were anathema to Asquith and many of his cabinem
colleagues but in the highly charged climate of anti-alien
opinion in the country they had difficulty in dismissing
them out of hand. McKenna reminded the House of Commons
that the term 'enemy alien' was a technical definition
and unless exemptions were made under an internment policy
there would be 'gross injustice - and a quite useless gross
injustice.' He said he had seen thousands of cases of enemy
subjects who represented less risk than the average baf 
75Englishman. The Marquis of Crewe, Lord President of
the Council, whose judgement Asquith rated 'highest of any
7 6of my colleagues, ' compared the attitude of the 
government's hardline critics with those who engaged in
74. 1SHL 5s, 93 00 
1—
1 ov. 1914.
75. 6 QHC 5s,., 1394-5, 2 6 Nov. 1914.
76. Earl of Oxford and Asquith, op. cit., p. 73, vol. II
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the 'wild justice of revenge' reflected in lynch law. He 
could not help thinking that,
...at the back of the minds of some of those 
who criticise the government so freely there 
exists the thought that, after all, in these cases, 
where there is a great public danger, evidence does 
not so very much matter, and that even if you are 
unfortunately wrong and hang or shoot two or 
three people against whom nothing is really proved 
- well you are sorry? it is their bad luck? but in 
a great public crisis you cannot afford to be quite 
so particular as that. That is not an attitude which 
it is possible for the government or for the legal 
advisers of the government... to take up.^^
Crewe also noted the inconsistency of many critics of
internment policy who, while urging more drastic control
measures, themselves had friends and acquaintances among
enemy aliens 'about whom suspicion would be almost
farcical, and who therefore ought obviously to be excepted
78from any idea of general internment.'
The attempts by Crewe and others to argue the 
government's case from a standpoint of logic and legality, 
however, sadly misjudged the temper of public and 
parliamentary opinion. During the tense months of the 
winter of 1914-15, in which rumour mongers and propagandists 
were hyperactive, the voice of the moderate had little 
chance of a fair hearing. Moreover the prime Minister was 
ill equipped to successfully project unpopular views and 
policies in the hostile prevailing climate. He had little 
understanding of the propagandist's art and 'No public man 
was more unaffectedly and consistently disdainful' of 
the growing power and influence
77. 18HL 5s., 77, 18 Nov. 1914
78. 18HL 5s., 167-8, 25 Nov. 1914
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of the press. " Much the same might be said of McKenna 
and Kitchener, who were singu'"larly unfitted to provide 
the kind of advice and support which might have assuaged 
some of the confusion and criticism surrounding intern­
ment policy. Increasingly on the defensive in early 1915, 
the government were glad to find an influential ally
against the extremists in Viscount Bryce, author of the
8 0report on alleged German atrocities in Belgium. Despite
his apparent willingness to accept uncorroborated
evidence of claims of enemy atrocities, he adopted a
strongly humanitarian stance on the treatment of enemy
aliens in Britain. He called for assurances that no
unnecessary suffering was caused to innocent foreigners
and urged rapid release of 'safe' aliens who had been 
81interned.“ One of the few backbench MPs to publicly adopt 
an unequivocally humanitarian stance on the internment 
question was Arthur Henderson of the Labour Party, who 
believed that government policy had already caused 'a
great amount of hardship' to enemy aliens and their
., . 82 families.
While Bryce, Henderson and others argued from the 
humanitarian standpoint, support for moderation in interning
79. W.F . Churchill, The Lorld Crisis
vol. II.
90. Cd. 7894, 1915.
•—
1
00 13HL 5s . , 5 03-4, 10 Feb. 1915.
82. 7 0HC 5s., 383-4, 3 Mar. 1915.
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aliens also came from more pragmatic politicians who 
believed there was a strong economic case for such an 
approach. It was estimated in May 1915 that to maintain
30.000 men in captivity would cost the country between
£2 million and £3 million a year. The building of camps
to house the prisoners diverted labour and materials from
other work vital to the war effort. Also there was a
shortage of labour in many fields in which a high
proportion of aliens had traditionally worked, and they
could, if allowed to remain at liberty, make a positive
contribution to the war effort. Every man in captivity was, I
it was argued, a cash loss to the economy and this injured
83Britain and helped the enemy. “ Such arguments were not lost1 
on the government but they cut little ice with the hard­
liners, who refused to accept that enemy aliens at liberty 
were not necessarily a danger to the community. One KF 
declared that he would 'rather lose the economic value of
1.000 Germans than allow one German who is a danger to
Q4
this country to continue at large.'
Despite their misgivings, both on moral and 
practical grounds, Asquith and most of his cabinet 
colleagues were by the late spring beginning to accept 
that further delay in imposing a more stringent and positive 
regime of aliens controls might dangerously damage the 
government's credibility and popular support. The position
83. fee, for example, 71HC 5 s., 1853, 13 Pay 1915.
84. Sir Fortesque Flannery, 71HC 5s., 1359, 13 ; ay 1915.
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of most ministers had, in any case, been hardened by the 
alleged enemy atrocities in Belgium and at sea. McKenna 
believed that anti-German feeling was running so high in 
the country that it would be in their own interests for 
enemy alien men to be in the safety of an internment camp. 
Following the sinking of the Lusitania by a German sub­
marine on 7 Kay with loss of civilian lives, there was 
street rioting and attacks on homes and businesses 
believed to belong to enemy aliens. Among the centres where 
disturbances occured were Liverpool, home port of the 
Lusitania, and the Fast End of London. Demands for a 
harsher internment policy were being voiced not only in
parliament and the press but at public meetings, in
85Petitions, resolutions by local councils and patriotic 
organisations, and in personal letters to KPs, ministers 
and government departments. On 12 Kay, with public order 
apparently under growing threat, a sad Asquith told the 
House of Commons,
No-one can be surprised that the 
progressive violation by the enemy of the 
usages of civilised warfare and the rules of 
humanity, culminating for the moment in the 
sinking of the Lusitania, has aroused a 
feeling of righteous indignation in all 
classes in this country7 to which it would 
be difficult to find a parallel. One result, 
unhappily, is that innocent and unoffending
95. On 12 Kay, for example, V’illiam Joynson Hicks and
Admiral Sir claries Beresford presented to the House 
of Commons petitions signed by 250,000 women asking 
parliament 'immediately to take the necessary steps 
to ensure the safety of their homes, by interning all 
alien enemies of military age, and by removing all 
alien enemies - men and women alike - to a distance 
of at least 30 miles from, rhe sea coast. ' (71HC 5s., 
161S).
\
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persons are in danger of being made to pay
the penalty of the crimes of others...The
government are... carefully considering the
practicability of the segregation and
internment of alien enemies on a more
comorehensive scale...orob
The following day the Prime Minister bowed to public 
opinion and unveiled an aliens .control policy of a severity 
which a few months earlier he would not have contemplated. 
Persons of hostile origin were divided into two classes - 
those who had been naturalised and those who had not. Some
19,000 enemy subjects were at that time interned, leaving 
about 40,000 (24,000 men and 16,000 women) at large. In 
future all adult males in this class were 'for their own 
safety and that of the community,' to be segregated and 
interned or, if over military age, repatriated. Women and 
children, in 'suitable cases, ' would also be repatriated, 
but there would 'no doubt be many instances in which justice 
and humanity will require that they should be allowed to 
remain. ' An advisory body of judicial character was to be 
established to consider applications for exemption from 
the general rule of internment. The Home Secretary would 
be responsible for ascertaining to whom the new policy 
applied. As soon as the military authorities, had provided 
the necessary accommodation those who did not secure 
exemption would be interned. In the case of naturalised 
subjects of enemy origin, who were thought to number about 
9,000, the prima facie presumption would be that they 
should not be interned, unless it was established to the
96. 71HC 5s., 1649, 12 Kay 1915.
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satisfaction of the advisory body in particular cases that
it would be dangerous to leave them at large. Since
legislation was not required it would be possible to
p7implement the new policy quickly.
'The Times 1 observed that 'the government have at 
last decided to do what they should have done nine months
o Q
ago1 and the voluble Joynson Hicks accused Asquith of
yielding to 'clamour and outrage' what he had refused to
89yield to parliament,' but it is doubtful if many politicians
believed that a better compromise could have been reached
between extremist demands and moderate consciences. The
measures had, in any case, received the tacit approval of
the Unionist leadership before they were introduced. Sonar
Lav: explained that he had always avoided being associated
with government policies over which he could have no
control, but such was his concern over the violence against
the alien population, that he had held discussions with-
Asquith on the issue.
After hearing the course which the 
government proposed to adopt...I said to the 
Prime Kinister, and I think it right to say 
it publicly, that I could think of no better 
clan than that which is now proposed. 0
The meeting of minds between Asquith and Eonar Law
on the aliens question was a vital prelude to the uneasy
alliance between Liberals and Unionists in the first
coalition government of the war announced on 25 Kay.
37. 71HC 5s., 1842, 13 Kay 1915.
38. The Times, leader, 14 Kay 1915.
89. 71HC 5s., I860, 13 Kay 1915.
90. Ibid.,col. 1844.
Kay 1915 - December 1916
When Asquith formed his coalition administration 
91in May 1915 the persistent controversy over internment 
of enemy aliens and the ostensibly related issues of 
espionage and national security left him little alternative 
but to remove McKenna from the Home Office. Although he 
despised the activities of the anti-alien extremists and 
the injustice of much of the campaign against McKenna# 
Asquith had to accept that a climate of opinion had been 
created in the country# reflected in parliament# which 
made a change of leadership at the Home Office imperative 
if the new aliens policy was to have a chance of winning 
credibility.
If McKenna saw himself as a scapegoat for the
government's unpopularity over the aliens question he at
least had the consolation of being promoted to Chancellor
of the exchequer. It was an appointment suited to his
talents and temperament but which suprised his detractors#
who expected him to be dropped from the government as was
Haldane# the Lord Chancellor# another prime target of the
og
anti-alien extremists." But where McKenna wras characterised 
as the v/eak, misguided politician unable properly to 
comprehend the danger frorri the 'enemy within1 # Haldane was
91. ?or a discussion of the cabinet changes see S.E. Koss# 
'Britain's Last Liberal Government'# Journal of 
Modern His tor-/# vol. 4 0# 2# June 1958# pp. 257-77.
92. Richard Burdon Haldane# first Viscount Haldane of 
Cloan (1856-1928)# Secretary of State for War 1905-12; 
Lord Chancellor 1912-15. He studied at Gottingen 
University and spent much time in Germany during the 
pre-war years.
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portrayed by his critics as an unabashed friend of Germany 
who regarded that country as his spiritual home.
McKenna's old adversary Kitchener continued to 
remain aloof from the controversy over the aliens issue 
despite the considerable responsibility his department bore 
for the erratic pattern of internment policy. Asquith was 
undoubtedly happy to keep the war minister separated in the 
public mind from aliens matters. Whatever the shortcomings 
of the War Office under Kitchener's leadership - and the 
handling of the internment question was clearly one of them - 
they paled into relative insignificance when weighed against 
the importance to military recruitment and national morale 
of Kitchener's presence in the cabinet. Perhaps, as Koss has
suggested, Asquith '/took/ refuge behind Kitchener's massive
93index finger that protruded from recruitment posters. '
After May 1915 the War Office had little direct 
involvement in the key questions of exemption and release 
of civilians from internment which, under Asquith's new 
measures, were placed firmly in the hands of the Home office
and the Scottish Office, acting with the advice of the new
„ . . 9 4Aliens Advisory Committees.
93. S.E. Koss, op. cit.
94. The proceedings of the committees were not published. 
Incidental references to the work of the committee for 
England and 'Wales are to be found in various Home 
Office files, but there is a dearth of information at 
the Scottish Records Office on the work of the 
Scottish committee or on the general handling of 
aliens matters in Scotland. There seems little doubt, 
however, that the policy pattern established in 
England and 'Wales was closely followed in Scotland.
995Asquith appointed Sir John Simon," the widely- 
respected Attorney-General, as Home Secretary, probably 
confirming what many observers had anticipated, that althoug 
the prime Minister was prepared to make apparently 
significant concessions to the hardliners he was determined 
that the interpretation and implementation of the new 
regulations would be in the hands of a man of known 
moderate and humanitarian views. For Asquith it was probably; 
a compromise between political expediency and an uneasy 
conscience. Simon's appointment was greeted with surprising 
enthusiasm even by some of the more stridently anti-alien 
sections of the popular press. The Evening News, for example! 
which had often attacked McKenna and the government's 
internment policy, said -c imon' s appointment gave every hope '
t
that in a short time 'we shall have heard the last of a 
deplorable state of things which has secured for us the 
amazement of our allies and the contempt of our enemies. '"
It may be that the euphoria had less to do with Simon's 
qualities., however admirable they may have been, than with 
relief at the rerrioval of McKenna and an assumption that any 
new regime was likely to be more in tune with the views of 
the critics who helped unseat McKenna. This may have been 
reinforced by the knowledge that 1 imon would have a freer
95. Simon (1873-1954) entered the House of Commons in 19 06* 
Served as Solicitor-General 1910-13; Attorney-General 
(seat in cabinet) 1913-15m and Home Secretary 1913-15. 
He'ld a number of senior cabinet posts in the 193 0s, 
elevated to Viscount 194 0 arid served as Lord 
Chancellor 1940-45.
96. Evening News, 18 June 1915.
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hand on internment than his predecessor. But however the
militants chose to interpret Simon's stance - and his
speeches were models of judiciousness - he promised no
more than McKenna had done. There was the obligatory
assurance of strong action where warranted in the national
interest, but also the qualifying assertion that he would
not be pushed by extremist opinion into decisions that were
97unfair or unjust. Although his fundamental attitude to 
the internment issue was not markedly different to that of 
McKenna, Simon began with a number of advantages. Apart 
from being able to note the lessons of the mistakes made 
during the early months of the war, he had greater powers 
and more flexibility, and the existence of the advisory 
committee would almost inevitably help diffuse some of the 
criticism which might otherwise be directed at the Home 
Secretary.
The Advisory Committee for England and Wales was 
chaired by Mr. Justice Sankey and included another High 
Court judge, Mr. Justice Younger, four members of 
parliament (Stanley Baldwin, Donald Maclean, John Mooney 
and the Rt. non. Lieutenant-Colonel A.R.M. Lockwood) and 
two women members, the Rt. Hon. Maude Lawrence and Miss 
Talbot. Their brief was,
To advise as to the grant or refusal of 
applications made by enemy aliens for exemption 
from internment or deportation, and on such 
other questions relating to the treatment of 
persons of enemy alien origin as may be 
referred to them,. p
97. 72HC 5s., 844-5, 18 June 1915.
93. Home Office List, March 1916
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The government attempted to give the advisory committees 
'elasticity' and the power to relax regulations and to
discriminate in order to avoid 'serious injustice and
9 9hardship to individuals.' The committees largely
determined their own procedure and decided that hearings
would be in private, although many KPs believed they should
be open to the public and the press. Hearings were
presided over by a judicial member and, although solicitors
often appeared on behalf of aliens, counsel were not heard
and proceedings were strictly confidential.
The committee for England and ..'ales divided itself
into two sub-committees; one, headed by Sankey, dealt
with internment matters, the other, under Younger's
chairmanship, handled repatriations questions. The Sankey
sub-committee held its first meeting on 27 Hay and sat on
40 occasions during the next two months. During that period
14,117 applications for exemption from internment were
received, 7,325 were refused, 6,092 granted, and the
1 0 0remainder held for further consideration. The small
number of enemy aliens in Scotland meant that the Scottish
Advisory•Committee's work was on a much reduced scale
compared to that of the Sankey sub-committee. By 5 July
the Scottish committee had held nine meetings and dealt
with 510 cases, granting exemption in 417 instances and
101refused on 93 occasions. In all cases the onus was on
99. 71HC 5s., 1S77, 13 Hay 1915.
100. 73HC 5s., 2133, 27 July 1915.
101. 73HC 5s ., 367, 7 July 1915.
102
the alien seeking exemption to show why he should be made 
an exception to the general rule of internment. Most of 
those released were, Austrian subjects of friendly races
considered 'likely to be hostile to the Austrian government
102and in favour of the allies. 1 Of the relatively few 
internees of German nationality set free the majority were 
Poles or Alsatians.
The Home Secretary had final responsibility for 
deciding which aliens should be arrested and which released 
but he normally accepted the recommendation of the advisory 
committee. The task of collecting information and preparing 
cases for the committee and conveying its recommendations 
to the Home Secretary was assigned to the Home Office 
Prisoners of War Branch which had been returned to the 
jurisdiction of the Home Secretary from the War Office under 
Asquith's measures introduced in May.
In advising the committee, the Prisoners of War 
Branch adopted the principle that if room for doubt 
existed about the loyalty of an enemy subject to Britain, 
whatever his race, internment was recommended. Waller, 
who probably adopted a more uncompromising line on 
internment than most of his senior colleagues at the Home 
Office, particularly in the case of German nationals, 
wrote after the war that the general internment of Germans 
was a proper measure 'because of their strong patriotism, 
the extensive ramifications of the German system of
102. Memo., M.L. Waller, 14 May 1915, HO 45/1:760/269116/42.
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obtaining intelligence and the impossibility of trusting 
assurances of pro-British feeling, whether by a German or 
on his behalf.' Waller believed that the Austrians were 
in a different category. They had less attachment to their 
own country" and were ’more apt to identify themselves with 
the country in which they had settled. 1 More than half the 
Austrian subjects in Eritain belonged to races friendly to 
the allies and in practice the advisory committees treated 
them more leniently than the Germans. Waller saw the Turks 
and Bulgarians as standing on a differing footing to the 
Germans and Austrians. There were relatively few of them 
in Britain and they were usually 'uneducated men without 
sufficient brains to be dangerous.' Some who were destitute 
were interned 'for their own protection or support' but
10generally they were exempted except in cases of suspicion.^ 
The advisory committees took careful account of the 
advice of the bona fide organisations representing the 
main ethnic groups. The committees and successive Home 
Secretaries were undoubtedly guided by the belief that 
members of the friendly races represented by the groups 
deserved to be treated as sympathetically as possible, but 
more pragmatic considerations may also have influenced the 
government's attitude. Calder argues with some persuasion 
that a relatively lenient internment policy left at liberty 
many emigres of the subject nationalities, who were able to 
move about freely and work with the minimum of inconvenience
103. Waller report on work of Prisoners of War Branch, 
op. cit.
104
104towards the goal of post-war self-determination.
While the Home Office was considering 
problems of internment the Foreign Office was 
being approached by emigres representing the 
subject nationalities of eastern Europe/ each 
with a programme for national liberation. The 
officials were well aware that these emigres 
might be too useful to be interned.
A further advantage of allowing certain members of the
friendly races to remain free was that they were able to
pass to the British authorities information gleaned from
contacts in their own countries and elsewhere in Europe.
While relations between the emigre organisations
and Whitehall were sometimes strained, in Hay 1915 a Home
Office official noted that the Czech, Polish, Serbian and
Italian liaison groups had worked well 'and no misleading
recommendation, so far as is known, has been male by any of
them. , 1 0 6
The Home Office had, however, formed a very different 
viev/ of the group that purported to represent the Alsatian 
community in Britain, the Alsace-Lorraine Patriotic 
League. After a brief period -of co-operation between the 
League and the Home Office in the early days of the war, 
relations became progressively imore abrasive, if not hosuile. 
From Hay 1915 both the Home Office and the aliens advisory 
committee depended solely on the French Consulate-General 
for advice on cases involving Alsatians. The League continued
104. K.J. Calder, op. cit., p. 22
105. Ibid.
106. Memo., K.L. Waller, 14 Hay 1915, KC 45/10760/269116/42.
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to fight for recognition as the official link between
their compatriots and the British government, but their
representations were resisted in Whitehall where the Home
Office considered the conduct of the group open to 'grave 
107objection. 1 On several occasions the League had vouched
for aliens who had proved subsequently to be strongly pro-
German and had notified the Home Office that certain
individuals were bona fide Alsatians when they were actually
of German parentage. The League was also thought to have
failed to pass on information to the department which could
have prevented the internment of several genuine French 
10SAlsatians. ~ Home Office officials suspected that the
■
League's activities may have been partially motivated by 
financial gain with money being paid by ^lsatian men of
military age in the hope of avoiding the alternatives of
109service m  the French Army or internment in Britain.
Under Anglo-French agreements the only Alsatians interned 
were those not recognised as of French origin and those of 
military age and physically fit who were unwilling to go to 
France to perform military service with the French Army.^^ 
Otherwise any member of the Alsatian community who"obtained 
a certificate from the French Consulate-General to the effect
107. Nemo., R.S. Nolan to M.L. Waller, 5 Oct. 1916,
HO 45/10760/269510/3la.
103. R.S. Nolan to H. de Coppet, French Consul-General,
27 June 1916, HO 45/10760/269510/25e.
109. Memo, J.F. Koylan, 10 Oct. 1917, n0 45/10760/265510/53
110. HO 45/10760/269510/41.
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that in France he would be treated as a French citizen was
accorded the same status in Britain, and was no longer
subject to the restrictions applying to enemy aliens.
Despite the complexities of assessing the claims of
the various emigre groups for favoured treatment, the
coalition government were anxious to be seen to implement
the new internment policy with firmness as well as fairness.
Within a month 3,339 enemy alien men were interned, all
available accommodation was filled, and more was being
brought into operation week by week. By 5 July a further
3,305 aliens had been placed in captivity, the total
interned since the beginning of the war reached 26,713, and
arrests were taking place at a rate of about 1 , 0 0 0  a week. " 1 1
The early impetus of the new policy slowed by the end of
the summer and from the beginning of August to mid-October
112only 3,000 enemy subjects were interned. But by late 
November the process of interning or repatriating enemy 
aliens not exempted on the recommendation of the advisory 
committees was almost complete. By 2 2 November the number 
interned had risen to 32,44 0, an increase of over 60y0 
since the introduction of Asquith's new measures in .'-ay.
Of the 15,410 who had applied for exemption from internment
r-J O / O  ^ 17,r43 were successful.
Having supervised the internment of virtually all
1 1 1 . 73HC C c-• / 17, 5 July 1915.
1 1 2 . 74HC 5s., 14 63, 14 Oct. 1915
113. 76HC 5s., 313, 24 Nov. 1915.
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non-exempted enemy aliens Simon's tenure at the Home Office 
came to ai abrupt end when he resigned on 11 January 1916 in 
protest over the introduction of military conscription. His 
successor Herbert Samuel/ a former junior minister in the 
department/ was familiar with the historical background of 
the aliens question and/ as a Jew, with the public prejudicq 
it inspired. Whatever his personal sympathies with the enemy 
aliens as a beleaguered minority group/ however, Samuel 
was acutely conscious of the potential political, if not 
strategic,problems posed by the presence of 23,000 people 
officially classed as enemy aliens at liberty in the 
community. It was a statistic which the anti-alien 
propagandists exploited relentlessly, invariably ignoring 
the fact that it included 1 2 , 0 0 0  women, many men above and 
below military age and members of races deemed friendly to 
the allies.
Samuel insisted that he personally considered each
new case of internment or repatriation and, unless it came
within well defined categories, he also considered each
114release from internment. As an example of the ostensibly 
strong line he was adopting, Samuel recounted to the House 
of Commons the case of a German national living in Forest 
Gate, -ondon, who had been exempted from internment on the 
grounds that he was 65 years old, had lived in Britain 
since 1S64, maried an English woman and had five children. 
The man was fined £5 in police court for failing to shade 
a light during an air raid and, on the grounds that Germans
114. 80HC 5s., 409, 21 Feb. 1916.
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who were allowed to remain free should scrupulously observe 
wartime regulations# Samuel directed that he should be 
interned whether or not the offence was committed through 
ignorance.'*'1  ^Despite his sensitivity to public arid 
parliamentary opinion on the aliens issue# however# Samuel 
continued# as his predecesors had done# to regard 
sympathetically applications from members of the friendly 
races for exemption or release from internment. Any 
significant deviation from this approach was likely to have 
prompted a vigourous reaction from i/vc
several of which had conducted sophisticated campaigns to 
win support for their causes and had enlisted a number of 
influencial backers.
The Slavs in particular had attracted many prominent 
supporters who helped to ensure that the British government 
was well informed of their case. The Serbian rociety of 
Great Britain#^ ^  for example# had Lord cromer as president 
and boasted an executive committee which included Wickham 
' t e e d/the distinguished foreign editor of The Times; the 
historian# Robert Seton Watson# who in the latter part of 
the war worked in the cabinet's intelligence bureau and 
headed the Austrian section of the propaganda department 
based at Crewe House# and John Buchan# the writer# who was 
a subordinate director in the Ministry of Information 1917-18. 
The School of Slavonic Studies established in London in 
October 1915 also helped to focus attention on uhe Slav
115. 80HC 5s.# 407# 21 Feb. 1916.
116. H. Hanak# Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the 
First World ’War: A Study in the -"ormation of Public 
Opinion (1962T~, pp. 195-5.
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case and further backing was subsequently provided by a 
weekly review, The New Europe, launched in late 1917 by 
feton vvatson, T.G. Kasaryk, the Czech patriot, and others. 
While the Slav lobby undoubtedly won considerable sympathy 
in Britain, particularly in government and official circles 
where they had a number of influencial friends, it seems 
doubtful that the complexities of Balkan political 
aspirations ever achieved much popular understanding.
The political aims of the subject races of the 
Ottoman Empire were equally little understood in Britain, 
but after the early months of the war when internment policy! 
was confused, they were treated with considerable sympathy. 
Nearly all appeals by members of the subject races, notably j 
Greeks, Armenians and Syrians, for exemption from intern­
ment were granted on the recommendation of the advisory 
117committees.
Although in general members of the friendly races
were treated more leniently than other enemy aliens, the
government always insisted that each case was dealt with
on its merits and where suspicion existed about an
alien's opinions or attitudes he was liable to be interned.j
The general rule was that 'exemption could only7 be
maintained in cases where it appeared perfectly clear from
every point of view that no danger to the country7 could
119possibly result.' Any exempted alien imprisoned for a
117. 19KL 5s., 1071, 14 Oct. 1915.
118. 30HC 5s., 1050, 1 Mar. 1916.
119. Waller report on work of Prisoners of War Branch, 
op. cit.
110
criminal offence was interned as soon as his sentence had
been completed.
Many decisions on internment, repatriation and
exemption in the early days of the advisory committees '
operations were made on inadequate evidence and hundreds
of cases were later reviewed in the light of fresh
information, resulting in some cases in a reversal of
12 0earlier recommendations. Between 1 August 1915 and 21
February 1916 the Sankey sub-committee dealt with 2,076 
applications for exemption, recommending favourably in 
1 , 2 1 1  instances, half of which involved members of the
121 ifriendly races. Of 6,700 alien of German and Austrian ■* ^
nationality at large at the end of February 1916 just over
3,000 were Czechs, Poles and southern Slavs, and the
remainder had been exempted on the recommendation of the
122advisory committees on 'special grounds.' In the latter 
case the grounds were usually categorised as 'national' or 
'personal 1 . National reasons took account of the value of 
the alien's skills and experience to the war effort; 
personal grounds included such factors as the alien's 
length of residence in Britain (usually required to be 
over 35 years to gain exemption-', his marriage to a British 
woman, and the service of one or more of his children in 
the British armed forces. The latter circumstance was 
clearly not considered an overriding ground for exemption
120. Ibid.
121. 80HC 5s., 408, 21 Feb. 1916.
122. 80HC 5s., 1247, 1 Mar. 1916.
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since, by December 1917, an estimated 6,000 enemy alien
fathers of men serving in the British forces were confined
.  ^  ^ 123in internment camps.
Samuel assured the cabinet that the decisions
arrived at by the advisory committees were provisional only
and any complaints received abcut exempted enemy aliens werd
immediately investigated by the police. The whole of the
alien population was 'under constant supervision' and there
was no reason to suspect that any errors of importance had
been made in the exemptions which had been allowed.
Similar assurances were given publicly by other ministers,
but with the internment camp population running at over
32,000, the government was still prepared, both on economic
and humanitarian grounds to release prisoners considered 
12 5'safe'. One of the most forceful advocates of the
practical arguments for releasing internees was Lord
Newton who, as Paymaster-General in the first coalition,
spoke for the War Office in the House of Lords during
Kitchener's frequent absences and later became Controller
of the independent Prisoners of War Department which was
12 6detached from the Foreign Office in 191*6.. Newton
123. 100HC 5s., 1698-9, 17 Dec. 1917.
124. Confidential document for cabinet use, 19 June 1716, 
AP, 127/229.
125. 21KL 5s., 460, 22 Car. 1915.
125. Newton (1857-1942) became i.P in 1886, succeeded to 
father's peerage in 1898. Paymaster-General, June 
1915; Assistant Under-Secretary, FO, with 
responsibility for departments dealing with 
prisoners of war and propaganda, Far. 1915;
Controller of Prisoners of War Department, Oct. 1916- 
Aug. 1919.
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reasoned that even if an alien was technically hostile,
providing he was not suspected of subversion, he was
’better employed in making boots and clothes or baking bread
than being kept doing nothing in an internment camp at
127the expense of the taxpayers of this country. ' He also
argued that prolonged internment could seriously affect both
the physical and mental health of prisoners and in many
cases left their families destitute. Men previously
friendly to Britain could be converted into her 'most
dangerous enemies, 1 and, if not repatriated at the end of
the war, might form ’a most undesirable element in the
population, 1 harbouring bitter hostility to the government
128that had imprisoned them.
By the spring of 1916' the government was beginning 
to consider seriously the potential problems that would 
have to be faced when thousands of enemy aliens were 
released from custody at the end of the war. The prospect 
of former enemies competing with returning soldiers for 
jobs had obvious disturbing political implications. Clearly 
government planning for the immediate post-war period had 
to take account of the internees and the task was assumed 
by the Reconstruction Committee established by Asquith in 
March 1916 as a committee of the cabinet. On 2 3 :7arch, the 
committee secretary Vaughan Nash wrote to all key depart­
ments seeking their views and information on their work
127. 22HL 5s., 1034, 1 Aug. 1916.
128. 22HL 5s., 183, 25 May 1916.
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in so far as it fell within the committee's terms of 
129reference. In a submission from the Home Office, Troup 
stressed the practical and human problems that were likely 
to occur when the internment camps were cleared.
There will be strong feeling against 
allowing them to settle again in this country; 
but some of them have lived here for many 
years, have married British wives, have British 
children, and are so clcsely connected with this 
country that it would be practically impossible 
to expel them. On the other hand, there are 
large numbers who are bitterly^ hostile to this 
country and many of them, as a consequence of 
the war, wTill have lost their means of liveli­
hood here and, if they remain, will only be a 
source of embarrassment and even danger. More­
over they will be objects of strong popular 
resentment, and will find it difficult or 
impossible to obtain employment. It will be 
necessary to determine which of them are to 
remain here and which.of them are to be 
repatriated. The question is one of great 
difficulty, and it is most desirable that it 
should be settled well before the actual 
conclusion of peace, so that those v/ho are 
repatriated may be sent straight from the place 
of internment to their own country, and not 
turned loose here in circumstances where they 
may be lost sight of or may do mischief, or, 
on the other hand, may suffer from popular 
hostility.,  ^n
1  J  b
The detailed consideration of the problem of dealing with 
the enemy alien population at the end of the war was 
entrusted by the Reconstruction Committee to an inter-
129. Confidential report, Reconstruction Committee, •£ 
June 1916, AP, 127/160. The committee was formed to 
consider and advise, with the aid of sub—committees, 
on the problems which would arise at the end of the 
war, and to co-ordinate the work which had already 
been done by government departments in this 
connexion. The committee was reconstituted in ; ar. 
1917 to include representatives of business, 
finance and labour as well as KPs. The work of the 
committee was absorbed into the I-.inistry of 
Reconstruction established in Aug. 1917.
130. Troup to Vaughan hash, 25.Apr. 1916, AP, 127.
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departmental sub-committee appointed in June under the 
chairmanship of the Home Secretary, Samuel. Other Home 
Office appointees were Troup, Pedder and John Fischer 
Williams (secretary), and the group was asked to consider:
i. The questions which will arise at the 
end of the war in connection with the 
presence in this country of persons of 
enemy nationality, and whether the 
repatriation of such persons is 
desirable, and if so, in what cases.
ii. What restrictions, if any, should be 
imposed after the war on the admission 
of enemy aliens into this country and 
their residence here.
iii. VJhether changes in the lav: or practice 
of naturalisation have been shown by the 
experience of the war to be required in 
the public interest.
If the government was looking ahead on the aliens 
question, the hardliners in parliament, such as Joynson 
Hicks, Sir Fichard Cooper, I ir Henry Dalziel and Admiral 
Charles Beresford, insisted on reminding Asquith and 
his colleagues with increasing frequency of what they saw 
as the flaws in the current internment policy. They 
accused the government of failing to honour their pledges, 
underestimating the danger posed by the enemy aliens still 
at large, and of lagging far behind public opinion on the 
issue.
Samuel attempted to mollify the hardliners by 
assuring them that he agreed with their view that 'the 
presence of a large number or even of a small number of 
enemy aliens in this country may be a very grave danger,'
131. Home Cffice List, April 1918.
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and he added,
I am deeply impressed by what has 
happened in the United States and in Canada, 
where outrages of various kinds have 
undoubtedly been plotted and executed under 
the guidance of officers of the enemy govern­
ment by belligerent subjects living in those 
countries. If adequate measures were not taken 
I am far from thinking that there is no 
possibility of similar occurences taking place 
here, and the nation has a right to know that 
measures, and vigorous measures, are being 
taken by the government to guard against these 
dangers -1 3 2
Samuel's words were more cosmetic than a genuine reflection 
of a commitment by the government to stronger measures, -he | 
cabinet felt it had gone as far as v;as necessary on in re rn- 1 
ment and figures presented by the Home Secretary to the 
cabinet in mid-June reinforced this view. About 13,000 
enemy aliens had been interned since May 1915, about
1 0 , 0 0 0  had been repatriated, and there remained at large 
just over 10,000 enemy alien women, excluding British-born 
women; about 4,000 men of friendly race or origin; about 
1,500 men over 70 years of age, and a few individuals 
who were considered to be doing valuable scientific or 
industrial service in support of the British war effort. 
About 6,000 other enemy aliens, most of whom had long 
residence in Britain (an estimated two-thirds had lived 
in the country for over 3 0 years) and strong marital ar.d 
family ties here, also remained free.^~/“/ Samuel was well 
aware that the internment statistics regularly provided bv
132. 100HC 5s., 1662, 17 Dec. 1217.
133. Confidential report to cabinet, 19 June 1916, AP, 
127/229.
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the government were unlikely to prove a very effective 
counter to the inflammatory generalisations of the anti­
alien propagandists. When they complained that 22,000 
enemy aliens were allowed to remain at large 'everyone
imagines 22,000 able bodied active German or Austrian
,134 men. '
While few outside the more extreme anti-alien 
hardliners would have contested the view of Samuel and 
his predecessors that practical and humanitarian 
considerations demanded that there had to be some 
exceptions to a policy of general internment of enemy 
aliens, there was clearly a much more widely held beliei 
that the government's internment policy continued to be 
lenient. This view was exploited by the anti-alien 
propagandists, who saw potential saboteurs and spies in 
every uninterned enemy alien, although they had virtual] 
all been 'vetted1 by the police, the intelligence 
authorities and the advisory committees and found 'safe. 
That the committees recommended any exemptions from inte 
ment was sufficient to make them a target of criticism 
from the more unyielding extremists, but Sankey and his 
colleagues won the respect of most parliamentarians and 
the emigre groups for their painstaking impartiality. T’r 
reliance placed by the Home Office on the judgment of tr 
Sankey sub-committee is reflected in the fact that up tc 
the end of 1916 only about 25 0 people were exempted whos 
internment had been recommended by the committee, and
too
2
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134. 83HC. 5s . , 106S, 29 June 1916.
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practically all of those were allowed to remain free
because subsequent evidence not available to the committee
showed they were employed in work of value to the war
effort. Later reviews of cases by the Home Office led to
the internment of about 700 enemy subjects originally
135recommended by the committee for exemption.
Towards the end of 1916 criticism of the government
internment policy was beginning to acquire a new, more
bitter edge. The war had gone on far longer than most
people expected and there seemed little prospect of an
early peace; personal liberties were being increasingly
curtailed, and everyone was affected to a great or lesser
extent by the inconveniences and shortages arising from
the demands of the war effort. The early enthusiasm for the
war which had sustained national morale was beginning to
flag, and there were nagging doubts both in parliament and
the country about Asquith's effectiveness in managing the
war effort, and, as far as internment was concerned, whothe
he was sufficiently committed to the 'avowed policy of the
government. There seems little doubt that the confusion
which oft'en surrounded aliens policy arose partly from, the
casual administrative practices of the Asquith cabinet and
the lack of precise information about decisions taken, ho
record was kept of business discussed, apart from a private
letter sent by Asquith to the King, 'which often contained
136
.Little more than a nazy notion of decisions taken. Lord
135. 109HC 5s 447, ily 1918.
136. 3OHL 5s., 263-4, 19 June 1918.
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Hankey records one instance as secretary of the CID of
submitting a report to the cabinet on the treatment of
aliens with a request that it be given immediate attention.
Despite repeated inquiries he was never able to establish
137whether the cabinet had ever discussed the report.
Asquith's lack of urgency and apparent reluctance 
to act decisively on the aliens issue led some observers to 
conclude that his devotion to the concept of general intern­
ment of enemy subjects was as lukewarm as it had been in 
the early days of the war. Although many more aliens were 
in custody as a result of his -ay 1915 measures, a 
substantial number remained at large/ and the fundamental 
approach of the coalition government to civilian internment 
had not been conspicuously harsher than that of the previous 
administration. Asquith's attitude to the aliens issue was 
guided principally by caution and a genuine concern that 
vulnerable minorities should be treated justly# both for 
humanitarian reasons and because he believed Eritain should 
not only act in accordance with international lav; and 
practice but be clearly seen to do so. He regarded the anti- 
alien extremists with contempt# but his attempts to counter 
their appeals to emotion and ignorance with restrained and 
reasoned argument were largely ineffectual in the prevailing 
climate of opinion. But if his style and temperament were 
ill suited to the contemporary mood, and his government's 
handling of the internment question sometimes inept, it
137. Hankey to Balfour, 4 Dec. 1914, Balfour Papers, 
British Library, quoted by J.?. Naylor, 'The 
Establishment of the Cabinet Secretariat', 
Historial Journal, vol. 14# 4, 1971# pp. 733-303.
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can truly be said of Asquith that 'he never forgot the
classical injunction to treat an enemy as though he may
138one day become a friend...' But moderation and 
magnanimity were not qualities that the British public 
demanded in the. treatment of enemy aliens during wartime 
and when Asquith finally gave way to Lloyd George in 
December 1916 there was wide expectation that the nev; prime
Minister would take a much more decisive if not harsher
n . . 13Qline on internment.
133. J.A. r pender and C. Asquith, Life of Herb-, rt Henry 
Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith,2 vols. (19 3 2)
p. 231, II.
139. See B. McGill, 'Asquith's Predicament, 1914-13',
Journal of Aodem History, vol. 39, 3, 1967, pp. 2 53- 
303.
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December 1916 - November 1918
Lloyd George showed a shrewder appreciation than 
had Asquith of the complexities of the aliens question and 
the powerful passions it aroused. Although he privately 
shared Asquith's disdain for the extremists, he was quite 
prepared, when it suited his political purpose, to adopt 
their kind of rhetoric and to use the aliens issue to 
manipulate public opinion.
The composition of the new war cabinet can only have
encouraged those who looked to the government for a more
positive and stricter internment policy. Only Arthur
Henderson, the single Labour Party representative in the
cabinet, had consistently shown sympathy for the plight of
enemy aliens and a desire to ameliorate it. It is perhaps
not without significance that Lloyd George placed 'safe'
conservatives in the key ministerial posts concerned with
14 0aliens matters and prisoners of war. Sir George Cave, 
an orthodox and rather colourless Tory, was promoted from 
Solicitor-General to follow three Liberal Home Secretaries 
and the affable and popular Lord Derby replaced Lloyd 
George at the War Office. Cave clearly had the enthusiastic 
backing of the Prime Kinister in quickly demonstrating a 
firm line on internment, and one of his first initiatives 
as 'Home Secretary was to ord.er a survey of the cases of all
14 0. cave (1856-1928) entered the House of Commons in
1906, became Solicitor-General in 1915, and served 
as Home Secretary from 1916-19. created viscount in 
1918, he served two spells as Lord Chancellor in 
the 192 0s.
1German men who had been exempted fro::, internment or 
repatriation to determine whether their continued freedom 
was justified.
In Troup’s view the new national service scheme, 
designed to maximise the manpower available for the war 
effort, would make it impossible to leave enemy aliens 'to 
go on making money in any way they choose when British 
subjects are required to give up their ordinary businesses 
or occupations and undertake national service in other 
industries. ' The opportunity should be taker, in the review 
ordered by Cave to ascertain from the police -which exem.ptee 
were engaged in work of national importance and which were 
not so that the latter could be transferred into such 
work. Troup believed that 'Those who refused to do work
14necessary for this country could and should be interned. 1
The review was begun immediately in the Ketropolita 
Police area and a general circular was issued to all forces 
on 24 February 1917 advising that the continuing exemption 
of enemy aliens aged 16 to 65 would be conditional on:
i. Reports by the police that their conduct 
had been 'entirely satisfactory' and 'no 
reasonable suspicion as to his actions cr 
character had arisen.'
ii. Confirmation that they were undertaking 
work of national importance unless 
prevented from doing so by age and 
infirmity.
14 1. Memo. , . roup, 30 Dec. 1916, X-C 45/10831/226555/2.
142. Note on work of the Aliens Division for govern: sr.
record, 12 Jan. 1918, HOP.
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Cave's review was welcomed by Sir Edward Henry, 
the Metropolitan Police commissioner, who reminded the 
government that despite the introduction of Asquith's 
general internment policy in May 1915 and the work of the 
advisory committees there were still a 'very considerable 
number1 of enemy aliens living in London. The effect of 
Asquith's measures had been 'virtually to take all 
responsibility out of the hands of the police. ' Nevertheless 
cases had occured where the police received information 
indicating the desirability of interning certain aliens.
When this happened the police either reported the 
circumstances to the Home Office for reconsideration of 
the exemption or, if the case appeared urgent, interned 
the individual themselves and then sought approval. The 
only cases where the police might be said to have exercised 
their own discretion in refraining from interning an alien 
when such a course appeared desirable was in a few instances 
of severe illness where captivity seemed likely to 
endanger life, or where there was some doubt about . 
nationality, or where vital information had come to light
14
after consideration of the case by the advisory committee.
Although Cave's review resulted in some further 
internments and repatriations they constituted hardly more 
than a token gesture to 'the critics of internment policy, 
some of whom continued to demand nothing less than the 
internment or repatriation of all enemy aliens, with urgent 
priority given to the arrest of German nationals. Cave
143. Henry to Troup, 8 Jan. 1917, HO 45/10831/326555/3 
See appendix V.
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pointed out in mid-February that of the 20,000 enemy aliens 
still at liberty fewer than 2,000 were Germans, nearly
10.000 were women, and of the 7,500 men of military age 
the majority were subjects of Austria-Hungary, including
3.000 members of the friendly races, and about 500 were
Ottoman subjects. All had been recommended for exemption
144by the advisory committees.
Such arguments as were put forward in parliament 
at this period against general internment, notably by Lord 
Newton, tended to reiterate the view that it was more 
sensible to employ enemy subjects in helping the war 
effort, even if indirectly, than to keep them, languishing 
in camps at considerable cost to the public purse. Newton 
summed up his view thus,
I never could follow the doctrine that 
because you particularly dislike a man and 
disliked his country you should put him 
behind barbed wire and keep him there doing 
nothing. If I disliked a person very much I 
would infinitely prefer to see him working 
for the benefit of the country, and thus 
helping to bring the war to a conclusion.,^^
The case for exempting or releasing enemy aliens from.
internment on humanitarian as well as economic grounds
continued to be advocated by a small number of politicians,
and some also endorsed the view of the emigre groups that
members of the friendly races whose loyalty to the allied
cause was not in doubt had virtually a moral right to
freedom.
144. 90HC 5s., 710, 14 Feb. 1917.
145. 24HL 5s., 733, 29 Far. 1917.
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The argument for special consideration for Poles
took on a new dimension in lljarch 1917 when the revolutionary
provisional government in Russia declared Poland an
independent nation. The Polish lobby in Britain and other
countries urged that Polish committees should be
established and entrusted with consular functions previously
1^6undertaken by the Russian authorities. ‘ Ihe secretary Qf the 
influential Polish Exiles Protection group in London, 
Laurence Alma Tadema, suggested in Kay that
.... the time has come when an end might be 
put to sufferings due entirely to the 
political disadvantage which, before the 
position of the polish question was recognised, 
caused a Pole to be regarded not as a Pole, 
but an Austrian, German or Russian. It would 
surely not be in accordance with the present 
position of the Polish question to keep Poles 
interned in England today. -|^
Given the wide international implications of the situation
the British government stalled the representations of the 
148Polish lobby. It was not until February 1918 that an 
order in council was issued laying down that where the 
Secretary of ' tate was satisfied, whether by certificate
14 6 . The first group to take charge of Polish interests 
was the Polish Information Committee, under Russian 
auspices. In 1916 the Russian embassy transferred 
recognition to a society known as the Polish Exiles 
Protection and the Eritish government followed suit. 
The political side of the society's work was 
subsequently taken over by the Polish National 
Committee and the society remained in existence for 
charitable purposes only. After the armistice the 
Polish National Committee became the Polish 
Legation.
147. Tadema letter, 27 Apr. 1917, passed by intermediary 
'to FC, HO 45/10740/262173/49.
148. HO 45/10740/262173/49.
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from the Polish National Committee or otherwise, that an
enemy alien was a Pole, and well disposed to Britain and
her allies, he could grant exemption from all or any
provisions of the aliens restriction regulations except
149those applying to non-enemy nationals.
During Cave's first year at the Home Office the 
majority of those released from internment were prisoners 
(mostly of Austrian nationality) given conditional parole 
licences to carry out work of national importance, mainly 
in agriculture. Between 1 January and 17 December 1517 
only 2 35 enemy aliens were interned while 1,423 were 
released on licence and 52 were freed for other reasons. 
This latter group consisted of some elderly men from 
prohibited areas who could not be released, as recommended 
by the advisory committees, until their families had found 
homes for them in non-prohibited localities; a few men 
discharged owing to family circumstances fof a specially 
distressing kind1 and two or three prisoners dying from 
incurable diseases released to the care of their wives.
The rest were all men of friendly races, on 17 December
there was a totil of 24, 053 enemy aliens at large,
made up of 13,546 men and 10,507 women. The total includes
13,063 Germans, 9,259 Austro-Hungarians, 1,666 Turks and
en - icl ^uigailans.
In late 1917 Cave found himself under growing
149. Order in council, 5 Feb. 1919, amending Aliens 
Restriction (Consolidation) Order 1916.
150. 100HC 5s., 1319, 17 Dec. 1917.
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pressure, not least from rank and file members of his 
cun party, to impose a more stringent internment policy.
m
A splitAthe Unionist group in the coalition government 
and party activ/s'fs both on the backbenches and outside 
parliament was publicly highlighted in a debate 
engineered by Joynson Kicks on 17 December, when he 
proposed a series of amendments to the Consolidated Fund 
(Appropriations) Bill. These called for 'a more definite 
policy1 on internment under which 'no man should be 
allowed to remain unintemed except for definitely 
national as opposed to personal reasons;' repatriation 
of women and children of enemy origin unless there were 
exceptional reasons not to do so; new legislation to enable 
the Home Secretary where appropriate to cancel 
naturalisation certificates of men of enemy origin, and a 
bar against further enemy aliens being naturalised during 
the v,rar. Joynson Hicks told the House of Commons that the 
amendments represented the feeling of Unionists both in 
parliament and the country that the government had not 
taken effective action to deal with enemy aliens. The 
amendments were, in fact, substantially resolutions drafted 
by a sub-committee of the party's Business Committee and 
unanimously approved by its powerful War Committee. Previous 
proposals to intern all enemy aliens except those exempted 
for national reasons had been 'met with scorn by the 
ministerial benchr* said Joynson Hicks, and the Home Office 
differed from the the Unionist Party and the majority of 
the House of Commons on what constituted justifiable grounds
127
for exempting enemy aliens from internment. His call for 
a more uncompromising internment policy was eagerly 
endorsed by hardliners such as General Page Croft/ John 
Butcher/ George Faber and Sir Herbert Nield. According to 
Nield successive Home Secretaries had either wilfully blinded 
themselves to the danger from enemy aliens or they had been 
prevented from taking effective action by 'a cog in the 
administrative wheel. 1 Cave maintained that the final 
decisions were his# although taken on the basis of the 
advisory committee's recommendations. He pointed out that 
each wartime government had followed the general rule that 
prima facie all enemy aliens ought to be interned on the 
grounds that the safety of the realm was paramount. In- 
considering cases guilt was assumed and the burden of 
proving justification for exemption lay with the alien. In 
dealing with individual cases, said Cave, there had beer, 
many times when he had been 'very, very hard.' Joynson 
Hicks withdrew his amendments to the Consolidated Fund Bill, 
acknowledging that the Horne Secretary had 'met us very7
t
fairly, but it was clear that the amendments would not have 
been carried.'““Kany in parliament were concerned that the 
government seemed to consistently lag behind public opinion 
on the internment issue, but the militant hardliners in 
parliament remained a relatively small minority.
The hardliners 1 cause gathered momentum in the 
country during the spring and summer of 1918, and in July 
anti-alien sentiment reached its highest intensity since
151. 100HC 5s., 1659-1708, 17 Dec. 1917.
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May 1915. A nation drained by nearly four years of war,
weary of restrictions and shortages, bitter at the carnage
of its young men on the battlefield and faced with nev/s
of German advances on the western front, needed little
prompting from the propagandists to direct its frustration
and anger at the easily accessible 'enemy in our midst. '
It mattered little that of the 12,5 00 enemy alien men
remaining at liberty, 4,000 belonged to the friendly races
152and over 3,000 were elderly or invalids. Demonstrations 
in Hyde Park and elsewhere, petitions to the government 
and resolutions by local councils, patriotic groups and 
other organisations demanded sterner measures against 
the enemy alien population. With stridently anti-alien 
groups such as the nationalist Party - formed by right wing 
Unionists under General Croft's leadership - and the British 
Umpire Union fomenting agitation, urged on by the Northcliffe 
Press, Lloyd George and his cabinet colleagues accepted that 
seme changes in aliens policy were a political if not 
a practical necessity.
Lloyd George had no qualms about exploiting the 
aliens issue as a propaganda weapon and during the critical 
days of early July he blatantly encouraged popular 
prejudice with attacks on alleged German atrocities and 
ill treatment of prisoners of war, and accused enemy aliens 
of gloating over British setbacks at the western front. He 
claimed that with the news of every British reverse he 
received anonymous letters•crowing over the situation. The
152. 107HC 5s., 1825, 4 July 1918
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letters bore British postmarks and were obviously written 
by Germans, many of whom admitted their nationality. The 
aliens question, he said, had become ’a matter of great 
concern affecting the prosecution of the war' and everyone 
who had evidence of suspicious activities by aliens ’should 
place it at the disposal of the authorities for a 'real 
examination. ' The risks were far too great for dangerous 
aliens not to be ruthlessly searched out and the only limit 
he placed on this was that he 'would not enter into 
competition with Germany in inhumanity, injustice and 
unfairness* but overtrustfulness would be folly.
Lloyd George's promise during a June by-electior. 
campaign in Finsbury, London, that he would devote urgent 
personal attention to the aliens question almost certainly 
played an important part in ensuring the election of the 
candidate endorsed by the coalition government. The 
internment issue figured prominently in the campaign and 
some observers took the Prime ' inister's assurances to 
imply that harsher measures were imminent. The Lav; Times, 
which had taken a consistently critical line on the 
government's aliens policy, noted,
It would seem, that, after nearly four years 
the Government has crasped that their method 
of dealing with interned and uninterned alien 
enemies in this country is causing a widespread 
feeling of uneasiness... Immediately steps 
should be taken for absolutely terminating the 
enemy taint in this country and the existing 
policy of laissez faire dropped once and for
153. 1GBHC Sr., 573-7, 11 July 1919.
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Lloyd George gave more comfort to hardline opinion 
when he appointed a committee of six MPs, most of whom 
had consistently advocated harsher m e a s u r e s , t o  advise 
him on what steps might be taken to allay public anxiety 
on the aliens question. The committee's report, submitted 
on 8 July, made 15 recommendations, including the whole­
sale internment of all enemy alien men over the age of 
18, with exceptions on 'national 1 or medical grounds to be 
within the discretion of the Home Secretary; the repatriation 
of alien women of enemy origin, again with provision for 
exceptions on grounds of justice and humanity; the review 
of naturalisation certificates granted to persons of enemy 
origin; the discharge from government offices'of men and 
women of enemy origin; the invalidation of name changes 
by persons of enemy origin since 1 August 1914 until six 
months after the armistice, and the immediate winding up 
of enemy businesses and the closing of enemy banks still in 
operation,The committee's report was generally well received 
in parliament'and the government broadly accepted the
ijt*
recommendations. In a major debate on the aliens question 
on 11 July Cave acknowledged public anxiety but said it was 
due to a great extent to irresponsible propaganda and a 
lack of knowledge of the steps the government had already
155. The committee comprised Mr. Kennedy Jones, Mr. 
Joynson Hicks, Sir Henry Dalziel, Sir Richard 
Cooper, "ir John Butcher and Mr. Charles Bowerran.
156. 103HC 5s., 527, 11 July 1913. See also Annual
Review, 1913, p. 110.
1taken to deal with the situation. Although the country had 
suffered no ill consequences as a .result of the present 
system, he accepted that the government had to take account 
of public feeling on the issue, but that feeling would not 
be allowed to dictate policy. There was to be a review 
of internment policy to see ‘whether it cannot in one way 
or another be tightened up with a view to the security of 
this country.' Exemptions from internment were to be 
scrutinised by the exisiting advisory committees 
strengthened by additional members, including at least one 
military representative in each case. The cases of enemy 
alien women were also to be reviewed although the govern­
ment remained against the general internment of women. There 
was also to be a review of certificates of naturalisation 
issued during the v;ar, new restrictions on the employment 
of aliens in government offices, stricter measures on the 
carrying of identification by aliens, the provision of 
shipping for deportation of 'undesirable' aliens, the 
immediate winding up of German branch banks,an end to the- 
practice of accepting patent specifications from German 
subjects, and new controls over name changes by persons who 
were not natural-born British subjects .
Some MPs remained sceptical as to whether the 
government had the will to impose a much stricter aliens 
control policy and suspected undue influence over
policy direction by civil servants, notably at the Home 
Office. Cave condemned the criticism of officials who were
108HC 5s., 522-9, 11 July 1918.
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not in a position to defend themselves publicly/ but the
hardliners persisted in their attacks. Some sections of
the popular press helped to give credence to the spurious
image of Home Office officials as 'Whitehall wirepullers'
and. 'friends of Fritz', and Northcliffe claimed that he
had it on excellent authority that certain officials were
158'determined to protect their friends.' No evidence was
produced to substantiate such statements, but they no doubt
helped fuel a popular belief that the government continued
to be *too soft' on enemy aliens. To monitor the way in
which the government's new aliens control measures were
implemented a group of MPs formed an 'Aliens Watch Committee'
with Sir Edward Carson as chairman and sir Henry Dalziel 
159as his deputy. w No record appears to exist either of their
deliberations or findings.
Few voices were raised against the clamour for a
harsher internment policy but among those who did speak
forcefully was Colonel Josiah c. Wedgwood (Liberal), who
said that the anti-alien campaign had made him 'more
ashamed of my country than J have been at any time during 
169this war.' Lord Ribblesdale warned that Britain had
became 'almost crazy about the whole of the aliens 
ques tion, ' and the King, who had adopted a consistently
humane view on the treatment of enemy subjects, reacted in
1?°. -l. Pound and G. Harms worth, Northcllffe (1959), p. £53.
159. The Times, 17 Aug. 191S.
160. lOSHC 5s ., 546-8, 11 July 1913.
161. 31HL 5s., 444, 2 Aug., 1918.
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private correspondence to the renewed demands for an 
indiscriminate internment policy with the comment/ 'Intern 
me first.'
The reconstituted aliens advisory committee for 
163England and Wales held its first meeting on 21 July to
begin the task of sifting through all cases of enemy aliens
at large, paying particular attention to those of German
nationality. Sankey said the committee would continue to
act on the cardinal principle of giving the state the
benefit of the doubt but at the same time justice would
be done and the special circumstances of each case mould
be taken into consideration. The committee would continue
164to sit in private. “ The public was invited to send 
information to the committee on any enemy aliens of whom 
they were suspicious. By the end of October the committee, 
which was empowered to hold local enquiries, had considered 
the cases of about 3,200 aliens of whom some 300 were 
interned and about 2 2 0  recommended for repatriation, 
hot surprisingly the hardliners saw the undram.atic outcome 
of the committee's work as merely further evidence of undue 
leniency to enemy aliens, but by the end of the summer the 
internment -question had ceased to be an issue of significant
162. H. Kicolson, Kina Georce the rifth: His Life and 
Reign (1952), p. 212.
163. Members of the reconstituted committee were: Mr. 
Justice r ankey, Mr. justice Younger, £ir John 
Butcher, Lord isnboume, Sir Ronald Maclean, Mr. 
John J. : ooney, Mr. Thomas Richards and Major- 
General Lord Cheylesmore.
164. Annua 1 Ref} \ s~fc 1918, p. 115.
165. 110HC 5s., 1593, 31 Get. 1913.
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national controversy. I-.ore momentous matters were occupying 
public attention with the turn of the tide in favour of the 
allied forces on the western front and the rising prospect 
of peace.
When the armistice with Germany was signed on 11 
November about 24, 450 civilian prisoners remained in the 
internment camps, the numbers having been reduced from the 
peak of over 32,000 by release of members of the friendly 
races, paroling of prisoners for work of national 
importance and repatriations. By the end of April 1919 
between 4, 000 and 5, C v:.; had refused repatriation
were still held, but the camps were cleared during the 
year as a committee appointed by the government under Kr. 
Justice Younger's chairmanship dealt with applications for 
exemption from repatriation.^"''’'
166. See charter four for an account of the committee's 
work.
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CHAPTER THREE 
ENEMY ALIENS IN CUSTODY
The incarceration of thousands of enemy alien 
civilians, mostly able-bodied men of military age, many of 
them Stilled workers, members of the professions and 
businessmen, whose only 'crime' was their nationality, 
posed novel and difficult social and administrative 
problems for which the authorities were ill-prepared either 
through contingency planning or previous experience.
This chapter considers the development of the intern­
ment camp network, the organisation of the camps and the 
treatment of prisoners. While the main concentration is on 
civilian internees some reference will also be made to 
combatant prisoners since both categories were classed as 
prisoners of war and subject to military law and the same 
international conventions. As far as possible civilian and 
military prisoners were kept in separate camps, but in some 
instances both categories were housed in the same establish­
ments, though normally in segregated accommodation. At one 
stage of the war there were nearly 500 camps in operation.^
The War Office, which initially had primary 
responsibility for custody of prisoners of war, both 
civilian and military, fulfilled this function through its 
Directorate of Prisoners of War headed by Lieut.-General 
Herbert Belfield. As he later recalled the main difficulty
1. H. Gordon, The War Office (1935), p. 313.
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at he outset was the total lack of experience or useful 
precedent available to his department. Little could be 
gained by studying conditions which existed and the 
regulations in force during the second half of the 18th 
century and the early years of the 19th century, the last 
period when England held prisoners of war in considerable 
numbers. Times had changed, ideas of propriety were 
different, and in the earlier period there were no 
conventions by which states had bound themselves in regard 
to the conduct of war, especially the treatment of 
prisoners. ^
At the beginning of the war the War office took the 
initiative in requisitioning land and buildings to house 
prisoners, but from an early stage the Home office assumed 
a key role in the administration of civilian internment 
camps. The Home Office acted through the agency of the 
Destitute Aliens Committee (later renamed the Civilian 
Internment Camps Committee, with a broadened remit to deal 
with camp administration), which was formed shortly after 
the outbreak of the war under the chairmanship of John 
Pedder, head of the Home Office Aliens Division, and 
including representatives of the War Office and Local
2. Unpublished report of the work of the Directorate of 
Prisoners of War, 26 March 1920, HO 45/11025/410118/5. 
Belfield wrote that the only 'text books' available 
at the beginning of the war on the subject of 
prisoners of war were the Geneva Convention of 1906, 
as regards medical personnel and chaplains; section 
1 of the annex of the 4th Hague Convention of 19 07? 
chapter 2 of the 5th Hague Convention of 19 07 (with 
the4iexplanatory notes of all the above in the Manual 
of Military Law); a few sections in chapter 14 of the 
Field Service Regulations (part 2) and the Royal 
Warrant of 3 Aug. 1914.
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Government Board.
The major proportion of civilian internees during 
the war were housed in two camps in the Isle of Man# one 
purpose-built at Knockaloe, near Peel, which eventually 
had accommodation for 25,000 men, and the other at Douglas, 
where a former holiday camp was adapted to house over
3,000 prisoners. The Home Office anticipated at one stage 
that Knockaloe might be used to accommodate all civilian 
prisoners but this proved impracticable.
The operating costs of the island camps were met 
from central funds, with a weekly allowance made to the 
Isle of Man Government to provide food, clothing and foot-
4
wear for prisoners, and to cover administrative expenses.
3. The initial remit of the Destitute Aliens committee was;
i. to arrange for the repatriation of destitute 
aliens, especially alien enemies, not being for 
military service or suspects.
ii. to co-operate with charitable societies 
relieving destitute aliens and to guide and control 
their operations.
iii. to organise (in co-operation with the 
authorities concerned) any special arrangements 
which may be necessary for the accommodation and 
maintenance of destitute aliens.
iv. generally to deal with questions arising from 
time to time as to the relief and assistance of 
destitute aliens which may be referred to the . 
committee by the Home Office, War Office or Local 
Government Board. (Home Office List, 1917)
See appendix IV for terms of reference after the 
the committee was designated the Civilian Intern­
ment Camps Committee.
4. 80HC 5s., 911, 29 Feb. 1916, and 70HC 5s., 1263-4, 
9 Mar. 1915.
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The Home Office was broadly responsible for administration 
of the camps in co-operation with the Manx government, but 
the War Office and Home Office initially had difficulty in 
reaching agreement on the proper division of responsibility 
for the day-to-day operation of the camps. It was 
eventually agreed after many conferences and voluminous 
correspondence that the War Office would be responsible 
for guarding, disciplinary control and censorship,
while the Home Office would undertake the upkeep of 
buildings, equipment and installations for lighting and 
water supply, the provision of food and clothing, and the 
management of canteens. The commandants and staff to 
maintain the military services were supplied by the War 
Office and civilian staff by the Home Office. All 
correspondence between the Home Office and civilian staff 
passed through the commandants, who were thus able to 
monitor the civilian as well as the military aspects of 
the camps' operations. The military supervision of the 
camps was under a Brigadier who also commanded all troops 
on the island. According to Belfield 'grave irregularities 
and much misunderstanding' resulted from the system of dual 
control operated at the Isle of Man camps.
It was an unsatisfactory makeshift arrange­
ment which worked on account of the goodwill and 
tact with which it was handled and in spite of 
its many shortcomings• It should never be 
repeated. Either the War Office or the Home 
Office should have been solely responsible, but 
the latter had no force at its disposal for 
guarding prisoners and no powers under military 
law to deal with them; it is difficult to see 
how this responsibility could have been borne by 
any other department than the War Office, which,
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however, would gladly have shifted it to other
shoulders.^
While the majority of civilian prisoners were housed 
in the isle of Man camps, many were held in establishments 
nearer their homes in London and the provinces. They were 
housed in an assortment of accommodation, ranging from 
disused factories and workhouses to tents and ships. 
Locations in the early weeks of the war were: Olympia 
(exhibition building), Frimley, Haywards Heath, Newbury 
(tents), Stratford, East- London, Lancaster (former factory 
buildings), Queensferry, Stobs (huts), Handford (huts and 
buildings), York (disused buildings), Wakefield (pleasure 
grounds and buildings), Southampton (skating rink) and 
Douglas (former holiday camp). Also used were passenger 
liners moored in the Thames and off the Isle of Wight, and 
camps subsequently brought into operation included Alexandra 
Palace, Hackney Wick (former workhouse), Libury Hall (farm 
and buildings) and Knockaloe. Some of the early camps, 
such as Olympia, which was required for other purposes, and 
Newbury and Lancaster, which were found to be unsuitable# 
were later closed. Some of the camps were administered by 
the war Office and some by the Hbme Office. The military 
department was also responsible for guarding most establish­
ments - each commandant was responsible to the General 
Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the area for the safe custody 
of prisoners - and for supervising transfers between camps. 
The camps at Islington, Hackney Wick and Libury Hall were 
guarded by the police.^
5. Belfield report, op. cit.
6. Ibid.
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Internees in the London camps included a considerable 
proportion of waiters# barbers# cpoks# bakers# tailors and 
clerks# while the Hackney Wick establishment was set aside 
mainly for those with a knowledge or aptitude for mechanical 
work to man a sewing machine manufacturing shop established
0
there. A number of older enemy aliens were housed at the
b ce/i
Libury Hall camp in Hertfordshire# which hadAestablished 
before the war by Germans to provide a temporary shelter 
for unemployed and destitute German-speaking men. The camp 
had no guards and its internal operations were supervised 
by the farm's pre-war managing director. With accommodation 
for 244 men the camp produced its own food supplies# except
9
for certain kinds of meat which had to be bought outside. 
Probably the most unusual internment camp' was at Buckfast 
Abbey in Devon# where the community of 4 0 Benedictine monks 
included a substantial proportion of German subjects of 
military age. The monks were not repatriated because the 
government felt that as able-bodied men they would be 
useful to Germany. Instead they were confined to the Abbey 
and its 45-acre grounds and continued their farming# 
gardening and beekeeping# as well as their religious 
activities.^
7. M. MacDonagh# In London During the Great War (1935)# 
p. 91.
8. Memo, on work of Aliens Division,for government record# 
12 Jan. 1918# HOR.
9. Ibid.
10. 93HC 5s.# 461# 3 May 1916; 97HC 5s.# 6 Aug. 1917;
Cd. 8419# 1916.
From the early months of the war there were periodic 
inspection visits to the camp by neutral observers, 
representative of the Red Cross and other charitable and 
welfare organisations, British politicians and members of 
the press, visits by journalists were, however, discouraged 
by the War Office and Belfield summed up the position thus,
There was naturally much curiosity to see 
the conditions under which prisoners lived 
when the camps were first opened in this 
country; but as anyone entering a camp had to 
be accompanied by a member of the camp staff, 
of which the numbers were small, compliance 
with all requests would have thrown an 
intolerable burden on them. It was necessary 
from the first to stop visits by newspaper 
reporters without sanction from the War Office, 
and to only a few of them was this given.^
Belfield said that the arrangement which existed up to
September 1915 under which General Officers Commanding-in-
Chief had authority to permit inspection visits 'led to
abuse,1 and subsequently all such visitors were required to
12obtain War Office passes.
Until the United States entered the war in April 
1917 it acted as the protecting power for enemy subjects 
held in British internment camps and for British prisoners 
in the custody of other belligerents. In the latter part of 
the war this role was assumed by Switzerland and Sweden.
One of the first inspection tours of British camps
was carried out by two American diplomats, Chandler S.
13Anderson and Chandler Hale, in September 1914. They were
11. Belfield report, op. cit.
12. Ibid.
13. Report to Sir Edward Grey, 15 Oct. 1914, HO 45/10729/ 
255193.
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given written authority by the War Office for unrestricted 
access to all parts of the camps, they visited and to have 
private conversations with prisoners. These conditions 
were scrupulously observed and the ensuing report, covering 
visits to mixed camps at Frimley and Queensferry and an 
officers' camp in Wales, provides a useful if somewhat 
cursory and uncritical insight into internment conditions 
in the early weeks of the war. The Americans said they 
received few complaints, although in the case of Frimley 
the men were all housed in tents, with 1 0  prisoners in 
each, sleeping on sacks on board flooring. Those who could 
afford it were able to buy mattresses with their own money. 
In the other camps men made their own beds from timber 
supplied by the camp authorities and were provided with 
straw mattresses. Adequate bath and shower facilities were 
generally available and each man was inquired to bathe at 
least once a week. Each of the camps had separate 
'hospital ' accommodation for contagious diseases and for 
the treatment of other ailments, with army doctors in 
regular attendance. Prisoners who could afford it were 
expected to pay for the medicines they required. Civilian 
internees were allowed to wear their own clothing, and those 
who lacked what was judged to be an essential minimum of 
serviceable garments and could not afford to buy more, were 
provided with the necessary items by the camp authorities.^^ 
(Several cases were reported to the Home Office where 
prisoners used the garments supplied as stakes in gambling
14. Anderson/Hale report, op. cit.
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games and had to be given further items to replace those 
lost.^)
While in most camps the material needs of internees 
were adequately met, despite a number of logistical and 
administrative problems during the early weeks of the war, 
prisoners never ceased to be subject to the monotony of 
camp routine and diet, the loss of dignity and privacy, and 
the wide range of rules and regulations covering such 
sensitive matters as visits and correspondence.
Visiting arrangements were formally regulated by 
the War Office in the early war years, but in practice camp 
commandants, and on the Isle of Man the Manx government, 
were allowed some discretion over the length and frequency 
of visits. Instructions issued by the War Office in 1914 
laid down that an internee should be allowed two visitors 
a month at the same time for 15 minutes. This period could 
be extended by the commandant if he felt it appropriate, and 
he could withhold visiting privileges in cases of 
misbehaviour. Visits took place in the presence of a member 
of staff and an interpreter was on hand if the conversation 
was not held in English. Strict precautions were taken to 
prevent articles or messages being illicitly passed into or 
out of the camp. All items brought in were examined and 
books and letters were subject to censorship. Men who had 
received visitors were sometimes searched afterwards. With 
the bulk of prisoners concentrated in the Isle of Man camps 
and others scattered between more than 4 0 camps throughout
15. Cd. 7815, 1915.
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the country^ visiting was often difficult for relatives
because of the long journeys involved. In the case of the
Isle of Man camps each visitor was permitted on the island
once every three months and during the stay could pay
three camp visits each of a half hour duration. Relatives
living on the island were allowed a half hour visit every
two w e e k s . A t  the Islington and Alexandra Palace camps
in London, where most internees had families living in the
area, weekly visits were generally permitted. The standard
arrangement laid down by the War Office was usually adhered
to at the Wakefield camp, but visitijig periods were some-
17times extended up to one hour. In October 1916 the Home 
Office took over responsibility for regulation of visits to 
all internment camps. Existing rules were maintained in 
respect of length and frequency of visits but commandants 
were instructed,
i. not to give extra visits to solicitors 
and others intended to facilitate the 
conduct of an enemy's business;
ii. to use their discretion in regard to the 
duration of visits from wives and 
relatives travelling from a distance;
iii. to refer any special cases to the Home 
Office for decision.
On the whole the visits system worked reasonably well
although there were occasional allegations by MPs, not
substantiated, that certain prisoners were allowed extra
19visits because of their influence or social standing.
16. 104HC 5s., 1224, 21 Mar. 1918.
17. 107HC 5s., 711, 24 June 1918.
18. Ibid.
19. 107HC 5s., 1203, 27 June 1918; 107HC 5s., 1737, 3
July 1918.
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One of the more irksome regulations which prisoners
had to endure was the censorship of their letters and the
limitation on the number of letters they were allowed to
send. Because of the difficulties posed for the censors by
the large number of letters written by internees in the
opening weeks of the war, from early October only two a
week were permitted. Camp commandants were, however, given
discretion to relax this rule in certain cases, as, for
example, where an internee had to conduct correspondence
in connection with a business in the United Kingdom.
Prisoners had to write their letters on ordinary lined paper
and could use English or their native languagej but in the
latter case there was likely to be a longer delay in
censorship. Each camp was assigned two days on which
letters could be posted. There was no limit on the number
of letters an internee could receive, and he was allowed
20to send and receive mail without charge.
Any money sent to an internee through the post or
brought by him to a camp was retained by the camp
authorities, who allowed him to draw on his funds at such
times and in such amounts as they deemed advisable. Any
money paid or received had to be carefully receipted.
Cheque books could be used but they remained in the custody
21of the camp authorities. Apart from such 'strategic' items 
as cars and cameras, prisoners were permitted to retain 
most of their personal belongings. Items sent to internees
2 0. WO instruction to camp commandants, 6 Oct. 1914, 
HO 45/10729/278559/128.
21. WO instruction to camp commandants, 31 Aug. 1914, 
HO 45/10732/255193/13.
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had to be approved by camp staff before possession was 
22authorised.
The restrictiveness and frustrations of internment
were compounded for many prisoners during the early war
months by being housed in tents and a variety of hastily
requisitioned buildings of varying suitability for human
habitation. Despite appeals by the War Office to local civil
and military authorities to find suitable sites, available
accommodation fell short of what was required. In
September 1914 the war Office advised that buildings were
needed which could house 1,000 or more prisoners, with
accommodation for about 100 guards, some 12 officers and
administrative staff, and ground for an exercise area. The
erection of a barbed wire fence would be necessary unless a
s.Officiently high wall already existed, and it was not
considered advisable for camps to be located in thickly
populated areas or on the east coast, in Kent, Sussex or
23m  the neighbourhood of a defended port.
With thousands of prisoners still under canvas by 
early November, the War Office feared that there could be 
serious disciplinary problems as the' winter set in. There 
were 5,600 internees in tented accommodation at the Newbury 
and Frimley camps alone, most of whom were totally 
unaccustomed to a rigorous outdoor life, and many complaints 
were received by the camp authorities about the conditions 
and the potential danger to health. The War Office warned 
the Home Office that in a few cases 'resentment at existing
22. Cd. 7815, 1915.
23. • Circular, HO to chief constables, Sept, 1914,
HO 45/10729/255193/69.
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conditions...has taken a form which threatens to give
serious trouble1 and claimed that plans to close the tented
camps by the end of October had been 'rendered impossible
by the number of aliens interned under the recent
instructions issued by the Home Office# a large number of
24whom were by necessity sent to Frimley and Newbury.1 This 
assertion evoked an angry response from McKenna# the Home 
Secretary# who reminded the War Office that#
...the internment of alien enemies of 
military age was undertaken early in 
September at the express request of the 
Secretary of State for War. It was later 
suspended because the military authorities 
were unable to provide the necessary 
accommodation; but it was renewed# and the 
instructions of 2 0th October were issued on 
the authority of the Secretary of State for
War. When the accommodation provided by the
military authorities proved insufficient# 
these instructions were again suspended...^
The War Office fears of serious trouble from
internees were tragically borne out when rioting occured at
the Douglas camp on 19 November and five internees were
killed and 15 injured, one of whom died in hospital later.
The incident followed several weeks of tension in the camp,
during which, according to the commandant, Lieut.-Colonel
H.W. Madoc, there had been 'very apparent signs of unrest.'
On one occasion early in November prisoners had staged an
overnight 'sit-in' in the dining hall and at dinner on the
day before the riot they had engaged in what they termed
26a 'hunger strike.' At the time of/riot about 2,4 00 inmates
24. B.B.Cubbitt# WO, to Troup# 6 Nov. 1914# HO 45/10760/ 
269116/27.
25. Troup to Cubbitt# 10 Nov. 1914# HO 45/10760/269116/27.
26. Madoc to Isle of Man Government# 2 0 Nov. 1914,
HO 45/10946/266042/35.
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were in the dining hall at the end of the lunch period.
Many began throwing plates and smashing furniture# and
several made a dash towards the kitchens. Their passage was
blocked by a number of guards who at first threatened the
prisoners with bayonets and then fired warning shots in the
air. When the rioters kept moving forward, throwing knives,
forks and other missiles, the soldiers fired about 34 shots
at the men. The guards claimed that an order had been given
to fire but it was never established who gave the order. The
commandant believed the riot had been pre-arranged and was
organised by 'some dangerous ringleaders of whom there are
several in the camp.* The object was apparently to smash
dining room equipment and wreck the kitchen. Foiled by the
arrival of the guards, the prisoners took their revenge
27by attacking them. The inquest jury unanimously agreed 
that all six deaths resulting from the riot were 'caused by 
justifiable measures forced upon the military authorities 
by the riotous behaviour of a large section of the
2 8prisoners...' The verdict was endorsed by the coroner.
The Destitute Aliens Committee, which conducted its own 
inquiry into the riot, found that the outbreak appeared 
to be without a definite practical objective. There was no 
evidence of any planned escape attempt and the riot seemed 
to be 'a conceited attempt by a few agitators, and 
supported by most of the prisoners, to make a patriotic
27. Ibid.
28. Official report of coroner's enquiries held on 20 and 
27 Nov. 1914, HO 45/10946/266042/38. See also report
of inquests inlsle of Man Daily Times. 23 and 25 Nov. 
and 1 and 4 ner. and -isle of Man Weekly Times 28 Nov.
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demonstration* and added that,
...there can be no doubt that, in view of 
the large numbers assembled in the dining hall, 
prompt suppression was necessary in order to 
prevent the overpowering and disarming of the 
guard, and further consequences of the most 
serious sort^g
The underlying causes of the riot are not absolutely clear
from the evidence of the official inquiries, but it seems
probable that, in addition to the general frustration
common to inmates of all prison camps, many of the Douglas
prisoners were also unhappy about the remoteness from their
families on the mainland, the discomfort of the tented
accommodation in which many of them were housed at a time
when the weather was cold and wet, and dissatisfied with
the camp diet. Whatever the grievances of the Douglas
internees, the riot was the first and only serious outbreak
of violence at an internment camp during the war.
At the time of the Douglas riot there about 14,5 00
enemy alien civilians in captivity, in addition to those
taken from merchant ships, but suitable accommodation
was in short supply and even ocean liners were pressed into
service on a temporary basis. The ships were requisitioned
by the Admiralty at the request of the War Office because
insufficient suitable accommodation could be found on land
for the growing number of civilian and military prisoners.
Nine vessels formerly engaged in the trans-Atlantic
passenger service were utilised, three each at Southend,
29. Confidential report by Destitute Aliens Committee to
Home Secretary, 4 Dec. 1914, HO 45/10946/266042/38.
30. 68HC 5s., 179, 16 Nov. 1914.
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Gosport, and Ryde, with two allocated to civilians and one
31to military prisoners at each location. The ships were
never seen as anything more than a temporary expedient, but
their use provoked sharp criticism in parliament. Charter
price' of the liners (102,2 05 tons) was approximately
32£86,000 a month, prompting one MP to suggest that, m
the case of the three ships anchored in the Thames, it
would have been cheaper to take the whole of Grosvenor
Square,furnish it handsomely, and keep the prisoners there.
Another member condemned the use of the ships as ’a
colossal folly,' since they could have been performing
34valuable war service as transports. While space was 
limited and prisoners lacked the exercise facilities 
available at the land-based camps, the ships had the virtue 
of providing warm and comfortable accommodation during the 
winter months. From the authorities* point of view the 
ships also had the advantage of making it easy to keep the 
various classes of internees separated. By payment of extra 
charges wealthier prisoners could obtain superior 
accommodation and messing facilities.
The segregation of internees according to social 
class and affluence was a problem which exercised the War 
Office and the staff of the internment camps, particularly 
during the early years of the war. It was the policy in
32. 69HC 5s., 1004, 16 Feb. 1915.
33. Sir Robert Price, 69HC 5s., 982, 15 Feb. 1915.
34. Mr. R.D. Holt, 71HC 5s., 1858, 13 May 1915.
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most campsAonly to keep members of different classes
separate as far as possible, but to allow wealthier
prisoners to enjoy a better grade of accommodation and
food if they were prepared to pay for it. In October 1914
the War Office instructed camp commandants to divide both
35military and civilian prisoners into three classes:
a. Officers (either naval or military) on 
full pay at the time of their capture or 
internment. These will, when assurance as to 
reciprocity of treatment are received from the 
Austro-Hungarian and German Governments, receive 
pay of the corresponding ranks of British 
Infantry. They will then be expected to feed 
themselves. Pending this assurance they will be 
fed at the cost of the State and advances of 
cash may be made to them to an amount not 
exceeding half their pay.
b. Those approved persons who are willing and 
able to pay for superior feeding on a scale 
similar to the officer class. These will not be 
rationed or clothed at the expense of the State.
It is hoped to afford them better accommodation 
but this cannot be promised.
c. Others. These will be rationed and clothed 
at the expense of the State.
Commandants were asked to ascertain how many men could be
recommended for class b. and were advised, *As it is hoped
to move these to better quarters only those who give proof
of their ability to continue to pay for these privileges
* 3 6are to be recommended.' soon afterwards the War Office 
extended class b.
...to endeavour not only to offer 
opportunities of enhanced comfort to those 
willing to pay for it, but to assemble 
together those who, although unable or
35. Circular, WO to camp commandants, 17 Oct. 1914, 
HO 45/10760/269116/120.
36. Ibid.
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unwilling to pay for increased comforts# 
are of a higher social grade than the bulk 
of the prisoners•
Those who could pay were designated as class b(l) and
those who could not as class b(2). While prisoners could
acquire b(l) status simply by the possession of sufficient
funds# to earn b(2) status the internee had to be vouched
for by the police as having enjoyed an appropriate social
standing and mode of life. The type of accommodation and
privileges enjoyed by the different classes of prisoners
varied considerably between camps# much depending on the
nature of the establishment and the available facilities#
but also# to some extent# on the attitude of the
commandant. At Douglas# for example# the affluent internees
occupied a separate camp from the main body of internees.
The establishment was divided into the upper camp#
consisting of two compounds# and the lower camp# in which
the privileged prisoners were housed. In May 1916 about
5 00 of the 2#7 00 internees were living in the lower camp#
which came to be designated as the 'privilege camp.' These
men employed about 100 of the poorer prisoners from the
3 8upper camp to carry out a variety of services for 'them.
Apart from segregation on grounds of class and 
affluence#some attempt was made to provide separate 
accommodation for prisoners of different nationalities# 
largely at the demand of the internees themselves# the
37. Circular# WO to camp commandants# 6 Nov. 1914. 
HO 45/10760/269116/120.
38. Cd. 8324# 1916.
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organisations representing them and, in the case of
Austriaps, their government. The British government were
at first reluctant to separate Austrian from German
prisoners, having already protested strongly to Germany
about the latter's alleged practice of segregating British
prisoners from those of other nationalities and subjecting
39them to a harsher regime. More positive efforts were,
however, made to separate Germans from Slav and Alsatian
internees, both of which groups were vehement in their
objections to sharing accommodation with 'full' Germans.
From the spring of 1916 a camp at Feltham, Middlesex, was
devoted mainly to housing members of the friendly races.
Before a prisoner was moved to Feltham from another camp
he was carefully 'screened' in respect of his associations,
opinions and conduct. Any prisoner at Feltham suspected of
harbouring enemy sympathies was liable to transfer to
4 0another camp, usually on the Isle of Man. M0st of the
Alsatian internees were concentrated at Feltham and they
were accompanied by a mixture pf Czechs, Slovaks, Poles,
41Croats and Slovenes.
The efforts of the authorities to take account of 
nationalist sentiments of the various ethnic groups 
increased as the war progressed, but the government 
remained acutely sensitive about being seen to make 
concessions to internees bee aVtee the suspicion persisted
39. HO 45/10760/269116/120.
40. HO 45/10760/269510/25 and HO 45/10818/317810/16.
41. HO 45/10760/269510/25.
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in the country, nurtured by the anti-alien propagandists, 
that prisoners were being pampered while the population as 
a whole was suffering increasing restrictions, discomfort 
and food shortages.
The degree of segregation sought by some of the
ethnic groups was never provided, but the authorities were
more successful in facilitating a form of self-government
among prisoners. At most camps 'captains* were elected and
the prisoners divided into smaller groupings each with its
elected representative. These camp 'governments' often had
considerable authority, subject to the general supervision
of the commandant and his staff, and members sometimes
enjoyed superior messing and sleeping accommodation and
other privileges. In most camps internees formed a network
of committees concerned with such matters as kitchens,
canteens, workshops, education, sport, music, drama and
42other leisure activities. One camp had a board of justice
which regulated minor disputes among prisoners? another
had a sick and burial club which cared for internees with
terminal illnesses, . arranged their burials in a nearby
43churchyard and attended their graves. The committee 
system helped bring about a substantial increase in the 
sports, leisure and cultural facilities available to 
prisoners and to improve the general quality of life in 
the camps. Such developments were carefully monitored by 
the independent observers allowed into the camps.
42. See appendix VII.
43. Cd. 8324, 1916.
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The most comprehensive series of visits to the
internment camps during the early months of the war was
conducted in January and February 1915 by Mr. John B.
Jackson, a retired German-speaking American diplomat who
was appointed by the U.S. Ambassador in Berlin, Mr. James
W. Gerard, as a special commissioner to inspect prisoner
of war camps in Germany and Britain and submit reports
44for the governments concerned. Gerard arranged for the
visits by Jackson because 'So many reports came to Germany
about the bad treatment in England of German prisoners of 
45war...' Jackson visited both civilian and military 
prisoners at 13 camps and aboard nine ships. At that time 
about 19,000 civilians and members of the Merchant marine 
and nearly 7,000 combatants were in custody. Jackson found 
a considerable number of boys under 17 and men over 55 in 
the camps, but in each case steps had been taken by the 
authorities with a view to arranging repatriation. The 
commissioner received a number of complaints from men held 
on ships, in some cases over the class system operated on 
a number of vessels. Aboard the 'Royal Edward', for example, 
the best appointed of the three internment ships moored in 
the Thames, prisoners were divided into three classes in 
which ability to pay was more important than social status 
in obtaining privileged treatment. Some were allowed to 
join the 'club' in which members made their own catering 
arrangements; others, somewhat less affluent, were 
permitted the use of the 'first-class' mess, and the
44. Jackson report, 27 Feb. 1915, HO 45/10760/269116.
45. J.W. Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (1917), p. 108.
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remainder occupied steerage accommodation and received 
standard prisoner of war rations. In contrast to the 
'Prince Edward' and certain other vessels# Jackson found 
that on the 'Saxonia1# also anchored in the Thames# all 
prisoners were treated alike with the exception of those 
engaged in regular work. These men were allowed to occupy 
cabins rather than communal accommodation. On the day of 
the commissioner's visit several men were being tried by 
court martial for attempting to escape and he noted that 
there had also been problems over the attempts of 
'undesirable* females to visit the ship. On the 'Tunisian*# 
moored off the Isle of Wight# there were many complaints 
about medical arrangements and food# and some prisoners 
had even resorted to placing letters about their grievances 
in bottles and throwing them over the side. Conditions on 
this ship were found by Jackson to be 'generally 
depressing.' Despite the complaints and problems referred 
to in his report# Jackson concluded that#
On the whole, the present treatment seems 
to be as good as could be expected under the 
circumstances. The new camps are all better 
than the old ones and everywhere there seemed 
to be an intention to improve on existing 
conditions. Lack of organisation and 
preparation would account for most of the 
hardships which prevailed at first.
Absolutely nowhere did there seem to be any 
wish to make conditions any harder or more 
disagreeable for the prisoners than was 
necessary# and I saw no instance and heard of 
none where any prisoner had been subjected 
either to intentional personal annoyance or
undeserved discipline. .46
46.. Jackson report# op. cit.
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Gerard considered that Jackson's report did much to allay
the German belief that their subjects were being ill treated
and helped him to achieve better conditions for British
47prisoners in Germany.
Another favourable report on conditions in the
British camps early in 1915 was submitted to both sides by
Professor Eduard Naville and M. Victor van Berchem of the
48International Red Cross. So complimentary was their 
assessment that the Archbishop of canterbury suggested 
that it should be publicised to demonstrate to the world 
the contrast between what was happening in Britain and the 
poor conditions and ill treatment of prisoners believed to 
be commonplace in German internment camps. The Archbishop 
reflected a popular view of the German camps, but it was 
based on a good deal of uncorroborated evidence and 
coloured by propaganda. The unsatisfactory nature of some 
German camps and the instances of brutal treatment and 
neglect of prisoners which undoubtedly occured were less a 
reflection of a wilfully cruel system than of one that was 
administratively inefficient, particularly during the early 
war years. Inadequate central control led to excessive 
powers being left in the hands of camp commandants, which 
in turn led to considerable variation in the standards of 
the camps and the nature of the regimes operated. The 
German war ministry tried consistently to impose greater
47. Gerard, op. cit., p. 108.
48. The Times, 29 Jan. 1915.
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consistency, but it appears never to have fully succeeded 
in solving the problem.
In what might be seen as an exercise to obtain 
further support for the image of Britain's internment camp 
system as more efficient and humane than that of Germany, 
a delegation of m Ps was formed at the initiative of 
Asquith and Kitchener in April 1915 to carry out a tour 
of inspection. The group, which included Sir Henry 
Dalziel, a leading hardliner, concluded that the internees* 
accommodation was 'infinitely more comfortable' than that 
in which many British soldiers and their officers had been 
housed during the previous winter. Most of the internees 
interviewed were reported to have said that the food was 
good, though some complained of its monotony; none spoke
49of ill treatment or criticised the living accommodation.
As one peer noted, on the evidence of some of the 
camp inspection visits the treatment of internees was 'not 
only considerate and liberal but generous to a point 
sufficient to attract a certain amount of criticism.
Some MPs suggested that instead of being housed in 'country 
mansions ' prisoners should be moved to available space in 
prisons and workhouses.^  The camp at Wakefield acquired 
a reputation of being particularly comfortable for civilian 
internees. Located in a pre-war pleasure park, its facilities
49. 71HC 5s., 675-6, 27 Apr. 1915.
50. Marquis of Lansdowne, 18HL 5s., 863, 27 Apr. 1915.
51. 7OHC 5s., 959-60, 4 Mar. 1915; 70HC 5s., 846, 3 Mar. 
1915.
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included a skating rink, large recreation rooms and a
stage. One MP alleged .that the inmates were allowed to
visit Leeds unescorted, and that those who were liberal
with tips to camp staff were much more leniently treated
52than their less affluent compatriots. While it is true 
that a minority of wealthier internees, in common with 
officer prisoners, enjoyed a superior standard of 
accommodation and food compared to the majority of 
prisoners, no camp resembled the havens of luxury 
portrayed by some of the more inflammatory propagandists. 
The truth was probably much closer to the account of Paul 
Cohen-Portheim, a German artist and writer, who spent four 
years in captivity, including a period at Wakefield:
...the picture of conditions and 
treatment of prisoners in British internment 
camps given to the British public was 
extremely fanciful. The whole question had 
become part of the vast system of propaganda 
attributed, rightly or wrongly, to Lord 
Northcliffe. The main idea never varied:
British prisoners abroad were being treated 
abominably, German prisoners in England were 
being treated with foolish generosity. The 
latter was, to be just, frequently denied in 
parliament by members of the Government, but 
this made no difference whatsoever to the 
continuation of the press campaign against 
the supposed scandal.^
Not only did the government have to give reassurances that
the internees were not living in idle comfort or enjoying
a better diet thain the general population, but they also
had to reiterate that the camps were run with the greatest
52. 73HC 5s., 1963, 26 July 1915.
53. P. Cohen-Portheim, Time Stood Still: My Internment 
in England 1914-18 (1932), p. 74.
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possible economy consistent with the maintenance of the
54reasonable health of the prisoners.
Arrangements for the health and welfare of internees 
in the early days of the war were often fairly rudimentary. 
Camp 'hospitals • sometimes took the form of refurbished huts 
or tents. More serious cases were sent to outside hospitals 
for treatment. Sanitation arrangements were under the 
supervision of the camp medical officer who generally 
liaised closely with the local medical officer of health. 
Standards varied between camps but typical of the kind of 
guidelines laid down were those in force at the Douglas 
camp early in 1915:
1. Owing to the large number of men 
concentrated in the camp, it should be the 
aim of each prisoner to co-operate in 
endeavouring to keep the sanitation of the 
camp as perfect as practicable;
2. Prisoners should make a point of taking 
baths, of washing themselves and their clothing 
as frequently as possible, and of informing 
medical officers, through the captains of their 
huts, of any unusual indications on their 
persons, or of any pain or affection from which 
they may be suffering;
3. Prisoners should keep their hair cut as 
short as possible, and should apply to the 
captains of their huts for the loan of clippers 
for the purpose;
4. Prisoners should lose no opportunity that 
may be offered of being vaccinated against small­
pox, and innoculated against typhoid fever;
5. After clothing has been washed it should 
be wrung out in a five per cent solution of 
boracic acid, which can be obtained from the 
captain of the hut;
6. Every prisoner should do his utmost to 
keep his hut as clean as possible, and free 
from refuse;
54. Memo on work of Aliens Division for government record, 
12 Jan. 1918, HOR.
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7. Care should be taken to throw matches, 
cigarette ends, orange peel, paper and all 
other forms of refuse into receptacles 
provided for the purpose. On no account must 
urine be passed anywhere except into the 
urinals and utensils provided for the purpose, 
nor must anything but water be thrown down the 
drains,^
All camps made some provision for prisoners to
keep themselves physically . fit, either through the use of
gymnastic apparatus, ball games or marching. Exercise was
not obligatory but internees were compelled to spend a
certain amount of time every day outside their domestic 
56quarters. Sir Edward Grey informed the German government 
in December 1914 that,
Everything possible is being done to 
provide the prisoners with recreation, mental 
and bodily, and .in each place of internment a 
committee is formed from among the prisoners 
(whether soldiers or civilians) to organise 
amusements and to frame suggestions for 
occupation, either intellectual or athletic.
In this the military authorities are aided by 
philanthropic individuals and bodies.
This somewhat optimistic assessment of the situation took
no account of the fact that it was often difficult or
impossible to provide adequate social and recreational
facilities in some of the temporary establishments that had
been pressed into operation to cope with the rising number
of civilian and military prisoners.
55. Jackson report, op. cit.
56. Ibid.
57. Grey to W.H. Page, U.S. Ambassador, London, 14 
Dec. 1914,-Cd. 7815, 1915.
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During 1916 several prisons were used to house 
prisoners of war and, although it was a temporary expedient 
to cope with a shortage of secure accommodation,the govem- 
authorised it with considerable misgivings. Placing 
military prisoners in civil gaols violated international 
conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war and, if 
it became known, was likely to offend neutral opinion, 
particularly in the United States, which Britain had been 
assiduously cultivating as a potential ally. Use of the 
gaols appears to have attracted little critical attention, 
however, although the government maintained its 'open 
house' policy for visits to internment accommodation by 
American and other bona fide neutral observers.
Before the United States declared war on Germany in 
April 1917 the most frequent inspection visits to the camps 
continued to be those by American diplomats, whose reports, 
although they sometimes appeared to gloss over less favour­
able aspects of camp conditions and morale, nevertheless 
provide a valuable commentary on the situation of internees 
during the first two and a half years of the war. The
reports of inspection visits by Swiss and Swedish 
representatives later in the war tend to paint a less 
favourable picture, but these accounts reflect the food 
shortage of 1917-18 and the damaging effects on the mental 
state of some prisoners caused by long-term confinement.
A doctor attached to the Swiss Legation in London, 
Dr. A.L. Vischer, who visited the Douglas and Knockaloe 
camps in May 1917 found that prolonged internment had 
caused in many prisoners a state which he called 'barbed
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wire psychosis.' This was characterised by a gradual loss
of memory, irritability and continual concentration of the
58mind on certain aspects of camp conditions. A similar 
assessment was made by Lieut.-Colonel E. ^ossberg, a 
Swedish diplomat who visited the camps at the same period.
He found that 'the mental and moral degeneration, which 
the prisoners stated is rapidly increasing, has - quite
59naturally - its principle reason in the long internment... ' 
Both Dr. vischer and Col. Mossberg noted complaints about 
food, accommodation conditions and slowness in 
implementing repatriation agreements between Britain and 
Germany. Col. Mossberg warned that 'Another winter of 
internment under the prevailing conditions would probably 
mean for many men ruined health for life. Another 
Swedish representative who visited the camps in November 
1917, Captain W. Unander, found that the mental and 
physical condition of internees, particularly at Knockaloe, 
'cannot be considered very favourable.* He reported that 
the island climate, the monotony of camp life and 
unnecessarily strict discipline was undermining prisoners ' 
nerves and,
In the interest.of humanity, should the 
war continue for a considerable time, the 
prisoners should have either more liberty, or 
as soon as possible be transferred to a 
neutral country.^
58. Vischer report to Swiss Minister, May 1917, HO 45/ 
10947/266042/247.
59. Mossberg report to Swedish Minister, May 1917,
HO 45/10947/266042/261.
60. Ibid.
61. Unander report to Swedish Minister, Nov. 1917,
HO 45/10947/266042/298.
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The condition referred to by Dr. Vischer as 'barbed 
wire psychosis'# but more commonly termed 'barbed wire 
fever'# often seemed more pronounced in older internees# 
some of whom were over 60. They were less able to stand 
the stresses of camp life than their younger and often 
healthier compatriots who were more likely to find diversion 
in the sporting and leisure activities organised in the
fi 0camps. Neutral observers noted that combatant prisoners
generally adapted better to internment conditions than
civilians. Most of the deaths that occured in the camps
were not directly connected with internment# however,
although the authorities acknowledged that in some cases
6 3death may have been hastened by it. The position taken 
by the government was that although some nervous stress was 
an unavoidable corollary of captivity# internees were well 
treated and had few complaints. This was not often 
challenged# but a few politicians and others outside 
Westminster were prepared to dispute it# among them Sylvia 
Pankhurst# the radical feminist# who claimed that the 
authorities had placed her on a blacklist of people barred 
from visiting internment c a m p s . I n  October 1916 she was 
the intermediary for a petition from inmates of Knockaloe 
camp to Asquith, which claimed that#
62. 24HL 5s.# 239# 22 Feb. 1917.
63. 92HC 5s.# 1135# 3 Apr. 1917.
64. E.S. Pankhurst# The Home Front: A Mirror to Life in 
England During the World War (1932)# p. 388.
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You have created untold misery for 
thousands of families/ ruined many of us 
financially and morally...Our.records show how 
reasonable and extraordinarily patient we have 
been...But everything has its limit...A third 
winter cannot be tolerated unless you want to 
turn us into maniacs. We have appealed often 
...all in vain. We now demand: let us free to 
go...to our own countries/ or any neutral 
country...Yours is the responsibility for all 
the misery caused to the unhappy wives, 
children and relations, for all their 
suffering and heart burning...
The English wife of a German schoolmaster interned on the
Isle of Man wrote to Miss Pankhurst,
Everyone here believes that prisoners of 
war- in Germany are deliberately ill treated. No- 
one believes prisoners of war in England are 
anything but luxuriously treated. Yet I hear 
from my husband in Knockaloe that the poorest 
of the poor men in his compound have been 
driven by hunger to killing a stray cat and 
eating it. in Germany, I take it, the papers 
extol the excellencies of their camps and the 
villainies of the English camps. My husband 
was struck on the head by a bayonet by a 
drunken soldier, and the commandant refused 
to hold an inquiry...I do not see what can be 
done? no paper would publish an account of a
camp from an insider's point of view.^,
bo
Miss Pankhurst claimed that a prisoner at the Alexandra
Palace camp who had been confined in the guardroom for
writing to members of the government about the hardships 
67there. Among the few MPs who took up internees 
complaints were Sir William Byles (Labour) and Mr. Joseph 
King (Liberal), but they were rarely able to persuade 
ministers at the Home Office and the War Office to
65. Ibid., p. 387.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
166
68acknowledge the problems complained of.
No aspect of camp regime attracted more public
interest than that of prisoners 1 diet# especially in the
latter part of the war when the general population was
subjected to rationing of many food commodities# due
primarily to shortages caused by the German submarine
campaign against allied shipping. It was sometimes alleged
that internees were enjoying more and better food than
their guards or the average British soldier# and that they
were largely protected from the effects of food rationing
imposed on the general public* It was also alleged that
German prisoners were allowed a much more generous diet than
British prisoners held in Germany. There is little doubt
that most civilian and combatant prisoners enjoyed an
adequate if monotonous diet during most of the early war 
69years, and were later subjected to increasing restrictions
once supplies of food commodities became short and
rationing was imposed in the country. In December 1914 when
food was still relatively plentiful internees enjoyed quite
liberal rations, the daily allowance being,
1 lb. 8ozs. bread or 1 lb. biscuits# 8 ozs. 
fresh or frozen meat or 4 ozs. pressed meat, \ 
oz. tea or 1 oz. coffee, ^ oz. salt, 2 ozs. 
sugar, l/20th tin (1 lb.) condensed milk# 8 ozs. 
fresh vegetables# 1/72 oz. pepper# 2 ozs. 
cheese, or 1 oz. butter or 1 oz. margerine,
2 ozs. pears# beans, lentils or rice.^Q
68. See, for eg., 86HC 5s., 413, 17 Oct. 1916; 107HC 5s., 
1202, 27 June 1918.
69. See appendix VIII.
70. Cd. 7815# 1915.
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It seems clear that many camp authorities worried less
about the quality and variety of food given to prisoners
than its calorific value. The diet was periodically revised
to accord with food regulations applying to the general
population and was fixed on medical advice and approved
by the Food Controller. The calorific value of the food
ration allowed to each internee varied according to the
type of work he performed. The ration was progressively
reduced during 1917 and 1918 as food shortages became more
acute in Britain. In May 1917 prisoners engaged in heavy
manual work were thought to require about 4,000 - 4,500
calories a day; for ordinary manual work 3,400 calories
was considered sufficient, and sedentary and clerical
workers were expected to function on a daily intake of
712,700 calories. Despite protests from internees, their
families and sympathisers, the government insisted that
the diet was sufficient to maintain health and strength
72and there was no justification for increasing it. Cohen- 
Portheim recalls that in the latter stages of the war,
One article of diet after another vanished. 
Horseflesh made its appearance (it tastes like 
very tough and sugary beef), vegetables 
disappeared. Bread was gritty and mouldy, then 
it disappeared altogether for months and was 
replaced by 'broken biscuit' which is just 
like pebbles. Potatoes were frozen and 
sickeningly sweet, then there were no potatoes 
at all. Milk went, butter went. There was 
nothing now to be bought at the canteen and so 
one never got fruit. Every day or week made
71. 93HC 5s., 2458, 25 May 1917.
72. 96HC 5s., 1285, 25 July 1917; 96HC 5s., 1713, 30 
July 1917.
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matters worse, until a time when one really 
always felt hungry. Everybody's health 
suffered...People got even thinner, ever 
crosser, even more listless, and they talked 
of, thought of, and lived for nothing but 
food.
Prisoners were allowed to receive food parcels from
enemy or neutral countries, but not from anywhere in
the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands, and they
could not buy additional items of food from camp canteens
other than certain condiments and a limited amount of
74potatoes, herrings and sauerkraut. By March 1918 the 
daily ration for civilian prisoners consisted of:
5ozs. bread, 3 ozs. biscuit, 3/4 oz. 
flour, 4ozs. meat (fresh or frozen) or 3 ozs. 
meat (preserved or tinned), 12 ozs. salt- 
cured herrings, ^oz. edible fat, h oz. tea 
or ^ oz. coffee, 1 oz. sugar, % oz. salt,
1/72 oz. pepper, 4 ozs. oatmeal, 1 oz. 
syrup or jam, 1 oz. split peas or beans or 
rice, 20 ozs. potatoes, 4 ozs. fresh 
vegetables otjer than potatoes. (Prisoners 
employed on work approved by the government 
could receive an additional 2 ozs. bread,
3 ozs. biscuit and 1 oz. cheese. Other 
prisoners were allowed extra food only if
authorised for medical reasons).^
Under an agreement negotiated by Britain and Germany at the
Hague in July 1918 it was laid down that the daily rations
of prisoners should be ’sufficient in quantity and quality,
especially as regards meat and vegetables, regard being had
to the restrictions imposed on the consumption of food of
the civil population of the country.1 Officer prisoners
73. Cohen-Portheim, op. cit., pp. 164-5.
74. 103HC 5s., 1808, 5 Mar. 1918; 30HL 5s., 842, 11 
July 1918. See appendices IXa and IXb.
75. 103HC 5s., 1808, 5 Mar. 1918.
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were to be given assistance to manage their own messing? 
other prisoners of war were to receive as far as possible 
the same allowance of rationed commodities as the civil 
population, with a minimum daily calorific value of 
2, 000 for non-workers, 2,500 for ordinary ‘workers and 
2,85 0 for heavy manual workers. The daily ration of bread 
was in no case to be less than 250 grams. Ordinary workers 
were to receive a daily addition of 100 grams of bread or
7
cereals and heavy workers an extra 150 grams of those items.
Most civilian internees were found by camp 
authorities to be prepared to work, although not required 
to do so under the terms of the Hague convention, as were 
combatants other than officers and NCOs. Finding useful 
work for civilian prisoners, either on or off the camps, 
proved difficult, particularly during the early war years. 
Inspection teams in 1914 and 1915 found a few volunteers 
employed in 'policing' camps, tailoring, shoemaking, cooking 
and carrying out other domestic and maintenance tasks, but 
most internees had little to occupy their time. The 
authorities were nevertheless well aware of the value of 
useful employment in raising the morale of prisoners. Mr.
D.D. Reid, one of the joint secretaries of the Civilian 
Internment Camps Committee, noted that,
...the provision of employment greatly 
lessens the difficulty of carrying on the 
administration of the camps, and conduces 
to good discipline as it takes the minds of 
the men off their grievances.^
76. Articles 45 and 46 of the Hague agreement signed on 
14 July 1918 under reserve. The agreement did not 
become operative before the armistice.
77. Reid to Troup, 22 Nov. 1917, HO 45/10887/350150/2.
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Several attempts were made to organise camp industries,
be
but only three might/termed reasonably successful - the
production of brushes at the Douglas and Islington camps
and sewing machinery production at Hackney Wick. The brush-
making machinery was installed by contractors and instructors
were hired to train internees. The output was sold through
contractors to government departments and the public and
provided work for an average of about 600 prisoners, who
were paid at industrial rates and allowed to retain their
earnings less a reduction for maintenance. The government
claimed that-brush production by prisoners helped
alleviate the shortage of brushes which resulted from the
war but the brushmaking industry and some KPs did not accept
this explanation. They objected to what they saw as enemy
subjects being trained at public expense to compete with
78firms employing British labour. The Hackney Wick sewing
machine workshop was established with a view to driving
cheap German machines out of the British market. Skilled
German tradesmen were recruited from several interment
camps to make the necessary machine tools and bring the
shop into operation. The Vickers company provided the
machinery and paid the men, and production began in the 
79autumn of 1917. In December 1917 a scheme was instituted 
at the Knockaloe camp under which prisoners would produce 
furniture for presentation to the inhabitants of the
78. 23HL 5s., 474, 14 Nov. 1916? 21HL 5s., 1125, 18 Nay
1916; 93HC 5s., 33, 30 Apr. 1917? 104HC 5s., 1211,
21 Kar. 1918; 105HC 5s., 980, 24 Apr. 1918. See also
unpublished report by K.L. Waller, head of Prisoners 
of War Branch, HO, Dec. 1920, HO 45/11025/410118/2.
79. Waller report, ibid.
171
areas of France invaded by the Germans and subsequently
recaptured by the allies. The scheme was recommended to
the Home Office by the Civilian Internment Gamps Committee
and the cost met by funds raised by the Emergency Committee
for Assistance of Germans, Austrians and Hungarians in
8 0Distress, sponsored by the Society of Friends.
The principle obstacle to the establishment of camp
industries was the lack of suitable workshop buildings and
the shortage of machinery, materials and instructors. The
potential level of output of camp industries was considered
unlikely to justify the employment of materials and
financial resources needed for other purposes connected
with the war effort. As Waller, head of the Home office
Prisoners of War Branch, noted, 'The needs of the nation
had to come first, and therefore the idea of creating large
81camp industries had to be dropped.1
In the later war years some internees were released
under strict conditions to work in agriculture and other
industries of importance to the war effort, which were
acutely short of labour. But while the range of work
available to prisoners in the camps was gradually extended,
for many internment became an ordeal of inactivity and, as
Waller admitted, 'for the most part, when the ordinary
camp fatigue duties, to which every inmate was liable, had
been performed, the interned men had to fill the rest of
82the day as best they could.'
80. HO 45/10887/350150/2.
81. Waller report, op. cit.
82. Ibid.
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If for most prisoners life in the camps was far 
from the comfortable, well-fed existence depicted by some 
propagandists, it did not approach the harsh kind of 
regime advocated by the Germanophobes and anti-alien 
extremists. Social class and affluence won privileges for 
some, but the majority of internees faced a life in which 
the only constant factors were boredom, frustration and 
apathy. Their treatment was, with few exceptions, humane 
and their diet adequate for most of the war, though 
questionably so during the final 18 months. Apart from the 
bloody riot at Douglas in November 1914 violent disturbances 
did not occur and few men tried or succeeded in escaping
Q3
from the camps, those that did being quickly recaptured.w 
The rarity of breakouts, although they would have been easy 
at many camps, was probably due in part to the general 
apathy which increasingly pervaded the camps as the war 
progressed and the virtual impossibility of a fugitive 
being able to re-unite with his family and find a job with 
which to support it.
The concern expressed by some politicians about the 
adequacy of security arrangements at the camps proved to be
83. It is believed that only five civilians and seven 
military prisoners escaped during the war. Four of 
the civilians absconded from Knockaloe on 13 Jan. 1916 
and were recaptured the following day in a fishing 
boat in Peel Harbour. An 89-yard tunnel dug by internees 
was discovered by guards at Knockaloe in Jan. 1916 
leading from the camp theatre towards the perimeter 
fence. The ringleaders were identified and given 14 
days detention (HO 45/10946/266042/119). See also 
Belfield report, op. cit.
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groundless, and Belfield conceded that it was open to
argument whether the military advantage of interning enemy
subjects was adequate compensation for the expense
involved and the loss of the services of the officers and
84men employed in administering and guarding the camps. If, 
as seems probable, most enemy aliens posed no real threat 
to the community, as far as serving their ostensible 
purpose of protecting the safety of the realm was concerned, 
the internment camps may have been a costly irrelevance.
84. Belfield report, op. cit.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REPATRIATION
While repatriation rather than internment as a means of removing 
enemy aliens from circulation may have had much to commend it in practical 
and often in humanitarian terms, it proved a controversial option as far 
as adult male aliens were concerned and a general exchange of such men, 
favoured by Germany, was resisted by the British government almost until 
the end of the war.
Thousands of women, children and elderly men of enemy nationality 
were permitted, and sometimes compelled, to leave but, apart from the short 
period of grace at the beginning of the war, few men thought capable of 
military service were allowed to go.
The primary stumbling block to a general exchange of civilians 
was the disparity in the number of enemy nationals in Britain compared to 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. In a full exchange Germany could have 
acquired about 50,000 subjects and Austria-Hungary between 10,000 and 
11,000, while Britain and its colonies could have got back only about 
5,000 subjects from Germany and a mere 200 from Austria. Since a 
significant proportion of enemy aliens in each country, including many 
internees, made it clear they had no wish to be repatriated, an all-for- 
all exchange would have entailed a considerable degree of compulsion.
If Britain was not prepared to agree to the block exchange 
of civilians it soon reached the conclusion that 'head for head1 
exchanges of selected individuals were also unsatisfactory. They 
involved lengthy preliminary negotiations, which in many cases proved 
abortive, and at the same time created strong discontent among those who
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could not command the political or social influence usually required to
be a party in this type of exchange. The bargaining which took place
between opposing governments often developed into a kind of blackmail. ^
From the outset the War Office regarded proposals for such exchanges 'very 
2
coldly' and attempts to arrange individual exchanges were eventually
discontinued 'except in cases where the individual in question was of
special value to the country and his exchange urged by a government 
3
department.' According to General Belfield, Director of Prisoners of 
War at the War Office, only three British officers, one an invalid, were
4
returned to Britain under individual exchange arrangements.
While Germany pressed from the outset for a general exchange of 
civilians who wished to leave, the British government resisted on the 
grounds that the much higher ratio of manpower that the Central Powers 
would gain, including many ex-servicemen and reservists, would be too 
disadvantageous to Britain in military terms.
With the Americans acting as intermediaries, terms were, 
however, agreed with both Germany and Austria in the autumn of 1914 for 
the repatriation of women, children, elderly men, invalid men of military 
age, ministers of religion and medical doctors. In the agreement with 
Germany military age was defined as 17 to 55 inclusive and with Austria as
1. 22HL 5 s., 188-90, 25 May 1916, and Lord Newton, Retrospection 
(1941), p. 220.
2. Unpublished report by General Herbert Belfield, Director of
Prisoners of War, War Office, 26 Mar. 1920, HO 45/11025/310118/5.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. 92HC 5s., 15, 26 Mar. 1917 and 18HL 5s., 282, 6 Jan. 1915.
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18 to 50. Britain refused to accept 45 as the maximum age of military
£
usefulness as the Germans and Russians had done in exchanging prisoners. 
Britain initially insisted (at the request of the Admiralty) on excepting 
from repatriation all ships* officers and German seamen (because British 
merchant seamen held by the Germans were classed as combatant prisoners),  ^
but an agreement was reached with Germany on 4 December 1915 under which 
seamen under 17 and over 55 could be repatriated. The Germans had 
reservations about repatriating military officers, even those on the
g
reserve list. Initially Britain and Germany refused to let their
respective consular representatives leave, but in March 1915 an agreement
was reached under which both consuls de carriere and honorary consuls would
9
be exchanged on a man-for-man basis. But the agreements proved easier 
to make than to implement, and the rate of exchanges, particularly in the 
case of male enemy aliens, never achieved the levels potentially possible 
under the agreements, despite protracted diplomatic efforts.
There were few precedents in modern times and little in inter­
national law to guide the belligerents on the question of repatriation 
and exchange of prisoners. In Britain the Home Secretary had powers 
under the 1905 Aliens Act to deport ’undesirable1 aliens on an individual 
basis, but these powers were largely superseded by the Aliens Restrictions 
Act of 1914. ^  The accompanying Aliens Restriction Order empowered him
6. 71HC 5s., 1621, 12 May 1915.
7. J.M. Garner, International Law and the World War, 2 vols.,
(1920), p. 49., vol. 1.
8 C 18HL 5s., 282, 6 Jan. 1915.
9. Garner, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 49.
10. Orders for deportation of aliens were made under Section 1(1)
(c) of the Aliens Restriction Act, later subsumed in the Aliens
Restriction (Consolidation) Order 1916.
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to * deport any alien (whether the subject of an enemy or friendiy power) 
whenever in his judgment it was deemed advisable.* The Home Secretary, 
who could also make deportation orders under the Defence of the Realm 
regulations, was not required to justify his reasons for an order in the 
courts. The deportee could, however, make representations to the Home 
Secretary, who had no power to dictate the country to which an alien should 
go. ^  Where war conditions made it impracticable for an alien to be 
deported he was imprisoned or interned, in many cases until the end of the 
war.
There was undoubtedly much support in parliament and the
country for the removal of as many enemy aliens as possible by repatriation
and the government was under some pressure in parliament in the early days
12
of the war to make funds available for this purpose. The cabinet
agreed to finance the passages of British-born women who had acquired
enemy nationality through marriage and funds were also made available by
the Austrian and German governments, through the American Embassy in London
to facilitate the repatriation of any of their subjects who could not affor
to pay their own fares. A similar fund was established by the British
Government at the U.S. Embassy in Berlin to enable British subjects in
Germany and Austria to return home. Between 1 September and 31 December
1914 the Americans arranged funding for the repatriation of 1,137
13
destitute German subjects and several hundred Austrians, and by the end
11. The Court of Appeal held in 1917 that under the Aliens
Restriction Act 1914 and article 12(2) of the Aliens 
Restriction (Consolidation) Order of 1916 there was no power
to specify in a deportation order the country to which a
deportee should be sent. (Rex v. Home Secretary; Ex parte 
Due de Chateau-Thierry, 1 KB 922)
12. 18HL 5s., 140, 25 Nov. 1914 and 18HL 5s., 286, 6 Jan. 1915.
13. 18HL 5s., 283, 6 Jan. 1915.
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of that period between 6,000 and 7,000 women and children under the
14
age of 14 and about 2,300 males over 14 had left Britain.
All wartime governments gave special consideration to the plight
of enemy alien women, particularly those of British birth. Except in
special cases, as for example where there was suspicion of espionage, no
women were interned, and as a general rule none of the 12,000 British-
15
born women of enemy nationality were repatriated against their will.
Simon, during his period at the Home Office, declared that to remove such
women as a matter of course would be 1 cruel and monstrous* although he
accepted that there were cases in which women may have transferred their
allegiance to their husband’s native country. ^
Asquith’s revised policy on aliens control announced on 13 May
1915 represented a hardening of the Government’s position on repatriation
of enemy alien women - and men over military age - in that it formally
placed the onus on them to show why they should not be expelled. Cases
involving women, however, continued to be treated with particular sympathy,
and of the 18,500 Germans and Austrians of both sexes who had applied to
remain in the United Kingdom by the end of July, over 15,200 were allowed
to stay after their applications had been considered by the Repatriation 
th«
Sub-committee of^Aliens Advisory Committee and the Home Office.
14. Ibid.
15. HO 45/10787/298199/2 and 71HC 5s., 2358, 19 May 1915.
16. 72HC 5s., 848, 17 June 1915.
17. Of the 16,456 enemy aliens whose applications for exemption from
repatriation were dealt with by the committee, 14,939 were allowed 
to remain in Britain.
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The bulk of wartime repatriations took place during 1915;
between 13 May and 22 November alone, 9,469 enemy alien men, women and
18
children left voluntarily or, less often, compulsorily. But these
figures failed to satisfy some parliamentary critics who accused the
government of being far too lenient in allowing what they regarded as an
excessive number of exemptions from repatriation.
The most contentious aspect of the government’s policy, however,
was the failure to effect the repatriation of British civilians interned
by the Central Powers, only 628 of whom were returned between December
1914 and May 1916. During the same period 1,160 German internees were 
19
sent home. The constant dilemma of the British government was that of
trying to retrieve its subjects from enemy custody without giving in to 
what it considered unacceptable German demands for an all-for-all 
exchange of civilian prisoners.
The difficulty of effecting exchanges with Germany caused 
particular concern and controversy in Britain because it was widely 
believed, thanks in no small measure to the efforts o f .the propagandists, 
that British prisoners in Germany were singled out for harsher treatment 
than those from other countries. The Austrians, on the other hand, were 
commonly thought to treat British subjects fairly and humanely. So few 
British civilians were held in Turkey and Bulgaria that the sporadic and 
generally unfruitful contacts with those countries were primarily concerned 
with combatant prisoners.
During the first half of the war responsibility for matters 
concerning British prisoners in enemy hands, including the controversial
18.
19.
76HC 5s., 24 Nov. 1915.
22HL 5s., 186, 25 May 1916.
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repatriation issue, rested principally with the Foreign Office, The 
day-to-day work was handled by its Prisoner and Alien Department, 
established to oversee the care and protection of British combatant 
and civilian prisoners of war and to liaise with other Whitehall 
departments with responsibilities for enemy prisoners in the United 
Kingdom, In March 1916, Lord Newton was moved from Paymaster-General 
to the Foreign Office, where his responsibilities included the Prisoners 
and Aliens Department, This work, and his role as chairman of the 
standing committee established to co-ordinate the activities of the
20
various Whitehall departments concerned with prisoner of war matters, 
was to make him a focal point of criticism and controversy for the 
remainder of the war.
The sometimes acrimonious relationship between Newton and the 
War Office, and to a lesser extent the Home Office, was perhaps derived 
in some degree from his experiences as Paymaster-General, In that post 
he represented the War Office in parliament during Kitchener*s frequent 
absences and also occasionally stood in for other departmental ministers. 
After his assignment to deputise for the War Minister, officials in the 
department,
...made it quite clear that they wished to see as little as 
possible of me, refused me a room or even a table or chair, and 
condescended only to give me very scanty information, which was 
supplied at the eleventh hour by an overworked official whose duty 
it was to compile enigmatic answers to parliamentary questions. ^
20. Newton became chairman of the committee in 1915. It included
representatives of the War Office, Admiralty, Home Office and, 
when necessary, other departments. The principle questions 
dealt with were those relating to repatriation. See unpublished 
report by M.L. Waller, head of Prisoners of War Branch, Home 
Office, dated Dec. 1920, HO 45/11025/410118/2.
21. Newton, op. cit., p. 214.
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Newton fotind officials of some other departments similarly inconsiderate
and unhelpful, with Home Office staff the worst offenders. He wrote
later that he could not recall one occasion on which a Home Office
official had provided him with anything more than 'an inferior brief
22
at the last moment.'
One of Newton's first major objectives at the Foreign Office
was to try to reach agreement with the Germans on the exchange of enemy
alien internees over military age. He believed the plan would be
acceptable to the Germans because of the numerical advantage in their
favour, but he expected the War Office and Admiralty to object 'as they
only counted heads and looked upon every released civilian as an addition
23
to the German Army.' The scheme had the unstinted backing of Grey,
and cabinet approval was given, but the agreement was negotiated with
only grudging acquiescence from the military departments.
Initially Britain offered to exchange all internees over 50
and those over 45 who were unfit for service in the field, even though
under such an arrangement the Germans would receive back far more men than 
24
Britain. There were believed to be about 4,200 German internees over
the age of 45 in British camps, and of these 1,800 had, by November 1916,
declared that they did not wish to return to Germany. The maximum
expected to be returned to Britain from the German camps under the over-
25
45 agreement was about 600. While the Germans were prepared to exchange 
civilians over 45 they continued to resist the British proviso that the 
remaining British internees below 45 should be exchanged for an equivalent 
number of German civilians held in Britain. This condition was dropped
22. Ibid. p. 218.
23. Newton, op. cit., p. 218.
24. 27HS 5s., 594, 5 July 1916 and Cd. 8352, 1916.
25. 23HL 5s., 503, 15 Nov. 1916.
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by Britain in late August 'from motives of humanity' and the Germans
were informed by Grey that the British Government was,
...most anxious to arrange for the immediate release of 
civilians over 45 owing to the deplorable accounts which 
are reaching them as to the mental condition of many of 
the older men both in the British and German internment 
camps.' 26
After further correspondence between Britain and Germany 
through U.S. diplomatic channels it was agreed that all civilian 
internees over 45 should be exchanged, with a proviso (included at 
Britain's request) that each side could detain up to 20 men in that age 
category for military reasons. These were defined by Britain as 'such 
reasons as justify the government concerned in the detention of an 
individual whose conduct has given reasonable cause for suspicion,or 
complaint, or because, owing to his special qualifications, his
27
repatriation is likely to be of particular value to the enemy.' It
was also agreed that neither government should have the right to demand
repatriation of persons unwilling to leave; the cost of repatriation was
to be borne by the persons returning or by their government; repatriation
of Germans from British colonies and overseas dominions were to follow with
the utmost speed circumstances would allow; retired army and navy officers
not in receipt of pay, as well as officers and crews of British and German
merchant ships were to be considered as civilians, and the arrangements
were to apply to civilians on each side who came into enemy hands in the
28
subsequent course of the war. The German government also proposed
that the exchange of prisoners should, if possible, be'carried out 
simultaneously, and that for this purpose they should be repatriated in
26. Cd. 8296, 1916.
27. Grey to Laughlin, U.S. Charge d'Affaires, Berlin, 2 Sept. 1916,
Cd. 8352, 1916.
28. Cd. 8352, 1916.
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three groups of approximately equal numbers; the names of those
prisoners over 45 who were retained by each country should be made
available to the other country; and the internees who had been retained
in Britain in spite of being entitled to release under earlier agreements
29
should be included in the first group of repatriates.
Negotiations through diplomatic channels on the details of the 
agreement were protracted and Newton relates that there was ’much trouble 
over the question of exchanges of civilian prisoners, both the War Office 
and the Admiralty obstructing action.1 He accused the military author­
ities on both sides of being,
...prone to regard every interned civilian as possessing 
some potential naval or military capacity ...and if he is 
physically unfit they frequently discover other reasons which 
in their opinion are excellent and adequate for keeping the man 
under restraint,
One of the few members of the War Office staff held in high personal 
regard by Newton was ironically the head of its Prisoner of War 
Directorate, General Herbert Belfield. Newton records a visit from 
Lord Stamfordham, the King's secretary, in June 1916, during which he was 
informed that the King wanted exchanges of civilian prisoners to be extende 
and would like to see Belfield replaced at the War Office. While acknow­
ledging that the rate of exchanges had been unsatisfactory, Newton argued
that the fault did not lie with Belfield, a loyal and efficient officer,
31
who never acted without consulting his superiors.
On 3 October 1916 Newton attended a cabinet meeting called to 
discuss the difficulties raised by the military departments on the
29. Note verbale, German Foreign Office to U.S. Embassy, Berlin,
16 Oct. 1916, Cd. 8437, 1917.
30. 22HL 5s., 188, 25 May 1916.
31. Newton, op. cit., p. 225.
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proposed exchanges of civilian internees. He noted afterwards,
Not at all impressed with the proceedings; more than 
20 people sitting in the Cabinet room, with various assistants; 
Asquith presiding, and proceedings characterised by confusion 
and indecision. Most of the talking done by Lloyd George. ^
Grey grew increasingly disenchanted with the inter-departmental 
conflict over repatriation and its effect in delaying the over-45 exchange 
arrangements. He made clear to the cabinet that he would be pleased to 
have his department relieved of its responsibilities for prisoners of war.
In mid-October Newton returned from a trip to France to find that 
as a result of 'a nebulous decision' by the cabinet, the War Office had 
been made the primary authority for prisoner of war affairs. Apart from 
matters concerning American representation of British interests, the 
Foreign Office had been relieved of all its responsibilities for prisoners. 
Newton was to become Controller of an 'independent' Prisoner of War 
Department with responsibility for matters concerning British prisoners 
of war. His inter-departmental standing committee on prisoners of war 
continued to act as an adjunct to the new department and Newton still 
dealt with questions in the House of Lords on *\<\ * rs concerning British 
prisoners of war. Such questions were handled in the Commons by Mr. 
Fitzallan Hope, a Treasury minister. Despite the powerful position now 
held by the War Office and his lack of authority to make decisions where 
there was disagreement with other departments, Newton continued to regard 
himself as primus inter pares among departments concerned with prisoner 
matters. He clashed with the War Office on a number of occasions over
32. Ibid., p. 228.
33. Departments ultimately represented on the committee were the
War Office, Admiralty, Home Office, Colonial Office, India
Office, Board of Trade, Air Ministry, Ministry of Shipping 
and, towards the end of 1918, the self-governing dominions 
(CAB 15/6/15). See Newton, Retrospection, op. cit. p. 228.
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repatriation policy and cabinet intervention was sometimes required to
34
resolve the more serious differences of opinion. Newton grew
increasingly irritated over the inflexible stance of the War Office and 
on 23 November he noted in his diary that the department was,
...now threatening to wreck the whole scheme of over-45 
exchange, because the Germans are enforcing universal conscription. 
Cannot believe that they will persist, but if they do I shall 
probably have to go. ^
Despite Newton*s fears the over-45 scheme came into operation
on 2 January 1917, but soon foundered due to lack of ships to convey
repatriates between Britain and the Continent. The situation
deteriorated further after intensification of the German submarine
campaign, the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the United
States and Germany (on 3 February) and the declaration of a blockade zone
by Germany. When, during February, the exchanges were suspended only
370 Germans and 70 British civilians over 45 had been liberated; a mere
25 Britons had reached home, the rest being presumed to be waiting in
36
Holland for space on ships.
The breakdown of the exchange arrangements provoked a barrage 
of criticism in parliament of the government*s general handling of the 
repatriation question and stimulated increased support for a total 
exchange of civilian prisoners, regardless of the numerical advantage 
that this would concede to the Germans. Despite the government*s 
insistence that the lack of progress on repatriation was due to the 
unreasonableness of the German negotiators, it was clear to all but the 
most biased observers that a fundamental cause of the impasse lay in the
34. 30HL 5s., 29, 28 May 1918.
35. Newton, op. cit., p. 229.
36. 24HL 5s., 239-240, 22. Feb. 1917.
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cabinet's acceptance of the War Office view that a wholesale exchange 
of civilians would be too mih’f^rUy advantageous to the enemy. A War Office 
committee reported in March 1917 that,
Any increase of the resources in manpower of the 
Central Powers must tend to prolong the war, and as the 
war is to a great extent one of attrition, the best and 
really most humane course to follow is to place and keep 
out of action as many of the enemy as possible.
Taking all circumstances into consideration, and more 
especially in view of the disparity of the numbers involved, 
the proposal of a general exchange of interned civilians should 
not, in the interests of the State, be entertained. ^
The same conclusions were again reached by a War Office committee which
reconsidered the question of a general exchange of civilian internees in
38
February 1918.
The humanitarian case for general repatriation was passionately
argued by such figures as the Archbishop of Canterbury, Viscount Bryce
and Lord Gainford. The Archbishop's contention that the country was
solidly in favour of general repatriation on humanitarian grounds was
disputed by Newton, who said he had received letters which indicated that
many people saw the agreement with Germany on prisoners over 45 as 'only
39
another proof of the perpetual incapacity of the government.' Bryce
questioned why the War -Office and the Admiralty should have the decisive
voice on the exchange of civilians, and found it hard to believe that it
would make any material difference to the war whether a large or small
number of enemy internees, some of them possibly capable of military
40
service, continued to be held by the belligerents. Other speakers
37. Belfield report, op. cit.
38. Ibid.
39. 23HL 5s., 1501-2, 15 Nov. 1916.
40. 24HL 5s., 247, 22 Feb. 1917.
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argued that a wholesale exchange of civilian prisoners would rid the 
country of what was ostensibly the most undesirable group of aliens, 
it would remove a burden on public funds, and would ensure that when 
peace came former enemies would not take jobs which could be filled by 
returning British servicemen.
While Newton accepted the humanitarian and practical arguments, 
he had little option but to publicly defend the government position that 
a general exchange of civilian internees would allow too great a military 
advantage to the enemy. Despite his differences with the War Office he 
conceded that the department was only advocating a policy which they 
deemed to be in Britain*s best interests. Newton also advanced the War 
Office view that even if, as the Germans stated, returning civilians 
would not be assigned to military duties, their repatriation would release 
an equivalent number of other men to take up such duties. While Newton 
sometimes appeared ambivalent on the issue of general repatriation, his 
humanitarian concern for prisoners on both sides was never in doubt. He 
was acutely conscious of the demoralising effect on prisoners of the lack 
of progress on exchanges, and after the breakdown of the over-45 agreement 
in February 1917, he mused sadly,
Imagine the position, if you can, in which these men 
were placed. After months of laborious negotiation they 
are told that they are going to be free; they receive their 
passports and their papers; they are told that ships are 
waiting for them, and that trains will convey them. Then it 
is intimated to them at the last moment that negotiations have 
broken down, and they must again wait indefinitely. ^
In the spring of 1917 Newton attempted to revive exchanges with
the Germans, but by his own admission was ’singularly unsuccessful.1
Ships to convey repatriates were difficult to find, particularly since
41. Ibid., col, 240.
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the resumption of the German submarine campaign, which had caused the
withdrawal of steamship services between Britain and Holland. And
Newton did not find the Admiralty very helpful.
...I am bound honestly to confess that I never met 
with very much assistance from the Admiralty... I have 
always been informed that there were no boats available.
(The Admiralty] hold a very well grounded view that the 
German Government are much less concerned to repatriate 
civilian or military prisoners than to sink shipping of 
whatsoever kind, whether a hospital ship or anything else. ^
It may be that the British government underestimated Germany's
commitment to repatriation. In late 1916 and early 1917 Newton heard
from a number of sources that the Germans were anxious to negotiate
directly with British representatives in an effort to reach a workable
43
exchange arrangement. It was an idea which appealed to Newton, who
believed 'you can do more in a few hours conversation than in the course of
44
months of writing. There was considerable opposition among politicians
and in the popular press against the principle of direct negotiation with
Germany, and Newton was surprised and relieved to find when the idea was
put to the cabinet that Lloyd George, Curzon, Milner and Bonar Law were in
favour. The only minister who expressed doubt was Cecil, who thought that
such negotiations might be suspected by some of being peace talks. This
possibility also worried the French, but their objections to an Anglo-
German conference were considered by Newton, not without some justification,
to be impudent, 'as I knew that without any consultation with us, they had
45
recently met the Germans in Berne...' The French objections were
42. 25HL 5s,, 446-7, 14 June 1917.
43. Newton, op. cit., pp. 230 and 236.
44. 26HL 5s., 104, 31 July 1917.
45. Newton, op. cit., p. 236.
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withdrawn after Newton had convinced Cambon, their ambassador in London,
46
that Britain had no intention of talking peace with the Germans..
Despite criticism in parliament and predictably outraged
reactions in some newspapers, an Anglo-German conference was arranged at
The Hague, beginning on 25 June. Newton was accompanied by Sir Robert
Younger, of the Aliens Advisory Committee, General Herbert Belfield,
and three assistants. A German delegation of similar size was led by
General Friedrich, head of the Prisoner of War Department at the War
Ministry, and the talks were chaired by Jonkheer van Vredenburch, a Dutch
diplomat, what had paid a number of inspection visits to German internment
camps. Newton, who spoke excellent German and French, struck up a useful
47
rapport with Friedrich, finding him humane and reasonable, but both side:
held firmly to their well-established positions on the fundamental question
of a general exchange of civilian prisoners; the Germans demanded it and
the British refused to contenance it. Existing agreements on the exchange
of civilians over the age of 45 and invalids were re-affirmed, but little
progress was made in finding a basis for the exchange of other categories
of civilians, although Newton later claimed that Britain had been prepared
48
to make ‘large concessions.' New agreements were, however, reached on
matters relating to the welfare of prisoners, including the reduction of 
punishments for some offences in the prison camps, more efficient delivery 
of mail, improvements in camp administration, and a more lenient inter­
pretation of disabilities for purposes of repatriation of invalids. An 
arrangement was also agreed under which a total of 16,000 prisoners of 
war, including 2,000 civilian invalids - 1,600 Germans and 400 British -
460 Ibid. p. 236.
47. Ibid. p. 140.
48. 29HL 5s., 344, 7 Mar. 1918.
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would be transferred from camps in the belligerent countries and interned
in Holland. The achievements of the negotiations, which concluded on 2
July, were, as Newton admitted, modest, but they at least offered the
prospect of substantially improving the position of several thousand
prisoners. At a War Cabinet meeting on 11 July Newton and Belfield
received warm congratulations on their work at The Hague. Ministers
expressed surprise at the relative success of the negotiations, and Newton
records that he attributed it to Belfield, whose thorough knowledge of the
prisoner of war question and obvious sincerity and frankness made a great
49
impression on the Germans. As he later noted, Newton enjoyed, for the
first and last time, a measure of popularity, but he harboured no illusions.
I knew perfectly well that all the many people who had
relatives or friends among the prisoners in Germany would
expect either that their conditions would be radically 
changed or that they would be immediately exchanged, and 
that any delay would cause disappointment and exasperation.
Newton*s forebodings proved correct. Although the Hague
agreement was signed on 2 July it did not become operative until 2 January
1918, due to protracted haggling over its detailed implementation. It
took more than three months simply to agree on which ships should be used
to transport the repatriates and which route they should take. A series
of alternatives was considered and rejected by one side or the other until,
in mid-September, they finally settled on the use of Dutch vessels bearing
distinctive markings and using the ports of Boston and Rotterdam. Despite
a number of false starts and misunderstandings the sailings began in
October. By the time the armistice was signed with Germany, 3,662
civilian prisoners had been transported to the continent, bringing the
total of internees repatriated to their own countries or transferred to
49.
50.
Newton, op. cit,, p. 242. 
Ibid. p. 241.
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camps in Holland since the beginning of the war to 6,840, ^
A separate repatriation agreement was made between Britain
and Turkey after a meeting between Newton and Turkish representatives at
52
Berne in December 1917, Because of transport difficulties between
the two countries, however, the agreement never became effective, A few
Turkish internees who were sick or aged were repatriated through Holland
into Germany independent of agreements. The handful of Bulgarians to
53
qualify for repatriation were also sent home via Germany,
Newton estimated that when existing repatriation agreements
had been fulfilled about 21,000 German civilians would remain in British
internment camps, and between 3,000 and 4,000 British civilians in the
54
camps in Germany, There was growing concern in the war cabinet during
1918 about the problems thought likely to arise from the release of
thousands of enemy aliens at the end of the war, and the repatriation of
all internees before that time looked an increasingly attractive option,
although it was estimated that about a third of the prisoners would not 
55
wish to go, But whatever the appeal of the practical and humanitarian
arguments for wholesale repatriation as put forward by such influencial 
figures as the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Bryce and others, the govern 
ment continued to adopt the position advised by the military departments, 
firmly opposing a general exchange of civilian internees, Newton records
51, Waller report, op, cit,; 26HL 5s,, 31 July 1917; 26HL 5s,, 
684-5, 21 Aug, 1917; 26HL 5s,, 901, 6 Nov, 1917,
52, Newton, op, cit,, p, 249,
53, Waller report, op, cit,
54, 29HL 5s., 344, 7 Mar. 1918.
55, Ibid., col, 346,
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that he had to conceal his own opinion on the issue, believing that the
tyar Office and Admiralty would eventually have to give way to the growing
56
current of opinion in parliament favouring a block exchange policy.
The military departments were adamant, however, arguing that at a time
when Germany sorely needed an infusion of manpower to stimulate its
flagging war effort, it was even more important to deny it" the benefit 
of receiving back thousands of repatriates. Some who supported the War 
Office position regarded German prisoners as hostages whose custody helped 
to ensure better treatment for British subjects held in Germany than would
otherwise be the case; others believed that total repatriation should be
opposed as a matter of principle since to agree to it would mean giving in 
to the demands of the enemy.
But many in parliament felt that the military departments had 
never produced convincing reasons for opposing an all-for-all exchange of 
civilian internees. The Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Davenport and Lord 
Gainford were among those who questioned the rationale of the military 
argument. In Davenport.'s view,
The mere statement that military considerations forbid 
such an exchange is, in my judgment, neither convincing, 
nor ought it to be decisive. I think myself that humane 
considerations should have some play in the decision unless, 
of course, an overwhelming case can be made out for retention 
of the Germans in this country - an overwhelming case that it 
would be contrary to the national interests and expose the 
national interests to great danger. But I think that until 
those overwhelming considerations can be revealed, humane 
considerations should and ought to outweigh the mere military 
objection, ^
The Archbishop of Canterbury agreed that the point had been 
reached where arguments based on technical considerations had been 
overtaken by larger questions of humanity. It was unreasonable to expect 
that men who in many cases had been in captivity since the early days of
56,
57,
Newton, op. cit., p. 252, .
29HL 5s., 333-4, 7 Mar. 1918.
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the war would become dangerous combatants for their own countries. The
collapse of Russia and the shortage of food in Britain had also changed
58
the situation in recent months,•
Newton conceded that the humanitarian arguments for repatriation 
were Unanswerable* and he blamed the Germans for the relatively small 
number of exchanges that had taken place.
The plain and simple fact is that we want to exchange 
prisoners but the Germans do not,,,If you have one side 
always anxious to make a bargain and the other not only 
extremely reluctant, but seizing every opportunity to obstruct 
and, if possible, to destroy the negotiations altogether, it 
is not surprising that there should have been what I am 
prepared to admit - namely, intolerable delay, ^
The credibility of the government*s position on exchanges was
severely undermined in April 1918 when the French and Germans bilaterally
agreed to an exchange of civilian and military prisoners involving a total
of 330,000 men. The agreement came as a surprise to the British governmen
which had always claimed to act in accord with the French on repatriation
matters. The Franco-German arrangement provoked a further onslaught of
criticism on government policy, and Newton was again singled out as the
main target of attack. The Northcliffe newspapers charged the government
with incapacity and indifference on the repatriation issue, and demanded
that neither Newton or Belfield should be allowed to attend any further
negotiations with the Germans, ^
58, Ibid., col, 336,
590 Ibid,, col, 343,
60, Newton remained the target of intermittent attacks by the
Northcliffe newspapers. In July 1919, Newton sued the Da ily 
Mail for alleging that he had joked about the sufferings of 
prisoners of war. The newspaper withdrew an imputation on 
Newton*s efficiency but through its counsel, Sir John Simon, 
accused him of levity, Newton was able to show that any 
levity in his speeches had been directed against Northcliffe 
and his newspapers, not prisoners of war, and the jury awarded 
Newton £5,000 damages with costs. After the case Newton wrote 
that *everyone was delighted to see the arch-journalistic bully 
rebuffed* and even the King, *was much entertained at the 
discomforture of Northcliffe,* (Newton, op, cit,, pp, 255, 264, 
267, 270-3),
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Although Newton argued that there was no reason why Britain
should follow a similar policy to France since individual governments
are the judges of their own action,* ^  as a direct result of the Franco-
German agreement the cabinet made an urgent re-appraisal of repatriation
policy. The almost inevitable outcome was a resumption of direct
negotiations with the Germans. Acutely sensitive to the attacks on
their record on repatriation, the government chose Cave, the Home
Secretary, as the senior member of the British delegation to negotiations
arranged at The Hague early in June. He was accompanied by Newton and
Belfield and the party included seven officials. One of two ships
accompanying the vessel carrying the British delegation sank during the
crossing. The cause was never ascertained but inevitably there were
rumours that the ship had been sunk by the Germans attempting to destroy
the vessel carrying British government ministers. The incident resulted
in a stoppage of repatriation sailings and the Dutch line concerned only
62
agreed to resume them shortly before the armistice.
The German delegation at the negotiations was led by General 
Friedrich and included Prince Hermann Hatzfeldt to counterbalance the 
presence of a senior minister in the British party. Cave*s inexperience 
of international negotiations soon led to embarrassment. At the opening 
session of the talks he made a long speech in ‘atrocious French* although 
it had been presumed that each side would speak in its own language. On 
another occasion, in an address to British prisoners of war repatriated to 
Holland, Cave*s references to Germany upset Friedrich*s delegation so much 
that an explanatory communique had to be issued before negotiations could
61.
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be resumed. The talks were slow and difficult, and Newton believed
that Cave was a liability to the British delegation. He considered that 
the Home Secretary had an inflated idea of what could be achieved and that 
he was too uncompromising over minor issues. The atmosphere at the meet­
ings was hardly helped by a major ursurge of anti-alien agitation in 
Britain, which became so serious that Lloyd George recalled Cave to London, 
After Cave's departure on 30 June, Newton noted in his diary,
Do not regret it, as he and the Germans had a strong 
antipathy to each other and I found him very unwilling to 
incur any responsibility without previously consulting the 
War Cabinet, who had far too much work to do to attend 
seriously to our proceedings. ^
Newton records that he had much difficulty in persuading Cave to write to
Vredenburch, the Dutch conference chairman, to announce his departure.
Cave apparently feared that the Germans would be informed and that his ship
would be attacked. Newton and the rest of the delegation spent two more
weeks in The Hague before eventually signing what he considered a 'patched
up agreement', arrived at after some differences of opinion among the
65
British delegates. The agreement, signed on 14 July, provided for the
general repatriation of all civilians on both sides who wished to go, with 
the exception of a maximum of 70 Germans who might be retained in Britain 
and 40 Britons whom the Germans might continue to hold on 'special grounds.' 
Combatant prisoners were to be exchanged on a man-for-man basis and the 
agreement included a detailed code of regulations for the management of 
internment camps and the accommodation, diet and other facilities to be 
provided for prisoners; internment in neutral countries, and transport 
arrangements for repatriates. Sick and wounded prisoners, both combatants
63. Newton, op. cit., p. 257-8.
64. Ibid., p. 260.
65. Ibid.
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and civilians, were to have priority in the exchanges, with families 
being allowed to travel together as far as possible. Civilians were to 
be repatriated without regard to numbers and additional British combatants 
were to be liberated to compensate for the numerical advantage the Germans 
would enjoy in a general exchange of civilians. In signing the agreement 
the Germans reserved their position because of their concern over the 
internment of German nationals in China, Britain*s treatment of captured 
U-boat crew members, and the British insistence (subsequently withdrawn 
by the cabinet) that all children born of German parents in the United 
Kingdom would be regarded as British subjects and would not be repatriated 
even if their parents were.
Failure to implement The Hague agreement due to protracted 
wrangling over points of detail aroused an angry response in parliament 
and the press, and the government found itself under growing pressure to 
demonstrate its commitment to general repatriation by placing a senior 
minister in charge of prisoner of war affairs. Such an appointment had 
been urged on a number of earlier occasions when Newton seemed unable to 
achieve much success in effecting exchanges of prisoners. It was argued 
that a high ranking minister could ensure that the issues would be properly 
represented at the top level of government and in parliament, where some 
confusion continued to exist as to the responsibilities of the different 
departments in respect of prisoners. Questions were dealt with variously 
by the War Office, the Home Office, the Treasury and sometimes other 
departments, and there were occasions when ministers did not decide until 
the last moment who was to deal with a particular parliamentary question. 
Some MPs believed that prisoners had suffered because of the diffusion of 
responsibility for their interests among several departments, and military 
members were particularly scathing over what they saw as the indifference
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of the government and the War Office to the plight of British prisoners 
of war.
Despite these criticisms, Newton remained highly sceptical as 
to whether the situation would be greatly improved by the appointment of 
a senior minister to represent the interests of prisoners of war. Such an 
appointee, Newton argued, would not be free to do as he pleased since it 
would be necessary for him to consult the other departments concerned, 
notably the War Office and the Admiralty, If there was disagreement it 
would still be necessary to ask the Cabinet to act as arbiter. In the 
long run ’things would not be materially different from the way they were.1
Notwithstanding Newton’s views, on 25 September the War Cabinet 
appointed Cave as chairman of the inter-departmental committee on prisoners 
of war. Whether the Home Secretary could have achieved the results 
demanded by the government’s critics remains a matter for speculation 
because his appointment came too late in the war to make any significant 
impact on the situation. When the Germans announced on 13 October that 
they were prepared' to negotiate a peace settlement in accordance with 
President Wilson’s 14-point programme, implementation of The Hague agreement 
seemed to have lost its urgency, since it was generally felt that release 
of prisoners would not now be long delayed. ^
Of nearly 24,500 enemy aliens still held in the internment camps 
when the armistice with Germany was signed on 11 November about one-fifth 
indicated that they did not wish to leave Britain. Towards the end of 
December the War Office advised the government that the military position 
was such that the general repatriation of civilian enemy aliens of military
6 6 .
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age might safely be started, and the necessary arrangements were made
with the Ministry of Shipping. Although ships were difficult to
obtain, between the end of December and the end of April 1919 repatriations
were taking place at a rate of 600 a week and later, as more ships became
68
available, the rate increased to between 2,000 and 3,000 a week.
Most repatriates travelled via Harwich and Rotterdam. Each 
was allowed to take a maximum of 100 lb. luggage, excluding light hand 
baggage, and a maximum of £100 in the currency of his own country (earlier 
the limit was £10, then £50). They could take no British currency. 
Voluntary repatriates who could afford it were charged £2 towards the cost 
of their journeys. All aliens were carefully searched by the police before 
they left British custody and their baggage was placed under guard until 
embarkation. This was to prevent repatriates taking with them goods which 
were scarce in their own countries. According to Belfield, *Cushions 
stuffed with unravelled socks, money in the soles of boots, false bottoms 
to boxes, were comparatively common discoveries.1 ^
Internees who indicated that they wished to remain in Britain 
remained in the camps while repatriation of their compatriots proceeded, 
and it was not until May 1919 that government established a committee, 
under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Younger, to consider appeals for 
exemption from repatriation. ^  The committee dealt with nearly 4,300 
cases, including 3,250 Germans, 1,000 Austrians and Hungarians, and 50 
Turks. Among the Germans were many 1 friendly* aliens of Danish, Polish
68. Waller report, op. cit.
690 Belfield report, op. cit.
70o Under Mr0 Justice Younger the committee consisted of Brig.-Gen.
G 0Kc Cockerill MP, Major the Hon. Hugh 0*Neill MP, the Hon. 
Alexander Shaw MP and Sir Hyland Adkins MP. The Hon, W.H. 
Cozens-Hardy MP was subsequently added. The committee submitted 
their report to the Home Secretary on 21 Oct. 1919, Cmd. 383.
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or Alsatian origin; the Austro-Hungarians included a large proportion
of Galician Poles, and aliens of Czech, Slavonic, Croatian or Rumanian
descent, A considerable number of the men were elderly and had been
interned for their own protection or because they were unable to support
themselves outside the prohibited areas; many had been in the same
employment for over 20 years, some over 30 years; most had British-born
wives or wives of alien birth whose residence in Britain had been as long
as their own. The bulk of the appeals dealt with by the committee,
however, were from men of military age, with strong family and employment
ties and usually long residence in Britain, The committee recommended
for exemption from repatriation 3,030 Germans, 840 Austro-Hungarians and
20 Turks and these men were subsequently released on the authorisation of 
71
the Home Office,
Between the armistice and mid-November 1919 some 21,904 civilian 
internees were repatriated from Britain, bringing the total of such 
repatriates since the beginning of the war to 28,744, The total included 
23,571 Germans (5,837 before the armistice), 5,034 Austro-Hungarians (997), 
112 Turks (2) and 27 Bulgarians (4), In addition 1,600 German invalid 
prisoners were transferred to Holland under the 1917 Hague agreement.
Of the enemy aliens interned at the date of the armistice nearly 84 per
cent were ultimately repatriated and the remainder allowed on appeal to
• . „ . 72remain m  Britain,
71. Cmd, 383, 1919, and HO 45/11522/287285/148.
72, Belfield report, op. cit.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ENEMY ALIENS AT LIBERTY
Unpreeendented inroads into traditionally accepted individual 
freedoms affected the whole British population during the First World 
War, but many far reaching additional restrictions were imposed on 
enemy aliens deemed harmless enough to be left at liberty. ^
The Defence of -the Realm Acts, the Aliens Restriction Act and other
emergency legislation, and the flood of rules and regulations
introduced under these umbrella statutes, curbed the legal rights of
enemy aliens, dictated where they could live, how far and to which
destinations they could travel, what kind of work they could engage in
and which newspapers they could read, forbid them to change their names
or possess or use a wide range of items, such as firearms, motor cars 
2
and telephones.
In general the authorities applied the regulations less rigorously 
against enemy aliens of the friendly races who were considered 
sympathetic to the allied cause, and special consideration was given to 
British-born women who acquired enemy nationality through marriage.
Space limitations direct the discussion in this chapter to a general 
consideration of the more significant restrictions affecting uninterned 
enemy aliens rather than a detailed examination of the myriad orders made 
under the emergency legislation and the large body of legal precedents
1. Most enemy aliens allowed to remain at liberty were women, children, 
elderly or infirm men, and members of races considered friendly to the 
allied cause.
2. See appendix II. An inter-departmental committee on aliens 
restrictions was headed by Sir Edward Troup of the Home Office and 
included representatives from the War Office, the Admiralty, the 
Board of Trade and the Board of Customs and Excise, but information 
on the deliberations of the committee is sparse.
201
established in the courts. The most fundamental restrictions and 
those creating the greatest increase in.the work of the police and 
local military authorities were concerned with registration, travel, 
the so-called prohibited areas, and curfew arrangements, and this is 
reflected in the space devoted to these subjects in the following 
pages. The criteria used by the authorities in deciding which aliens 
should be left at large and which interned, and the statistical 
fluctuations in the numbers remaining at liberty, were considered in 
chapter two.
REGISTRATION AND MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS
Before the war, although there was no official registration of
aliens, an unofficial and confidential register of aliens was kept
by the War Office with the assistance of the police. The list was
by no means exhaustive, but it did provide an indication of the number
and geographical distribution of aliens, and special attention was paid
to areas of naval or military importance. The registration was
ostensibily carried out under the authority of the Official Secrets Act
of 1911 and was considered to be virtually complete as far as was
possible by the beginning of 1914. After that the registers in each
. 3
area were kept carefully up to date.
Under instructions issued by the Home Office to police forces in 
4
July 1914, and confirmed in the Aliens Restriction regulations 
introduced on the outbreak of the war, all aliens living in prohibited 
areas were required to register and could not continue to live in the
3. HO 45/10629/199699/4.
4. 66HC 5s., 139, 27 Aug.1914.
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areas without special permission of the police. Outside the
prohibited areas only enemy aliens were required to register.
Chief constables were designated as chief registration officers
and police officers at divisional and local level were appointed as
registration officers. Each force maintained a central register and
a register in each division. Information was available at every
police station as to the nearest office at which an alien could apply
for registration. In addition to the obligation upon aliens to
register, all householders had to inform the police of any alien
living in their homes.
An enemy alien could not reside in a prohibited area for more than
four days after the introduction of the Aliens Restriction Order
without a special permit from a registration officer, and the alien
required similar authority to travel more than five miles from his
residence. When the alien was allowed to move his residence from one
district to another his particulars were passed by the police in the old
area to the registration officer in the new locality. Information on
aliens who had served in the armed forces or police of any country were
passed by the police to the War Office for the attention of the
intelligence authorities.
The rush of aliens attempting to comply with the registration
regulations after the outbreak of war imposed a heavy burden on the
police, particularly in London because of the large concentration of
aliens living there. The Times of 10 August described the scene at
some London locations:
Bow-street, Albany-street and Old Jewry Police Courts were crowded 
on Saturday. At times there were as many as a thousand waiting to 
register. Some made four or five visits without success; others 
waited from six to eight hours. Yesterday the rush was quite as 
great, and by 10.30 enough had assembled at Bow-street to occupy the 
authorities until 4 o*clock.
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Of the 66,773 German and Austro-Hungarian nationals registered in the 
United Kingdom by 10 i6e>r^37,457 were resident in the London area.
The Metropolitan Police appointed nineteen registration officers with 
staffs employed wholly on aliens work. The officers recorded 
addresses and particulars of aliens living in the area, issued identity 
books, prosecuted offences against the Aliens Restriction Order, 
investigated cases of doubtful nationality, and handled a wide variety 
of other related matters. ^
Few enemy aliens left their registered places of residence and could
not be traced by the police. It seems likely that those who ’disappeared*
did so before the police and ports machinery for controlling the movement
of aliens were fully operational in the early months of the war.  ^ In
early March 1915 a government minister could claim, that ’Every single
alien enemy in this country is known and is at this present moment under
8
constant police surveillance.1
Where aliens claimed to hold the nationality of a neutral country 
and the police were not satisfied with the documentary evidence offered, 
confirmation could often be obtained from the diplomatic or consular 
representative of the country to which the alien claimed to belong. If 
the police suspected that a foreigner claiming a neutral nationality was 
in fact an enemy alien, he was normally summonsed to appear in court for 
failing to register as a subject of an enemy country. The onus was 
then on the alien to prove he did not hold enemy nationality, and if he
5. 66HC 5s., 626, 10 Sept,1914.
6. Report of Commissioner of the Metropolis for 1917, Cd. 9204.
7. 77HC 5s., 26, 20 Dec.1915.
8. 70HC 5s., 891, 3 Mar. 1915.
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could not do so he was compelled to register as an enemy alien.
Stricter reporting requirements applied to enemy aliens than to 
other categories of foreigners, but there was considerable disagreement 
between the Home Office and the War Office as to whether registration 
and travel restrictions were sufficiently rigorous to control the 
supposed threat from uninterned aliens. The War Office were 
particularly concerned about 1 securing the adequate protection of 
aerodromes, munition works and similar vulnerable points from the 
actions of evil disposed persons of enemy origin or otherwise who may 
still be residing in their neighbourhood,' ^  A survey of 'vulnerable 
points' by MI5 in the autumn of 1917 showed that there were over 11,500 
munition works, exclusive of the premises of auxiliary sub-contractors 
and small controlled firms, and some 390 military aircraft works and 
stations which were in need of special protection. There were also a 
large number of ammunition dumps and stores of other war materials 
distributed relatively uniformly throughout Britain, MI5 calculated 
that there was one vulnerable point to each seven square miles of 
Britain. An enemy alien, although confined to a radius of five miles 
from his registered address (equivalent to an area of 78 square miles), 
had access, on average, to the vicinity of 11 vulnerable points. MI5 
said the figures were produced to point up the inadequacy of the 
protection that could be afforded by any process of removing enemy 
aliens or other potentially dangerous persons from one place to another 
or declaring the vicinity of all inland vulnerable points to be prohibited 
areas. The situation,Ml5 believed, indicated the necessity for more
9. 78 HC 5s., 593, 20 Jan. 1916.
10. B 0B.Cubbitt, W0, to Troup, 24 Oct.1917, HO 45/10881/33849.
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reliance to be placed upon the close personal supervision and control 
of individual aliens who may or may not be permitted to remain in the 
vicinity of any vulnerable point. The War Office advised the Home Office 
that the military and security measures taken to guard vulnerable points 
would be 'sensibly enhanced by a more accurate and widely circulated 
official knowledge of the character, personal credentials and associations 
of all persons of known enemy or dangerous precedents who might otherwise 
succeed in obtaining access to such places; and by more precise control 
of their movements, * To achieve these aims the Army Council drew up a
list of measures and sought Home Office co-operation in implementing
. 11 them.
i. A list should be prepared and printed from the Home Office
central index of registered male enemy aliens, showing those 
authorised to be at large in the United Kingdom, with the 
addresses of their registered places of residence, reference 
numbers of identity books, and of the documents authorising 
their exemption from internment or repatriation, and a brief 
indication of the supposed degree of their enemy sympathies.
ii. No enemy alien at large should in future be given a travel
permit to go further than five miles from his registered place 
of residence without the joint consent of the chief officer of 
police and the military authorities in the new district, upon 
the written recommendation of his present registration officer. 
Any enemy alien unable or unwilling to abide by such a condition 
should be employed by the state on work of national importance 
or repatriated.
iii. Every enemy alien at large, unless exempted by endorsement
in his identity book or by medical certificate, should report 
in person once a week to his registration officer or other 
local police officer.
iv. All persons of enemy race by parentage, but claiming British
nationality, should be called upon formally to substantiate their 
claim to be considered British subjects by submitting documents 
or evidence for verification on behalf of the Home Secretary 
together with the address of their permanent place of residence. 
An alphabetical list should be printed and supplied for official 
use showing the names and addresses of such persons as 
established their claim to British nationality. The list
should also include particulars of persons of enemy race who
were registered as friendly aliens.
11. Ibid.
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To help in compiling the list suggested in (iv) the War Office
reminded the Home Office that a confidential but not officially
verified index of persons of enemy parentage claiming British
nationality had been prepared by the Directorate of Special
Intelligence, and contained over 10,000 names. This index could
be placed at the disposal of the Home Secretary for use as a check
12
on the official returns which were made.
The War Office proposals to tighten registration and travel
restrictions on aliens were supported by the Admiralty, who considered
that 1 the activities of enemy agents can be most effectively checked
by putting all alien enemies at large in this country under a closer
13
supervision than is enforced at present.* Asked by the Home Office
if they had any specific information regarding any dangerous or suspect
persons residing near aerodromes, munition works or other vulnerable
points, the War Office could only say that,
...the credentials of a large number of such persons are at all 
times under inquiry and examination by the competent military 
authorities and officers engaged in intelligence duties with a 
view to arranging for such legitimate precautionary action and 
safeguards as may be appropriate in time of war to each individual 
case. 14
Senior Home Office officials reacted with incredulity at many of 
the War Office recommendations. J. F. Moylan of the Aliens Division 
believed that the War Office and the Admiralty had shown 'an 
extraordinary lack of recognition of the actual facts of the matter1 
and noted that,
Not a single instance of an alien enemy having improperly gained 
access to a vulnerable point is adduced nor apparently can be
12. Ibid.
13. Memo., J.F. Moylan, 10 Nov. 1917, HO 45/10881/338498.
14. Cubbitt to Troup, op.cit.
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adduced, and it is well known to MI5 that it is not amongst the 
alien enemies now at large that the real danger from enemy agents 
exists but amongst alien friends and British subjects without any 
German blood, whether whole or half. But enemy agents are elusive 
and hard to find in the mass of British subjects and alien friends, 
while the alien enemy presents a known and easy target at which 
MI5 owing to the difficulty and scarceness of the other quarry, keep 
firing away in their natural anxiety to appear always on the qui vive.15
The main objections of the Home Office to the War Office proposals may be
summarised as follows: ^
1. The proposed lists of uninterned enemy alien men and persons 
of enemy parentage who were Brisith subjects or alien friends 
might be useful for historical purposes and for dealing with 
the disposal of enemy aliens at the end of the war, but they 
would serve little if any purpose as an aid to wartime aliens 
control. If any uninterned male enemy alien required further 
supervision than he was already receiving he ought to be 
interned.
The proposed new measures would be extremely difficult to 
apply in the Metropolitan Policedistrict where the great majority < 
aliens were concentrated and where there were a large number of 
vulnerable points and opportunities of obtaining information 
useful to the enemy.
Chief Constables had their own registers of enemy aliens in 
their areas and would have scant use for a catalogue of aliens 
in other areas.
The only possible way of locating British subjects of enemy 
parentage was by a public announcement instructing such 
people to provide the necessary particulars to the authorities.
A measure of this kind would cause great offence to large 
numbers of British subjects, including members of the 
government, public officials, and men serving in the armed 
forces. Even if practicable, however, there seemed little 
value to the police or the military in such an index.
The preparation of the proposed lists would involve a great 
deal of time and labour and, if the Home Office undertook the 
work, many new staff would have to be employed. There would 
also be much extra work for the already overburdened police.
The expense of printing and publishing would be substantial 
and the lists would presumably have to be kept constantly up 
to date. (The existing Home Office central index covered 
only enemy aliens outside the Metropolitan Police District as 
the commissioner had found i't impossible to supply the 
relevant information in respect of the large numbers in London).
15. Moylan memo., op.cit.
16. HO 45/10881/338498.
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2. The proposal that no enemy alien should travel more than 
five miles without the consent of the chief officer of 
police and the competent military authority of the new 
district would probably mean the prevention of any enemy 
alien from going more than five miles from his place of 
residence, since it was unlikely that local military 
authorities would want to admit fresh enemy aliens to 
their areas. The proposal would be impractical in London 
and perhaps other large towns, and would also hamper the 
task of transferring enemy.aliens to work of national 
importance.
The most effective way of protecting vulnerable points 
was that already employed by the War Office and the 
Admiralty, i.e. the prevention of access by unauthorised 
persons.
3. The rule that every uninterned enemy alien, unless 
specially exempted, should report weekly to the police 
already applied in many police districts without the 
authority of the Aliens Restriction Order. To make it 
universal would require an amendment to the ARO, but such 
a measure would overwhelm the Metropolitan Police because 
of the concentration of aliens in the area. Moreover the 
commissioner felt that more frequent reporting provided no 
real safeguard since, if an alien wished to engage in 
mischief, he had the intervening days between reporting to 
do so.
The central index of enemy aliens suggested by MI5 was never 
introduced but more comprehensive registration requirements covering 
aliens of all nationalities, favoured by the intelligence authorities, 
were imposed as general aliens controls were tightened during the war.
The obligation to register with the police, which applied to enemy
aliens from the beginning of the war, was extended, with certain exceptions,
in 1916 to all male aliens and, in 1918, to all alien women over the age
* IQ 17of 18 years.
Alien registration was placed upon a peace footing in August 1919, 
when an order in council was passed which enabled foreign visitors to 
remain in Britain up to a month without registering with the police and
17. HO 45/10828/323249/2.
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allowed alien residents to be absent from home for bi-monthly periods 
without having to report a change of address. But registration, 
introduced as a wartime emergency measure, has remained as a central 
feature of the British aliens control system ever since.
PROHIBITED AREAS
Enemy aliens were excluded under the Aliens Restriction Order of
5 August 1914 from living in or entering any part of Great Britain
designated as a prohibited area*, unless provided by the local police
18
with a special permit to do so. The areas>selected by
consultation between the Home Office, the War Office and the Admiralty,
included docks, naval bases, military installations, parts of the coast
and their hinterlands which were considered potential targets for enemy
invasion, and other areas where the presence of enemy aliens, was thought
19
by the authorities to present a danger.
The concept of the prohibited area, recommended before the war by 
the Committee of Imperial Defence, created a situation novel in the 
history of British aliens control by barring a class of aliens from 
large sections of the country. In August 1914 the War Office stated 
that,
The primary military intention of the Aliens Restriction 
Order as regards prohibited areas is that alien enemies should 
be removed therefrom unless there is some urgent consideration 
of a humanitarian nature which appears to outweight the military 
urgency of each case.
The exceptions should be as few as are compatible with the 
primary intent of the Order. 20
18. See appendix II.
19. Aliens Restriction (Consolidated) Order, 9 Sept.1914.
20. HO 45/10817/317072/5.
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Possible exceptions envisaged by the War Office, 'pending a possible
eventual insistence upon removal by the military authorities,* were
single women with no alternative domicile, invalids unable to move,
and children under British or friendly alien guardianship. Typical
cases for removal were alien men who appeared to be capable of
Activities prejudical to the military control of the prohibited area*
or who had lived in the area long enough to be well acquainted with
its manpower and material resources and about whom 'some reasonable
doubt may exist as regards their unreservedly loyal intentions towards
this country,'1 The War Office insisted that no universal rule should
be applied which precluded examination of each case by the chief
21
registration officer concerned.
Instructions issued by the Home Office to chief constables at the
beginning of the war were that they should exercise the greatest care
22
in issuing permits; consult the 'competent military authority'
in doubtful cases, and supply full particulars to the War Office of any 
23
permit issued. While the Aliens Restriction Order placed the
responsibility for issuing permits upon the chief officer of police - 
and the Home Office urged them to exercise personal supervision 
wherever possible - the chief officer had discretion to delegate the
21. Ibid.
22. A 'competent military authority' was responsible for implementation 
of the emergency regulations in a particular locality. The 
Admiralty and the Army Council could appoint any commissioned 
officer to undertake the duty, providing he was not below the rank 
of lieutenant-commander in the Navy or field officer in the Army. 
(DORA, Consolidated Order, 28 Sept 1914)
23. Circulars, HO to chief constables, 5 and 11 Aug.1914.
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duty to the superintendent or other officer keeping the register in 
24
each division. Under the Aliens Restriction Order responsibility
for removing enemy aliens from prohibited areas rested with chief
constables, consulting the military authorities where necessary, but
the latter also had an independent power under the Defence of the
Realm regulations to remove suspected persons whatever their
nationality. This duality of authority to remove enemy aliens from
prohibited areas, and to allow their return, created some confusion
and overlapping of effort in the early months of the war. To try to
improve co-ordination between the police and the military, the Home
Office and the War Office, working in consultation, attempted to
establish clear guidelines on the procedures to be followed and the
criteria to be applied, stressing the overriding principle that
...it is desirable on naval and military grounds that 
alien enemies should be removed from prohibited areas.
Permits allowing them to remain should not be granted, 
except in cases where there are special circumstances
involving considerations of humanity or public interest,
to which weight can be given without damage to naval or 
military requirements. 25
In mid-September 1914 the Home Secretary wrote to chief 
constables to point out that he had 'some reason to think that 
sufficient care has not always been exercised' in the applications 
of the regulations concerning prohibited areas and certain other 
aspects of aliens control, and there'was also evidence that in 
administering the Aliens Restriction Order some police forces were 
'not governed by any general principles.' The primary purpose of the
24. Circular, HO to chief constables, 11 Aug. 1914.
25. 69HC 5s., 583, 10 Feb,1915.
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order, it was stressed, was military and the police had to administer 
it in close harmony with the military authorities, both the officers 
attached to the War Office and local commanding officers, *any of 
whom may from time to time make suggestions for more stringent 
application of the order1. If such a suggestion was of a general 
character, *due weight must be given to the fact that the order has a 
distinctly military purpose, but at the same time to the fact that the 
general discretion to carrying it out rests with the principal 
registration officer/ A suggestion about a particular individual was 
rather different, *and, as a rule, it will be best to act upon the
suggestion without questioning the grounds of the officerfs
. . .  26suspicion*.
By late November the prohibited areas formed a ring from the north
of Scotland down the east coast and along the south coast to include
27
Dorset, and extended 10-20 miles inland. Further areas were
added until by June 1916 the territory covered took in between one-third
and a half of Great Britain, including the greater part of Scotland and
28
the whole of 15 counties of England and Wales. By 1918 the whole
of the coast and adjoining districts of England, Wales and Scotland were
classified as prohibited areas, in addition to such areas as Aldershot
and the London docks. (In Ireland the Dublin, Belfast, Cork and
29
Londonderry districts were designated as prohibited areas)
26. Memo., J.F. Moylan, 21 Sept.1914, HO 45/10734/258926/77.
27. 68HC 5s., 789, 23 Nov, 1914.
28. Cd. 8419, 1916; 82HC 5s., 1076, 29 June 1916.
29. HO 45/10828/323249/2.
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Some politicians demanded that the whole of London, not only the 
principle docks, should be designated as a prohibited area on the 
grounds that it was the vital nerve centre of the British and imperial 
war effort and also the home of the majority of the country’s 
uninterned aliens. The proposal was always resisted by the government 
because it was felt that the huge additional workload it would impose on 
the already overburdened Metropolitan Police would have been out of all 
proportion to any gain in public safety. The police would have to 
keep under surveillance a large number of friendly aliens and many 
enemy aliens would be forced into areas which were policed less efficientl 
than London. ^
Anti-alien hardliners predictably demanded removal of all enemy
aliens from prohibited areas regardless of individi,ial circumstances,
and there were many heated exchanges in parliament in the early war
years about the alleged laxness of the government in failing to
implement such a policy. According to returns compiled by the police,
on 7 November 1914 there were 771 male and 2,190 female enemy aliens
living in prohibited areas along the coast of Scotland and England
31
between Aberdeen and Devonport. Lord Curzon called the figures
32
’very significant and rather alarming,* and the Earl of Crawford
warned that it was *a grave risk* to leave enemy aliens in these 
33
areas’ The bombardment of Hartlepool, Scarborough and Whitby
30. See, for e.g. 21HL, 5s., cols. 582-5, 30 Mar, 1916.
31. 68HC 5s., 789, 23 Nov. 1914.
32. 18HL 5s., 160 25 Nov-1914.
33c Ibid. col 132.
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by German warships in mid-December ' shocked the nation and added
credence to the demands of hardliners for indiscriminate removal of
enemy aliens from prohibited areas. As a direct result of the raids
many aliens were removed, from the east coast, but enough remained to
provoke continued criticism of the government. By early February
1915 the coastal prohibited areas still contained 695 enemy alien men
35
and the number of women had slightly increased to 2,302. Viscount
Galway spoke in the House of Lords of
...a general feeling of insecurity on the whole of the 
Yorkshire coast since the bombardment, owing to aliens 
still being left there. It is a matter of common 
knowledge that signalling has been going on for some months, 
and also that intelligence has been given to the enemy 
somehow or other; and there is a fear that Her Majesty*s 
Government do not quite realise how strong is the feeling 
of insecurity. 36
Curzon warned the government that 'whether a total removal of aliens 
from prohibited areas is possible or not, you may be certain that we 
shall not rest until we get the matter put upon a much safer and sounder 
footing than it is at the present time. Similar concern was
expressed by other politicians in the early months of 1915 and Bonar 
Law reflected the exasperation of some of his colleagues when, in 
early March, he asserted that,'Either you should not have the
34. A squadron of German cruisers bombarded Scarborough, Hartlepool 
and Whitby on 16 Dec.1914. At Scarborough 51 people were 
reported killed and 200 wounded; at Hartlepool 55 killed and 115 
wounded; at Whitby two killed and two wounded. Nearly all the 
victims were civilians, many of them women and children. Similar 
raids were carried out by the German Navy in 1916 and 1917 on 
Lowestoft, Yarmouth, Ramsgate and other English coastal towns.
35. 69HC 5s., 130, 3 Feb.1915.
36. 18HL 5s., 277, 6 Jan.1915.
37. Ibid. col. 285.
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prohibited areas, or you should make them effective and not have a
38
single alien within them. Despite mounting criticism of the
government, a House of Commons motion moved by Joynson Hicks on
3 March calling for the removal of all enemy aliens, including
39
women and children, from the prohibited areas, was defeated.
The more stringent range of aliens control measures introduced
by Asquith in May 1915, reduced to some extent the importance of the
concept of the prohibited area, but the government showed no
inclination to opt for the total removal of enemy aliens, although
their numbers were steadily reduced in the east and south coast areas.
From 592 enemy alien men in early June, the figure had dropped to 471
40
by late October and 401 by mid-January 1916.
Important additions to the schedule of prohibited areas were made
in January 1916 with the object of including the whole of the coast and
adjoining districts of Great Britain and an area around Aldershot.
The main object of the additions, according to the Home Office, was to
•secure further supervision of the movement of a class among whom
enemy agents have recently been found, namely, aliens of friendly or
neutral nationality, but of enemy origins or associations’. In
designating the new prohibited areas, the Home Office, after
consultation with the War Office and the Admiraltyj^advised the police
that enemy aliens exempted from internment or repatriation who were
living in a prohibited area should not be required to leave that area
unless some new information making that course desirable came to the
38. 70HC 5s., 866, 3 Mar. 1915.
39. Ibid. col. 'go-7.
40. 72HC 5s., 360 10 June 1915; 75HC 5s., 350, 28 Oct,1915; 77HC 5s., 
1761, 13 Jan.1916•
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knowledge of the registration officer. ^  In March 1916 a 
government minister was able to tell the House of Lords that,
Only those alien enemies who, having passed under the 
review of the Advisory Committee, have been exepted from 
internment or repatriation, are now at liberty in any part 
of the country; and the police supervision exercised over 
them, whether in prohibited areas, or otherwise, affords, 
it is believed, adequate safeguards against their constituting 
any danger to the country. 42
MI5 remained sceptical, however, of the government’s reassurances
and believed that police powers to grant permits to enemy aliens
to remain in prohibited areas had been used too liberally. This view
was endorsed by the Army Council, and in early June 1916 the War Office
recommended to the Home Office that 'as a measure of military
necessity* residential and travel permits already issued to enemy
aliens of both sexes and of any age should as far as possible be
withdrawn throughout the prohibited areas of the United Kingdom.
The War Office argued that,
Apart from the ill-feeling it arouses, the presence of 
enemy aliens in districts from which British subjects of 
military age are necessarily being withdrawn and which are 
subject to raids by sea and air, gives rise to a growing 
sense of insecurity and creates a military danger of increasing 
magnitude. The sympathies of these aliens must be with their 
own country; they are in a position to obtain naval and 
military information of value and they would doubtless be 
anxious to communicate it, if possible, to the enemy. Alien 
passengers and ships entering and leaving the United Kingdom 
afford the means for so doing and there is strong ground for 
the suspicion that enemy aliens have taken advantage of this 
channel of communication with their own country. In this 
connection females are as capable of collecting information, 
and are therefore as dangerous, as males. 43
But by the end of June 1916, 866 enemy alien men (730 Germans
and 136 Austrians) were still living in the prohibited areas,
and the government faced continuing parliamentary pressure to reduce’
41. Circular, HO to chief constables, 4 Feb,1916.
42. 21HL 5s., 585, 30 Mar. 1916, Marquis of Lansdowne.
43. B.B.Cubbitt to Troup, 4 June 1916, HO 45/10817/317072/5.
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drastically the numbers or remove all enemy nationals from the areas.
Samuel, the Home Secretary, responded by appointing a two-man
commission to review the permits granted by the police allowing enemy
aliens to live in prohibited areas and to advise him if any should be
withdrawn. The commissioners, Sir Louis Dane, a distinguished Anglo-
Indian administrator, and Lieutenant-Colonel Alan Sykes, the widely
respected MP for Knutsford, tackled their assignment vigorously and
conscientiously but their report, submitted to the Home Secretary in
late October, was judged by the department to be lacking both in precision
and discretion, and was extensively revised before being presented to
44
parliament on 7 December. Figures in the commissioners original
draft were found by one Home Office official to be 'quite unreliable,
• 45
arithmetically impossible and mutually irreconcileable' and it was
decided that certain references to MI5 and one of its officers,
Lieutenant-Colonel V.G.W. Kell, should not be published. Several letters
and memoranda, i n c l u d i a p p e n d i c e s , w e r e  also ruled out by the Home
Office on the grounds that they were confidential. The Home Secretary
agreed to publication of the report with the omissions and amendments
4 6
recommended by Troup and other senior departmental officials.
One of the appendices accompanying the commissioners' first draft
was a note from MI5 setting out their conception of the purpose of the 
47
prohibited areas, viz. the creation of a coastal zone 10 to 40 
miles wide which was to be entirely cleared of known enemy aliens 'in
44. Report presented to parliament as Cd. 8419, 1916.
45. Memo, J. Fischer Williams, 11 Nov. 1916, HO 45/10817/317072/5.
46. HO 45/10817/317072/5.
47c Ibid.
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order that the intelligence (counter-espionage) service may have a 
clear field in which to discover and pursue the many enemies, 
disguised as British subjects or friendly aliens, who operate 
principally in this coastal zone,r and to reduce the opportunities 
for enemies, known and unknownjto:
i. Transmit information overseas in evasion of the postal 
and telegraph censorship.
ii. Obtain access to the most vulnerable points, which are 
principally on the coast.
iii. Make observations of the coast traffic, naval and 
military activities within the coastal zone.
iv. Signal to or communicate with coasting vessels.
v. Meet and converse with (unknown) enemies and neutral
aliens (crews and passengers) recently landed or about 
to depart.
vi. Act as fixed and safe houses of call or post offices for 
the interchange of hostile conversations and coastal 
information.
vii. Act as local informants, well versed by long residence,
to enemies visiting the coast from inland and parties of the 
enemy in the event of raids or invasion.
viii0 Prepare guide signals for arriving hostile aircraft.
ix. Act as local military and political irritants to the
inhabitants of this coastal zone, always apprehensive of 
enemy raids, and thereby lower the general public security.
In mid-July the commissioners advised MI5 that they had consulted 
five chief constables in different parts of the country and found that 
the number of male enemy aliens still living in prohibited areas 
appeared to be very small. In most cases, they were very old and 
infirm and had been allowed to remain for humanitarian reasons. In a 
few cases they had been permitted to stay in recognition of services 
rendered to the British Government, and in these instances suitable 
restrictions had apparently been imposed. Most of the enemy aliens 
with whom the commissioners had dealt were the wives and other female
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dependents of enemy nationals who had returned to their own countries,
48
or been interned, or ordered to leave the prohibited area.
It was usually found to be the case that a British-born woman,
especially if she had British-born children, sympathised with and
was loyal to her country of origin. But there were also instances
in which 'from motives of affection, fear, or otherwise she is so
dominated by her alien husband as to forsake her country of origin
and cleave to her husbandfs cause and country^* and such a woman was
'a potential source of serious danger.1 Children of enemy aliens
who were born in the United Kingdon and were British subjects also
posed a difficulty. In cases of suspicion they could only be dealt
with under the Defence of the Realm Regulations applying to British
subjects. There seemed little use in excluding an enemy alien, or
even his wife, whether foreign or British-born, from a prohibited
area, if his children remained there, probably carrying on his
business and free to travel anywhere and communicate with their parents.
The commissioners believed that it might be advisable to keep the whole
\ 49
family together 'in the place where they are known and can be watched.
Dane and Sykes held 46 hearings in London and the provinces and 
obtained from chief constables particulars of 4,294 enemy aliens living 
in prohibited areas. The commissioners expected and found considerable 
divergencies of policy among the various police forces in applying the 
regulations. In some cases these were due to circumstances peculiar 
to a particular area and in others to differing interpretations of the 
Aliens Restriction Order or circulars from government departments.
48. Memo., Dane and Sykes to MI5 14 July 1916, HO 45/10817/317072/5.
49. Ibid.
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Some chief constables had failed to grasp that the onus was on the 
alien to show that special circumstances existed which justified the 
issue of a permit to stay in a prohibited area. Sometimes the 
police seem to have stretched ‘considerations of humanity* to cover 
cases in which exclusion from an area would merely have involved 
inconvenience, deprivation of sentimental associations or pecuniary 
loss, but would fall far short of cruelty or inhumanity. There 
also appeared to have been a divergence of action among local military 
authorities when consulted by the police about doubtful cases, but in 
no case had they failed to secure the exclusion of any enemy alien 
where they felt this was advisable.
Of the 847 enemy alien men found by Dane and Sykes to be living in 
prohibited areas, 548 were over military age, 287 were of military age 
(17 to 60 years) and 12 under military age. Of those of military age, 
64 were inmates of religious houses or ministers of religion, 57. were 
Armenians exempted from removal by the Aliens Restriction Order
or Czechs and Poles vouched for by their national committees, and 
the remainder had been granted permits for ‘public reasons or very
b
special circumstances. There were 188 over 70 years of age, 37 blind 
or bedridden and 56 in workhouses, hospitals or lunatic asylums. Of 
the 2,922 enemy alien women living in prohibited areas, 2,039 were 
British born and of these 185 were widows or divorced and, in the 
absence of any special objection, deemed to be entitled to regain their 
British nationality. The families of enemy aliens included many sons 
and daughters who were British subjects because of their place of birth, 
and 594 sons were serving or had lost their lives while members of the 
British armed forces. Dane and Sykes recommended that permit holders
50. Cd. 8419, 1916.
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living in religious communities, both male and female, should only 
leave the precincts of their communities accompanied by a resident 
of British or friendly nationality, and all communications with the 
outside world should be by post. Buckfast Abbey in Devon, where 
the 40 inmates were almost all of military age was being 1 treated 
on the lines of internment camps. * The commissioners appended to 
their report a list of 66 cases involving 77 individuals in which they 
recommended that the Home Office should instruct chief constables 
concerned to withdraw permits allowing enemy aliens living in 
prohibited areas. Although they were critical of some aspects of the 
way in which the Aliens Restriction Order had been administered in 
respect of prohibited areas, Dane and Sykes found that on the whole 
the work of the police and local military authorities in carrying out 
fa scheme so novel in the history of this country* was
very well done indeed and not many were left in prohibited 
areas who were likely to be an open or secret danger to the state, 
and after this review but few can be residing in such areas whose 
presence could even justify popular suspicion or discontent on 
social or commerical grounds. 51
The findings of Dane and Sykes confirmed the government*s view 
that there was no case for indiscriminate removal of all enemy aliens 
from prohibited areas, and that the existing arrangements for vetting 
and supervising permit holders had worked satisfactorily. The system 
nevertheless became stricter and more efficiently administered in the 
final years of the war, due in part to the continuing concern of MI5 
with the situation in the prohibited areas and to the demands inside 
and outside parliament for more stringent controls over enemy aliens.
51. Ibid.
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CURFEW
In December 1914 the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police,
Sir Edward Henry, recommended to the Home Office that a curfew should
be imposed on enemy aliens in the capital, requiring them to remain in
their homes after 8.00 p.m. Henry estimated that there were more than
10,000 Germans and 6,000 Austrians between 17 and 50 years of age in
London, many having moved there from other areas after the war began.
It was also a * somewhat disquieting fact* that the number of firearms
declared by enemy aliens, or found in police searches, had been
disproportionately small.4 viz. 370 revolvers, 190 rifles, 91 pistols
and 82 other guns. The inference, Henry believed, was that in many
instances enemy aliens had deliberately not declared firearms in their
possession. In view of this, and the likelihood that internment
accommodation would not be available for many of the aliens whose
confinement might be thought advisable, the commissioner considered it
would be prudent to 1 immobilise, as far as may be practicable, those
who may be left at large1 and 'keep them out of the street at night.'
It was envisaged that permits waiving the curfew would be freely given
in suitable cases, for example for business purposes or to members of
52.
the friendly races.
The curfew proposal was received sympathetically by the Home Office 
but John Pedder, head of the Aliens Division, believed it would be 
difficult to administer and could impose hardship on many respectable 
people. On his recommendation copies of a draft order in council to 
give legal sanction to the curfew was circulated to the chief constables 
of the Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and Cardiff forces, as well as
52. Henry to Troup, 28 Dec. 1914, HO 45/10782/278944/1.
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the Metropolitan Commissioner to test their reactions. The order,
which stipulated that enemy aliens must remain in their registered places
of residence between 8.00 p.m. and 6.00 a.m. unless holding a police
permit to do otherwise, was supported by each of the police chiefs
contacted and none believed it would cause undue hardship to those
affected. The Manchester police were already operating a form of
curfew under which they required enemy aliens to sign an undertaking to
remain at home during hours stipulated by the police according to the
53
circumstances of the individual. Despite the evidence of police
support for the curfew, the cabinet refused to agree the draft order in
council recommended by the Home Secretary, McKenna, and shelved the
proposal pending further consideration.
Early in January, McKenna wrote to his cabinet colleagues
reiterating the case for a curfew, which in general would operate
between 8.30 p.m. and 6.00 a.m. and apply to enemy aliens over the age
of 16. The police would, however, have powers under the proposed order
to vary the times of the curfew, which could not begin earlier than 8.00
p.m., or end later than 8.00 a.m. Where aliens .lived in lodgings an
obligation was placed upon their landlords to inform the police if the
54
curfew regulations were not complied with. Again the cabinet
declined to accept the Home Secretary’s proposals and the curfew issue 
was left in abeyance until it was raised again by the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner in May after the government’s announcement of more stringent
53. HO 45/10782/278944/la. The order in council would have been 
inserted as article 25b of the Aliens Restriction Order and cited 
as the Aliens Restriction (Prohibited Hours) Order, 1914.
54. Confidential memo., McKenna to Cabinet members, 5 Jan*1915, AP 3/47.
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aliens control regulations. Henry feared that insufficient
accommodation would be available to house the numbers of enemy aliens 
earmarked for internment under the new regulations. He believed public 
feeling towards enemy aliens, and Germans in particular, had hardened 
in the previous few months and there was an insistent demand for their 
deportation or internment. If the government would agree to the 
passage of the order in council authorising the curfew, the commissioner 
wrote to the Home Office,
...this, in my opinion, would be a satisfaction to many 
reasonable people who entertain a morbid dread of the possible 
activities at night, under certain conditions, of those of enemy 
races who live in our midst.
Such a restriction could not be deemed oppressive and it 
would be certainly effective, as the aliens* neighbours will 
satisfy themselves that it is not ignored.
We must contemplate the possibility of a zeppelin raid, 
and if it proved successful in causing much loss of life, public 
feeling might prove uncontrollable unless the public were convinced 
that the government and the executive are doing all in their power 
to render harmless our alien enemy neighbours. 56
McKenna took up the question again with the Prime Minister and
Asquith agreed to the introduction of the curfew in London, but did
not favour it being formalised by an order in council. Henry was
advised that, in the first instance, the curfew should be a direction
from him, to be enforced by arrest and, if necessary, by internment.
Asquith was prepared to introduce an order in council later if it
proved necessary, but he felt that a public directive from the
57
commissioner would be obeyed.
Notices were posted in the Metropolitan Police district warning
55. Henry to Troup, 14 May 1915, HO 45/16782/278944/10.
56. Ibid.
57. Troup to Henry, 15 May 1915, HO 45/16782/278944/la.
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that, with effect from 18 May, male enemy aliens were required to
remain at their registered places of residence between 9.00 p.m. and
58
8.00 a.m. unless issued with a police permit. In the first few
months of the curfew most enemy aliens found by the police disobeying
the instruction were merely cautioned or, in exceptional cases,
interned. The procedure subsequently became more formalised. First
offenders, provided they were of good character and had a satisfactory
explanation for contravening the curfew, were cautioned. If an offender
was of unsatisfactory character or had deliberately evaded the order, he
was interned, as were all aliens who offended for a second time, and the
Home Secretary was also prepared, in appropriate cases, to deport
offenders. The curfew, which was later eased to begin at 10.00 p.m.,
59
was not enforced in the case of female enemy aliens. Although it
had the backing of the government, the curfew in London, imposed on the 
order of the police commissioner, never had the legal sanction that would 
have been provided by an order in council. There seems no reason to 
believe, however, that the operation of the curfew was any the less 
effective because of this. It is not clear from sources available to 
the author to what extent the curfew arrangements in the capital were 
reflected in provincial towns where the concentration of enemy aliens 
was much less.
OTHER RESTRICTIONS
Among the wide range of other restrictions progressively imposed 
during the war, the following are worthy of special mention, either 
because of their significance in terms of their effects on the everyday
58. Metropolitan Police notice, signed by Henry and issued 15 May 1915, 
HO 45/16782/278944/la.
59. HO 45/16782/278944/10.
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lives of enemy aliens or because of the interest or controversy they
evoked at the time of their introduction.
Possessions
The wide range of ’strategic1 items which enemy aliens were 
forbidden to have in their possession or to use without police 
permission were listed in the Aliens Restriction Order issued on 
5 August 1914 and extended in future amendments. They included 
firearms, explosives, signalling apparatus, carrier pigeons, petroleum 
and other fuels, motor cars, cycles, boats, telephones, cameras, and 
military and naval maps and charts.
The police were advised by the Home Office at the beginning of the 
war that the issue of permits for any of the listed items 'must be
exceptional, and, to justify a grant, there must be a great deal more
than the mere whim or convenience of the alien, while his personal 
comfort or pleasure are negligible factors.' ^
Where enemy aliens were suspected of possessing any of the 
forbidden items, the police and the military had wide powers of search 
and arrest in enforcing the regulations. ^
Legal Rights
There were numerous limitations on the rights of enemy aliens as 
litigants during the war. These affected their position as plaintiffs,
defendants and appellants in the civil courts and as creditors in
, , 62 
bankruptcy cases.
60. See appendix II.
61. See appendices II and VI.
62. An excellent summary of the position of enemy alien litigants by 
1918 is provided by A.D. McNair in Law Quarterly Review, Apr. 1918, 
pp. 134-142.
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Special legislation was enacted in 1915 to facilitate proceedings
against enemy aliens, providing for the service of writs outside the
6 3
jurisdiction of the courts.
Provision under the Defence of the Realm Act deprived aliens 
of the right to trial by jury for certain offences.
Marriage
Although the authorities had no direct legal power to prohibit
a marriage between a British subject and an enemy alien, such marriages
could be, and sometimes were, prevented by interning or repatriating 
6^
the alien.
During 1915 arrangements were made for the Register-General to
consult the Home Office before any marriage licence was granted, and
the system was later extended by agreement with the church authorities
to cover religious marriages. One result of the procedure was to
help police keep their aliens registers up to date by enabling them to
record changes of nationality and registration consequent upon 
65
marriage.
Sometimes enemy alien women attempted to escape their liability to 
repatriation by marrying a British subject, but such marriages were not 
generally allowed except in cases where the alien belonged to one of the 
races friendly to the allied cause. ^
63. Legal Proceedings Against Enemies Act, 1915, 5 Geo. 5 c. 36.
64. 109HC 5s., 610, 1 Aug.1918.
65. Memoranda (bound copy of nos. 1-46) of Aliens and Nationality 
Committee, 1919, HOR.
66. 109HC 5s., 610, 1 Aug.1918.
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There were very few marriages between enemy aliens and British 
subjects in the later war years, and the only cases which caused the 
authorities difficulty were those involving men released from 
internment camps on licence for employment (usually Austrians 
working in agriculture) who wished to marry a British woman, 
frequently to prevent a child being born illegitimate. Although 
such men were still technically classified as ‘interned/ a category 
of alien for which marriage was not permitted, the Home Office usually 
viewed such cases sympathetically. ^
Name Changes
An order in council which took effect on 12 October 1914
68
prohibited enemy aliens from changing their names. Any enemy
national who had adopted a new name since the beginning of the war was 
obliged, under penalty, to revert to the name by which he was known on 
4 August 1914.
The order was strictly enforced throughout Britain and the Home
Secretary rarely used his powers to exempt aliens from the order.
By May 1916 only 12 exemptions had been allowed, almost all cases of
British-born women who had married Germans and had been widowed or
69
separated from their husbands.
Under an amendment to the Defence of the Realm Regulations, which 
took effect on 19 August 1918 and was retrospective to the beginning
67. Memo., J. Fischer Williams, 11 Nov. 1918, HO 45/10899/371591.
68. Aliens Restriction (Change of Name) Order, 1914.
69. 82HC 5s., 684, 10 May 1916.
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of the war, no person who was not a natural-born British subject was
allowed to change his name without the special permission of the Home
Secretary. ^  The measure changed the position under common law by
which it had always been open to any British subject to adopt a new 
71
surname.
Closure of Clubs used by Enemy Aliens
In September 1914 a new provision was included in the Aliens
Restriction Order enabling the police, on the authority of the Home
Secretary, to close or restrict the opening hours of any club
frequented by enemy aliens. In enforcing the provision the police
could enter, if necessary by force, and search or occupy any premises
72
to which the order related.
A number of clubs and restaurants, including the exclusive German
Athenaeum Club in Stratford Place, London, were closed, but there were
frequent complaints in parliament of other establishments, particularly
restaurants which catered for the German community, being allowed to
continue in business. Joynson Hicks was among the MPs who regularly
raised the issue and as late as February 1917 he was complaining that
life in the German community in London was continuing just as it had two
years earlier, with German restaurants, using menus and notices printed
73
in German, providing meeting places for enemy aliens.
70. Article 14H, Defence of the Realm Regulations, 19 July 1918.
71. Law Times, vol. 145, 17 Aug.1918, p.317.
72. Aliens Restriction (Consolidation) Order, 9 Sept 1914; circular 
HO to chief constables, 14 Sept 1914.
73. 90HC 5s., 706, 14 Feb.1917.
230
An amendment to the Aliens Restriction Order on 30 March 1917 
extended police powers to close or restrict the operation of 
establishments frequented by enemy aliens or ’undesirable aliens^* 
or controlled by an alien and ’conducted in a disorderly or improper 
manner, or in a manner prejudicial to the public safety.' ^
Registration of Aliens in Hotels
To help the police keep track of the movements of aliens, an
order in council was introduced on 25 April 1915 placing a duty upon
all hotel proprietors and boarding house keepers to maintain a register
75
of alien visitors over the age of 14.
Enemy Language Newspapers
The circulation among enemy aliens of any newspaper or periodical 
printed wholly or mainly in the language of an enemy state was forbidden, 
except with the written permission of the Home Secretary. Any premises 
being used to produce such publications could be entered by the police, 
using force if necessary, and copies of the offending edition and type 
confiscated. ^
74. Article 25, Aliens Restriction Order, as amended 30 Mar. 1917.
75. Order in council passed 13 Apr. 1915;- circular HO to chief 
constables, 21 Apr. 1915; 71HC 5s., 1480, 11 May 1915.
76. Aliens Restriction (Consolidation) Order, 9 Sept. 1914.
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CHAPTER SIX 
NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP
When the war began an estimated 9,000 naturalised British 
subjects were former nationals of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey or 
Bulgaria. Of these nearly 7,000 were of German origin and the vast 
majority of the remainder were previously citizens of Austria-Hungary.  ^
Thousands of citizens of these countries living in Britain, in 
some cases for most of their lives, who had failed to obtain British 
nationality, tried to become naturalised after the war began when they 
found themselves classified as enemy aliens. But they were successful 
in only a very small minority of cases, usually where their enemy nation­
ality precluded them from carrying out work of particular importance to 
the war effort or because of special circumstances such as long residence 
in Britain, marriage to a British-born woman and sons serving in the
British armed forces. All of those naturalised had to sign a statutory
2
declaration of their intention to live in Britain. The cases of
British-born women who had acquired enemy nationality through marriage and
sought re-admission to British citizenship after being widowed were treated|
sympathetically. Apart from such re-admission, only 146 Germans and 44
Austro-Hungarians were naturalised between 4 August 1914 and November 
3
1916. After that time no holders of German or Austro-Hungarian
1. The estimate is based on the 1911 censuses of England and Wales 
(Cd. 7017, Vol. IX) and Scotland (Cd. 6896, Vol. II). The 
assumption is made, as it was by the Home Office (Cd. 8566,
1917),that the figures remained approximately the same at 
outbreak of the war. The total number of naturalised British 
subjects in England, Wales and Scotland recorded in the 1911 
censuses was 23,623.
2. 66HC 5s., 140, 27 Aug. 1914; 71HC 5s., 570-1, 27 Apr. 1915.
3. 30HL 5s., 690, 8 July 1918.
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nationality, except British-born women, were naturalised during the war.
Naturalisation, even when granted some years before the war, 
failed, however, to place former citizens of Germany above suspicion in 
the eyes of many. It was frequently argued in parliament and the press 
that naturalised subjects posed a greater danger to national security than 
known enemy aliens since the former could still be enemy sympathisers and 
potential subversives yet were not subject to the stringent alien control 
regulations. A number of naturalised subjects deemed to be suspect were 
interned under Regulation 14B of the Defence of the Realm Regulations as 
persons of 'hostile origin and association.1
This chapter examines wartime naturalisation policy and its 
legislative basis.
only obtain British nationality by private act of parliament or by letters 
patent. The seminal 1844 legislation established the essential principles 
which have since formed the basis of Home Office policy in dealing with 
applications for naturalisation. Apart from the period of the two world 
wars and the decade after the First World War, the general practice has 
been to grant certificates in cases where the applicant could satisfy the 
Home Secretary that he had established his home in the United Kingdom, he 
was of good character, he had become sufficiently assimilated to the life 
of the UK and was loyal to the UK and likely to remain so. No 
maximum limit has ever been placed on the number of aliens who could be 
naturalised in one year, but since 1918 applications have been much more 
carefully scrutinised and the letter of the law more closely followed.  ^
When the war began British nationality regulations derived from
4. 7 & 9 Vic. c. 66.
4
Before the passage of the Aliens Act of 1844 an alien could
5. 'History of Naturalisation 1252-1970% unpublished paper by J.M. 
p n ce fnrmp.r Head of Nationality Division, Home Office, (December
2 3 3
the Naturalisation Act of 1870, which had repealed most previous 
legislation on the subject and provided for the few citizenship rights 
withheld from naturalised subjects by earlier statutes. The act laid 
down a requirement of five year residence in Britain or crown service as 
qualifications for naturalisation, but it gave the subject the right to 
sit in parliament or on the Privy Council, removed restrictions on aliens 
acquiring or owning land, and provided that married women should be deemed 
to hold the same nationality as their husbands. British subjects were 
also given a formal right to divest themselves of British nationality, 
and anyone voluntarily acquiring the nationality of a foreign state was 
automatically deprived of his British citizenship. The legislation also 
took account of the effects of naturalisation or loss of nationality by a 
husband or father upon the status of his wife and children, and provided 
for re-admission of former citizens to British nationality. The Home 
Secretary was empowered to issue or withhold certificates as he thought 
•most conducive to the public good' and applicants had no appeal against 
his decisions. The 1870 act, which remained on the statute book until 
the end of 1914, eased the path to British nationality for thousands of 
emigrants who poured into the country from Europe and elsewhere before the 
war. Although the size of the influx undermined the liberal climate of 
opinion in which the legislation was conceived, naturalisation remained a 
relatively simple matter for those who ostensibly held the appropriate 
qualifications. The imprecise wording of the act allowed what some 
observers regarded as virtually indiscriminate admission of aliens to 
British nationality. Sir Edward Troup has noted that,
Before the war certificates under the (1870) Act were 
granted to practically everyone who satisfied the statutory 
conditions...No doubt it is right that every country should 
absorb into itself the good elements of the alien population
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permanently settled within its borders, as in the past 
England absorbed the Huguenot refugees from France; but 
•before the war the statutory conditions were insufficient 
to limit naturalisation to this class; and though the Home 
Secretary had power to refuse the certificate in any case 
without giving a reason, all attempts on the part of the 
Home Office to exclude persons who had not identified them­
selves with English life and remained in sentiment really 
foreigners proved abortive. ^
In the ten years to the end of 1913, 10,356 certificates of naturalisation
were registered at the Home Office with Russian and German subjects
providing by far the largest number of recipients. Naturalisations
reached a peak of 1,709 in 1913.  ^ During 1914 up to the outbreak of
the war 165 Germans and 55 Austro-Hungarians were naturalised and between
4 August and the end of the year 97 Germans and 30 Austro-Hungarians were
granted certificates. These represented only a small fraction of the
applicants and the Government insisted that, after the war began,
certificates were issued only in cases where, after a thorough examination,
the Home Office considered there was some advantage to the national
interest or exceptional personal reasons, coupled with a certainty that no
g
danger to the state could arise. A total of 3,268 certificates were 
issued to aliens of all nationalities during the years 1914-18 and 1,613 
people, mostly British-born women, were re-admitted to British nationality.
6. Sir Edward Troup, The Home Office (1925), p. 152.
7. Certificates issued annually during the period 1904-1913: - 979,
1905: 684, 1906: 841, 1907: 685, 1908: 576, 1909: 874, 1910: 
1,131, 1911: 1,537, 1912: 1,340, 1913: 1,709. Countries of 
origin of the recipients: - Austria-Hungary 779, Belgium 68, 
Bulgaria 7, Denmark 278, France 191, Germany 2,740, Greece 103, 
Italy 16‘0, Norway and Sweden 849, Ottoman Empire 198, Portugal 
27, Roumania 225, Russia 3,977, Spain 43, Switzerland 163,
The Netherlands 189, other European countries 9, USA 201, Brazil 
10, Chile 7, Japan 8, Morocco 12, Persia 23, other non-European 
countries 17, subjects of no foreign state 19, nationality 
doubtful or unknown 53. Total 10,356. (Source: Return of
Certificates issued to Aliens, Home Office, 1 May 1914).
8. 71HC 5s., 570-1, 27 Apr. 1915.
9. Home Office Nationality Returns, 1914-18.
235
The outbreak of the war inevitably made the question of
nationality one of great importance, and each of the main European
states introduced legislation to facilitate the denaturalisation where
it was considered justified of subjects who were former citizens of enemy
countries, and to impose more stringent qualifying conditions for natural
isation, Britain and her allies were also concerned to counteract the
situation created by the German imperial and state nationality law passed
on 22 July 1913 (the Delbruck Law), which enabled German citizens to
retain their original nationality although becoming a subject of another
nation, providing they had obtained prior permission from the German
authorities to do so. As one legal commentator expressed it, 'Dual
nationality is not half of one nationality and half another, but two
complete nationalities and in time of war verily a damnosa hereditas.1 ^
The complexities of German nationality law made British politicians
hesitant to interpret its operation with regard to naturalised citizens
of German origin living in the United Kingdom. ^  But the government
believed that the possession of dual nationality created a prima facie
case for examining the status of a naturalised British subject, although
12
such a person was not necessarily considered likely to be disloyal.
While many German expatriates claimed that under their country's 
nationality regulations they had forfeited Germany nationality by being 
absent from the country for more than 10 years, this policy seems to have 
been variously applied by the German Government. It became the practice
10. Lord McNair and A.D. Watts, The Legal Effects of War (1966),
p. 70.
11. 18HL 5s., 1034, 18 May 1915.
12. Ibid., col. 1040-1.
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at the Home Office to refuse to accept without documentary proof that
an alien had been discharged from enemy nationality. Even where such
evidence was forthcoming the Home Office did not necessarily accept it
as conclusive proof that the holder was not to be regarded in English
law as an enemy alien, especially in cases where the individual concerned
13
had not been naturalised in Britain. Some holders of German or Austro-
Hungarian nationality discharge certificates were in effect rendered
stateless while others held the nationality of countries other than Britain.
Neither category, in the Home Office view, ceased automatically to be an
enemy in English law or were necessarily deemed to be free from a liability
14
to military service in an enemy country.
The Metropolitan Police, whose area contained the greatest 
concentration both of enemy aliens and of naturalised British subjects of 
enemy origin, treated holders of the discharge certificates with great 
caution, if not suspicion. Sir Edward Henry, the commissioner, considered 
that,
It is obvious that most alien enemies actually engaged 
on secret service work would arm themselves with such a 
document, and the operations of the German Secret Service 
have been on such a large scale that it is necessary, in the 
interests of public safety, that the Police should be almost 
unreasonably circumspect in dealing even with individuals 
against whom nothing specific may be known. ^
With the concurrence of the Home Secretary, the Metropolitan
Police advised all Germans or Austrians submitting certificates of
discharge from their nationalities, where their antecedents were unknown
or doubtful, that their names could not be removed from the aliens
1 3. 72HC 5 s., 3 5 6, 10 June 1 9 1 5.
1 4. . J. Pedder, HO, to H.C. Beamish, Marlborough Street Magistrates
Court, Sept. 1 9 1 4, HO 4 5/1 0 7 3 4/2 5 8 1 5 7/1 7.
1 5. Henry to Troup, 13 Nov. 1 9 1 4,
HO 4 5/1 0 7 3 4/2 5 8 1 5 7/2 7.
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register. Exceptions were sometimes made by the police where they had 
definite knowledge of the character and bone-fides on an alien and he 
could satisfy them that he had lost his enemy nationality. ^  Aliens 
who were dissatisfied with a police ruling could take their case to the 
civil courts. Passports were refused to any naturalised subject of enemy 
origin who could not produce acceptable documentary evidence of having
lost enemy nationality, or who it seemed might use the passport for an
.» 17'improper purpose.
18
The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914,
which was going through parliament when the war began, received royal
assent on 7 August and became operative on 1 January 1915. It formed
the basis of nationality controls for most of the war and, with periodic
amendments, until it was replaced by the Nationality Act of 1948.
Although not strictly a war measure the timing of the 1914 BNSA Act made
it effectively part of wartime legislation. The statute embodied the
recommendations of a committee set up in 1907 under the chairmanship of
Sir Kenelm Digby, Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, to review the
19
whole of nationality and naturalisation law, and was largely a
consolidating measure which did not make any substantial changes in the 
law or take account of the war. Drafted in consultation with member 
countries of the British Empire, the act provided a common code of 
nationality, which enabled each country to grant certificates of British 
nationality where previously certificates had been effective only in the 
territory of issue. A natural-born British subject was deemed to be:
16. Ha *f5f//0734/z5r/57/27
17. 68HC 5s., 1292, 26 Nov. 1914.
18. 4 & 5 Geo. 5 c. 17.
19. Vfou/J, op,
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(a) Any person born in Great Britain or its dominions 
and allegiance; and
(b) Any person born outside the dominions whose father 
was at the time of that person*s birth a British 
subject, and who fulfilled any of the following 
conditions;
(i) his father was born within British allegiance;
(ii) his father was a person to whom a certificate
of naturalisation had been granted;
(iii) his father had become a British subject by 
reason of annexation of territory;
(iv) his father was at the time of that person*s 
birth in the service of the Crown;
(v) his birth was registered at a British consulate
within one year or in special circumstances, with 
the consent of the Secretary of State, two years 
after its occurence.
(c) Any person born on board a British ship whether in foreign 
territorial waters or not.
This definition which was to have considerable significance during the
war, and was repeatedly spelled out in Home Office and War Office
instructions to the police and local military authorities to guide their
dealings with aliens and persons of hostile origin.
The BNSA Act repealed all nationality law then in force and
codified the ways in which British nationality could be acquired or lost.
The granting of a certificate of naturalisation was entirely at the
discretion of the Home Secretary; he did not have to give reasons for
his decisions and there was no appeal if a certificate was refused.
Before qualifying for naturalisation an alien had to establish that,
(a) he had resided in the British Empire for at least 
five of the eight years preceding the date of the 
application;
(b) he was of good character;
(c) he had an adequate knowledge of the English language;
(d) he intended to reside in the British Empire or to enter 
or continue in the service of the Crown.
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For the first time the Home Secretary was given power to revoke a
certificate of naturalisation, where it appeared to him that it had
20been obtained by * false representation or fraud.* This provision,
under Section 7, was so limited in its scope, however, that it was
21
invoked only once, in July 1918, . and there were repeated demands in
parliament throughout the war that the Home Secretary should have much
wider powers to denaturalise British subjects of enemy origin. Those
who believed such subjects to be just as great a potential danger as
enemy aliens argued that any foreigner intent on working against British
interests in the event of war was more likely than not to have obtained
naturalisation. This would give him much greater freedom to act
subversively without the constraints inevitable placed on the alien in
wartime. As the government was frequently reminded in the early months
of the war while aliens could be interned on suspicion, naturalised
British subjects could only be placed in captivity after due process of
law. Some hardliners argued that naturalised subjects of enemy origin
should be treated in the same way as enemy aliens, even if this meant a
general revocation of citizenship for such subjects.
Such was the intensity of feeling against naturalised subjects
of German origin, as well as their compatriots who held German nationality
that one contemporary political observer noted that, in their rage,
22
members of all parties were * foaming at the mouth* and the fanatical 
Germanophobe, Horatio Bottomley, proclaimed in John Bull that *You cannot
20. Before 1914 British law contained no power to revoke a 
certificate of naturalisation once granted. The position 
was, as far as the Home Office was able to ascertain, the 
same in other * civilised*countries. (Cd. 8566)
21. London Gazette, 13 July 1918.
2 2 . MacDonagh, op. cit., p. 63.
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naturalise an unnatural abortion, a hellish freak. But you can
23
exterminate him.* A number of politicians asserted that there
were Germans who had obtained British nationality in order to secure 
positions of influence in British society, particularly in the financial 
community, whose sympathies remained with their native country and who 
were promoting Germany’s interests in the war. Joynson Hicks said 
several Germans had secured naturalisation so that they could become 
members of the Stock Exchange and other exchanges where only British 
subjects were allowed to deal. These men kept up their German connexions, 
their names were on the subscription lists of German societies and organ­
isations and there was ’undoubtedly no greater source of German propaganda
24
and thought in this country than these rich, naturalised Germans.*
Lord St. Davids spoke of highly placed British citizens of German birth
who had property in Germany, held German decorations and honours, and
’never spoke out against the outrages* being committed by their native 
25
country. If Britain was invaded, Viscount Galway warned, naturalised
subjects of German origin ’will rush to join the invaders and offer their
26
services as guides.' Many German-born naturalised citizens publicly
affirmed their loyalty to Britain, often in the form of letters and
petitions to the newspapers. A typical letter, signed by dons at five
universities, pleaded in May 1915,
In view of recent events we desire to publicly express 
our unswerving loyalty to the country of our adoption, to 
which we feel bound not only by gratitude, family ties, and 
our solemn oath of allegiance, but also by deep sympathy born 
of common work and intimate knowledge of the nation’s life 
and character, -^j
23. John Bull, 15 May 1915.
24. 108HC 5s., 554, 11 July 1918.
25. 18HL 5s., 1031, 18 May 1915.
26. 18HL 5s., 422, 3 Feb. 1915.
27. The Times, 14 May 1915.
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To conduct a concerted campaign to demonstrate their patriotism towards 
Britain a group of prominent business and professional men formed a
28
Committee of Naturalised British Subjects of German and Austrian Birth.
In the early months of the war Asquith*s Liberal administration adopted
the position that naturalised British subjects of enemy origin considered
a danger to the state could be dealt with under the Defence of the Realm
regulations and it would be ill advised to give a minister or the
Executive powers of revocation which should be in the hands of the courts.
Moreover the government insisted that naturalisation conferred a status
which, once given, was not expected by other countries to be capriciously,
29
arbitrarily or hastily withdrawn. Although there was a prima facie
presumption that as British citizens naturalised subjects of enemy origin 
would be loyal to their adopted country, the government nevertheless 
proceeded on the assumption that such subjects posed a potential danger to 
national security. ^
A witch hunt against German-born naturalised subjects, particularl; 
those in public life, was conducted by hardline politicians and some 
sections of the press, and the victims were subjected to the same remorse­
less vilification as their compatriots in Britain who still retained their
31
German nationality.
The government continued to take the view that the burden of
28. C.C. Aronsfield, *Enemy Aliens 1914-1918: German-born Jews in
England During the First World War,1 Jewish Social Studies.
Oct. 1956.
29. 68HC 5s., 932, 24 Nov. 1914; 18HL 5s., 267, 6 Jan. 1915; 18HL
5s., 265-6, 27 Apr. 1915.
30. 22HL 5s., 475-6, 29 June 1916.
31. Among the prominent figures who became targets of the witch hunts
were Prince Louis of Battenberg, the First Sea Lord, and a 
relative of the royal family, Privy Council members Sir Edgar 
Speyer and Sir Ernest Cassel, and members of parliament Sir 
Alfred Mond and Arthur Strauss.
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proving that a naturalised subject was a danger to the state should 
rest with those who wanted to take hostile measures against him. In 
introducing his new 1 package* of aliens control measures in May 1915, 
Asquith strongly defended the overwhelming majority of naturalised 
citizens of enemy origin. They were, he said,
...decent, honest and respectable men, have given 
hostages to fortune in this country, and are carrying 
on legitimate trades and businesses, some of them 
professional men, some of them men employed in our most 
technical industries where their services can very ill 
be spared; and to initiate or to countenance anything in 
the nature of a vendetta against a class of that kind as 
a class would not only be disgraceful from the moral 
point of view, but most impolitic from the point of view 
of the best interests of this country. ^
But although the prima facie presumption was that a naturalised British
subject would 'do his duty', said the Prime Minister, under the new
measures, where there was reasonable ground for suspicion against a
citizen of hostile origin, 'we shall have the same power of detaining
33
and interning him as if he had never been naturalised at all.'
The controversial Regulation 14B made under the Defence of the
Realm Act (DORA) gave the authorities power to detain a person of hostile
origin where it appeared 'expedient for securing the public safety or the
defence of the realm,' British subjects could be interned without
recourse to normal legal procedures,
but individuals who appealed against internment orders had a right
to a hearing before the aliens advisory committees established under
Asquith's May 1915 measures. Although the legality of the regulation
was contested on several occasions in the courts it was consistently 
34
upheld. Those interned included a number of people suspected of
32. 71HC 5s., 1876, 13 May 1915.
33. Ibid., cols., 1875-6.
34. J.M. Garner, International Law and the World War, 2 vols.,
(1920) includes a useful consideration of the cases.
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espionage or communicating with the enemy, against whom there was 
insufficient evidence to bring them to trial, and a number of 
naturalised British subjects who by their actions, writings or speeches 
were deemed to have been disloyal to Britain and to have obtained natural­
isation merely for business purposes. Where individuals appealed against 
internment orders - and most did - they had a right to a hearing before 
the aliens advisory committees, whose recommendations went to the Home 
Secretary for final decision. Few 14B internees were subsequently able 
to obtain their release although such cases were periodically reviewed 
at the Home Office, and, when it seemed discharge might be justified, 
referred to the aliens advisory committees for reconsideration. Those 
14B internees who were released were subjected to stringent conditions.
MI5 maintained a regularly revised list of potential 14B cases,
which was supplied through the Home Office to the police, who in turn
kept a check on the movements of people on the list and also reported
35
any fresh suspects immediately to MI5. Information or complaints
about naturalised subjects of enemy origin were frequently received by 
the police and military authorities from zealous members of the public 
and each case was carefully investigated. Instances where the subject 
concerned had been recently naturalised were scrutinised with 'special
• 4. » 3 6severity.*
Many saw regulation 14B as the necessary complement to the 
Aliens Restriction Order in ensuring that naturalised subjects of enemy 
origin as well as enemy aliens could be interned with the minimum of
35.
36.
Memo., Oct. 1917, HO 45/10881/338498.
Confidential memo., Samuel to Cabinet, 19 June 1916, AP, 127/229.
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legal difficulty. Even Simon, probably the most liberal of the
wartime Home Secretaries, insisted that he could not be shackled by
having to produce legal proof before taking action against suspicious 
38
people. His successor at the Home Office, Samuel, made clear his
belief that ’although a man changed his nation he did not always thereby
change his nature* and ’there might be many who, although they had changed
ostensible allegiance...as far as regards the safety and security of the
39State, ought still to be regarded as Germans.* While, as shown
earlier in this chapter, few enemy aliens were naturalised while McKenna
and Simon were at the Home Office, it was under Samuel’s regime that the
practice was firmly established of refusing all applications for
naturalisation from enemy nationals with the exception of British-born
40
widows seeking re-admission to their original nationality.
The powers available to the Home Secretary under regulation 
14B were used sparingly and there were repeated demands from the hard­
liners that naturalised subjects should be treated in the same way as 
enemy aliens as regards liability to internment and restrictions imposed 
on those at liberty. Inevitably Admiral Beresford was a leading voice 
in the criticism, with his oft-repeated aphorism, ’once a German always
a German®. In his view German-born residents ’must be traitors either
41
to their own country or to ours.1 The Earl of Meath felt similarly.
37. Law Times, vol. 139, 22 May 1915, p. 63, illustrates this point 
of view.
38. 72HC 5r., 844-5, 17 June 1915.
39. 80HC 5s., 1241, 2 Mar. 1916.
40. 100HC 5s., 1702, 17 Dec. 1917.
41. 22HL 5s., 470, 29 June 1916.
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'Why,' he asked, ’should we imagine that the mere act of naturalisation
could at once change the entire feelings of a man or a woman towards
the country of his or her birth?...it is only natural to suppose that
under the exciting stimulus of war some might consider it their duty to
injure as far as they could, notwithstanding any oath they had taken,
42
the enemies of their original mother country.* The same kind of
sentiments were expressed by others in both houses of parliament, and in 
January 1917 the Unionist War Committee issued a report calling for a 
number of radical changes in the treatment of naturalised subjects. The 
report, prepared by the committee's Enemy Influence Sub-committee, chaired 
for much of its deliberations by Sir Edward Carson, proposed that natural­
ised citizens should not be eligible for membership of the Privy Council; 
if of hostile origin, should cease to hold naval and army commissions, and 
should not, without special permission of a Secretary of State, be allowed 
to hold any civil office where the salary exceeded £160 a year from public
funds. The report also alleged, erroneously, that the authorities had
43
failed to maintain a list of naturalised people. (Complete lists of
naturalisation certificates had been kept by the Home Office since 1844
and had been presented to parliament and published at intervals up to
1886 and anually since then. An alphabetical index of certificates was
also prepared from time to time and was complete up to the end of 1914.
Papers containing these statistics were made available for purchase by the 
44
public) •
Although parliamentary opinion against naturalised subjects 
steadily hardened, successive Home Secretaries showed little inclination
42. Ibid., col. 465-6.
43. Statement issued by the committee reported in Law Times, vol.
142, 13 Jan. 1917, p. 182.
44. Manchester Guardian. 8 Jan. 1917.
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to seek wider powers to revoke naturalisation certificates until the
question was taken up by the Aliens Sub-committee of the Reconstruction
Committee in 1916 under Samuel*s chairmanship. Troup had earlier raised
with the Reconstruction Committee the question of how British subjects
of enemy origin who had been interned for suspected disloyalty should be
dealt with at the end of the war. He suggested that *it would probably
not be considered desirable* that such subjects be allowed at the end of
the war to revert to full possession of the privileges of British subjects.
This, he said, raised the question of denaturalising those subjects of
enemy origin who under the law of their native country still retained the
nationality of and allegiance to that country, but such a course raised
many difficult points and was complicated by the * exceedingly diverse laws
45
of other countries, including those of Britain's allies.' A report
submitted by Samuel's sub-committee to the Reconstruction Committee 
recommended that a judicial tribunal should have power to revoke natural­
isation on the following grounds. ^
(a) conviction of a serious offence committed at such time 
and in such circumstances as to indicate that the 
certificate had been obtained by false representation 
as to character;
(b) conviction of an offence involving disloyalty;
(c) if the tribunal, without any such conviction#finds that
the continuance of the certificate is not conducive to 
the public good.
While recommending an extension of the grounds for revocation, the sub­
committee pointed out that,
There appears to have been a general consensus of civilised 
opinion that nationality is a status not lightly to be assumed
45. Troup to Vaughan Nash, Secretary, Reconstruction Committee, 28
Apr. 1916, AP, 127/161.
46. HO 45/11177/32476/1.
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or put off, and that it is not open to a State to go 
back upon what have turned out to be bad bargains... 
it is highly desirable that nationality acquired by 
naturalisation should be, as far as reasonably possible, 
equivalent in permanence to nationality acquired by birth, 
and so properly to be accepted in exchange for an original 
nationality. In other words it is desirable not to 
debase a coinage for which international currency is 
sought. 47
The sub-committee, with the endorsement of the Home Office, also
suggested that German citizens might properly (without amendment of the
law) continue to be refused naturalisation in Britain for a period of
perhaps five years after the war. The Home Secretary would retain
his statutory powers to grant certificates in exceptional cases,
principally those of British-born widows who had been married to Germans,
but also where enemy alien men or their sons had voluntarily enlisted in
the British armed forces. The question of the grant of naturalisation
to subjects of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria was considered to be
of less importance, and not suitable for settlement by the imposition of
any general rule. All the states concerned, especially Turkey and
Austria-Hungary, included subject races whose members had a special claim
48
for sympathetic treatment. The sub-committee's proposals were accepted
by the Reconstruction Committee, but with the proviso that the power of
revocation should be vested in the Home Secretary acting on the advice of
49
a judicial tribunal.
A draft bill based on the sub-committee's recommendations was 
submitted to the Imperial War Conference in April 1917. The main purpose 
of the measure was 'to introduce wider powers of revoking certificates of
47. Ibid.
48. Cd. 8566, 1917.
49. HO 45/11177/324746/1.
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naturalisation and to provide machinery for the purpose,' but it also
made minor drafting amendments to the British Nationality and Status
50
of Aliens Act of 1914. In a memorandum accompanying the draft bill,
the Home Office reminded the conference that 'A revocation of nationality 
is a serious step, and should be carried into effect only for grave 
reasons and after inquiry and report by a committee containing some 
person of judicial experience, and not by merely administrative action.'
The Home Office also asked the conference to note two practical difficulties 
raised by revocation: (1) The status of the wife and minor children, if
any, of the person whose certificate was revoked, and (2) the treatment 
to be given after revocation to the person affected. In respect of (1) 
the draft bill proposed that the Home Secretary should deal with each case 
as he thought best in the circumstances, and it was assumed that he would 
usually act on the recommendation of a judicial tribunal. Unless the 
Home Secretary ordered otherwise the wife's nationality would remain 
unaffected, but she might have an optional power to make a declaration of 
alienage. As to (2) the individual concerned would be dealt with in 
accordance with the aliens legislation in force at the time. The Home 
Office believed that 'while it is proper and desirable to give effect to 
the general popular feeling that persons of enemy origin should not be 
allowed to retain a citizenship to which they have proved themselves 
disloyal,' it was unlikely that it would be necessary to make many 
revocations. Accurate figures were not available as to the number of 
naturalised British subjects of enemy origin living in enemy countries
50. Among the aims of the proposed minor amendments were to allow
time spent in the service of the Crown to be reckoned as 
equivalent to residence in the British dominions and to modify 
the definition of 'British subject' to cover the case of a 
person who acquired British nationality by annexation. (Cd. 
8566, 1917).
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or elsewhere abroad who had 'adhered* to the enemy, but only 25 such
cases had been reported to the Home Office. Of the approximately
6,000 male British subjects of German orAHungarian extraction in the
United Kingdom at the beginning of the war, by March 1917 only 35 had
51
been interned under Regulation 14B.
The Imperial War Conference agreed a resolution recognising
1 the desirability of securing uniformity of policy and action throughout
the Empire with regard to naturalisation1 and commended the British
proposals to the governments represented (Canada, India, Newfoundland,
52
New Zealand and South Africa). Consideration by these countries was
protracted and Lloyd George's government came under heavy parliamentary
pressure to take legislative action on the naturalisation issue. The
former Home Secretary, Samuel, called on the government to provide
greater powers to denaturalise individuals 'who were clearly showing that
they are holding allegiance as a mere formality, and that their heart is
not in the country whose citizenship they have, for financial reasons,
53
assumed.' General Croft, Lord Beresford and other hardliners
54
demanded a much more indiscriminate revocation policy. Croft urged
that every man naturalised no more than four years before the war and
since it began should be denaturalised, regardless of status or whether he
55
was considered essential in some war industry. Beresford's view was
characteristically emotive, extreme and unsubstantiated:
51. Cd. 8566, 1917.
52. Ibid.
53. 90HC 5s., 716, 14 Dec. 1917.
54. See, for example, 98HC 5s., 1574, 31 Oct. 1917; 99HC 5s.,
14, 12 Nov. 1917.
55. 100HC 5s., 1682, 17 Dec. 1917.
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We have been faced with very grave national dangers 
in the present war through alien enemies who have become 
naturalised, some of whom have been locked up. In my
humble opinion all should have been locked up at the
very beginning of the war. We know that some of them 
have consorted with spies, traitors, sedition mongers, 
and those people who call themselves pacifists and forget 
what our men are doing in the trenches and on the sea for
the honour and defence of our country. ^
Although the government reminded their critics that the question
of naturalisation had become an imperial matter and not one for Britain
alone, parliamentary impatience at the lack of positive action by other
countries of the Empire left the government little option but to introduce
national legislation, principally to extend powers of revocation. Cave
was anxious that the new measures should not devalue the status of the
naturalised subject, but he agreed that revocation powers should be
available for use in cases where the continued status of naturalised
subject was 'not conducive to the public good.1 He reminded parliament
that, since the 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act had
made naturalisation an imperial matter, a withdrawn certificate in
Britain affected British nationality in the dominions. Moreover, any
legislation introduced would not be simply a war measure, but would have
57
a permanent effect. A comparatively moderate bill was introduced by
Cave in May 1918, but its passage through parliament took place during a 
period in which public and parliamentary antagonism to enemy aliens and 
naturalised subjects of enemy origin had reached its highest level since 
the hysteria of the early war period, and the legislation was subject to 
much amendment in both houses designed tc make its provisions stricter. 
Despite the clamour for swingeing measures against naturalised subjects 
there remained some cooler voices as Cave's bill was discussed in
56.
57.
27HL 5s., 772, 17 Jan. 1918.
100HC 5s., 1691-2, 17 Dec. 1917..
parliament. Lord Finlay of Nairn, the Lord Chancellor, urged his
fellow peers to keep their heads and not to 'rush into extreme
measures which I am tempted to think would make us a little ridiculous
58
to a great many of our best friends.1 Even Samuel, a leading
advocate of wider revocation powers, believed that the sweeping with­
drawal of certificates advocated by some hardliners would be ’wholly
unwarranted by the circumstances* and if allowed would ’create grave
. . .. , 5 9injustice m  many cases.'
When the bill received royal assent on 8 August as the British 
Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1918, ^  the powers provided to 
revoke certificates of naturalisation were the most comprehensive in any 
legislation before or since. In addition to retaining the provision in 
the 1914 BNSA Act for revocation in cases where naturalisation was obtained 
by false representation or fraud, the new legislation empowered the Home 
Secretary to revoke a certificate where he was satisfied that the 
recipient,
(a) has during any war in which His Majesty is engaged
unlawfully traded or communicated with the enemy or
with the subject of an enemy state, or been engaged 
in or associated with any business which is to his 
knowledge carried on in such a manner as to assist 
the enemy in such war; or
(b) has within five years of the date of the grant of the
certificate been sentenced by any court in His Majesty's 
dominions to imprisonment for a term not less than 
twelve months, or to a term of penal servitude, or to
a fine of not less than one hundred pounds; or
(c) was not of good character at the date of the grant of
the certificate; or
58. 30HL 5s., 1252, 26 July 1918.
59. - 108HC 5s., 626, 12 July 1918.
60. 8 6. 9 Geo. 5, c. 38.
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(d) has since the date of the grant of the certificate 
been for a period of not less than seven years 
ordinarily resident out of His Majesty’s dominions 
otherwise than as a representative of a British 
subject, firm, or company carrying on business, or 
an institution established, in His Majesty’s 
dominions, or in the service of the Crown, and has 
not maintained substantial connection with His 
Majesty’s dominions; or
(e) remains;according to the law of a state at war with 
His Majesty a subject of that state.
The Home Secretary was also empowered to revoke a certificate
in any case where he judged its continuance was not conducive to the
public good. He had discretion to grant a certificate to any British-
born widow of an enemy alien who declared her wish to be re-admitted to
British nationality, and Cave made it clear that such applicants would
continue to be treated with sympathy.
I have made it a practice to look with the greatest of 
favour upon the application of a British-born widow of a 
German to regain her British nationality, and I have 
naturalised dozens of poor women upon that ground alone. ^
The act provided that no citizen of a country which was at war with the
United Kingdom on 8 August 1918 could be granted a certificate of
nationality until 10 years after the termination of the war, unless he had
served in the allied forces, or was a member of a race or community known
to be opposed to the enemy governments, or had been at birth a British
subject. The war did not officially end until 31 August 1921, which meant
that many former enemy aliens did not qualify for British nationality until
1931. Of the 13,535 foreigners naturalised between 1921 and 1931 only 35 
62
were Germans.
Under the terms of the act any naturalised subject who had at any
61.
62.
108HC 5s., 582, 11 July 1918.
Home Office Naturalisation Returns and London Gazette.
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time held the nationality of an enemy country was referred by the Home
Office to a committee appointed to scrutinise and recommend whether or
6 3
not certificates held by such subjects should be revoked. The
64
committee, chaired by Mr. Justice Atkin and including two other 
members, Lord Hambleden and Judge Radcliffe, assumed considerable 
influence. Although some formal rules of procedure were laid down by 
the Home Office, the committee had considerable autonomy in how it 
conducted hearings. It was vested with all the powers, rights and 
privileges of the High Court in being able to enforce the attendance of 
witnesses, examine them under oath or affirmation, issue a commission 
or request to examine witnesses abroad, compel the production of documents, 
and punish persons guilty of contempt. For security reasons the committee 
invariably held its hearings in private during the war. The Home Office 
was bound to accept the committee's recommendations in cases involving 
enemy aliens naturalised after the outbreak of the war, but only 15 
revocations resulted from 207 such cases considered by the committee.
Most of these were dealt with under the disloyalty category. In cases 
dealt with under other headings defined in Section 7 of the Act, the 
subject commonly had a right of an inquiry by the committee or could have 
such an inquiry at the discretion of the Home Secretary. There was also 
provision for the Home Secretary to refer cases to the High Court, but in 
practice this was never done.
Even if a subject was denaturalised, however, that did not
63. The Certificate of Naturalisation (Revocation) Committee was
established on 20 Aug. 1918. Its terms of reference were:
'To be the committee referred to in sub-section (4) of section 
7 of the BNSA Act, 1914, as amended by the BNSA Act, 1918.
64. Mr. Justice Atkin was replaced by Mr, Justice Salter in Mar. 1919.
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necessarily mean that the State revoking the certificate was then free
fb r iv\« f*
of all obligation to the individual concerned. As a senior Home Office
A
official noted,
...a state cannot sever the tie of nationality in 
such a way as to release itself from the international 
duty, owed to other states, of receiving back a person 
denationalised who has acquired no other nationality, 
should he be expelled as an alien of the state where he 
happens to be. ^
During the inter-war years the powers to revoke nationality
assumed by Britain and other countries in 1914-18 had far-reaching
social and political implications, with many subjects of the belligerent
nations becoming Stateless, a situation further complicated by the creation
of new state boundaries under the peace treaties. Most of the revocations
in Britain during the immediate post-war years arose from the war and
involved individuals living outside countries of the British Empire. The
harsh revocation policy spawned by the First World War continued into the
1930s and during the period 1918-34 some 273 British subjects had their
66
naturalisation certificates cancelled. After that revocations dwindled 
to a trickle and there were very few during or after the Second World War.
The perceived danger from naturalised subjects of enemy origin, 
which ultimately led to the wide revocation powers in the 1918 BNSA Act, 
proved largely unfounded. No serious charge of disloyalty was brought 
in the courts against any such subject and there appears to have been no 
substantiated evidence of naturalised subjects engaging in activities 
which posed a serious threat to national security or of them exerting a 
sinister influence on British society as alleged by many propagandists 
and hardline politicians.
65c Sir John Fischer Williams, 'Denaturalisation', The British Year
Book of International Law (1927), pp. 45-61.
66. J. M. Ross, op. cit
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ALIENS BRANCH AND PORT CONTROLS
Some form of control over the movement of aliens through 
British ports has been operated for centuries, with a widely varying 
degree of stringency and effectiveness.  ^ But during the First World 
War it assumed a greater intensity and sophistication than ever before,
2
and the foundation was firmly laid for the modern immigration service.
In the early months of the war the adequacy of the controls at 
some ports, most notably London, was suspect because of the lack of 
trained manpower. Urgent steps were taken to recruit officers to the 
aliens service, and a series of new regulations and ad hoc measures were 
introduced to tighten security at the ports. Aliens could enter the 
country only through 'approved ports,1 other ports being declared 
'prohibited.* Elaborate precautions were taken to keep track of alien 
arrivals, and particular attention was paid to regular visitors, such as 
merchant seamen, who were regarded as potential couriers or agents for 
enemy powers.
This chapter considers the proliferation of port controls durin; 
the war- and the development of the organisation which was primarily 
responsible for implementing them.
For most of the decade before the First World War the entry and
1. See T.W.E. Roche, The Key in the Lock (1969), for a descriptive 
account of immigration controls in Britain from the Norman 
conquest.
2. Restrictions on aliens entering and leaving the United Kingdom 
were set out in detail in Part I of the Aliens Restriction 
Order of 5 Aug. 1914, and steadily extended under later orders. 
See appendix II.
256
departure of aliens through British ports was regulated by the provisions
3
of the 1905 Aliens Act. The Home Office was responsible to parliament 
for the administration of the act and the new port control organisation
.i
was headed by William Haldane Porter, who was designated Inspectpr
4
under the Aliens Act. The corps of officers he assembled before the 
war came largely from the customs and excise service, which had assumed 
responsibilities for immigration and emigration controls at the ports from
5
early times. Haldane Porter*s men remained formally under the juris­
diction of the Board of Customs and Excise and their duties under the 
Aliens Act were settled by consultation between the Board and the Home 
Office. The relationship between the two departments was generally cordial, 
but there is evidence of some friction in the immediate pre-war years over 
the precise division of authority. Despite this, Haldane Porter, by 
virtue of his powerful personality and drive and the personal interest that
he took in each of his recruits, succeeded in building up a considerable
, ■ . 6 esprit de corps m  his organisation.
When the war began Haldane Porter*s *Aliens Branch' had to cope
with a rapidly expanding range of responsibilities. Initially recruitment
did not keep pace with the demands placed upon the service, but Haldane
3. See discussion of the act in chapter one.
4. Sir William Haldane Porter (1867-1944), a barrister, served as
Secretary to the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, which 
reported in 1903, before being appointed H.M. Chief Inspector 
under the Aliens Act of 1905. After, heading the aliens service 
during the war, he was designated Chief Inspector of the Aliens 
Branch in 1919, a post he held until leaving the public service 
in 1929.
5. See Edward Carson, The Ancient and Rightful Customs (1972) for
a discussion of the development of the customs and excise service.
6. HO 45/10892/357410.
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Porter proved a strong and persistent advocate for his organisation in 
Whitehall and the manpower position was steadily improved. The cadre 
of customs officers who formed the pre-war basis of the Aliens Branch was 
augmented after August 1914 by men from other branches of the public 
service, such as the Factory Inspectorate, and by personnel with special­
ised knowledge of port procedures, notably merchant marine officers. 
Previously classified as * immigration officers*, members of the service 
were from the beginning of the war designated as ’aliens officers.* ^
By the end of September 1915 the Aliens Branch, under Haldane 
Porter’s leadership, comprised one deputy inspector, five superin­
tending aliens officers and 54 full-time aliens officers stationed at the 
approved ports, with customs officers fulfilling the role of aliens officers 
in addition to their normal duties, at the prohibited ports. The branch
g
also had on its strength 12 interpreters deployed at the approved ports.
Improved pay and allowances for aliens officers and supervisory
staff were approved by the Treasury because of the increase in the volume
9
and importance of their work. A substantial salary increase for Haldane
Porter was authorised after Troup had submitted in October 1915 that his 
remuneration was ’entirely inadequate to the position which he occupies 
and is insufficient...for the heavy and responsible work he is called upon 
to perform.* Moreover the senior officials with whom Haldane Porter had 
to deal on a daily basis were on considerably higher pay rates. ^
7. The designation ’aliens officer* was changed to 'immigration
officer* under the Aliens Order of 1920.
8. HO 45/10732/255987/86 and 231.
9. HO 45/10732/255987/38 and 130.
10. HO 45/10732/255987/86.
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In the early days of the war Haldane Porter and his small head­
quarters staff were inundated with requests for guidance on problems 
which were constantly arising at the ports in connection with aliens, and 
there was frequent consultation with the Foreign Office, War Office and 
Admiralty. ^  Such was the pressure of work on Haldane Porter and his 
colleagues that for the first year of the war he was virtually precluded
from visiting his staff in the field, an activity to which he had
12
previously attached much importance.
The principle task of aliens officers at the ports was to detect
enemy agents or other undesirables and offenders against the Aliens
Restriction and Defence of the Realm Acts and the orders made under them.
With only Belgium and part of France occupied by Germany, civilian traffic
continued between Britain and much of western Europe and the Iberian
peninsula, making the movement of agents and information in both directions
a relatively simple matter. The situation was further complicated in the
early war period by the flood of refugees to and from the continent,
including many French, Belgians and Americans returning home. The Times
reported that travellers from the continent had been amazed at the apparent
13
ease with which aliens were allowed into Britain, and there was much 
speculation in the press about the extent to which the influx of Belgian 
refugees provided cover for the entry of enemy agents. There seems little 
doubt on subsequent evidence that fears on this score were exaggerated.
In the early months of the war the Port of London, because of its 
size and the inadequate staffing of its many docks and wharves, was
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. The Times, 26 Aug. 1914.
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considered by the military authorities as specially vulnerable to
14
unauthorised entry and departure by enemy nationals. The Home
Secretary, Simon, ’positively agreed* with Troup’s assessment that
London was ’the weakest point in our defence against espionage* and
’Any spy who is or looks like a sailor can easily get into or out of
London docks.* The total staff of the Aliens Branch in the Port of
London during the first year of the war consisted of 12 officers, six on
secondment from the customs and excise service^and six from the Factory
Inspectorate. All were stationed at Tilbury, the approved part of the
port, and they attempted as far as possible to check vessels heading for
other moorings up river as well as those docking at Tilbury. The volume
of traffic made it impossible to examine all ships at Tilbury and there
was no alternative but to visit vessels at the docks or wharves where
they berthed. ^  In a submission to the Treasury in October 1915 Troup
sought authority for the immediate recruitment of additional aliens
officers. He pointed out that London was the only port in the United
Kingdom at which scrutiny over ship's arriving and leaving was seriously
inadequate, and that the poor level of supervision had been the subject
of strong representations to the Home Office by the military and naval 
17
authorities. The Treasury promptly approved the appointment of an
extra 25 aliens officers and, in addition to the group of officers based 
at Tilbury, new teams were established at the London, Surrey, Victoria 
and West India docks. The enlarged force of officers on the Thames
14. HO 45/10732/255987/86.
15. HO 45/10732/255987/88.
16. HO 45/10732/255987/32.
17. Troup to Lord Commissioners of the Treasury, 6 Oct. 1915, 
HO 45/10732/276521/30.
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was headed by Lieutenant Commander Thomas N. Keen, Royal Naval Reserve,
former Dock Master at the Port of London, whose services were made
18
available to the Home Office by the Admiralty. Keen's staff was
further augmented early in 1916 as the work of the service expanded at
the London docks. Aliens officers were stationed at each of the docks
between London Bridge and Crossness, but for economy reasons, responsibility
for such aliens control work as was necessary at moorings further down
19
river was left to customs officers.
Aliens officers were empowered on the authority of the Secretary
of State to 'enter on board any vessel, and to detain and examine all
persons at or leaving any port in the United Kingdom, and to require
20
production of any documents by such persons...' Enemy aliens could
leave only on the authority of a deportation order or a special permit
from the Secretary of State, except in cases of members of the British
21
forces, prisoners of war or diplomats in certain categories. Any alien
seeking admission to the country had to prove he was coming on urgent or
necessary business, for legitimate trading purposes or for other adequate
reasons. He was required to carry a passport or other document establishing
his identity, which was examined by the British consul in the country of
22
embarkation as well as by aliens officers on arrival in the UK.
Regulations were imposed under both the Aliens Restriction and Defence of 
the Realm Acts which made the possession of a passport or identity document 
mandatory for entry or departure from the United Kingdom, except in cases
18. HO 45/10732/255987/88.
19. HO 45/10732/255987/128.
20. Aliens Restriction (Consolidated) Order, 9 Sep. 1914.
21. Defence of the Realm Act (Consolidated)Order, 28 Nov. 1914.
22. 98HC 5s., 482, 22 Oct. 1917.
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where special permission had been obtained from the Secretary of State.
The passport had to contain a photograph and have been issued during
the previous two years.
Although heavy penalties were prescribed for abuse of the pass­
port regulations there is little doubt that there was considerable use of
forged documents early in the war by enemy aliens leaving the country under
the guise of neutrals.
Aliens officers had not only to ascertain the identity of 
travellers and their authority to enter or leave the country, but also to 
ensure that they were not carrying letters, messages or other materials 
which might contain information intended for an enemy power or one of its 
agents. Alien passengers arriving in Britain were issued with a notice 
warning that,
The carrying to or from the United Kingdom of letters, 
written messages or memoranda is strictly forbidden, and no 
one may carry any printed or written matter (including plans, 
photographs or other pictorial representations) out of the 
United Kingdom to any neutral country in Europe or America 
without a permit from the Chief Postal Censor. ^
Aliens were also forbidden to bring into the country such
'strategic® items as firearms, fuel, signalling apparatus, pigeons, motor
vehicles, cipher codes or other means of conducting secret correspondence.
Aliens officers did, however, have the significant power to waive these
regulations if they deemed that it was safe to do so in the case of aliens
24
from a friendly country. A major innovation made in February 1917,
which has survived to the present day, was the granting to aliens officers 
of authority to attach conditions when giving an alien permission to land.
23. Defence of the Realm Act (Consolidated)Order, 28 Nov. 1914; 
HO 45/10828/323249/2.
24. Aliens Restriction (Consolidated) Order, 9 Sept.1914.
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These conditions were usually endorsed on the alien's passport, and
failure to comply with them constituted an offence under the Aliens
. . 25
Restriction Act.
From the early days of the war aliens of all nationalities 
entering or leaving Britain had to use one of the locations designated 
as an 'approved port', all other ports being declared prohibited. Enemy 
aliens could not use the approved ports without prior permission from the 
Secretary of State. Initally the approved ports were Aberdeen, Dundee,
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, West Hartlepool, Hull, London, Folkestone, Falmouth,
2 6
Bristol, Holyhead, Liverpool, Glasgow and Dublin. The list was
subsequently amended to exclude Aberdeen, Dundee and West Hartlepool and
27
to include Southampton. While aliens officers manned the approved
ports, controls at other ports and harbours were administered by customs 
officers, working closely with the naval, military and police authorities 
to prevent the landing and embarkation of alien passengers and controlling 
the movements of alien masters and crews. These duties were considered
by the Commissioners of Customs and Excise to be 'analagous to, but much
28
more onerous and intricate than the aliens work in time of peace.'
Travel to any country deemed by the government to be a likely
centre for German espionage agents was strictly controlled by the Permit
29
Office, set up under Home Office jurisdiction in March 1915. Initially
25. Circular, HO to chief constables, 15 Sept. 1917.
26. Aliens Restriction (Consolidated) Order, 9 Sept. 1914.
27. HO 45/10828/323249/2.
28. Seventh Report of the Commissioners of His Majesty's Customs
and Excise for year ended 31 Mar. 1916, Cd. 8428, 1917.
29. Mo Vt/iO ?2.S'/323<2.4?/2- •
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concerned with travel to Holland, the work of the office was subsequently 
extended to deal with passengers to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Russia,
Spain, Portugal and South America. The inter-departmental committee 
appointed to advise on the operation of the Permit Office was headed by 
Troup and included Pedder, Haldane Porter, and representatives of the 
Foreign Office, Admiralty and War Office. ^  The main Permit Office 
was located in the quadrangle of the Home Office and there were branches 
at Hull, Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Liverpool. Long queues outside the 
London Permit Office in the early days of the war, a contemporary civil 
servant noted, included,
....Alsatians, Czechs, Poles, Italians, and, of course, 
Germans; German prostitutes, anxious and tearful, seeking 
permits to go to Argentina and Brazil; German schoolgirls, 
bursting with Teutonic arrogance, who scarcely condescended 
to give their names to a representative of a race which they 
believed to be already beaten; German bands, still in their 
uniforms and clutching their instruments, from the Clyde 
steamers and seaside resorts. ^
Difficulties often arose at the Permit Office because there were no staff
members able to speak the languages of the wide range of nationality
groups involved. Applicants for permits often had to sit and wait
while staff tried, not always successfully, to find someone to interview
the alien in his own tongue. The language problem was exacerbated when
Turkey entered the war and applicants included Levantines, Armenians,
32
Arabs and other members of Ottoman subject races.
Records of the movements of all aliens between Britain and 
Europe were maintained in a card index at the Home Office, and later in
the war the system was expanded to include traffic to and from other parts
30. Home Office List, 1918.
31. Sir Harold Scott, Your Obedient Servant (1959), p. 37.
32. Ibid.
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of the world. This ’traffic index,* which was to become a permanent
feature of aliens control in Britain, was complemented by the ’central
register* of aliens registered with the police.
Aliens officers at the ports were backed up by members of the 
33
Special Branch, military intelligence officers and in some cases by
representatives of the French and Belgian intelligence organisations, to
provide what one former Home Office immigration official termed an ’awe
34
inspiring tribunal.* By late August 1915, according to military
intelligence, German agents were finding that the ordinary passenger
routes into and out of the United Kingdom were so closely watched, and the
permit system so strict, that these channels of .communication had become
almost useless to them. There was evidence that an alternative means of
getting agents into and out of the country was by the use of small merchant
vessels running between Britain, Holland and Scandanavia. Aliens were
known to have been smuggled to Holland on ships sailing between London and
Amsterdam. Aliens officers were instructed to obtain details of tramp
steamers entering and leaving ports, and pay greater attention- to the
35
possibility of enemy agents being concealed on such vessels. Police
33. There was close co-operation between the aliens service and the 
police from the early days of the war. Before the war began 
the Home Office had advised chief constables that
*It will be the duty of the Police to give the Aliens 
Officers generally such assistance and support as they may 
require in dealing with the aliens; and for this purpose 
the Police should keep in close touch with these officers.
In particular the Police should be ready to take into custody
any aliens who may be detained by the Aliens Officers...On 
receiving such alien the Police should take steps with a view
to his being prosecuted for the offence which has led to his
detention by the Aliens Officer.* (Circular, HO to chief 
constables, 30 July 1914)
34. Roche, op. cit., p. 88.
35. MO 5(g), WO to HO, secret memo, 19 Aug. 1915, HO 45/10727/
254753/98.
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forces were also asked to show extra vigilence at landing places in their 
36
areas.
As a further precaution military guards were placed on ships
which docked in Britain after visiting neutral European ports. The
duties were carried out largely by territorial soldiers because regulars
could not be spared, and by April 1918 about 1,100 men were employed on
37this work throughout the United Kingdom.
But the possibility of enemy agents entering Britain under the 
guise of seamen of neutral nationality remained a source of concern to the 
intelligence authorities, and a number of warnings were issued to the polic
3
and port staffs to show particular vigilance in Screening* ships' crews.
Ships arriving at British ports from neutral European countries
were numerous during the early war period and it was found impracticable
to prevent at least the master landing to conduct the ship's business
ashore. With the subsequent reduction in sea traffic, the Home Office,
in conjunction with military intelligence and other departments concerned,
evolved a system which could effectively prevent anyone landing from such 
39
ships. The master was required to furnish particulars to an aliens
officer of all aliens aboard his ship and was forbidden to allow any 
person to land or embark without the permission of an aliens officer.
The master was also obliged to provide passages to his ship's destination 
for any alien designated by a Secretary of State or an aliens officer.
If the ship belonged to the same company as the vessel on which the alien 
arrived in Britain, the master could be required to provide the passage 
free of charge. Any alien, ship's master or other person who arrived or
37. HO 45/10841/335981/9.
38. Circular, HO to Chief Constables, Feb. 1918, HO 45/10991/338498.
39. HO 45/10841/335981/9.
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left without the permission of an aliens officer, refused to answer
reasonable questions from such an officer, made false statements or
refused to produce a document required by the officer, acted in
40contravention of the Aliens Restriction Act. There were numerous
cases of seamen overstaying the time specified on their permits; most
of the offenders were dealt with by withdrawing permission to land, but
in more serious cases they were prosecuted. By October 1916 more than
41
50 convictions had been recorded. The Home Office became concerned,
however, that in imposing penalties the courts were showing little
discrimination between minor and serious offences. The department
42
classified the offences under three headings:
a. Outstaying the hours specified in a landing permit or 
failing to fulfil the conditions attached to the permit.
b. Landing without a permit from a ship which had arrived
from an allied or extra-European port.
c. Landing without a permit from a ship which had arrived
from a neutral European port.
Offences under (a), where the fact that the alien seaman had been
permitted to land indicated that there was not much risk of espionage,
were not considered serious enough to warrant more than a fine, with
imprisonment for repeated offences. Offences under (b) and (c),on the
other hand, were felt by the Home Office generally to require more severe
treatment. This was particularly so in the case of (c) as it was deemed
to bet
40. Aliens Restriction (Consolidated) Order, 9 Sept. 1914.
41. HO 45/10732/255987/128.
42. Circular, HO to chief constables, Feb. 1918, HO 45/10991/338498.
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...of the greatest importance that alien seamen from ships 
trading between Norway, Sweden, Holland, Denmark or Spain 
and this country should not be allowed to land (save in 
exceptional cases), owing to the grave risk of such seamen 
conveying information to the enemy. ^
The Home Secretary urged the police to ensure that courts were properly
informed as to the relative importance, from the security point of view,
of the various kinds of offences committed by alien seamen so that they
were in a position to distinguish between cases and impose suitable
, . 44
penalties.
While port controls became progressively more comprehensive and
efficient, the military authorities in particular remained worried about
the possibility of aliens attempting to land illegally on beaches or
unfrequented parts of the coast. Area commanders were instructed by the
War Office to issue orders to troops on coast-watching duties to stop and
question any person landing on the coast 'who appears to have arrived from
overseas or to have been in communication with any vessel lying off the
coast...8 If the person was found to be an alien he was to be handed over
45
to the police for further examination.
The efforts of the authorities to prevent enemy aliens entering
the country as seamen were paralleled by their concern to deter enemy
nationals leaving under the guise of members of ships' crews. With few
places available on ships for passengers, the Home Office warned the police
in September 1917 that,
...there is a considerable risk that aliens may attempt to 
leave the country by signing on as seamen of a crew and thus 
escaping the special measures in force for the control of 
alien passengers. The Aliens Officers have been instructed
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Instructions and Notes on the Defence of the Realm Regulations,
issued by GHQ, Home Forces, 1918.
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not to allow any alien to sign on or embark as a member of a 
crew unless he holds a seaman*s registration card. Any case 
therefore of an alien applying for a seaman*s registration 
card should be carefully investigated and the card should not 
be issued unless the alien can produce satisfactory evidence 
that he really is a seaman. Further, if the applicant has 
been resident for some time in the United Kingdom, the Police 
should satisfy themselves by enquiries that it is proper that 
he should have facilities for embarking as a seaman rather than 
as a passenger. ^
A number of aliens were arrested as they attempted to leave the country
posing as seamen, but others probably succeeded in escaping undetected,
47
some perhaps using documents obtained from neutral seamen. As
regulations were progressively tightened and port staff became more
experienced, abuses of the system became far more difficult. Moreover
the number of aliens likely to try and leave the country illegally was
greatly reduced by internment and repatriation.
To cope with the constantly increasing burden of work falling on
the Aliens Branch, both at the Home Office and in the field, the staff of
the branch more than doubled between October 1915 and June 1917. Apart
from junior clerical staff the strength rose to 147, including one deputy
inspector, two clerks, nine superintending aliens officers (based at
Liverpool, Southampton, Folkestone, Cardiff, Tilbury, London, Hull), nine
chief aliens officers (at Tilbury, Liverpool, Glasgow, Bristol, Newcastle-
upon-Tyne, Cardiff, Swansea, Newport and Barry Dock) 114 aliens officers,
48
and 12 interpreters. Because of pressure of work on the branch and
to enable better supervision of staff at the ports, a second deputy
49
inspector was appointed in July. To permit the branch to retain its
trained staff, aliens officers were not subject to conscription under the
46. Circular, HO to chief constables, 15 Sept. 1917, HO 45/10881/338498.
47. 80HC 5s., 1682, 9 Mar. 1916.
48. HO 45/10732/255987/231.
49. Ibid.
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Military Service Acts of 1916.
As the size of the Aliens Branch was progressively increased, 
so were its powers and effectiveness, and it is doubtful whether more 
than a small handful of enemy agents were able to evade the system of 
controls at the ports. Some at least of the 15 spies who were
executed during the war were arrested at the ports, and the evidence of 
aliens officers helped to convict them.
Many of the men recruited to the Aliens Branch during the war on 
a temporary basis stayed on afterwards and were joined by returning serv­
icemen to form the basis of the modern immigration service as a department 
of the Home Office. The importance of the role of Haldane Porter in
helping to establish the service can hardly be exaggerated. He was
knighted in 1926 and when he left the service at the end of 1929 to take 
up a commercial appointment, a senior colleague aptly summed up his 
contribution:
The penetrating intelligence, unflinching purpose and 
superlative leadership of Sir Haldane Porter has laid the 
foundation of a service with a splendid tradition despite 
its youth. Whatever the future holds in store for us,
Sir Haldane Porterfs reign of twenty-four years has impressed
his character indelibly on the Aliens Branch... ^
50. Memo on work of Aliens Division for government record, 12 Jan.
1918, HOR.
51. Roche, op. cit., p. 82.
52. 'Retrospect - Aliens Control in the UK 1829-19291, paper by Senior
Superintending Inspector, Immigration Department, Home Office, 1929 
quoted in Roche, op. cit., p. 116.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EMPLOYMENT AND MILITARY SERVICE
The use of enemy alien manpower to aid the British war effort, 
either in work of ’national importance* or through some form of military 
service, was an issue of continuing controversy during the First World 
War, which successive governments never satisfactorily resolved.
Opportunities for useful and worthwhile work in the internment 
camps, where most able bodied enemy alien men of military age spent the 
war, were limited, and the efforts of the authorities to place uninterned 
enemy nationals or paroled internees in agriculture and other industries 
shorn of British labour by the military recruiters were often frustrated 
by the prejudices and fears of potential employers, trade unions and 
indigenous workers. The situation was made more difficult by the 
reluctance of the War Office to detach soldiers from what were considered 
more essential duties to act as guards for working parties of prisoners 
employed on farms and elsewhere.
Unlike combatant prisoners (other than officers and non-commiss­
ioned officers), civilian internees could not, under the terms of the 
Hague Convention, be compelled to work, except for carrying out routine 
fatigue duties at their camps. Most were, however, prepared to do so 
to help support their families, to be able to buy extra food or other 
items from the camp canteen, or simply to help combat the monotony of 
camp life. The few enemy aliens either in the camps or outside who 
refused to help the British war effort by working probably did so either 
out of patriotic feelings for their homeland or because of concern over 
possible punitive action against them should they subsequently return to 
the country whose nationality they held. German citizens had good
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reason to feel apprehensive since their government had threatened action
against any of them who helped Britain’s war effort.  ^ The Home Office
found that many Austrians would have preferred to have been compelled to
work. They were quite willing to work but ’afraid their government may
2
not like their volunteering.* Compulsion was ruled out, but 
ultimately uninterned enemy aliens who refused to carry out work of 
national importance were liable to internment.
Despite an acute shortage of labour in the later war years and 
rising public resentment, nurtured by the anti-alien propagandists, at 
the spectacle of thousands of able bodied men apparently languishing idly 
in internment camps at public expense, the problem of finding work for 
internees was never treated by wartime governments with the kind of 
priority that many in parliament, most prominent among them Lord Newton, 
thought warranted.
Some enemy aliens were released from the camps in the later war 
years on a form of parole for employment on work of national importance, 
mainly as agricultural labourers, and a few avoided internment because 
they possessed skills specially valuable in war industries. The 
continuing liberty of enemy alien men of military age, even if they were 
engaged on work of national importance, provided a constant target for 
the hardliners and propagandists. Some of these men, it was argued, 
were prospering in jobs and businesses vacated by British men serving in 
the armed forces, but few instances were ever cited.
A small number of enemy aliens, all members of the ’friendly’ 
races and mainly Czechs, were allowed to serve in combatant units of the 
British Army and other volunteers were placed in a specially constituted
1. Memo, on work of B Division for government record, HO, 12 Jan. 
1918, HOR.
2. HO 45/10831/326555/19.
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non-combatant labour battalion of the Middlesex Regiment. The War 
Office and later the National Service Department never gave more than 
reluctant agreement to enemy aliens undertaking military service in any 
capacity, and in the later stages of the war blocked most such enrolments.
Some enemy aliens were allowed to leave Britain to enlist in the 
armed forces of allied countries, and a number were virtually compelled 
to do so. Able bodied Alsatian men of military age, for example, were 
confronted with the stark choice of either joining the French Army or 
being interned.
The relatively few enemy alien men of military age left uninterned 
in Britain after the early years of the war nominally faced the alter­
natives of either undertaking worked deemed by the authorities to be of 
*national importance* or military service, generally in a non-combatant 
labour unit.
CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT
Immediately after the outbreak of the war the government faced 
pressure from MPs to prevent German and Austrian nationals from holding 
jobs in Britain o n tthe grounds that some British workers were unemployed.
The cabinet were reluctant to add to the growing number of unemployed 
enemy aliens since many of them were becoming destitute and were seen as 
potential social danger and drain on public funds. Moreover it was clear 
that a total ban on employment of enemy nationals could have greatly 
disrupted trade. Instructions were nevertheless issued to local employment 
exchanges in the early weeks of the war that no person believed to be an 
enemy alien was to be placed in employment, and particulars of all 
registrants at the exchanges had to be submitted to the chief constable 
of the district. These instructions were later modified so that enemy 
nationals could be placed in#jobs for which no British workman could be 
found.
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With a shortage of internment accommodation and government policy
still tentative, enemy aliens interned during the early months of the
war were in many cases released if they could satisfy the authorities
that they would not constitute a danger to the community or become
destitute and a charge on public funds, which for most meant that they
had to show they would be able to obtain employment after their release.
The police had to verify that a job awaited an internee before he was 
3
released. The critical reception by many politicians of the liberal 
release policy was prompted partly by concern at what they expected would 
be the hostility of British workers to jobs being given to enemy aliens 
discharged from the internment camps. The Earl of Mar warned,
I have been informed on very good authority that among 
our working classes alarming discontent has sprung up, and 
it is likely to grow, against the further employment of aliens 
to the serious detriment of our British workmen. If that 
discontent should assume still greater proportions I need 
scarcely say that the government will incur very serious 
responsibility in allowing such a state of affairs to exist.. ^
Viscount Galway observed,
It is to my mind extraordinary that the government should go 
out of their way to announce that they will release at once 
alien enemies who can get work, because re-employment of these 
men at the present moment must mean displacement of British 
' labour... ^
A few politicians, such as Lord Bryce, publicly supported the release of 
‘safe® enemy aliens, although they recognised that many of the men had 
little prospect of finding work. In some cases their businesses had 
closed down and in others former employers refused to take them back. ^ 
There were several cases where British workmen refused to work with enemy
3. 18HL 5s., 501, 10 Feb. 1915.
4. 18HL 5s., 432, 3 Feb. 1915.
5. 18HL 5s., 499, 10 Feb. 1915.
6. Ibid., col. 504.
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aliens or even naturalised Germans, but the problem never approached 
the scale predicted by the more alarmist politicians.
In early 1915 there were a number of stories in the newspapers 
and complaints from members of parliament to the Home Secretary that 
the Metropolitan Police had been actively trying to get enemy alien hotel 
and restaurant workers reinstated in jobs that they had lost, where 
necessary replacing British staff. This alleged favoured treatment of 
enemy subjects, branded by indignant parliamentarians as •monstrous* and
g
•unpatriotic*, was strongly denied by Henry, the Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, and by McKenna. The police had not been trying to find
jobs for enemy aliens, said Henry, but had merely been checking on them
9
for the War Office. The Home Secretary pointed out that during the 
four months from 1 October 1914 to 31 January 1915, only 62 Germans and 
Austrians had found work in hotels, boarding houses and restaurants in 
London, and of these 32 were members of the friendly races. ^  Allegations 
that the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police had 
been used to find- jobs for enemy aliens released from internment in 
Ireland were denied by the Irish Secretary, Augustine Birrell. ^
The number of aliens at large was progressively reduced by the 
stricter internment policy introduced in May 1915 and the authorities had to 
turn their attention increasingly to the problem of finding work for the 
swelling population in the internment camps. One of the most persistent 
advocates of the use of enemy alien internee labour was Lord Newton who,
7. See, for eg., 71HC 5s., 1875, 13 May 1915 and 105HC 5s., 1097, 
25 Apr. 1915.
8 . 18HL 5s., cols. 424 and 432, 3 Feb. 1915.
9. Ibid., cols. 126-7.
10. Ibid.
11. 69HC 5s., 265, 8 Feb. 1915.
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although a junior minister, was often critical of the government's
relative lack of success in placing prisoners in useful work during
the early war years. After one speech in the House of Commons in
November 1916, he noted in his diary, 'I must have forgotten I was a
member of the government. Find it difficult to speak with patience
12
of the manner in which the question has been managed.' At Newton's
suggestion, early in 1916 the Home Office launched a modest experiement
in Cheshire (Newton's home county) under which farmers were encouraged
to employ civilians of Austro-Hungarian or Ottoman nationality (Germans
were not included because public prejudice was deemed to be too strong
to make their acceptance likely). The employer had to provide the
prisoners with food and lodging, pay them the prevailing agricultural
wage in the district and ensure that they reported periodically to the
police. Although the employer was expected to maintain broad supervision
of the individual or small groups of enemy alien workers assigned to him,
13
no liability attached to him if any such worker absconded. Where
larger gangs of prisoners were employed on farms or public works projects
military guards were provided, but the War Office opposed the employment
of parties of less than 100 because of the heavy demand for guards that 
14
this created. The use of civilian volunteers to guard the working
parties was rejected because few such volunteers could be available on a 
round-the-clock basis as were members of the armed forces. ^  The 
results of the Home Office scheme for placing non-German civilian prisoners
12. Diary entry,12 Nov. 1916,referred to in Lord Newton, Retrospection 
(1941), p. 229.
13. 23HL 5s., 473, 14 Nov. 1916.
14. 87HC 5s., 1175, 21 Nov. 1916.
15. 23HC 5s., 477-8, 14 Nov. 1916.
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in agricultural work were disappointing. Instead of being welcomed 
by the landowners and farmers of Cheshire, as Newton had hoped, the 
scheme was derided and Newton told the House of Lords that he had been 
denounced as a * semi-dangerous lunatic who is anxious to let loose on 
the County of Cheshire a gigantic flood of German spies,* and had 
•found it an almost impossible task to induce people to realise that a
Croat, or an Armenian, or a Galician is not the same thing as a German
, 16 spy.1
Although the employment of interned civilians was not one of
Newton's responsibilities as head of the prisoner of War Department he
nevertheless assumed the unofficial role of 'employment agent' for the
internees, ^  and during the summer and autumn of 1916 conducted a
vigorous campaign to persuade the government and potential employers of
the logic of using enemy alien labour. In mid-July 1916 he declared
himself 'so scandalised at the spectacle of these thousands of men being
unemployed that I could not help making representations to the various
departments concerned,' but his efforts had met with failure in almost
every case, not because of failings in the departments but 'entirely due
to the stupidity and ignorance which prevails in this country and which
is fostered and pandered to by a certain section of the press and certain 
18
individuals.* Newton said he found the opposition to the employment
of enemy aliens unintelligible since it was not proposed to use them as 
cheap labour and undersell workers on the normal labour market. They 
would be employed only for the duration of the war and would be paid
16. 21HL 5s., 1126, 18 May 1916.
17. Grey said Newton had constituted himself into a labour bureau
or labour exchange, but Newton denied this (23HL 5s., 484, 14 
Nov. 1916).
18. 22HL 5s., 716, 13 July 1916.
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standard local wages. In some cases where employers were prepared to
give work to enemy aliens, as soon as their intention became known
British workers in their employ threatened to strike. Decrying the
neglect of the manpower potential in the internment camps at a time
when the country was short of labour, Newton warned that unless more
intelligence was displayed in utilising alien labour, at the end of the
war there would be ’thousands of these men still behind barbed wire,
demoralised and perhaps ruined and in broken health, who will constitute
19
a serious difficulty with which we shall have to deal.' He estimated
that up to mid-November only about 45 civilian internees had been given
work by outside employers, and in each case the prisoners had apparently
proved satisfactory. ^
The resistance to the use of enemy alien labour persisted well
into 1916, particularly in agriculture, although food production had
fallen significantly since the beginning of the war because of shortage
of manpower. Between 300,000 and 400,000 men had left agriculture for
military service, and it had become almost impossible to retain existing
21
arable land in cultivation. The President of the Board of Agriculture,
Earl Crawford, promised to devote ’the whole influence' of his department
22
to exploiting alien labour.
It proved easier to place combatant prisoners than civilian 
internees in work. In general the combatants were physically better 
equipped for the type of employment where labour was most needed, eg in 
agriculture and public works projects, and they could be more easily
19. Ibid., col. 717.
20. 23HL 5s., 475, 14 Nov. 1916.
21. Ibid., col. 482-3.
22. Ibid., cols. 480-1.
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organised into disciplined working parties and deployed to areas where
they were needed. The civilians were confined to fewer camps, with the
vast majority housed on the Isle of Man, and those interned near their
families were naturally anxious not to be moved around the country, often
to remote areas. Of the 25,000 combatants in the internment camps by
mid-November 1916, about 5,000 were employed in various capacities, mainly
in agriculture and forestry, and the remainder included 900 officers and
NCOs and between 2,000 and 3,000 invalids or wounded men who were excused
work. By Christmas 1916 about 8,600 combatant prisoners were employed in
23
or earmarked for work of national importance.
Much less progress was made in finding work for civilian internees,
despite the efforts of the Whitehall departments concerned. The Manpower
Distribution Board, set up by the Cabinet early in July 1916 'to determine
all questions arising between government departments relating to the
allocation or economic utilisation of manpower1 did little to improve the
situation. The Board had been given no executive powers and its main
recommendations were opposed by the Ministry of Munitions and other
24
interested departments and were not acted upon by the cabinet. In
December 1916 the crucial need for efficient utilisation of available
manpower was recognised by the formation of the National Service Department
25
with Mr. Neville Chamberlain as Director-General. During the same month
23. 85HC 5s., 1655, 21 Dec. 1916.
24. ' Chamberlain Papers, Birmingham University, NC 8/5/3/1 - 8/5/4/15.
25. The department was established as a ministry on 28 Mar. 1917
under the National Service Act 1917 (7 Geo. 5 c. 6), and its 
object was 'to make the best use of all persons, whether men
or women, able to work in any industry, occupation or service.'
In Aug. 1917 the ministry was re-organised and its powers 
extended to include the take-over of responsibility from the 
War Office on 1 Nov. for recruitment to the armed forces (see 
Cd. 9005, pp. 85-6).
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an inter-departmental committee was established under the chairmanship
of James Hope, a Lord Commissioner of the Treasury, 1 to consider questions
f 26
relating to the employment of prisoners of war# Chamberlain*s new
department was welcomed by the Home Office and Troup believed that its 
existence would make it impossible to leave uninterned enemy aliens * to 
go on making money in any way they choose when British subjects are 
required to give up their ordinary businesses or occupations and under­
take national service in other industries.* He felt the opportunity 
should be taken to ascertain from the police which exempted enemy aliens 
were currently engaged in work necessary to the war effort and in the 
case of those who were not, to decide what work of national importance
they might undertake. Those who refused to do such work should be interne 
27
Troup believed.
In early January 1917 the Metropolitan Police carried out a
survey to ascertain the occupations and marital and family status of
uninterned German men of military age (17-55) living in the London area.
Of the 1,862 aliens covered in the survey, 466 had served some time in
2 8
internment camps and been released. The breakdown was as follows:
Owners of shops and
restaurants. 125
Employees at shops and 
restaurants. 419
Managers of own businesses
other than retail outlets
and ‘controlled* estabs. 186
Employees of businesses 
■ other than retain outlets or
Controlled* estabs. 815
26. Home Office List, Feb. 1917.
27. Memo, Troup, 21 Jan 1917, HO 45/10818/317810/7.
28. Report by New Scotland Yard to Home Office dated 8 Jan, 1917,
HO 45/10831/326555/2.
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Employees at •controlled' 
estabs, 48
Members of professions, 91
Unemployed, 178
1,862
29
On 24 February the Home Office circularised all police forces 
asking them to review exemptions from internment and repatriation granted 
to enemy alien men of military age in their areas 'with a view to with­
drawing them,'
(1) in any case where the conduct of the exempted 
person has not been entirely satisfactory or 
any reasonable suspicion as to his actions or 
character has arisen;
(2) in all cases where the exempted person, not 
being aged or an invalid, is not fully employed 
in some work which is useful and necessary for 
the country during the war.
The police were asked to provide similar reports on male enemy aliens,
whether registered or not, between the age of 16 and 18. To decide what
occupations were 'useful and necessary* the police were referred to the
official 'List of Trades and Occupations of Primary Importance* issued
by the National Service Department, ^  but were allowed some discretion
in interpretting the circular where an occupation was not officially listed.
Very few enemy aliens interrogated during the survey were subsequently
interned and only one or two recommended for repatriation. About three-
quarters, or nearly 6,000 of the menrwere recommended by the Home Office
29. Circular, HO to chief constables, 24 Feb. 1917. The text was 
agreed with the Reserved Occupations Committee.
30. The main classifications in the list of trades of primary 
importance were mining and quarrying; metals, machines, 
implements and conveyances; woodworking; pottery and glass; 
building and construction work; textiles and allied trades; 
chemical, oil and related products; leather; transport; 
agriculture; food, and public utility services.
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to the National Service Department as suitable candidates for the
national service scheme; the remaining 25 per cent were classified as
’satisfactory*, ie they were ready to do useful work if asked or were
31
unfit for any type of work.
Enemy alien ’volunteers* in the national service scheme were
deemed to be available for any class of work, skilled or unskilled,
32
manual or office work, but with the following limitations:
(a) None were to be placed in such work against their will, 
and none were in any circumstances to be placed in 
factories where explosives were manufactured.
(b) They were not to be given jobs in which they would be 
much in public evidence, eg serving at counters or 
acting as messengers.
(c) They were not to be placed in prohibited areas without 
permission of the chief constable of the locality.
(d) They were not to be given posts where naval or military 
intelligence of any kind would be at their disposal, eg 
clerical work at a military establishment.
(e) If they were placed in railway employment it was only to 
be in positions where they could have nothing to do with 
the working of the line, eg they could be appointed as 
porters but not pointsmen.
Those who refused to accept work, other than war work, considered by the
authorities to be ’suitable* were to be reported immediately to the
National Service Department and were liable to internment. It was for
the managers of labour exchanges, as the local officers of the National
Service Department, to decide what work enemy aliens could reasonably be
called upon to perform, and, in the event of refusal or unsatisfactory
performance, to decide whether the offending aliens had sufficient excuse
for his actions or should be reported to the National Service Department.
31. HO 45/10881/338498 and 95HC 5s., 1684, 9 July 1917.
32. 24HL 5s., 78, 29 Mar. 1917.
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Adverse reports were passed to the Home Office and were considered
33
grounds for internment without further inquiries.
Enemy aliens were normally barred from employment in
Restricted occupations,* work considered non-essential to the war
effort. Industries placed wholly or partly in this category included
those engaged in the manufacture of jewellery, fancy leather goods,
furriers, bespoke tailoring, furniture, carpets and rugs, wallpaper, silks,
lace, hats and caps, linoleum, cutlery, brushes, paper, stationery, printing
and bookbinding, and * luxury1 foods, such as biscuits, chocolate and 
34
confectionery. Where an enemy alien had volunteered for work of
national importance he could be employed temporarily in a restricted
35
occupation while awaiting placement through the national service scheme.
Despite the shortage of labour in several key industries and the existence
36
of the national service scheme, the results of the combined efforts of
several Whitehall departments to place uninterned enemy aliens in work of
national importance were hardly more encouraging than the continuing 
attempts to find employment for internees outside the camps.
The limited Home Office scheme launched early in 1916 to find 
agricultural work for non-German internees was augmented a year later by 
a wider scale programme under which suitable prisoners were allowed out 
on licence to work in the food production and distribution industries and 
certain other industries of national importance but not connected with war
33. HO 45/10831/326555/19.
34. HO 45/10831/326555/2.
35. HO 45/10831/326555/19a.
36. The total number of ’useful1 workers from among uninterned workers
in the national service scheme did not exceed 300 (Unpublished
report by M.L. Waller, head of the Home Office Prisoner of War
Branch, April 1919, HO 45/11025/410118/2}
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operations. They were allowed to work only as employees and could not
own, control or manage businesses. Their licences did not allow them
to compete for work with British labour and they were barred from employ-
37
ment as waiters or domestic servants. The Home Office advised camp
commandants that when an internee was released on parole he should be 
warned that his licence was liable to cancellation at any time if that 
appeared desirable in the public interest, and the parolee,
...should be advised strongly to do his work quietly 
and keep to himself and to avoid, as far as possible, coming 
into contact with the general public as in the present state 
of public feeling, this might provoke hostility towards him 
and make it necessary to re-intern him without any fault of 
his own.
Agriculture remained the principle focus of the government's 
efforts to place parolled prisoners in work. Farmers wishing to employ 
parolees had to obtain forms from their County Agricultural Committees 
and submit them after completion to the Prisoner of War Branch at the 
Home Office. A prisoner was then assigned as quickly as possible to the 
applicant, at no cost to the employer. The Board of Agriculture assured 
farmers that,
Should he (the parolee) misconduct himself, or should the 
employer have other reasonable ground for wishing to termininate 
the employment, the man will be re-interned, also free of cost 
to the employer. ^
The parolees were not allowed to work in prohibited areas on the East Coast
but could be employed under special conditions in prohibited areas else- 
40
where. The employing farmer had to undertake to:
(a) tell the police when the prisoner arrived;
37. 24HL 5s., 787, 29 Mar. 1917.
38. Circular, Home Office to commandants of civilian internment camps,
May 1918, HO 45/10881/340700/852.
39. Circular, Board of Agriculture to farmers, Oct. 1917.
40. Ibid.
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(b) lodge him on the employer's premises; and remember 
that he may not change his address, nor travel more 
than five miles from his (the employer's) premises, 
nor proceed beyond any other bounds which may be 
imposed by the police, without getting special 
permission from them;
(c) feed him;
(d) employ him upon work which directly or indirectly 
increases the production of food;
(e) pay him the district rate paid to British labourers 
for the work, on the understanding that the employer 
is entitled in ordinary cases to deduct 15 shillings 
per week in respect of the man's board and lodging;
(f) see that the man is insured under the National Health 
Insurance Act;
(g) tell the police at once if he should misconduct 
himself in any way, or should abscond; or if the 
employer should desire to dismiss him;
(h) discontinue his employment at the end of the war, or 
as soon thereafter as British labour is available.
The prisoner for his part had to give an assurance, as a condition of
his release, that he would:
(a) do nothing that could harm the British Empire or 
its Allies in any way;
(b) conduct himself properly in every way and do the
work which was given to him. .,
41 ,
Parolees who refused to work were liable to be returned to their camps
at their own expense and there placed on the lower scale of rations
42
designated for non-workers. Despite many appeals by ministers and
circulars and notices from the Board of Agriculture, the Home Office and 
other departments, however, the response of potential employers remained 
cool, if not hostile, to the'programme. By mid-June only about 900 
civilian prisoners, the vast majority Austro-Hungarians, had been released
41. Ibid.
42. 105HC 5s., 1530, 1 May 1918.
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on licence to work in ’essential industries*, principally agriculture.
The feasibility of using prisoners in the coalmines was considered by
the Coal Controllerate in consultation with the War Office, but was
ruled out on safety grounds and because of the expected strong opposition
44
of British miners to working with enemy labour.
The picture continued to be markedly different for combatant 
prisoners. By late July 1917, 23,620 out of 40,234 combatants held 
were usefully employed outside the camps and 2,590 were standing by to 
begin work as soon as accommodation could be found for them in the areas
in which they were needed. The balance was made up almost entirely of
prisoners who were exempt from work either because of their rank or
medical condition. 4^
Most combatants were employed under arrangements made by the Board 
of Agriculture in conjunction with the War Office. Prisoners of suitable 
physique or with previous agricultural experience were allocated to War 
Agricultural Committees throughout the country in batches of 75, then 
housed at central depots for duty with small working parties under guard 
on farms in the area. 46
In October 1917 the Board of Agriculture, dismayed at the 
continuing reluctance of farmers to employ paroled civilian internees 
as *living-in* labourers, issued a circular attempting to dispel commonly 
held fears and to extol the merits of the alien workers.
43. 25HL 5s., 443-4, 14 July 1917, and 25HL 5s., 660,. 27 June 1917.
44. 110HC 5s., 581, 22 Oct. 1918, and 110HC 5s., 1912, 5 Nov. 1918.-
45. 96HC 5s., 1447, 26 July 1917.
46. Circular, Board of Agriculture to War Agricultural Committees,
16 Jan. 1917, published in Board of Agriculture Journal, vol.
23, no. 11, Feb. 1917.
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From enquiries which the Board have made in a selected 
number of cases where farmers have availed themselves of 
the opportunity provided, it is clear that the men already 
placed out have given every satisfaction to their employers.
The farmers state that the men are invariably willing and 
useful, and give no trouble whatsoever.
The men provided under the scheme are not Germans, but 
are Austrians or Hungarians, or belong to races which are, 
generally speaking,friendly to the Allies. They are 
usually able to speak at any rate a little English.
In no case has there been any difficulty between the
men employed and the labourers already working on the farms, 
as it has been quickly recognised that the men are only in a 
technical sense enemies and are anxious to do anything they 
can to help the country of their adoption. ^
In December 1917 an inter-departmental committee was established
by the National Service Department, under the chairmanship of Lord Burnham,
to advise the minister on questions concerning the employment of aliens on
* 48work of national importance. The efforts of the committee were
directed in particular towards exploiting the considerable labour potential
among aliens of allied and neutral nationality, who far outnumbered
uninterned enemy aliens. About 13,000 enemy aliens remained at liberty
while allied aliens numbered some 128,000 and neutrals 33,000. By the
time the committee held its first meeting on 22 January 1918 only about
4,000 allied and neutral aliens had volunteered for work of national
importance, and nearly all of those had specified that they were only
49
available on a part-time basis. A further view of exemptions of
enemy aliens from internment or repatriation was carried out by the Home 
Office in the spring of 1918, and it was made clear to those allowed to 
remain free that the price of their liberty was readiness for employment 
in work of national importance. ^
47. Circular, Board of Agriculture to farmers, Oct. 1917.
48. Home Office List, April 1918.
49. HO 45/10832/326555/48.
50. Submission by Aliens Division for use in War Cabinet Report,
29 Nov. 1918, H0R.
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Despite the increasingly critical shortage of labour in
agriculture and other essential industries during the winter of 1917- 
51
18, the efforts of the authorities to persuade employers to accept 
internee labour produced disappointing results. By mid-February 1918 
only 2,000 civilian internees had been placed in outside work while an 
estimated 5,000 were engaged in some kind of useful work in the camps.
By contrast all but 400 of the 30,000 eligible combatant prisoners were
52
employed in agriculture, forestry, building, quarrying and other work.
The-situation remained much the same until the armistice. In March 
33,889 combatant prisoners were in employment but only 2,159 civilians, 
in June the comparative figures were 45,710: 2,360; in September, 62,106: 
2,573; in December, 66,853: 1,356.
A few uninterned enemy aliens of the friendly races were among 
the growing number of foreigners permitted during 1917-18, after careful 
’screening® by the police and military authorities, to work in the munition^ 
industry and in other sensitive categories of employment in the later 
years of the war. A close check was kept by military intelligence on 
enemy nationals in this type of employment, all of whom were required to 
carry special identity books-. Apart from the munitions industry, other 
areas of employment where enemy aliens were subjected to special scrutiny 
by MI5 included military and naval establishments; telegraph, telephone 
and railway companies involved in the transmission of official messages 
or carriage of members of the armed forces; military or any other categoriej
51. Geddes, Minister of National Service, said on 14 Jan, 1918 that
420,000 men needed for work of national importance (101HC 5s.,
86).
52. The War Cabinet Report for 1917, Cd. 9005, 1918.
53. Unpublished report by Lieut-Gen. H.E. Belfield on work of
Directorate of Prisoners of War, W0, 26 Mar. 1920, HO 45/11025/ 
410118/5.
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of hospitals dealing with military personnel; canteens, clubs or other 
organisations of a social, benevolent or religious nature conducted 
wholly or partly for the benefit of or used by members of the armed 
forces.
According to figures compiled by MI5, by the end of January
1918 just over 40,000 aliens, including about 800 of enemy nationality,
had been approved for employment in munitions and other sensitive
occupations, excluding those who had subsequently been permitted to leave 
55
the country. A few Germans of military age exempted from internment
because of their special skills in such fields as the production of
prismatic lenses, electrical apparatus and chemicals, were gradually
interned after the end of 1917 as British workers were trained to replace 
56
them. The exemption of Germans for work in these fields, usually
made at the request of the War Office or the Ministry of Munitions, ^
58
had usually been regarded with some misgivings by MI5. The Home
Office, too, suspected that not all alien workers claimed by their 
employers to be carrying out work essential to the war effort were in 
fact doing so. ^
Ultimately the contribution of enemy alien civilian labour to 
Britain®s war effort was negligible. The majority of enemy men of 
working age spent most of the war in internment camps doing little or no
54. Order by Home Secretary, 15 Nov. 1917, under Article 22A of 
Aliens Restriction (Consolidated) Order 1916.
55. HO 45/10809/311425/3.
56. Belfield report, op. cit.
57. 83HC 5s., 1073, 29 June 1916.
58. Draft of Cmd. 8419, June 1916, HO 45/10817/317072/5.
59. HO 45/10817/317072/5.
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nationally useful work. The prejudices and fears of potential employers, 
the trade unions and British workmen were a strong factor in blocking the 
employment of civilian internees outside the camps in the early war years. 
Later as the shortage of labour became acute this opposition diminished, 
but the government, perhaps afraid of the volatility of public opinion on 
the aliens question or preoccupied with more pressing wartime problems, 
showed insufficient will or imagination to solve the apparently simple 
question of how to place willing workers in a labour force critically 
short of able bodied men.
MILITARY SERVICE
Service by enemy aliens in Britain’s armed forces as an alternative 
to performing civilian work of national importance was confined largely to 
the enrolment of members of the ’friendly' races in an infantry works 
battalion established in 1916 after the introduction of conscription.
A few enemy nationals, mainly of Czech origin, were allowed to enlist in 
combatant units and a number of ’friendlies' were permitted to leave the 
country to serve in the armies of other allied countries, principally those 
of France and Serbia. During the early war years some friendlies were 
permitted to go to France to join' the French Foreign Legion.
The passage of the military service acts and the drafting of 
increasing numbers of British men into the armed forces made the position 
of uninterned enemy alien men, who were ostensibly exempt from military 
service, a matter of great political sensitivity. Popular resentment 
against alien men of military age working and running businesses free of 
competition from British men who had been called up for military service, 
often made no distinction between enemy, allied and even neutral aliens. ^
60o For parliamentary comments on public attitudes see, for example,
21HL 5s., 266, 2 March 1916; 90HC 5s., 715, 14 Feb. 1917; 92HC 5 s., 
909, 2 Apr. 1917; 95HC 5s., 1108, 9' May 1917.
290
International law offered no positive direction on the question 
of military service by aliens living in a belligerent country, but there 
was a widely accepted general principle that foreign nationals should not 
be conscripted into ordinary military service on the grounds that: ^
i. War is a political act, and aliens, being denied political 
rights, may not be burdened with political obligations;
ii. to participate in war might put them in the position of 
engaging in hostilities against their own country, or, 
at all events, against a country with which their own
State may be in alliance or on terms of peace and friendship.
To try to ensure the aliens of allied nationality did not avoid 
military service, Britain concluded a series of conventions with other 
allied governments under which subjects of allied states of military age 
living in Britain could be compelled to serve in the British Army if they 
did not return to their own countries within a specified period. The same 
rules applied to British subjects living in other countries with which 
reciprocal agreements were made. ^
The position of neutral aliens in respect of military service was 
considered at the Hague Convention of 1907, but no firm agreements were
reached. Customary law and usage continued to provide the only guide-
. 6 3  
lines, le:
i. The general rule is that neutral subjects may not be 
enlisted against their will for ordinary military service, 
especially so for operations abroad (unless, perhaps, they 
have exercised, political rights in the country in which 
they are resident);
ii. Exceptionally (and subject, of course, to special 
conventions between a belligerent and the neutral 
state concerned) resident aliens may be required to 
perform service in the military or civic national guard,
61. Coleman Phillipson, 'General Intelligence: Aliens and Military 
Service', Law Times, vol. 144, 20 Apr. 1918, p. 445.
62. The conventions were made under the authority of the Military 
Service (Conventions With Allied States) Act 1917.
63. Coleman Phillipson, op. cit.
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or local police, for the purpose of maintaining 
internal peace and order, and for defending the 
country against an external enemy when the existence 
of the social order or the safety of the civil 
population is endangered...
Allied and neutral aliens in Britain who were not liable to or 
unfit for military service were precluded under the Aliens Restriction 
Order and Defence of the Realm regulations from opening or conducting 
businesses to the prejudice of British subjects serving in the armed 
forces or carrying out national service. The employment of aliens was 
restricted as far as possible to work of national importance.
The intermittent friction between the War Office and the Home 
Office on alien matters during the war was probably nowhere more acute 
than over the question of service by enemy aliens in the British forces.
The Home Office consistently advocated military service for suitable 
enemy nationals, normally in a labour battalion, and believed that 
internees should be eligible for enlistment on the same basis as uninterned 
aliens. Enlistment of aliens in the British army was nominally allowed 
up to a total of 2°L of the total manpower of the armed forces. The men 
could serve in the army but not the navy, and could not hold combatant 
commissions. Administrative arrangements for enlistment of friendly 
aliens were settled by an inter-departmental committee comprising repres­
entatives from the War Office, Home Office, and Local Government Board,
64
with a member of the Central Appeal Tribunal as chairman. But the
War Office, and later the National Service Department when it became 
responsible for military recruitment, showed little enthusiasm for 
enlisting enemy aliens, particularly those in internment camps, in any 
capacity. With the exception of a few Czechs with acceptable bona fides, 
enemy aliens were effectively precluded in the later stages of the war
64. Army Council Instruction 1156, 8 June 1916.
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from military service.
Of all the races who were technically enemy aliens but were 
regarded as friendly towards Britain, Czechs of Austrian nationality 
were always treated with particular sympathy and provision was made 
for them to serve, in suitable cases, in combatant units of the army.
Enemy aliens of other races had in the main to undertake military 
service only in work units. The Czech community had a strong lobby in 
Britain from the early days of the war through the Legion for British Service 
and the Czech National Alliance. ^  On the third day of the war nearly all 
Czech men in London sent their names to the War Office, through Admiral Charles 
Beresford, offering to serve in the army free of pay. ^  The special 
position of the Czechs was strengthened by powerful backing of the allied 
cause by such leaders as T.G. Masaryk. Some Home Office officials,
however, came to believe that although the.Czechs were among the most 
favourable enemy aliens of the friendly races, the preferential consider­
ation they received was scarely justified. It was felt that in the early 
war years the War Office probably gave excess weight to the certificates 
issued by Czech expatriate committees testifying to their countrymen’s 
loyalty to the allied cause. Such documents were regarded by the Home 
Office simply as recommendations and as affording some evidence of support 
of an application for exemption or release from internment, ’which, upon 
scrutiny and consideration of all the circumstances, may or may not be 
accepted. ^  Despite the reservations of the Home Office, the special
65. HO 45/10818/317810/11.
66. H. Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary During the First
World War: a study in the formation of public opinion (1962),
p. 117.
67. R.S, Nolan, Prisoner of War Department, HOjto Colonel W eA„ White,
Adjutant-General * s Branch, WO, Aug. 1916, H o  ^ rSj\o%i f/3/7S70 (I b .
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consideration given to the Czechs by the military authorities in the
early period of the war was reaffirmed in November 1916 by the issue
of an Army Council Instruction. This stated that Czechs in possession
of registration authenticated by the Metropolitan Police after inquiring
into the alien's background and vouched for by the Czech Central
Committee (an amalgam of various emigre groups) were to be treated as
friendly aliens and their enlistment dealt with in accordance with the
regulations laid down for allied and neutral aliens. The registration
certificate was not obtainable by Czechs living outside London or by
those interned. Possession of the certificate meant that a Czech
could serve in any category of service in which British subjects were 
68
accepted. By July 1917 nearly all Czech men of military age who were
physically fit were in the army, thanks largely to the efforts of the Czechl 
Central Committee, which was formed principally to persuade their 
uninterned compatriots to 'volunteer' for military service. Most of 
those who did not volunteer were interned. ^
The position of military age Alsatians of German nationality 
proved particularly difficult to resolve and ultimately many members of 
this group were faced with the stark choice of either joining the French 
Army or being interned in Britain. The argument of the Alsace Lorraine 
Patriotic League, which claimed to represent the Alsatian community in 
Britain, that their compatriots were of French descent and sympathy and 
should therefore be exempt from internment, was countered by the French 
government, earnestly supported by Britain, with the view that the 
Alsatians should prove their patriotism by military service. Alsatian 
men of military age were required to report to the French Consul-General in
68. Army Council Instruction 2120, 28 Nov. 1916.
69. H. Hanak, op. cit., pp. 117-8.
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London. If he considered that they ought to serve in the French Army
and they could show no valid reason for not doing so, he made arrangements
for them to be returned to France for enlistment. All Alsatian men
from 18 to 40, whether married or not, were liable to be conscripted.
The French military authorities established an organisation for *screening*
and then deploying the returning Alsatians to appropriate army units.
Alsatians who undertook military service were offered the opportunity of
becoming French citizens. ^  Some Alsatians, supported by the Alsace-
Lorraine Patriotic League, expressed fears that by joining the French Army
and exposing themselves to the risk of capture they jeopardised the safety
of relatives still living in Alsace-Lorraine, who might be the subject of
reprisals by the Germans. This concern was viewed with some scepticism
in Britain, since most of the Alsatians sent to France could hardly be
classed as volunteers, and some Alsatians had sought employment in the
munitions industry as an alternative to internment. Surely, it was argued
by the sceptics, reprisals were just as likely if the Alsatians voluntarily
made munitions for Britain as if they were recruited into the French Army.
Moreover it was rather easier for the Germans to find out the names of
munition workers in Britain than of mens serving in France because of the
special precautions taken by the French Army to conceal the names of
Alsatian soldiers. ^  Except with their own consent, Alsatians serving
in the French Army were, as far as possible, not sent to any location in
72
which they would run a risk of direct contact with the German forces.
In the early period of the war a number of Alsatians who were released 
from internment on the understanding that they would go to France to enlist
70. HO 45/10760/269510/25-32-34.
71. HO 45/10760/269510/34.
72. HO 45/10760/269510/20a.
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for military service failed to do so and were re-interned. A system
was then established to ensure that the men were en-route to France
73
before they were released from custody. During 1916 the French
adopted a more lenient policy towards the Alsatians, allowing certain
individuals to work in the munitions industry or other useful civilian
work as an alternative to military service. This removed the crude
choice which had faced Alsatians in Britain of 'internment or the
trenches,' but, in the view of Home Office officials at least, made the
case even stronger for returning Alsatians to France to make their
74
contribution to the allied cause.
During the first year of the war a number of enemy aliens, 
principally Poles and Austrian subjects of Slav race, were permitted to 
leave Britain to join the French Foreign Legion. They were generally 
posted to Africa and were not sent to the western front without their 
consent. When Samuel was Home Secretary some of his officials raised 
the possibility of asking all enemy aliens who claimed that they were 
friendly to the allies if they were prepared to serve in the French 
Foreign Legion. The purpose of the question would be twofold: to test
the real commitment of the aliens to the allied cause and to secure recruit 
The test was considered to be a fair one because aliens would not be asked 
to fight against their fellow countrymen and their enlistment would release 
French soldiers from other theatres for service at the Western Front. In 
urging that enemy aliens should be put to the test a Home Office official 
wrote,
If the protestations of sympathy by reason of which they
73. HO 45/10760/269510/25e•
74. HO 45/10760/269510/45.
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are at liberty are genuine, they ought, generally, to
be. ready to do this, instead of living here in more or
less ordinary freedom, and, in some instances, upon 
the employment which Englishmen and Frenchmen have been 
compelled to abandon for military service. ^
Samuel agreed that it was *an excellent suggestion,* but it is doubtful if
it could have been implemented since the French had decided in August 1915
that subjects of enemy states, with the exception of Alsatians, should not
be admitted to the Legion. ^
The French did, however, relax nationality qualifications for their
regular army during 1916 by permitting Poles to enlist. ^  During 1917,
after the Russian Provisional Government had declared Poland independent,
a separate Polish Army was constituted in France and many Poles from Britain
were recruited. From this time Poles, whether of Russian, German or
Austrian nationality, were generally treated as ’alien friends* and were
given the option of joining their own national army, the British Army, or
returning to Russia under an Anglo-Russian agreement to serve in the Russian
forces. ^
While the War Office did not object to the release of enemy aliens 
of the friendly races for service in allied armies, it always took a much 
more conservative view on the enrolment of such men in the British armed 
forces. The department was particularly opposed to taking recruits from 
the internment camps, despite the Home Office*s contention that there was 
little ground for differentiating between interned and uninterned men.
Most enemy aliens of the friendly races were not in the camps because there
75. Memo., R.S. Nolan, 13 July 1916, HO 45/10818/317810/lc.
76. Ibid.
77. HO 45/10818/317810/la.
78. HO 45/10740/262173/49.
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was any firm suspicion against them, and a large majority was thought to
79be strongly in favour of the allied cause. The Home Office urged the
War Office to consider making similar arrangements to those of the French 
who allowed aliens of friendly races to enlist providing their bona fides 
were fully satisfactory. Troup wrote to the Secretary of the War Office 
in July 1916,
The Secretary of State does hot doubt that it would be 
possible to devise a system for the consideration of 
each case individually, and he would be willing to render 
to the Army Council any practical assistance in the 
natter. 80
If it was deemed inadvisable that such men should undertake active service 
at the front, said Troup, they might usefully be employed in labour 
battalions. ’Their employment there, even in cases of doubtful loyalty, 
would be no more dangerous than that of British subjects whether naturalised 
or natural-born of enemy origin.1 Troup cited cases brought to the Home 
Secretary’s attention of families where a son had been born abroad and was 
classified as an enemy alien while his brothers, born in Britain, were 
British subjects serving in the army. The enemy alien son was exempt 
from internment because of his obvious British sympathies, but also was 
under no obligation to undertake military service. Such cases were not 
only anomolous, said Troup, but were bound to cause ill feeling and friction 
in the areas where such men lived and in some instances were carrying on 
businesses vacated by British citizens serving in the forces.
In August 1916 the War Office formally laid down the principle 
that, in certain cases, men of military age whose sympathies were considered 
by the Army Council to be entirely loyal to Britain, although technically
79. Memo., M.L. Waller, 8 Apr. 1918, HO 45/10818/317810/15-16.
80. Troup to Secretary, War Office, 20 July 1916, HO 45/10818/ 
317810/le.
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of enemy alien nationality, could be accepted for service in the army.
The class of men entitled to consideration under this ruling was limited
to those born of enemy parents, who were brought to and had remained in
Britain since infancy, and whose sympathies and conduct, and those of
81
their parents, had been consistently loyal to this country. The Army
Council ruled that every recruit or serving soldier whose father was of
German, Austrian, Hungarian, Turkish or Bulgarian nationality, whether
naturalised British subjects or not, should be assigned to an infantry
works battalion of the Middlesex Regiment, and sent to Pease Pottage Camp
at Crawley, Sussex. The unit was designated as the 30th (Works) Battalion,
and the general officers commanding Northern, Western and Southern Commands
were each instructed to send the officers and NCOs for one company of the
battalion. In cases where recruiting officers or commanding officers were
doubtful whether to send a man to the works battalion their instructions were
82
to refer the matter up through usual channels to the War Office.
Despite the inauguration of the labour battalion, however,the War 
Office attitude to enlistment of enemy aliens remained ambivalent if not 
hostile. The Home Secretary, Samuel, on the other hand, advocated the new 
arrangements enthusiastically, particularly for the cases of uninterned 
enemy nationals. Samuel felt strongly that all 'friendlies* who had been 
exempted from internment on the grounds of their nationalist sentiments and 
support for the allies, should be called upon to demonstrate their professed 
loyalty since,
...to grant them immunity in the absence of any provision for 
proof of their sentiments by service would render their lot
81. Infancy was generally taken to mean under the age of 10. (HO 45/
10818/317810/4).
820 Army Council Instruction 1613, 18 Aug. 1916.
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easier than that of British or allied subjects in this 
country and, by enabling them, in many instances, to 
profit by the fact of these latter having been obliged 
to abandon their businesses or employment for military 
service, might provoke popular resentment.
O J
Some senior Home Office officials accepted, however, that the
84
caution of the War Office was ’proper* and that ultimately the choice
of aliens selected for military service rightly rested with the War Office.
They (the War Office) alone know what is the need of men 
whether for fighting or labour units and they alone must 
estimate how far they are prepared to take risks.
O J
Troup appears to have been more committed than some of his 
colleagues to the concept of military service by aliens. In late 1916 
he suggested that internees who had expressed willingness to join a labour 
battalion should receive drill training at the Feltham camp, where most 
friendly enemy aliens were held. This was opposed by the commandant at 
Feltham and his position was supported by some senior civil servants at the 
Home Office. They felt that such drilling would be interpreted by some 
prisoners as compelling men to become soldiers, and some volunteers would 
rather not have it known among their more patriotic fellow countrymen that 
they were willing to fight for the allies. There was also the possibility 
of reprisals against British prisoners if it was known that Britain was 
defying international convention and compelling civilian internees to 
undertake drill. The commandant had no power to order the internees to 
drill and there could be no legal sanctions against those who refused.- 
A further difficulty was that no member of the Feltham staff was qualified 
to drill 200-250 men speaking several different languages. Troup’s
83. Memo., H. Samuel, 11 Sept. 1916, HO 45/10818/317810.
84. HO 45/10818/317810/4.
85. Memo., J. Fischer Williams, Nov. 1916, HO 45/10818/317810/4.
300
suggestion was tacitly ignored and such drill as was undertaken by enemy 
aliens was generally carried out when they were assigned to a labour
v i • 86battalion.
Inquiries conducted for the Home Office in the internment camps
and among the emigre groups indicated that many enemy aliens of the
friendly races would be prepared to serve in a works battalion, but
objected to assignment to the 30th Middlesex Battalion because it included
a number of Germans. The Home Office suggested that a separate works
battalion for friendlies only should be established; the War Office agreed
87
to consider the idea, but it was never implemented.
When the Home Office pointed out in December 1916 that at the • 
Feltham camp alone there were 200 enemy aliens of friendly race ready and 
willing to be enlisted in labour units, the War Office replied with some 
irritation that,
.o.the solution with regard to the 200 men at Feltham 
is not so simple as you appear to think. There are several 
objections to be overcome, and the concurrence of other 
departments has to be obtained before any final decision 
can be arrived at. For instance we have to consider 
whether these men should be properly enlisted, what rates 
of pay should be instituted in their case and what separate 
allowances should be issued, whether they should be entitled 
to a pension if damaged, and questions of this nature, all 
of which are to be referred to other departments, gg
The use by the War Office of what appeared to be stalling tactics and its 
reluctance to adopt a clear-cut position on enlistment of enemy aliens, 
prompted Waller of the Home Office Prisoner of War Branch to seek a 
meeting at the War Office to ascertain its policy and to explore ways of 
extending the categories of enemy nationals eligible for military service.
86. HO 45/10818/317810/8.
87. HO 45/10818/317810/la-lb-2-3.
88. Colonel W.A. White to M.L. Waller, 18 Dec. 1916, HO 45/10818/
317810/lb.
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Accompanied by R.S. Nolan of the PoW Branch and J.F. Moylan of the
Aliens Division, Waller met Colonel W.A. White *of the Adjutant-General*s
Branch on 30 November 1916. The Home Office representatives made
clear that their department was prepared to release from internment any
enemy alien whom the War Office would take into the army, and the meeting
considered the categories of enemy aliens, whether of friendly race or
not, whether interned or at liberty. The first group considered were
89
interned enemy nationals, who were divided into three classes:
i. Germans and Austrians resident in Britain since infancy.
(A few men in this category had volunteered for military 
service and could be taken under existing Army Council 
Instructions).
ii. Germans and Austrians who had not lived in Britain since 
infancy. (Members of this group were not technically 
eligible for military service under existing regulations, 
but a number had volunteered and the authorities believed 
that many more would do so if there was provision for them 
to be enlisted).
iii. Enemy aliens of friendly race, such as Czechs, Poles and 
Ruthenes. (Czechs could be enlisted under current 
regulations whatever their length of residence in Britain, 
but hitherto had not been released from internment for 
this purpose. The question of how members of other 
friendly races, who might arguably be as strongly in 
favour of the allied cause as the Czechs, should be treated, 
remained unresolved).
The position of uninterned enemy aliens was also considered. There were
several hundred Germans and Austrians of military age resident in Britain
since infancy who it was believed might be willing to enlist if they were
aware that this was possible. Such cases came to the attention of the
Home Office from time to time and Waller suggested that the papers in each
case should be sent to the Directorate of Recruiting who’, after consulting
MI5, could decide whether to invite the man to enlist. If the individual
refused to do so, the possibility of internment could be considered. (When
a youth in this category reached the age of 18 the local police were advised
89. Memo., J.F. Moylan, Dec. 1916. HO 45/10818/317810/7.
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by the Home Office Prisoner of War Department and they invited the
youth to enlist). The Home Office officials pointed out that among
the interned enemy aliens who were not currently eligible for military
service, but who would be willing to enlist if they had the opportunity,
wt^S5 a large group of Austrian or Polish Jews. The Jewish War Services
Committee had indicated that they would be ready to urge these men to
enlist if the army would take them. In the case of uninterned Czechs,
the Home Office was prepared to work with the Czech Central Committee to
inform men of military age that they were eligible and ought to enlist.
Similarly if the War Office decided to form a special labour unit for men
of friendly races, the Home Office was prepared to use its influence with
the appropriate emigre committees to win their backing in obtaining recruits.
The Home Office believed it was desirable that funless there are strong
reasons to the contrary, any available labour should be utilised in
special labour battalions,' and Waller and his colleagues put their
proposals to Colonel White as a series of questions to submit to his 
90
superiors:
1) Would the War Office concur in the release of men from 
internment?
2) Would the War Office establish a special non-German 
labour unit for enemy aliens of friendly race?
3) Could any extension be made to the relevant Army Council 
Instruction (1613) either by amendment or interpretation 
so as to allow the enlistment of Germans and Austrians 
not resident in the United Kingdom since infancy?
4) In the case of interned men could arrangements be made 
for medical examinations to be carried out in the camps 
by a medical board or could camp medical officers be 
instructed to decide whether an internee was fit to 
serve in a labour unit?
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5) Could the conditions laid down in the existing Army 
Council Instruction in respect of certificates of 
registration and identity books be waived in the case 
of men released from internment camps, and the men 
handed over to a military authority direct from the 
camp.
On 12 January 1917 the Home Office was informed that the Army
Council had turned down virtually all of the proposals made by Waller
91
and his colleagues. The Council firmly opposed the enlistment of
interned enemy aliens in any capacity, and refused to extend the
categories of enemy nationals who could be recruited, ie those resident
in Britain since infancy fwhose sympathies and conduct and those of their
parents have been consistently loyal to Great Britain1, and uninterned
Czechs. In the view of the Army Council responsibility for employing
enemy aliens in service useful to the British war effort should not rest
with the War Office.
...if the men in question are required for labour in this 
country they (should) be gathered together into civil 
labour units and detailed for useful national work. The 
Council consider that as the men under these circumstances 
would be organised on a civil basis, the organisation should, 
be carried out by a government department other than the War 
Office. ^
While the War Office letter gave no reasons for rejecting the Home Office 
proposals, it subsequently became apparent that one of the overriding 
objections was that it was 1 deemed inadvisable to transform alien enemies 
into pensionable soldiers.' ^
The Home Office was dismayed at the attitude of the Army Council, 
particularly as it had been hoped that enlistment of enemy aliens could
91. B.B. Cubitt, WO, to Under Secretary of State,
HO, 12 Jan. 1917, HO 45/10818/317810/7-9-13.
92. Ibid.
93. HO 45/10818/317810/13.
be used as a means of reducing the numbers held in the internment 
94
camps. Troup thought it ’curious to find the War Office refusing
these recruits at the moment when they are clamouring so loudly for 
95
more men* and Pedder, the head of the Aliens Division, saw the War
Office rulings as a waste of manpower ’which could easily have been
absorbed into the military machine but cannot equally be dealt with, as
the War Office lightly suggest, by civilian organisation.* ^  The Home
Office had no machinery at its disposal to organise alien labour units,
and even if it could create a new organisation for the purpose, it would
have no powers to enforce discipline. The War OfficeA on the other hand,
already had the necessary machinery with which to make immediate use of
the available alien labour.
In the view of senior Home Office officials the alternative to
enlisting enemy aliens in army labour units was to place them in useful
work through the National Service.scheme, but there was some uncertainty
whether suitable work could be found and there was likely to be considerable
97delay in deploying men. Moreover there were large categories of enemy
alien workers, such as hairdressers and jewellers, whose assignment to 
work of national importance might be especially difficult to arrange. 
Employers in the private sector would be unlikely to want their services, 
and they were unused to manual work of the kind required in such industries 
as agriculture, which was chronically short of labour. One suggestion 
considered in the Home Office Prisoner of War Branch was that enemy aliens 
who had little to offer in work of national importance could be placed in
94. Memo., J.F. Moylan, Dec. 1916. HO 45/10818/317810/7.
95. Memo., Troup, 21 Jan. 1917, HO 45/10818/317810/7.
96. Memo., J, Pedder, 17 Jan. 1917, HO 45/10818/317810/7.
97. HO 45/10818/317810/13.
a labour battalion for, say, six months, to improve their physique and
fitness for general labouring work. It was not, however, considered
worth pursuing the idea with the War Office, and in the event most such
98
aliens spent the war in the camps doing little or no productive work.
While the regulations continued to contain provision for the 
acceptance of Czechs in any unit of the British Army, the War Office 
position on the enlistment of enemy aliens hardened in the later years of 
the war and there was no easing of policy after the National Service 
Department took over responsibility for military recruitment on 1 November 
1917. The department adopted the view that 'the safer course is to 
discontinue the practice of enlisting enemy aliens' on the grounds that 
the negligible gain in manpower did not justify incurring even the
99
slightest risk of allowing a 'dangerous' alien to enter the army.
This approach, which prevailed until the end of the war, represented not 
so much a significant change of policy but a more positive reflection of 
thinking which had always had powerful adherents in Whitehall, particularly 
at the War Office.
98. R 0S . Nolan to M.L. Waller, 7 Feb. 1917, HO 45/10818/317810/7.
99. HO 45/10818/317810/15.
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CHAPTER NINE 
BUSINESS, TRADE AND PROPERTY
At the outbreak of the war enemy subjects living in Great Britain 
and in other countries had wide-ranging British business interests, with 
estimated real and personal property holdings worth well in excess of 
£100 million,  ^ Private property was not confiscated during the war, 
but many of the businesses wholly or partly controlled by enemy aliens were 
liquidated and the portion of the realised assets due to them was vested in 
government-appointed custodians for the duration of the war. The remainder 
of the proceeds, after payment of debts, charges and expenses, was normally 
distributed among non-enemy shareholders and others with a financial 
entitlement. Some enemy businesses were allowed to continue in operation 
where this was deemed to be in the public interest, but such companies 
were placed under the strict supervision of the Board of Trade. Efforts 
to eliminate the business interests of enemy aliens in wartime raised many 
complex legal questions, particularly in such areas as contracts, partner­
ships, payment of debts, patents, trade-marks and copyrights.
With few legal precedents to illuminate the situation, there was 
considerable confusion in the business community during the early period 
of the war concerning contracts involving enemy aliens and the firms with 
which they were associated. Much litigation ensued and it was established 
that, with important exceptions, contracts made between British citizens
1. The estimate is based on figures given by Runciman, the President
of the Board of Trade, on various occasions. The total grew 
during the war through the accumulation of interest, profits, etc. 
and as stated later in this chapter was estimated in November 1916 
to be of the order of £140 million.
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and subjects of states which had become enemies of Great Britain were
suspended for the duration of the war, and such contracts made after the
outbreak of the war were illegal and unenforceable. Pre-war contracts
2
were subject to abrogation if they involved trading with the enemy.
Partnerships between British subjects and enemy aliens were
dissolved after the outbreak of war and enemy asset's subsequently vested
in the custodians, but in some cases the businesses were kept alive by
the British partners. To prevent the original partnerships being revived
after the war, the Board of Trade was, in 1918, given powers to wind up
businesses where they had reasonable suspicion that such a revival would 
3
occur.
Enemy subjects held many important and valuable patents, trade­
marks and copyrights in Britain, and there is little doubt that the value 
of enemy patents in the United Kingdom was significantly greater than that 
of British-owned patents in enemy countries. Of the 16,000 - 17,000 
patents granted annually during the pre-war years, 2,000 - 3,000 went to 
Germans living outside the United Kingdom. Only about 700 of the yearly
average of 13,000 - 14,000 patents granted in Germany went to residents
4
of the United Kingdom. Early in the war legislation was introduced
empowering the Board of Trade to avoid or suspend, wholly or in part, any 
patent, licence or registered trade mark held by an enemy alien.  ^ Before 
taking such action the Board had to be satisfied that it was in the general
2. See McNair and Watts, op. cit., pp. 118-120; J.M. Garner,
International Law and the World War, 2 vols., (1920), pp. 
241-249; L.C. Scott, The Effect of War on Contracts (1914),
pp. 2-11.
3. Section 3, Trading With the Enemy Amendment Act, 1918, 8 & 9
Geo. 5, c. 31.
4. Confidential memo., Runciman to cabinet, 17 Nov. 1916, AP.
5. The Patents, Designs and Trade-Marks (Temporary Rules) Act.
interest of the country, a section of the community or a particular 
trade. The Board regarded confiscation of patents as being on a 
different footing to confiscation of private property of enemy subjects 
since patents were granted by the state, and * it might be held that 
circumstances justified the complete withdrawal from enemies of the 
privilege and monopoly derived from the state.* ^ The Board was 
authorised to grant licences to British subjects to exploit patents, 
but not trade-marks, held by enemy aliens. Royalties due to enemy 
patentees were paid by British licencees to the custodians. By July 1918 
there were about 10,000 patents belonging to enemy aliens in force in the 
United Kingdom. No patents were granted to enemy aliens after the war 
began, but applications continued to be received and in some cases the 
specifications were accepted. The applications were vested in the public 
trustee and British subjects were allowed to take out licences to use the 
inventions. The German government treated British patent applications 
in the same way. The arrangement enabled belligerents to benefit from 
new ideas originating in enemy countries and offered a measure of protection 
for the industries and property of one belligerent on the territory of 
another. The practice of accepting patent applications from enemy countries 
was discontinued by Britain in July 1918 to avoid the necessary frequent 
communication with those countries, albeit through neutral states. ^
In common with the other belligerents Britain safeguarded enemy
holders of copyrights. Under the Trading With the Enemy (Copyright)
8
Act passed on 10 August 1916, the copyright of all works published or
6. Runciman memo., op. cit.
7. Under the Trading With the Enemy Amendment Act, 1918.
8. 6 <£ 7 Geo. 5 c. 32.
made in an enemy country during the war was vested in a custodian until
the end of the war.
Businesses operated by enemy aliens came within the scope of the
9
Trading With the Enemy Act passed on 18 September 1914. The act 
authorised the Board of Trade to inspect the books of such companies to 
ascertain if any illegal trade was being carried on with enemy countries,
and also empowered the Board, with court permission, to appoint a
controller, with the powers of a receiver or manager, to take over the 
running of any firm where this was deemed to be in the public interest. ^  
The appointment of the public trustee as custodian of enemy 
alien property in England and Wales, and similar appointments in Scotland- 
and Ireland, were made in accordance with the terms of the Trading With the 
Enemy Amendment Act of 1914 which came into operation on 27 November. ^
The custodians* functions, progressively extended by later legislation, 
included ’receiving, holding, preserving and dealing* with the property of
enemy nationals. The courts were empowered to vest in a custodian any
\
property held by or on behalf of enemy aliens and dividends, interest and
profits accruing to them. Funds paid to or realised by a custodian were
deposited with banks or invested in securities. Further legislation in 
12
1916 gave the custodians the right to obtain particulars of any enemy 
alien property in the United Kingdom valued at £50 or more. For the
9. 4 & 5 Geo. 5 c. 87.
10. These powers were provided under sections 2 and 3 of the Trading
With the Enemy Act 1914.
11. The Accountant of Court was appointed custodian for Scotland and
the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy in Ireland the custodian for
Ireland.
12. Trading With the Enemy Act, 1916, 5 A 6 Geo. 5 c. 105.
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purpose of the act *property' included virtually anything of tangible
value - real estate, shares, securities, cash, patents, copyrights,
interests in a business, and debts of all kinds. Any trustee for an
enemy alien who failed to inform a custodian of funds due to the alien
faced heavy legal penalties. An advisory committee, including businessmen
in its membership, was appointed by the Lord Chancellor to assist the public
13
trustee in dealing with securities.
Enemy alien assets received by the custodians fell into two
categories: (1) dividends (including repaid capital), interest and share
of profits, and (2) property (including money) vested by court order. Funds
in the first category were invested in securities approved by the Treasury;
those in the second were dealt with in accordance with the orders of the
court vesting the property, and was normally applied to the payment of the
claims of British creditors against the enemy alien owners. Within a year
of the establishment of the custodian arrangements, the public trustee held
assets in the first category valued at £1,500,000 and in the second at 
14
£3,675,000. By late July 1916 the two figures had increased to £2
15million and £4.5 million respectively.
Up to the beginning of 1916 the Board of Trade had no powers to 
make orders winding up enemy businesses, although they were authorised to 
appoint inspectors and supervisors with the aim of detecting and preventing 
offences against the wartime regulations. Under the Trading With the 
Enemy Amendment Act of 1916 which became law on 27 January, the Board was 
directed to order the closure of all businesses owned or controlled wholly 
or mainly by enemy subjects, unless in particular cases it appeared
13. Committee appointed under terms of Trading With the Enemy Amendment
Act, 1916.
1 4. 75HC 5 s., 1 0 0 9, 9 Nov. 1 9 1 5.
15. 84HC 5s., 1296, 24 July 1916.
inexpedient to do so. The Board was authorised to appoint ’controllers*
to supervise the winding up of businesses which were made the subject of
liquidation orders. The duties of the controllers were to realise the
assets' of a business to the best advantage, to pay non-enemy creditors, and
to hand over any amounts due to enemy aliens to the custodians. A statutory
obligation was imposed upon enemy subjects to make returns in respect of
their property interests to the custodians. There was also formal provision
for the cancellation of contracts with enemy subjects when such arrangements
were considered to be against the public interest, and the custodians were
empowered to take over enemy patents. One government minister observed
during the passage of the new measures that ’It would be difficult to arm a
public department with more drastic powers.’ ^  and a legal analyst noted
that the Act had as its main purpose ’destruction and not preservation1 with
the consequence that the custodians had a less important place in it, and
the Board of Trade figured more prominently than the court. ^  To assist
the Board with the heavy workload imposed by the legislation an advisory
committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Ernest Moon, Counsel to the Speaker
18
of the House of Commons, was established on 9 February. The committee
was given the task of considering cases where Board of Trade inspectors and 
supervisors believed there were grounds for winding up businesses and making 
recommendations to the President.' After studying the departmental reports, 
the committee held hearings at which the businessmen concerned could explain 
why they believed they should be allowed to continue their operations. They 
were normally permitted to be accompanied by a lawyer if they wished. The
16. The Marquis of Lansdowne, Minister Without Portfolio, 20HL 5.,
965, 20 Jan. 1916.
17. R.F. Roxburgh, *6»ermBn Property in the War and the Peace,' The Law
Quarterly Review, vol. 37, Jan. 1921, pp. 46-62.
18. Members of the committee were the Hon. J.D. Fitzgerald, KC., Sir
George Croydon Marks, MP, and Mr. Gershon Stewart, MP. Marks was
subsequently replaced by Sir Edwin Cornwall, MP and he, in turn, 
by Mr. A.A. Allen, MP.
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subsequent recommendations of the committee were invariably acted upon
19
by the Board of Trade. From its early days the committee adopted
the view that,
...in cases in which businesses formerly carried on 
mainly for the benefit or under the control of enemy subjects 
were useful and successful businesses, it was more in the 
national interest to transform them into British businesses 
than to wind them up... 2q
On many occasions the committee recommended that enemy alien interests 
in a business should be sold by the custodian to leave control in the 
hands of British owners. The committee noted the wide variety of 
businesses in which enemy aliens were engaged, ranging from large chemical 
and electrical enterprises to such activities as the collection and export 
of rabbit skins, extraction of tin from disused cans, and the treatment of 
offals for the production of sausage skins. Whatever the business, 
'adaptability, personal application, and in case of necessity, ruthless 
competition, produced successful results.1 Few of the businesses which
21
came under the scrutiny of the committee were found to be unprofitable.
When the Moon committee began its work over 500 cases were awaiting
its consideration and more were constantly being added. Hearings were
held continuously during parliamentary sessions to clear the backlog, and
by the beginning of June 1917 the committee had dealt with 353 cases,
recommending 204 orders for closure and 50 for vesting in the custodian and
22
sale to British subjects. Many of the firms investigated were taken
from lists supplied by the Home Office of interned and uninterned enemy
19. Cd. 8303, 1916, and Cd. 9059, 1918.
20. Cd. 9059, 1918.
21. Ibid.
22. Cd. 8308, 1916.
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aliens with business interests in Britain. A number of businesses
were wound up on the advice of the War Office and the Admiralty. By
November 1916 the Board of Trade had issued orders for the winding up
of 344 companies, but there was a rising tide of criticism from the
hardliners that the Board was moving too slowly. Joynson Hicks charged
that the Board constantly lagged behind public opinion and warned of
strong feeling in the country on the issue, particularly within the
24
financial community, while Sir Richard Cooper accused the government
25
of being half-hearted about closures. The same sentiments were
expressed by a deputation from the London Chamber of Commerce which went
to the Board of Trade in June 1917 to complain of dissatisfaction with the
advisory committee, which, it was felt, should have included more business-
2 6
men and fewer lawyers (three of the four members were barristers).
The avowed patriotism of many British businessmen who joined in 
the strident demands for the rapid elimination of enemy firms may have been 
more than a little tinged with self interest since they stood to gain 
substantial commercial advantage by the removal of alien competitors.
The City, and in particular the stock and commodity exchanges, proved 
exceptionally zealous in their efforts to excise enemy aliens from their 
ranks. The London Stock Exchange barred enemy subjects from dealing, and 
members and clerks of enemy birth who were naturalised subjects had to 
satisfy the Stock Exchange Committee that they had been denationalised 
by their country of origin. From the beginning of January 1915, the
23. 103HC 5s. , 262, 14 Feb. 1918.
24. 94HC 5s., 1265, 14 June 1917.
25. 98HC 5s., 1575, 31 Oct. 1917.
26. 94HC 5s., 1265, 14 June 1917.
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operations of the stock exchange were governed by detailed and stringent 
instructions from the Treasury designed to:
1. Safeguard the London market against forced realisation 
of securities and against operations for the purpose 
of depressing prices.
2. Close the market absolutely to the enemy both directly 
and indirectly.
Resentment against alien businessmen, whether enemy subjects or
not, being allowed to continue their operations increased notably after
the introduction of compulsory military service. Questions in parliament,
petitions from local trade and business organisations, and press comment
reflected a widespread feeling that aliens not subject to conscription,
should be prevented from capitalising on the departure of British
competitors to serve in the armed forces. The number of such cases
involving aliens of enemy nationality was small, however, since the
majority of those at liberty were women, generally married with families,
or men over military age, and those who had businesses had in the main
relinquished control to Board of Trade supervisors. Some hardliners in
parliament doubted the thoroughness of the Board*s control of enemy firms
under its supervision. It was alleged that some companies staffed largely
by personnel of enemy origin, with a few British-born employees in junior
positions, were able to take advantage of only nominal Board supervision
to compete with and sometimes undersell British firms. Some enemy
controlled companies, prevented by the wartime regulations from accumulating
profits, were said to be selling at artificially low prices with a view to
27
building up a powerful market base for the post-war years. It was
even asserted by one MP that enemy controlled firms were outposts of the 
German Secret Service exerting a corrupting influence on British commercial
27. 78HC 5s., 785, 21 Jan. 1916.
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life by the use of unscrupulous business practices.
The Associated Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom 
demanded in 1916 that a list should be published of all businesses 
which were partly or wholly owned by enemy aliens or were being super­
vised by the Board of Trade, but Runciman, the Board President, refused
on the grounds that it would cause injustice in certain cases to British
29
shareholders in the companies. The government did, however, introduce
legislation later in the year designed to prevent enemy firms from changing
their names to disguise the enemy connections of their proprietors. The
Regulation of Business Names Act of 1916 prohibited any firm of which an
enemy alien was a member or partner from changing the name by which it was
known on 4 August 1914, except with the special permission of a Secretary
of State. The London Chamber of Commerce had urged an amendment to the
bill compelling anyone who had registered a change of business name after
31 December 1913 to re-register the original name. ^  Sir Edward Carson
charged during the passage of the legislation that many foreign firms
which promoted enemy trade used words such as 'British', •imperial1,
31
'London* or 'United Kingdom' in their titles. The Moon committee
noted in April 1918 that 'Foreign traders have habitually substituted 
British names for their own for the purpose of misleading their customers 
into the belief that they were dealing with British principals instead 
of aliens.' The committee also found 'remarkable' the extent to which 
German businesses were conducted through British staff and by British
28. 90HC 5s., 1080, 19 Feb. 1917.
29. 78HC 5s., 400, 17 Jan. 1916.
30. 86HC 5s., 1619, 31 Oct. 1916.
31. Ibid., col. 1606.
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32
employees •
From the early period of the war many British businessmen and
their allies in parliament argued that the sanctions on enemy aliens
trading in Britain should be continued into the post-war years. An
ardent proponent of this view was Joynson Hicks, who had close ties with
the London Chamber of Commerce, and it was also supported by other
hardliners such as Lord Leith of Fyvie. He considered every enemy firm
or businessman to be 'a caretaker for a business in the future* and warned
that *As long as we leave these associations of influencial Germans in our
midst we have to look forward to a loss of business in the future and a
33
continuation of what has been a very serious loss in the past.*
Those in parliament and the business community who demanded the
removal of enemy influence from British industry and commerce often made
clear that they considered British subjects of enemy origin, equally as
objectionable as enemy aliens. The attacks on naturalised British
businessmen were often personalised, none more so than in the case of
Baron Bruno Schroder, head of the merchant bankers, J. Henry Schroder,
one of the largest acceptance houses in London. He had worked in the
family business' for nearly 20 years when the war began and was quickly
granted naturalisation because the government believed it was in Britain*s
34
interests for the firm to continue in operation. The Home Office,
after consultation with the Governor of the Bank of England and officials 
of the company, also decided 'on important financial grounds' to give
32. Cd. 9059, 1918. Restrictions were imposed on the holding of
directorships by aliens under the Companies Foreign Interests
Act, 1917.
33. 22HC 5s., 22, 471-2, 29 June 1916.
34. 68HC 5s., 1391-2, 26 Nov. 1914 and 71HC 5s., 1873-4, 13 May 1915.
317
Schroder a licence to reside and trade in Britain. The licence was a 
precautionary measure and its necessity under English law was disputed 
by some lawyers. The last time such licences had been issued to enemy
35
aliens was during the Crimean War, when seven were granted during 1855.
Even Lloyd George, who was not averse to exploiting anti-alien sentiment
on occasions when it suited his political purpose, dismissed the attacks
on Schroder as nonsense and accused the critics of lowering the currency
36
of the House of Commons by 'appeals to the gallery.' Schroder
continued to be a focus of controversy later in the war because of alleged
37(but never proven) stockpiling of coal for his personal use, and his
38
philantropic activities on behalf of prisoners of war on both sides.
During the autumn of 1916 the government came under increasing
pressure from parliament and the City to eliminate remaining enemy influence
in British business and finance. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
President of the Board of Trade and the Home Secretary, all faced a stream
of questions and demands for action, and fact finding committees were
established by the Unionist War Committee and the Corporation of the City 
39
of London. Some critics argued that the slow-moving procedures for
eliminating enemy alien control from businesses should be replaced by a 
simple and direct system of confiscation. This, it was contended, was 
justified as a reprisal against Germany's alleged violations of inter­
national law during the war, and as a means of making funds quickly available 
to pay debts due from enemies to British subjects. But apart from any
35. HO 45/10745/264030.
36. 68HC 5s., 1531, 26 Nov. 1914.
37. See, for example, 30HL 5s., 692, 8 July 1918 and 30HL 5s., 1240,
26 July 1918.
38. 100HC 5s., 70, 3 Dec. 1917.
39. The Times History of the War, vol. 9, p. 475.
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moral objections the practical problems arising from confiscation were
likely to be far reaching, as the government was well aware. If such
a policy was reciprocated by Germany, Britain would probably be the
loser since the aggregate value of United Kingdom property in Germany
appeared to exceed that of enemy property in this country. In November
1916 Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade, estimated that enemy
property in Great Britain' (including debts) was worth about £140 million.
The value of property in enemy countries of persons living in the United
Kingdom totalled £166 million, of which £93 million was tangible property,
including securities, and £73 million consisted of debts, bank balances 
40
and bills. Regardless of potential reciprocal action by enemy
countries, a policy of confiscation of enemy assets would have met strong
opposition from the financial community in Britain since it could have
destroyed the confidence of other countries in the safety of private
property in the United Kingdom. Moreover such a policy was likely to
have been considered as contrary to the principles which allied governments
41
claimed to uphold. Although the government rejected confiscation as a
policy, there was, as Runciman conceded, * some element of confiscation*
in winding up a business, because of the destruction of the good-will
built up over a long period and through the restriction of the market by
42
confining sales to British purchasers.
In formulating policy in respect of enemy property in the United
Kingdom the government paid careful regard to what was done with British
43
property in other countries, but it was always asserted that an essential
4 0. Runciman memo., op. cit.
4 1. Ibid.
4 2. Ibid.
4 3. 72HC 5 s., 1 1, 3 June 1 9 1 5.
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aim was to secure proper treatment of all claims, both public and private, 
against enemy governments and individuals. Proposals for the establish­
ment of a clearing house where British firms and individuals could receive 
payment of debts from the assets of enemy businesses were turned down by
McKenna, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in late 1916 as impracticable 
44
during wartime. British debtors were prohibited from settling claims
due to enemies while the war continued. ^
The long established German and Austrian banking interests in
Britain were a frequent target of attention in parliament, although the
activities of the banks were severely curtailed and placed under the
4 6
supervision of a controller, Sir William Plender, at the beginning of
the war. An order in council issued by the government on 10 August 1914
prohibited enemy aliens from engaging in banking, except with the written
permission of a secretary of state and subject to such conditions and
restrictions as he might prescribe. The banks were also forbidden to
part with any cash or securities and were required to deposit those assets
in such custody as the government directed. The police were authorised
to enter banks, if necessary by force, and search and occupy premises for
47
the purpose of enforcing the order. On 19 September the Home Secretary
granted licences for the London offices of several German and Austrian 
banks to carry on business, subject to stringent conditions, and on 30 
November issued licences with similar limitations to the agencies of two
44. 88HC 5s., 156, 28 Nov. 1916.
45. 90HC 5s., 852, 14 Dec. 1916.
46. Plender, a chartered accountant, was appointed by the Treasury.
47. Aliens Restriction (Consolidated) Order 1914, Art. 24.
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Turkish banks. The permission to trade was restricted to dealing
with work in hand on 5 August 1914, and-no new transactions could be
undertaken except those ’necessary or desirable* to complete that work.
A further licence was granted to the German and Austrian banks on 14
October to receive dividends on certain shares and to accept transfers
of such shares. In January 1915 additional concessions were allowed to
the Turkish banks to enable individuals and firms in the United Kingdom
to enter into transactions with the banks* offices in France, Cyprus,
Egypt, or any part of the Ottoman Empire occupied by the allies, subject
to the limitations laid down with the issue of the 30 November licences.
One effect of the concessions was to enable enemy alien companies registered
in Britain to conduct business through the Turkish banks in, say, France or
Egypt. Many politicians believed that enemy banks were being allowed too
much freedom of operation, and there were allegations, never substantiated,
that the German banks were a channel of funds for espionage activities in
Great Britain. The Deutsche Bank did, however, fulfil a useful function
in the early war years in handling the distribution of money from Germany
for military and civilian prisoners of war held in British internment 
49
camps. But the business of the enemy banks gradually diminished
during the war, members of their staffs holding enemy nationality were 
interned as their services were no longer needed, and their branches were 
placed under British supervisors appointed by Sir William Plender. The 
enemy aliens on the staffs of the German banks fell from 446 at the
48. Licences .granted on 19 September to the Deutsche Bank, the
Dresdner Bank, the Disconto-Gesellschaft, the Oesterreichische 
Laenderbank, and the Anglo-Austrian Bank, and on 30 November 
to the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the National Bank of Turkey.
49. 90HC 5s., 851, 14 Dec. 1916.
3 2 1
beginning of the war to 34 by mid-1916. On 26 October McKenna
announced that the transactions which the German and Austrian banks had 
been licenced to complete had almost been concluded. Non-enemy creditors 
had been paid off, surplus assets were being transferred to the Bank of 
England, and the property of customers was to be vested in the custodian. ^  
There remained concern in parliament, however, that the affairs 
of the enemy banks were not being wound up quickly enough, and in December 
the Treasury appointed two British bankers, Walter Leaf and R.V. Vassar 
Smith to report, with as little delay as possible, on the progress being 
made towards ’bringing the operations of the banks to a conclusion.’ They 
were also asked to express an opinion 'in view of the public discussion 
which has arisen' whether due diligence had been used by those responsible 
for winding up the affairs of the banks. The principal figure involved,
Sir William Plender, had already asked the Treasury to relieve him as 
controller of enemy banking establishments in the United Kingdom, Leaf 
and Vassar Smith sympathised with his desire to give up a task which had 
proved to be 'both laborious and irksome, 1 but they did not consider it in 
the public interest that he be allowed to do so. (Plender subsequently 
agreed to the Treasury's request to remain as controller). Leaf and Vassar 
Smith advised the Treasury that Plender and his team of supervisors had 
carried out their duties with an ability and expedition which reflected 
the highest credit on them, and pointed out that,
The liquidation of a banking business of an international 
character is of necessity an operation of the greatest complexity, 
and at the best of times must be spread over a very lengthened 
period; no bank, however well conducted, can avoid a certain 
amount of locking up of its assets - due to failure of ’customers,
50. 83HC 5s., 1073, 29 June 1916.
51. 86HC 5s., 1329-33, 26 Oct. 1916.
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to unforeseen difficulties which involve *nursing,' and 
to a thousand other reasons which involve delay, often of 
the most tedious character. ^
The main obstacle to a fuller and more rapid liquidation was the decision 
of the French and Russian governments to regard the London establishments 
of the enemy banks as hostile creditors, and to refuse permission to remit 
to them any assets in their respective countries. These assets had been 
frozen and would not be released until the end of the war. The banks also 
faced great difficulty in trying to recover debts due to them from many other 
parts of the world. The reluctance of British subjects to work even 
temporarily in the enemy banks also delayed work on liquidating assets.
By 30 September 1917 total staff employed in the German and Austrian banks 
was 166, including 148 British subjects, 10 enemy aliens and eight neutral
i • 53aliens•
By July 1918, the admitted liabilities of the German and Austrian
banks to British, allied and neutral creditors amounted to approximately
£5,190,000. The Treasury was unable to make a precise estimate of the
value of outstanding assets of the enemy banks not yet lodged with the
54
Bank of England, but the figure reached several million pounds. As
far as businesses was concerned, said Cave, the Home Secretary, the enemy
banks were *practically dead,' although they nominally continued to exist 
55
as entities. On 19 July it was announced that the senior official
receiver had been appointed by the Board of Trade to wind up the business 
of the enemy banks in the United Kingdom. Sir William Plender, who had
52. Report by Leaf and Vassar Smith to the Treasury, 12 Jan. 1917,
Cd. 8455.
53. Report by Sir William Plender to the Treasury, 13 Dec. 1917,
Cd. 8889.
54. 108HC 5s., cols. 494 and 511, 11 July 1918.
55. Ibid., col. 536.
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spent four years as controller of the banks* affairs, offered his full 
assistance to the receiver.
The revival of the banks and other enemy trading interests in 
Britain during the post-war years was effectively stifled by the 
provisions of the Trading With the Enemy Amendment Act of 1918 passed on 
8 August. ^  The measure not only satisfied popular demands for punitive 
measures against the enemy but ensured lucrative peacetime opportunities 
for British trading and financial interests. Arrangements for 
compensating dispossessed enemy aliens were carried out under the provisions 
of the Treaty of Versailles.
56. 108HC 5s., 1206, 18 July 1918.
57. 8 & 9 Geo. V, c. 31.
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CONCLUSION
The evolution of enemy alien controls during the First World 
War reflected the attempts by mainly moderate politicians to solve 
a fundamental dilemma; that of reconciling the perceived requirements 
of national security with humanitarian principles in a generally hostile 
climate of public opinion, and in the face of relentless pressure from 
hardliners in parliament, propagandists and some sections of the press 
to introduce measures which were patently more repressive than was 
justified by the circumstances. The dilemma was not, probably could 
not be, solved, but if pragmatism and expediency came increasingly to 
dictate the pattern of policy, the harsh nostrums of the anti-alien 
extremists were firmly resisted by both the Asquith and Lloyd George 
administrations.
If the security threat posed by the enemy alien population was more 
apparent than real, and the scale of internment and increasing 
restrictiveness of wartime controls bore little relation to the danger 
they were supposed to be containing, it is arguable, given the volatility 
and strength of popular anti-alien feeling, that a more equitable policy 
would not have been politically viable.
While many politicians and the popular press, either through 
ignorance or for propaganda purposes, persistently exaggerated the 
potential danger of espionage and sabotage by enemy alien residents and 
British subjects of enemy origin, government ministers often expressed 
the view that the real threat came from subjects of non-enemy countries 
whose movements and activities were not under the same careful scrutiny 
as those of enemy aliens. A few Germans and others of enemy birth were 
charged with spying in the early weeks of the war, but most of those 
arrested subsequently were of neutral nationality. Such information
325
as was passed from Britain to Germany during the war was probably, 
conveyed mainly in the diplomatic bags of neutral legations or by 
crews of neutral ships. ^
Reports in popular newspapers of an ’unseen hand* at work in 
Britain, with enemy aliens subverting the war effort and passing 
information to the enemy, were largely figments of overactive 
imaginations. Thousands of police man hours were spent following up 
abortive leads provided by over-zealous amateur spy hunters. Few of 
the innumerable allegations of signals being sent from coastal areas to 
enemy ships were found to have any substance, and there were no proven 
cases of sabotage by enemy aliens during the war, although some 
politicians and newspapers blamed them for explosions and fires which 
occured at certain military and industrial establishments and aboard 
ships. ^
However illusory the danger from enemy aliens may have been, the 
policies designed to counter it and the climate of opinion in which 
those policies were conceived inevitably meant that many innocent people 
suffered injustice and hardship. The witch hunts of public figures 
alleged to be sympathetic to the enemy and the social ostracism, 
harassment and destitution endured by the families of interned enemy 
aliens were among the least edifying spectacles in Britain during the 
war.
The. often irrational hatred of enemy aliens which gripped the 
country with varying degrees of intensity developed into a more general­
ised xenophobia and helped to steer parliament towards the imposition of
1. Sir Edward Troup, The Home Office (1925), p.141.
2. 114HC 5s., 2757, 15 Apr, 1919.
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a regime of peacetime aliens controls of unwarranted severity. The war
proved to be a watershed in the history of British aliens policy; it
saw the disappearance of the last vestiges of the 19th century laissez
faire approach and the birth of a new, more uncompromisingly restrictive
system which, with adaptations, survives to the present day.
The measures adopted during the First World War provided the model
on which aliens policy in World War II was based. That policy was more
humane and enlightened, but it did little to dispel the impression
powerfully enforced in 1914-1918 that if truth is the first casualty 
3
of war, the enemy alien is surely the second.
3. ®The first casualty when war comes is truth*. (Hiram Johnson, quoted 
in Penguin Dictionary of Modern Quotations, 1978).
APPENDIX I
Aliens restriction Act, 191U
1 .— (1) i l l s  M a jes ty  m a y  at an y  t im e  wITen a state  o f  wav 
ex is ts  betw een II is  M ajes ty  and a n y  fore ign  pow er ,  or w h en  it 
appears th a t  an occasion  o f  im m in e n t  n a t ion a l  d an ger  or great  
e m e rg en cy  has arisen ,  b y  Order in C ouncil  im p o se  restr ictions  
on a l ien s ,  an d  provis ion  m a y  be m ade by  th e  Order—
(a) for p r o h ib i t in g  a l ien s  from  la n d in g  in th e  U n ite d  
K in g d o m , e ith er  g e n e r a l ly  or at c er ta in  p laces ,  and  
for im p o s in g  restr ic t ions  or c o n d it io n s  on a liens  
la n d in g  or a rr iv in g  at  any  port in  the  U n ite d  
K in g d o m  ; and
'(/>) for p r o h ib i t in g  a l ien s  from em b a r k in g  in the U n ite d  
K in g d o m ,  e ither  g en e r a l ly  or at certa in  p laces ,  and 
for im p o s in g  restr ictions and con d it ion s  on aliens  
em ba rk in g  or about to embark in the U n ite d  
K in g d o m ;  and
(e) for the deportation of  a lien s  from th e  U n ite d  K in g d o m ;  
and
(J ) for req u ir in g  a l ien s  to reside and rem ain  w ith in  certa in  
places or d is tr ic ts ;  and
(e)  for p r o h ib i t in g  a l ien s  from re s id in g  or r e m a in in g  in any
areas specified in the Order; and
(f)  for req u ir in g  a l ien s  re s id in g  in the  U n ited  K in g d o m
t • * < : ; V  w ith  such provis ions as to r eg is tra t ion ,  
ch a n g e  o f  abode, t r a v e l l in g ,  or o th erw ise  as m a y  be 
m ade by the Order; and
(g)  for the  a p p o in tm en t  of oflicers to carry  the  Order into
elf cot, and for co n fe r r in g  on such officers and on the  
S ecre tary  of S ta te  such powers as m a y  be necessary  or 
e x p e d ie n t  for th e  purposes of the O rder; and
(h)  for im p o s in g  p en a lt ie s  on persons w h o  aid  or abet a n y
con traven t ion  o f  the  Order, and f<>r im p o sin g - such  
o b l ig a t io n s  and restr ict ions  mi m asters o f  sh ips  or any  
other persons specified in 11 it* Order as appear n eces­
sary or exp ed ien t for g iv in g  full elVed to the Order;  
and
( i )  for co n fe r r in g  upon such persons as m ay  be specified in 
I he Order such pow ers w ith  resp ect  to arrest, d e te n ­
t ion ,  search of prem ises  or persons, and o th erw ise ,  as 
m a y  bo specified in the  Order, and for .any  other  
a n c il la ry  m atters for w h ich  if appears  e x p e d ie n t  to 
provide  w ith  a v iew  to g iv i n g  fu l l  effect to the Order;  
and
( / )  for  a n \  o i l i e r  m a t t e r s  w h i c h  a p p e a r  n e c e s s a r y  or  e -.tpc- 
• l imit wi t h  a v i e w  to t he  s a f e l y  o f  t h e  r e a l m .
o ' 1 I* ;,,,y pm-mi nets in emit raven! ion o f ,  or fo i ls  to co m p ly  
"■lb. p r o v i s i o n s  «»I any s u c h  O r d e r ,  h e  s h a l l  h e  l i a b l e  o n
c m i \ n  l i o n  Under t h e  N um m ary Ju r isd ic t io n  A cts  to a l i ne  no t
e x c e e d in g  one hundred pounds or t o im p r ison m en t  w ith  or 
w ithout hard labour for a term not e x c eed in g  s ix  m o n th s ,  and  
the court before w h ich  lie is convicted  m a y ,  e ith er  in a d d it ion  
1°> n* in l ieu  o f ,  an y  such, punishment-, require, that person to 
enter  into recogn izances  w ith  or w ith ou t su ret ies  to c o m p ly  w ith  
fi le prov is ions  of th e  Order in Council or such prov is ions  th ereo f  
a s  the court m a y  direct .
01
I f  an y  person fa i ls  to qom p ly  w ith  an order of the  court  
requ ir in g  h im  to enter  into recogn izances  th e  court,  or a n y  court  
of su m m a ry  ju r isd ic t ion  s i t t in g  for th e  sam e p la ce ,  m a y  order  
him  to be im prisoned w ith  or w ithout hard labour for an y  term  
not ex ce e d in g  s ix  m on th s .
(3) A n y  provision of any  Order in Council m a d e  under th is  
section w ith  respect to a liens  m a y  re la te  e ither  to a lien s  in  
general or to an y  class  or description  o f  a liens.
(4) I f  an y  question  arises on any  p roceed in gs  under a n y  such  
Order, or w ith  reference to a n y th in g  done or proposed to be  
done under an y  such Order, w h eth er  a n y  person is an a lien  or 
n ot, or is an a lien of a p articu lar  class or not, the  onus o f  prov­
ing  th a t  th at  person is not  an a lien ,  or, as th e  case m a y  be, r 
is not an a lien  of th a t  c lass,  sh a ll  l ie  upon that person.
(5) H i s  M ajesty  m a y  by  Order in C ouncil revoke, a lter ,  or 
add to an y  Order in Council m a d e  under th is  sect ion  as occasion  
requires.
(6) A n y  powers g iv e n  under th is  sect ion ,  or under an y  Order 
in Council m ad e  u nder  th is  sect ion ,  sh a ll  be in a ddit ion  to,  
and not in  derogation  of,  a n y  other powers w ith  respect  to 
the  exp u ls io n  of a l ien s ,  or th e  p rohib it ion  o f  a lien s  from  
en ter in g  the  U n ite d  K in g d o m  or an y  other powers of  H is  
M ajesty .
APPENDIX I I
Aliens Restriction Order, 3 August 191^
T h e  K i n d ’s M o s t  E xc e l l en t  M a j e s t y  in Cou nc i l .
Whereas  b y  the  A l i en s  R es t r i c t i on  A c t ,  1914 ,  p o w e r  is con­
f e r r e d  upon  H i s  M a j e s t y  in  t i m e  o f  tear or i m m i n e n t  na t i o na l  
d a n g er  or g r ea t  e m e r g e n c y  b y  Order  in Cou nc i l  to im p o se  res tr i c­
t i ons  on a l i e n s , a n d  to m a l e  such p re c i s i on s  as m a y  be necessary  
or ex p ed i e n t  f o r  c a r r y in g  such r e s t r i c t i ons  into  e f f e c t :
A n d  w her eas  a s t a t e  o f  xcar a t  p r e s e n t  exis ts  b e t w ee n  G re a t  
B r i t a i n  a n d  G e r m a n y :
N o w ,  there fo re ,  H i s  M a j e s t y  is p l eas ed ,  b y  a n d  w i t h  the  ad v i c e  
o f  H i s  P r i v y  Counc i l ,  to order ,  a n d  i t  is h e r e b y  o rdered ,  as 
f o l l o w s :—
P a r t  I .
R e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  A l i e n s  E n t e r i n g  a n d  L e a v i n g  t h e  
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m .
A pproved  Ports  and P ro h ib ited  Ports .
1.— ( 1 )  Fo r  the purpo se s  of  this Order ,  the  f o l l o w i n g  por t s  
are  a p p r o v e d  por t s ,  t h a t  is to s a y :—
A b e r d e e n ,  Br i s t o l ,
D u n d e e ,  H o l y h e a d ,
W e s t  H a r t l e p o o l ,  L i v e r p oo l ,
H u l l ,  Greenock ,
L o n d o n ,  D u b l i n ,
Fo lk es t on e ,  Russ ia re;
F a l m o u t h ,
a n d  a n y  o th er  por t  or p lace  in  the U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  is, f o r  the  
purpose s  o f  thi s  Order ,  a p r o h i b i t e d  por t .
( 2 )  F o r  the  jnirposes  o f  thi s  O rder  the  l i m i t s  o f  the  a p p ro v e d  
por t s  shal l  be those speci f ied in  the  F i r s t  S ch edu le  to this  Order ,  
a n d  a n y  p a r t  o f  an a p p r o v e d  p o r t  ou t s i de  those l i m i t s  sha l l  be  
t r ea t ed  as though  it  we re  p a r t  o f  a p r o h i b i t e d  p or t .
( 1)  .1// al ien sha l l  not  l and  in the  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  a t  a 
pi "h i b i l e d  p a r t :
Fra rul ed  t h a t —
ci)  where  an a l i ens  officer is sa t is f ied tha t  an al i en  f r i e n d  
who h a - a rr i v e d  a t  a prohibi t ed-  par t  h a d  em b a r k ed  
f o r  tha t  jiart be fare thi s  Or de r  eainc in to  op er a t i on , 
a n d  m ay  sa f e l y  be p e r m i t t e d  to l and,  he  m a y  g ra n t  
him  pei  in i s s i an a c c o r d i n g l y ;  a n d  
(it) rrln re a S e c re t a ry  of  S t a t e  is. sa t i s f ied  tha t  an al i en friend,  
has m  n  eed a t  a p r o h i b i t e d  port, in i g nor an ce  o f  the. 
■provisions o f  t ins Order  nr in a n y  o ther  c i r cu ms t an ces  
e n t i t l i n g  h im  to spec ia l  co n s i d e ra t i o n , a n d  m a y  sa f e l y  
be pi i m i l t e d  to l and ,  he m a y  g ra n t  h im  permi ss ion  
a c c o r d m g l y ; an d  
(e) s ub j e c t  to the  p ro v i s i ons  o f  thi s  O rder  the  f o r eg o i n g  p r o ­
h ib i t i on  shal l  no t ,  unless  in a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  case an  
a l i e n .< officer so d i r ec t s ,  a p p l y  to an al i en  f r i e n d  who  
is the mas t e r  or a m e m b e r  o f  the  c re w  o f  a vesse l  
a r r i v i n g  a t  a p r o h i b i t e d  j iort ,  i f  w h i l s t  he is on shore  
he com p i  ie a wi th such r e q u i re m en t s  ( i f  a n y )  as m a y  
he impo sed  upon h im  or upon  ma s t e r s  a n d  seamen  
ge n e ra l l y  b y  an a l i ens  officer a t  the  p o r t ;  
a n d  a n y  al i en f r i e n d  who lands  in accordance  w i t h  this  p r o ­
v iso ,  a n d ,  i f  c o n d i t i o n a l l y  d i s e m b a r k e d , w h o  c om pl i e s  w i t h  
the  co nd i t i ons ,  sha l l  no t  be l i abl e  to a n y  p e n a l t y  f o r  l and i ng  
a t  the  p o r t  in ques t i on .
•1. A n  a l i en e n e m y  shal l  no t  l and  in the  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  
at  an a p p r o v e d  p o r t . unles s  p r o v i d e d  w i t h  a p e r m i t  i s sue d  b y  the  
S e c re t a ry  o f  S ta t e  f o r  F o re ig n  Affairs .
4.  A n  a l i en a r r i v i n g  <ri an a p p r o v e d  por t  m a y ,  i f  a S e c r e t a r y  
of  State,  so d i r ec t s ,  or i f  an a l i ens  officer a t  the  port, is sa t i sf ied  
tha t  he  can not  s a f e l y  he p e r m i t t e d  to l and  in t h e U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ,  
he t r e a t e d  as th o u g h  the p or t  w er e  a p ro h i b i t ed  port .
5 .  A n  a l i en l a n d i n g  in co n t r a ve n t i on  of  thi s  Order ,  a n d  an  
al i en a r r i v in g  a t  a n y  p o r t  in c i r cums tances  in  w h ic h  he is p r o ­
h i b i t e d  f r om  la n d i n g ,  m a y ,  u n t i l  d ea l t  w i t h  un de r  thi s  Order ,  
he d e t a i n e d  in  such m a nn er  as a  Se c re ta ry  o f  S t a t e  m a y  d i r ec t ,  
a n d  w h i l s t  so d e t a i n e d  sha l l  he d e e m e d  to be in l ega l  c us to dy .
6.  A n  al i en sha l l  no t  l and  a t  a n y  p o r t  in the  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  
h a v i n g  in h is  posse ss ion —
(n) a n y  f i r earms ,  a m m u n i t i o n ,  or exp lo s i ve s ;
(b) a n y  p e t r o l e u m  sp i r i t ,  n a p h th a ,  benzol ,  p e t r o l e u m ,  or
o th e r  in f l a m m ab le  l i q u id  in qu an t i t i e s  exceed ing th re e  
g a l l o n s ;
(c) a n y  a p p a r a t u s  or con t r i va nce  in t e nd ed  fo r  or cap ab l e  of
be in g  used  fo r  s i gn a l l in g  appara tus ,  e i th e r  v i s u a l  or  
o th e r w i s e ;
(d) a n y  car r i e r  or h om i n g  p ig e on s ;
(e) a n y  m o t o r  car,  mo t or  c yc l e ,  or a i r c ra f t ;  or
(f)  a n y  c ip h e r  code or o ther  means  of  con du c t i n g  secre t
co r r e sp on den ce ;
a n d  w her e  an cffien lands  w i t h  a n y  such art icles in his possess ion  
he sha l l  f o r f e i t  the  ar t ic l es  an d  shal l  be deem ed  to h ave  i m p o r t e d  
t h e m  in  co n t ra ven t i on  of  the p rov i s ions  of  the Cu s toms  Co nso l i ­
da t i o n  A c t ,  1876,  as though  the  ar t ic les  in ques t ion  were  con­
ta i n e d  in  the  t a b l e  o f  p roh ib i t i ons  and  res t r ic t ions  set  ou t  in  
s ec t i on  fo r t y - t  wo o f  th a t  A c t :
P r o v i d e d  th a t  w her e  an al i ens  officer considers tha t  an a l i en  
f r i e n d  a r r i v in g  a t  a n y  po r t  m a y  sa f e l y  be p e r m i t t e d  to l and  w i t h  
a n y  such a r t i c l e s  as a foresaid  in his possession,  he m a y  p e r m i t  
h i m  to l and a c c or d in g l y ,  and  the  fo regoing  p rov i s i ons  of  thi s  
ar t i c l e  sha l l  not  a p p l y .
7. A n  a l i en c o n d i t i on a l l y  d i s em ba rk ed  un der  the  d i r ec t i ons  
of  an al i ens officer f o r  the pu rpose  of  in qu i r y  or ex a m in a t io n  
sha l l  not  f o r  the  purpose s  of  this  Order  be d ee m e d  to have  
l a n d e d  so long as the  cond i t i ons  ark co mpl i ed  w i th .
A lie n s  lea v in g  the U n ite d  K in gd om .
8.  A n  al ien  shal l  not ,  except  in pursuance of  an o rder  of  
d ep o r t a t i on  u n de r  this  Order ,  e m b ar k  in the U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  a t  
a p r o h i b i t e d  p o r t :
P r o v i d e d  th a t —
( a )  a n  a l i e n  f r i e n d  s h a l l  h e  p e r m i t t e d  t o  e m b a r k  a t  a p r o ­
h i b i t e d  p o r t  i f  he. s a t i s f i e s  a n  a l i e n s  o f f i ce r  at t h a t  
p o r t  t h a t  h e  h a d  h ooked ,  a  p a s s a g e  o n  a  v e s s e l  s a i l i n g  
f r o m  t h a t  p o r t  h e f o n  t h i s  ( J r d e r  c a m e  i n t o  o p r  r a t  i o n , 
a n d  tha t .  he. t u n  s a f e l y  he  p e r m i t  t e d  t o  h a r e ,  t h e  
/  c ■ t' d J\ I /■ ydo  .7 / ; n ml 
( \>) u h e . t e  a. . e< r ‘ ro r  )  o f  te  ,* f . J  * *
jt end oho  / >  / •  • to > - • • •
m a y  o j e t y  h< p m , .  f ,  • / , / . .  ... .
him per mi s s ion  aeeo id ing l  j ;  and
( i )  sub j ec t  to the provi s i ons of  the■ Order the  foregot  ng  
pr o h i b i t i o n  shal l  not ,  unless m a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  case  
an a l i ens  officer so d i r e c t s , a p p l y  to an al i en  f r i e n d  
who is the  mas t er  or a m em be r  of  the. c r ew  o f  a vessel  
, ,  l ea v i n g  a p ro h ib i t e d  por t ;  
an d  a n y  a l i en f t  t end  who embarks  in accordance  w i t h  this  
piroviso shal l  not be l i ab le  to any  p e n a l t y  f o r  e m b a r k i n g  
in the  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  at  the p a t in q u e s t i o n .
if. II here  an a l ien e n e m y  is about  to h a r e  a n y  yur t  on h o a r d  
a vessel  on w h i ch  he  has a r r i ve d  a t  the  jtort  he  m a y  fo r  the  
purpose s  o f  thi s  O r d e r , i f  a S ec re ta ry  of  S ta t e  so d i r ec t s  or i f  
i t  appea r s  nece s sary  to an al i ens  officer in the intCrests o f  p u b l w  
s a f e t y ,  be t r ea t e d  as though he had  em ba r ke d  a t  th a t  por t  in 
co n t r ave n t i on  o f  thi s  O r d e r , bu t  sha l l  not  be sub j ec t  to a n y  fine or 
i m p r i s o n m e n t  f o r  so em ba r k in g .
10.  -15 f r o m  a d a t e  to he fi.red b y  (I Secret  a r y  o f  S t a l e  an 
a l i en  e n e m y  sha l l  n o t , e.rcepf in pu r s uance  o f  an o rder  of  de p o r t a ­
tion under  th i s  Order ,  e m b a r k  in the  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  at an
ap p ro ve d  p o r t ,  unl es s  p r o v i d e d  w i t h  a p e r m i t  i s sued  b y  a  
Secr e ta ry  o f  S t a t e  ;
Provided-  th a t  an al ien e n e m y  abou t  to em b a r k  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  
K i n g d o m  a t  an a p p r o v e d  por t  e i the r  before  such d a t e  as a fo re ­
said.  or a f t e r  th a t  d a t e  udirn p r o v i d e d  w i th  such p e r m i t  as 
a fo r e s a id , m a y ,  i f  a S e c r e t a ry  o f  S t a t e  so d i r ec t s ,  or i f  in the  
opinion o f  an a l i ens  officer he canno t  sa f e l y  he p e r m i t t e d  to 
em bar k ,  be t r e a t e d  as though  the  por t  were  a p r o h i b i t e d  port .
11. A n a l i en e m b a r k i n g  op abou t  to em b a r k  in the  U n i t e d  
k i n g d o m  in con t r ave n t i on  o f  this Order  m a y ,  u n t i l  d ea l t  w i th  
under thi s  O r d e r , be d e ta i n e d  in such ma n n er  as a S ec re t a r y  o f  
S ta t e  m a y  d i r ec t ,  a n d  wh i l s t  so de ta i n ed  shal l  be d e e m e d  to be  
in l ega l  c u s t od y .
I d . — ( J )  .1 S e c r e t a r y  of  S t a t e  m a y  order the  de p or ta t i on  o f  
an y  a l i en,  a n d  a n y  al i en w i th  r espec t  to w h o m  such an o rder  
is m od e  shal l  f o r t h w i t h  l eave  the  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m .
( 2 )  'Where, an  al i en is o rdered  to he de p or t e d  u n d e r  thi s  Order ,  
he m a y ,  wh i l s t  a w a i t i n g  the  de p a r t u re  of  his sh ip ,  a n d  wh i l s t  
be ing  c o n v e y e d  to the  ship ,  a n d  w h i l s t  on board  the  sh ip  u n t i l  
the  sh ip  f i n a l l y  leave s  the  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ,  be d e t a i n e d  in such 
mann er  as the  S ec re t a ry  o f  S t a t e  d ir ec t s ,  and ,  w h i l s t  so d e t a i n e d , 
shal l  be d e e m e d  to be in l ega l  cu s tody .
O b liga t io n s  on M asters o f Vessels .
13 .— ( 1 )  The. m a s t e r  o f  e v e r y  vesse l ,  w h e th er  B r i t i s h  or f o re ign ,  
a rr i v in g  at  or l e av i n g  a por t  in the  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  shal l ,  i m m e ­
d i a t e l y  on the  a r r i va l  o f  the  vessel  at  tha t  p o r t ,  or,  as the  case  
m a y  be,  no t  m y r e  than 1 wen ty - fou r  hours before  l e av in g  lh a t  
por t ,  fu rn i sh  to an al i ens officer at  tha t  por t ,  w i th  r e spec t  to a l l  
persons  on board  the  vessel ,  or in t e n d i n g  to e m b a r k  on t h e  
vessel,  such p a r t i c u l a r s  in such  m a n n er  as the  S e c r e t a r y  of  S ta t e  
m a y  d i r e c t ,  a n d  sha l l  o th erw i se  t ake  a l l  reasonab le  s t ep s  in his  
po w er  fo r  s ec ur ing  the  en f or cem en t  o f  thi s  Order .
( 2 )  T he  m a s t e r  o f  a ve ssel  a r r i v in g  a t  or l e a v i n g  a n y  por t  sha l l  
not p e r m i t  a n y  pe r sons  to l a nd  or to em b a r k  w i t h o u t  the  sanct ion  
of  an a l i ens  officer a t  the  por t .
( 3 )  W h e r e  a person lands  or em ba rk s  a t  a n y  p o r t  in con t ra ­
vent i on  o f  th i s  Ord er ,  the  m as t e r  o f  the  vessel  f r o m  which  he  
lands  or on wh ich  he em ba rk s  shal l ,  unless  he p roves  the  
con t r ary ,  be d e e m e d  to h ave  a id ed  a n d  ab e t t e d  the  offence.
14. The m as t e r  o f  a sh ip  abou t  to ca l l  a t  a n y  po r t  shal l ,  i f  so 
rei /uircd hi/ a S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta t e  or an al i ens  officer,  r ecei ve  an  
a h  i n a n d  his  d< v i endant s ,  i f  a n y ,  on board  his s h i p  a nd  afford  
him or th e m  a pas sa ge  to that  par t ,  a nd  p rop er  a c c o m m o da t io n  
and  m a i n t e n a n c e  d u r i n g  the  passage ,  and ,  i f  the  sh i p  is the sa m e  
or be longs  to the  sa m e  owners  as the  sh ip  in w h ic h  the  a l ien  
a rr i ve d  in  the  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ,  shal l ,  i f  so r e qu i r ed  as a fo resa id ,  
afford such pas s age ,  a c c o m m o da t i o n ,  an d  m a i n t e n a n c e  f r ee  o f  
charge .
A lie n s  Officers.
1 5 X —(  1 )  The  f o l l o w i n g  pe rsons ,  th a t  is to sa y —
(a) a n y  i m m i g r a t i o n  officers a p p o in t e d  u n de r  the  A l i en s  A c t ,
1 9 0 5 ; { a )  a n d
(b) a n y  pe r s ons  a p p o in t e d  fo r  the  purpose  by  a S ec re t a ry  o f
S t a t e ;
sha l l  be a l i ens  officers f o r  the  purpose s  o f  thi s  Order  a t  the  var ious  
po r t s  i n  the  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ,  a n d  shal l  in the  exercise  o f  the i r  
po w er s  ac t  u n d e r  gene ra l  or spec ia l  ins t ruc t i ons  f rom  the  S ec re ­
t a r y  o f  S t a t e ,  an d ,  sub j ec t  to such in s t ruc t i ons ,  sha l l  have  p o w e r  
to en t e r  on boa rd  a n y  vesse l ,  a n d  to de ta in  and  exami ne  a l l  
j)ersojis a r r i v i n g  a t  or l e av in g  a n y  p o r t  in th e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ,  
a n d  to r equ i re  the  p r o d uc t i o n  o f  a n y  docume j i t s  by  such persons,  
a nd  g e n e r a l l y  to t a l e  such s t ep s  as are sanct i oned  b y  th i s  O rder  
or as m a y  be neces sary  fo r  g i v i n g  effect  to th is  Order .
16.  I f  a n y  a l i en ,  m as t e r  o f  a ship ,  or o ther  person a r r i v in g  at  
or l e a v i n g  a n y  . port  lands  or em ba rk s  w i t h o u t  the  pe rmi ss ion of  
an a l i ens  officer, or  refuses to a n s w er  a n y  ques t i on  r easonab ly  p u t  
to h im  b y  an a l i ens  officer, or  ma k es  a n y  fa l s e  r e t urn ,  f a l s e  
s t a t e m e n t , or f a l s e  r epre sen ta t i on  to a?) a l i ens  officer, or refuses  
to p ro d u ce  a n y  d o c u m e n t  in his  possession which  he is r e qu i r ed  
b y  an al i ens  officer to p ro duce ,  or obs t ruct s  or im ped es  an al i ens  
officer in the  c.i'craise of  his  p o w er s  or du t i es  un der  the  Order ,  he. 
shal l  be d e e m e d  to  have  ac t ed  in con t raven t ion  o f  thi s  Order.
E x cep t io n s .
17.  This  P a r t  o f  the  Order  sha l l  not  a p p l y —
(a) to p r i soners  of  war ;  or
(1)) to ch i l d r en  a p p e a r i n g  to an al i ens  officer to be under  the.
age  o f  f our t een .
P a  n r  I I .
l i E s r r j c r i o x s  a x  At . i F.xa  R i:sjj/j x<; i x  n u  U x i t f p  K / xcj hi m  
R es id en ce  and R e g is tr a t io n  of  A lien s .
IS .  A S e c r e t a r y  of  S ta t e  m a y  by  order  r equ i re  a n y  al ien  
e n e m y  to re s ide  or con t inue  to res ide in a n y  p lace  or d i s t r i c t  
spec i f ied  in the  o rder ,  a nd  the a l i en shal l  c o m p l y  w i t h  the order .
19.  A n  al i en e n e m y  shal l  not res ide  or con t inue  to res ide  e i ther  
t e m p o r a r i l y  or p e r m a n e n t l y  in a n y  of  the  areas speci f ied in the  
Sec on d  S ch ed u l e  to  thi s  Order  ( i n  thi s  Order  re f erred  to as p r o ­
h i b i t e d  a rea s )  unles s  p r o v i d e d  wi th a p e r m i t  i s sued b y  the  
r eg i s t r a t i on  officer o f  the  d i s t r i c t ,  sub j ec t  to the  genera l  or special  
‘in s truc t luns  o f  a S e c re t a ry  o f  S ta t e ,  an d  ev e r y  al ien e n e m y  who  
at  the  tune  of  the  m a k i n g  o f  thi s  Order  is result  at  in a p r o h ib i t ed  
area sha l l  w i t h in  f o u r  da y s ,  unless  in the  m en n t im e  he obta ins  
such a p e r m i t  a fo resa id ,  l eave  t h a t  a re a t h a v in g  first  r ep o r t ed  
his  p r o po s ed  r e s idence  to the  r eg i s t ra t i on  officer o f  the  r eg i s tra t i on  
d i s t r i c t  wh ich  hr  is l eav ing .
2 0 . — ( 1 )  A n  al i en r e s id i ng  in a p r o h i b i t e d  area,  and  an a l i en  
cue mg  w h e re v e r  r e s iden t ,  shal l  c o m p l y  w i th  the  f o l l o w in g  
r eq u i r em en t s  as to r eg i s t r a t i on  :—
(a) l ie sha l l ,  i m m e d i a t e l y  on the  ma k in g  o f  thi s  Order  a n d
on  a n y  subs equen t  ch an ge  o f  addres s ,  fu r n i sh  to the  
r eg i s t ra t i on  officer o f  the  r eg i s t r a t i on  d i s t r i c t  in  w h i c h  
lie is r e s iden t  par t i cu la r s  as to the  m a t t e r s  se t  out  in  
the  T h i r d  Sch ed u l e  to th i s  O r d e r :
(b) he sha l l ,  i f  he  is about, to chan ge  his res idence ,  fu rn i sh
to the  r eg i s t ra t i on  officer o f  the r eg i s t r a t i on  d i s t r i c t  
in  wh ich  he  is then r e s i den t  par t i c u l a r s  as to the  d a t e  
on which  his  res idence  is to  be so cha nge d ,  a n d  as  
to his  in t e n d e d  p lace  o f  r e s i d e n c e :
(c) he sha l l  fu rn i sh  to the  r eg i s t ra t i on  officer o f  the  r e g i s ­
t ra t i on  d i s t r i c t  in  wh ich  he  is r e s iden t  pa r t i cu la r s  o f  
a n y  c i r cu ms ta nce  a f f ec t ing  in  a n y '  m a n n e r  the  
a ccu ra cy  o f  the  pa r t i c u la r s  p re v i o u s l y  fu r n i s h e d  b y  
him  for  the  purpose  of  r eg i s t ra t ion  w i t h i n  f o r t y - e i g h t  
hours  a f t e r  the  c i r cu m s t a n ce  has occurred.
( 2 )  W h e r e  on al ien is l o dg in g  w i t h  or l i v i n g  as a m e m b e r  o f  
the  househo ld  o f  a n y  o ther  person,  i t  shal l  be the  d u t y  o f  th a t  
per son  e i the r  h im s e l f  to fu rni sh  w i t h  r espeet  to the  a l ien the  
p a r t i c u l a r s  a f o r e s a id , or to g i ve  no t i c e  of  the  j i rcscnee o f  the  
al ien in his ho useho ld  to the  r eg i s t ra t i on  officer.
(3) W h e r e  an al i en has a househo ld  he shal l  fu r n i sh  the  
pa r t i c u l a r s  as a fo resa id  not  o n l y  as respec t s  h imse l f ,  bu t  as 
r e spec t s  e v e r y  a l i en  who is l i v i n g  as a m e m b e r  o f  his h o u se h o l d .
2 1 . — ( 1 )  F o r  the  purpose s  of  thi s  Order ,  the  ch i e f  officer o f  
po l i c e  o f  the  po l i c e  d i s t r i c t  shal l  be the  r eg i s t ra t i on  o f f i c e r a n d  
the  po l i c e  d i s t r i c t  shal l  be the r eg i s t ra t i on  d i s t r i c t :
P r o v i d e d  th a t  whe re  a p r o h i b i t e d  area inc ludes  the  wh o le  or 
p a r t  o f  more than  one po l i c e  d i s t r i c t ,  a r r a n g em e n t s  m a y  be m a d e  
b y  a S e c re t a ry  o f  S ta t e  f o r  co n s t i t u t i n g  tha t  p r o h ib i t e d  area a 
s i ng l e  r eg i s t ra t i on  d i s t r i c t ,  and  fo r  the  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  a r e g i s ­
t r a t i o n  officer f o r  t h a t  d i s t r i c t .
( 2 )  A  r eg i s t r a t i on  officer sha l l—
(a) keep  fo r  h is  r eg i s t ra t i on  d i s t r i c t  a r eg i s t er  f o r  th e
purpose s  o f  thi s  A c t ;
(b) r eg i s t e r  the re in  a l l  a l i ens  r e s iden t  in his d i s t r i c t  w ho
furn i sh  pa r t i cu la r s  f o r  the  purpose ,  b y  en t e r ing  these  
pa r t i c u l a r s  on the  r e g i s t e r ;
(c) en t er  on the  r eg i s t er  a l l  o ther  pa r t i cu la r s  fu r n i s h e d  in
accordance  w i th  this  O rd er  wi th  r espec t  to a n y  a l i en  
so r e g i s t e r e d ; and
(d) i f  ‘a r e g i s t e r e d  al i en ceases to be r e s ide n t  in his d i s t r i c t ,
record  the  fac t  in the  regi s te r .
(3) The  o b l i g a t i o n  o f  a r eg i s t r a t i on  officer to  en te r  p ar t i cu la r s  
u p o n  the  r eg i s t e r  shal l  not  be af f ec ted  by  the. f a c t  tha t  the  p a r ­
t i cu la r s  m a y  not  h a ve  been f u r n i s h e d  w i t h in  the  t i m e  r e q u i r e d  
b y  th i s  Order ,  w i t h o u t  p re ju d i c e ,  ho wever ,  to the  l i a b i l i t y  o f  an  
a l i en  to a p e n a l t y  f o r  not  f u r n i s h i n g  the  pa r t i c u la r s  w i t h i n  th e  
r eq u i r ed  t i me .
( 4 )  E v e r y  a l i en shal l  fu r n i sh  to the  r e g i s t r a t i on  officer, in  
a d d i t i o n  to a n y  such  pa r t i cu la r s  as a fo re sa id , a n y  i n f o r m a t i o n
w h i c h  m a y  r e as on ab l y  be r e qu i r ed  fo r  the p u rp o s e  o f  r e g i s t e r in g  
the  a l i en,  or m a i n t a i n i n g  the  correctness  o f  the  pa r t i c u la r s  
e n t e r e d  on the  r eg i s t er .
( 5 )  F or  the  purpose s  o f  thi s  Order  the  expres s ion “ po l i c e  
d i s t r i c t ”  mea ns  a n y  d i s t r i c t  f o r  wh ich  there  is a  s eparat e  po l i c e  
f o r c e ;  a n d  the  expres s ion  “  c h i e f  officer o f  po l i c e  ”  means  the  
c h i e f  cons tab l e ,  or hea d  cons tabl e ,  or o ther  officer, b y  w h a t e v e r  
n a m e  ca l l ed ,  h a v i n g  the  ch i e f  c o m m a n d  of  the  po l i c e  f o rc e  o f  
th e  d i s t r i c t .
22 .  A n  a l i en  e n e m y  shal l  n o t  t r av e l  mo re  than  j i v e  m i l e s  
f r o m  h i s  r eg i s t e r ed  g la ce  o f  r es idence  unles s  f u r n i s h e d  w i t h  a 
p e r m i t  f r o m  the  r e g i s t r a t i o n  officer o f  the  r e g i s t r a t i o n  d i s t r i c t  
in  w h i c h  th a t  p la ce  o f  r es idence is s i tua t e ,  w h ic h  p e r m i t  shal l  
n o t  co v e r  a p e r i o d  exceed i ng  tw e n t y - f o u r  hours  f r o m  the  d a t e  
o f  i t s  issue a n d  shal l  be r e tu rn ed  to the  r e g i s t r a t i on  officer a t  
the  e n d  o f  the  p e r i o d  fo r  wh ich  i t  wa s  issued.
P r o v i d e d  th a t  tn  the  case of  an a l i en  e n e m y  h a v i n g  a bond  
f ide p l a c e  of  business  mo r e  than  f i ve  m i l e s  f r o m  his  r e g i s t e r e d  
p la ce  o f  r es idence  the r e g i s t r a t i on  officer m a y ,  i f  he  th inks  f i t ,  
g r a n t  a  p e r m i t  e n ab l in g  h im  to t r av e l  to or f r o m  his  p lace  o f  
bus iness  w h ic h  sha l l  be r en ew ab le  f r o m  t i m e  to t i m e  as a n d  
w h e n  the  r eg i s t ra t i o n  officer so d i r ec t s .
P ossess ion  of F irea rm s, &c. by A l ie n  E n em ie s .
2 3 . — ( 1 )  A n  a l i en  e n e m y  shal l  no t ,  excep t  w i th  the  w r i t t e n  
p e r m i s s io n  o f  the r e g i s t r a t i o n  officer o f  the  d i s t r i c t  in  wh ich  he  
r es ide s ,  be in possess ion of—
(a) a n y  f i rearms,  a m m u n i t i o n , or  ex p l o s i v e s ;
(b) a n y  p e t r o l e u m  sp i r i t ,  n a p h th a ,  benzol ,  p e t r o l e u m ,  or
o t her  in f l a m m a b l e  l i q u id  in  q ua n t i t i e s  exceed ing  three  
ga l lons  ;
(c) a n y  a p p ar a tu s  or con t r i va nc e  in t e nde d  fur  or capab l e  of
be ing  'used fo r  a s i g n a l l in g  ap pa ra tu s ,  e i t h e r  v i s ua l  
or o th er w i se ;
(d) a n y  car r i e r  or h o m i n g  p i g e o n ;
(e) a n y  motor  car,  m o t o r  c yc l e ,  or a i r c ra f t ;  or
( f )  a n y  c i p h e r  code or o ther  'means o f  co n d u c t i n g  secre t
corre spondence.
( 2 )  I f  a ju s t i c e  o f  the  peace  is sa t is f ied  b y  in f  urinat ion on oath  
th a t  th e r e  is r easonable  g ro u n d  fo r  su sp ec t ing  a n y  co n t ra ve n t io n  
o f  the  fo r e g o in g  p r ov i s i o n ,  he m a y  g r a n t  a search w a rr an t  a u th o ­
r i s in g  a n y  cons tab l e  n a m e d  the re in  to en t e r  a t  a n y  t i m e  a n y  
pre m ise s  or p lace  n a m e d  in the w arr an t ,  i f  necessary  b y  force ,  
a n d  to search the  p re m i s e s  or p lace  a n d  e v e r y  person f o u n d  th e r e ­
in,  a n d  to sei ze  a n y  a r t i c l e  which is be ing  kep t  in. the p rem i se s  or 
p lace  m  con tra  ven t  ion o f  this  Ar t i c l e .
117here  it ap pea r s  t o  a su p er in t e n de n t  or i n s p e c t o r  o f  pol i ce ,  
or a n y  p o l i c e  officer o f  h ig h er  rank,  th a t  the  case is one o f  g rea t  
e m e r g e n c y ,  a n d  t h a t  in the  int eres t s  o f  the  S t a t e  i m m e d i a t e  a c t i o n  
is n e c e s s a r y , he m a y  b y  a w r i t t en  o rder  un der  h i s  h a n d  g i v e  to 
a n y  con s tab l e  the l i ke  au th o r  it y  as m a y  be g i ve n  by  the  warran t  
of  a ju s t i c e  und er  thi s  A r t i c l e .
P.Mir HI.
G  I. M. I'M-
.oj  n  a U u person acts  in con t raven t ion  of  or f a i l s  to c o m p l y  
willi a n y  p rov i s i ons  of  thi s  Order ,  he is l i ab l e  on s u m m a r y  con-  
vict ion to  a fnu no t  e x ce e d i ng  one hu nd red  po un d s  or to impr i son -  
lll(ll, w i th  or w i t ho u t  hard  labour  fo r  a t erm not  ex ceed ing  six  
months ,  a n d  the co ur t  before  which he is c onv i c t ed  m a y ,  e i the r  ,n  
old it ion to or ,n l ieu of  a n y  such p u n i s h m e n t ,  requ ir e  th a t  pe rson  
i n i n t e r  into r ecogn i zances  wi th or w i t h o u t  suret ies  to c o m p l y  
with the  p ro v i s i ons  of  thi s  Order  or such p ro v i s i ons  the re o f  as the
court  mai l  d i r ec t .  . .
I f  a n y  person fai ls  to c o m p l y  w i th  an o rder  of  the court  requi  -
m g  h im  to enter  m t o  recogni zances  the  cour t  or a n y  court of  
s u m m a r y  ju r i sd i c t i on  s i f t i ng  fo r  the sam e  p lace  may  order  h im  
to be im p r i so n e d  wi th or w i t h o u t  hard  l abour  fo r  a n y  t e rm  no 
exceed in g  six m o n t h s .
25.  I f  a n y  person■ a i d s  or abe t s  a n y  person in a n y  co n t r a ­
ven t i on o f  th i s  O r d e r , or k n o w i n g l y  harbours  a n y  pe r son w h o m  he  
knows  or has  r easonab le  g ro u n d  fo r  suppo s i ng  to h ave  a c t e d  in 
co n t r a v e n t i o n  o f  thi s  Order ,  he sha l l  be d e e m e d  h i m s e l f  to h av e  
a c t ed  i n  co n t r av e n t i on  o f  this  Order .
26.  A n y  p e r s on  who  ac t s  in con t r ave n t i on  of  th i s  Order ,  or i s  
r ea s on ab ly  s u s p ec t e d  of  h a v in g  so ac t e d ,  or be in g  a b ou t  so to 
act ,  m a y  be  taken  into cu s t o dy  w i t h o u t  w a r r a n t  b y  an a l i ens  
officer or  b y  a n y  cons tabl e .
2 7 . — ( 1 )  A  S ec re t a r y  o f  S t a t e  m a y ,  i f  he th i nk s  i t  ne ce s sary  
in the  in t e re s t s  o f  p u b l i c  sa f e t y ,  d i r e c t  th a t  a n y  o f  the  p rov i s i on s  
o f  thi s  O r d e r  a< to a l i en  enemies  sha l l  in p a r t i c u l a r  cases be  
a p p l i c a b l e  to o ther  a l iens ,  a n d  the reupon  such p r ov i s i o n s  sha l l  
a p p l y  a c c o r d i n g l y .
( 2 )  A  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  ma y ,  i f  he  th i nks  fi t ,  d i r ec t  th a t  a n y  
po w ers  or  d u t i e s  assigned,  un de r  thi s  Order  to a l i e ns  officers or  
to r e g i s t r a t i o n  officers sha l l  be d i s ch ar g ed  b y  o th e r  pe r sons  
d e p u t e d  b y  the  S e c re t o r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  the  purpose .
28.  F o r  the  purpose s  o f  th is  O rder—
Th e  expre s s ion  “ a l i en f r i e n d ”  means  an  al i en  whose  
sove re ign  or S t a t e  is a t  peace  w i th  I l i s  M a j e s t y ,  a n d  
th e  expres s ion “ al ien e n e m y  ”  means  an a l i en  whose  
sove re ign  «or S t a t e  is a t  war  wi th Hi s  M a j e s t y ;  a nd  
R e fe r e n c e s  to l a n d i n g  or e m b a r k in g  shal l ,  unless  the con tex t  
o th er w i se  im p l i e s ,  be d e e m e d  to inc lude  re f erences  to 
a t t cm jp t in g  to l an d  or a t t e m p t i n g  to e m b a r k  r espec ­
t i v e l y .
20 . — ( 1 )  I n  the  ap p l i c a t i on  of  th is  Order  to S c o t l a n d —
The  expre s s ions  “ the  cour t ,"  a n d  “ a n y  c our t  o f  s u m m a r y  
ju r i s d i c t i o n  ”  mean  the  sher i f f ;
T h e  expre s s ions  “ e n t e r  into  recogni sances  w i t h  or w i t h o u t  
sure t i e s  ”  a n d  “  en t er  into  r ecogn i sances  ”  mean  
“  f in d  caut ion
( 2 )  I n  the  a p p l i ca t i o n  o f  thi s  O rde r  to I r e la n d —
T h e  expre s s ion  “ po l i c e  d i s t r i c t ” means  the  p o l i c y  d i s t r i c t  
o f  D u b l i n  m e t r o po l i s  a n d  a n y  c o u n t y  or o ther  area  
f o r  w h ic h  a c o u n t y  in sp ec t o r  o f  the  R o y a l  I r i sh  
C o n s ta b u l a r y  or officer h a v in g  the  rank  of  such c ou n ty  
in s pe c t o r  is a p p o in t e d ,  a n d  the  expre s s ion  “ ch i e f  
officer o f  po l i c e  ”  means  as respects  the  po l i c e  d i s t r i c t  
o f  D u b l i n  m e t ro po l i s  the  C h ie f  C o mm is s io n er  o f  the  
D u b l i n  M e t r o p o l i t a n  Po l i c e  an d  as r e spec t s  a n y  o ther  
po l i c e  d i s t r i c t  the  c o u n t y  in spec to r  of  the  R o y a l  Ir i sh  
C o n s ta b u l a r y  or  officer h a v in g  the rank o f  such co un ty  
in sp ec t o r  as the  case m a y  be.
The expre s s ion  “  su p er in t e n d en t  o f  po l i ce  ”  inc ludes  in  the  
case  of  the  R o y a l  I r i sh  C o ns ta b u l ar y  a s ergean t  and  
a n y  officer o f  h ig h er  rank .
30.  N o t h i n g  in thi s  Order  shal l  be cons t rued  as i m p o s i n g  a n y  
r e s t r i c t i on  or d i s a b i l i t y  on a n y  fo re ign  ambassador  or o ther  pu b l i c  
m i n i s t e r  d u l y  a u th o r i s e d , or a n y  s e rvan t s  in ac tu a l  a t t e n dan ce  
u p o n  a n y  su ch  amb as sa do r  or p u b l i c  m i n i s t e r .
3 1 . — ( 1 )  Th i s  O rder  m a y  be c i t ed  as the  A l i e n s  R es t r i c t i on  
Order ,  1014 .
( 2 )  T h e  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  A c t ,  1SS9, shal l  a p p l y  f o r  the  p u r ­
pose  o f  the  in t e rp re ta t i on  o f  this  Order  in l i ke  m a n n e r  as i t  ap p l i e s  
f o r  the  p u r p o s e  o f  the in t e rp re t a t i on  of  an A c t  o f  P a r l i a m e n t .
A lm e r ic  F i t z R o y .
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APPENDIX III
Counties and large towns in England and Wales 
with highest proportion of foreigners, 1 9 1 1
P ro­ Pro-
C ounty or T ow n. portion
per
lOu.OOO
County or Tow n. portion  
]K.T 
100,00  0
M ALES.
London Adm . Co. 4,108 N ew castle -u p on -T ym 1,019
Cardiff, C.B. 2 ,099 C.B.
T ynem outh , C .B . . . 2,033 Sou thport, C.B. 1,000
Sw ansea, C.B. 2,427 W est H am , C.B. 949
H ornsey, M B. 2,377 Sunderland, C .B. , . 945
N ew port, C.B. 
Sou tn  Shields, C.B.
2,312 M erthyr Tydfil, 913
2,295 c .b :
Grim sby, C.B. 2,105 W est H artlepool, 876 |
M anchester, C .B. . . 2,055 C.B. |
B ournem outh , C'.B. 1.904 W altham stow , U .D . 808 :
E astbourne, C.B. . . 1,903 Crovdon, C.B. 801 1
L iverpool, C.B. 1,829 O xford, C.B. 794 1
H astings, C.B. 1.829 Ilford, U .D . 730 j
B righton, C.B. 1,098 B lackpool, C.B. 728 |
K in gston -u p on -H u ll, 1,074 E ssex Adm . Co. 089
C.B. B ath , C.B. <>05 1
Leeds, C.B. 1,010 G lam organ Adm . Co. 003
M iddlesbrough, C.B. 1,578 L evi on, U .D . 042 1
W illesden, U .D . 1,513 Surrey Adm . Co. . . 040 |
Sou th en d -on -S ea , 1,511 K ent Adm . Co. 022 .
M B . Birkenhead, C.B. . . 018 ;
T ottenh am , U .D . . . 1.357 Sussex , E ast and 509 I
Salford, C.B. 1,305 W est A dm  Cos.
B ootle , C .B. 1,290 N orthum berland 557
A cton, U .D . 1,225 Adm. Co.
E ast Ham . M B. . . 1,171 Birm ingham , C.B. 539 |
M iddlesex Adm . Co. 1,100 H ertfordshire Adm. 508
Sou th am p ton , C.B. 1,158 Co.
E« ling, M B. 1 ,U89 Enfield U .D . 505
W im bledon. M B. ! ,072 E dm onton U .D . . . 503
W allasey M .B. . . 1,023 Cornwall Adm . Co. 503 j
FE M A LE S.
[ London Adm . Co. 2,741 1 East H am , M.B. . . 547
M anchester, C .B . . . 1,474 M e r th y r  T ydfil, C.B 543
' Leeds, C.B. 1,301 ! K ent, Adin. Co. . . 502
E astbourne, C .B. . . 1,129 | SouthjKjrt, C.B. 497
j W illesden, U .D . . . 1,054 1 W altham stow , U .D . 481
H ornsev, M B. 1,051 J W est Ham , C.B. . . 472
1 Salford, C.B. 975 Croydon, C.B. 404
W im bledon, M B. 971 Devonj>ort, C .B. . . ! 443
H astings, C.B. 948 M iddlesbrough, C.B. 1 410
Liverjjool, C.B. 922 Tynenioirth, C.B. . . I 413
Ealing. M.B. 914 j Sunderland, C.B. . . 492
B ournem outh. C.B. 894 Ilford, U .D . 397
T ottenh am , U .D . . . 8S2 South Shields, C.B. J 3*4,4
■ B righton, C.B. 805 W allasey, M.B. . .  ; 392
G rim sby. C .B. 844 H am pshire (S o u th ­ 392
A cton. U .D . 843 am p ton and Isle of !
Cardiff, C.B. 824 W ight Adm . Cos. V
K in gston -u p on -H u ll 790 H ertfordshire Adm. 374
C.B. Co.
M iddlesex Adm . Co. 774 Bath , C.B. 354
Oxford, C.B. 058 i B recknock, Adm. 353
Sw ansea, C.B. 049 | Co.
Sou thend-on-S ea, 030 j E ssex Adm. Co. .. . | 341
e  M-B. Enfield , U .D . . .  I 330
Sussex , E ast and 004 I D evonsh ire, Adm. ! 321
W est Adm . Cos. Co.
Surrey, "Adm. Co. •hb i B irm ingham , C.B. [ 315
N ew castle-up on- i> t » I Ik n set , Adm . Co. . .  j 310
T yne, C.B. L eyton, U .D . . .  ! 300
Sou th am p ton , C.B. 549
Source: Census of England and '.Vales, 1911 > 
vol. IX, table XVI, Cd. 7017, 1313.
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APPENDIX IV
Responsibilities and staffing of Home Office 
Divisions, etc. Concerned With Aliens Katters
B (Aliens) Division
Responsibilities:- Naturalisation and nationality; Aliens 
Act; Aliens Restriction Act and orders; registration and 
control of aliens; repatriation and deportation of aliens; 
Defence of the Realm regulations concerning aliens and 
persons of hostile origin and associations. (Other 
subjects handled by the Division included licencing and 
liquor regulations and certain classes of byelaws)
Staff:- Assistant secretary: J. Pedder; senior clerks:
J.F. Moylan, J. Fischer Williams, W.j.H. Broderick; junior 
clerks: E.W.E. Holdemess, S.B. Ward, G.J. Turner; second 
clerks: S.W. Drinkwater, W.G. Jagelman. There were also one 
assistant clerk, 10 temporary clerks and four boy clerks.
Prisoners of War Division
Responsibilities:- Civilian prisoners of war; internment 
and release; repatriation, employment.
Staff:- M.L. Waller (Prison Commissioner), A.B . Adams 
(Board of Education), R.S. Nolan, J.B. Wainwright, Lieut.- 
Colonel W.R. Clark (medical referee), T.S. O'Connell 
(clerk). There were also six temporary clerks and two 
boy clerks.
Inspector under the Aliens Act
Responsibilities:- Aliens Restriction Orders; control of 
passengers entering and leaving the UK and of seamen 
embarking and landing.
Headquarters staff:- Inspector: W. Haldane Porter; deputy 
inspectors: E. Davies, F.H. Mugliston; temporary assistar. 
N.A . Richardson; second division clerk: W.W.J. Burton. Th 
were 17 temporary clerks.
Field staff:- Nine superintending aliens officers, three 
assistant superintending aliens officers, one principal 
aliens officer , seven chief aliens officers, 125 aliens 
officers, 12 interpretters and four temporary clerks.
Civilian Internment Camps Committee
Responsibilities:- To organise and superintend the 
arrangements for keeping in internment alien enemies other 
than combatant prisoners of war, to co-ordinate and control 
the operation of charitable societies relieving destitute 
aliens, and to deal with any questions relating to intern­
ment or to the relief of destitute aliens, which may be
(D 
ft
referred to them by the Home Office, the War Office or 
the Local Government Board.
Members of the committee:- J. Pedder (chairman), sir 
William Byrne, R.S. Meiklejohn, Hon. F.T. Bigham, Lieut.- 
Colonel R.N.W. Larking, E. Seligman, J. Lamb, M.L. Waller,
E. Sebag Montefiore and J.S. Oxley.
Joint secretaries:- E. Sebag Montefiore and D.D. Reid.
Source: Home Office List, 1918
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APPENDIX V
Enemy Aliens Residing in the Metropolitan 
Police District, 31 December 1916
Men
Military age Non-Military
age
Total
Germans 1/917 2/934 4,751
Austro-Huncarians 2/967 779 3,746
Turks 398 4 5 44 3
Bulgarians 2 j -  ^w
Total 5/302
vromen
3/658 S/560
British b o m  Eoreign born Total
Germans 6 / 077 4/311 TO TDD -L W  -I-
Austro-Hungarians 1/313 2,604 3,917
Turks 44 270 j. e
Bulgarians 3 15 18
Total 7/437 7,2 00 14,637
Source: Return of registed 
adult enemy aliens by the 
Metropolitan police to the 
Home Office (HO 4 5/10831/ 
326555/3)
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APPENDIX VI
Exerpt from Defence of the Realm Regulations 
(Consolidated Order), 28 November 1914
14. Where a person is suspected of acting, or of having 
acted, or of l>eing about to act in a manner prejudiciali 
to the public safety or the defence of the Realm and it 
appears to the competent naval or military authority that 
it is desirable that such person should be prohibited from 
residing in or entering any locality, the competent naval or 
military authority may by order prohibit him from residing 
in or entering any area, or areas which may be specified in 
the order and upon the !making of such an order the person to 
whom the order relates shall, if he resides in any specified area, 
leave that area within such time as may be specified by the order, 
and shall not subsequently reside in or enter any area specified in 
the order, and if he does so, he shall be guilty of an offence against 
these regulations.
Any such order may further require the person to whom 
tbe order relates to report for approval his proposed place of 
residence to the competent naval or military authority and to 
proceed thereto and report his arrival to tbe police within such 
time as may be specified in the order, and not subsequently to 
change his place of residence without leave of the competent 
naval or military authority, and in such case if be fails to 
comply with tbe requirements of tbe order be shall be guilty of 
an offence against these regulations.
Pov'ers of Scot'ch Arrest, §'c.
51. The competent naval or military authority, or any 
person duly authorised by him may, if he has reason to suspect that 
any house, building, land, vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other premises 
or any things therein are being or have been constructed used 
or kept lor any purpose or in any way prejudicial to tbe public 
safety or the defence of the Realm, or that an offence against these 
regulations is being or has been committed thereon or therein, enter, 
if need be by force, the nouse, building, land, vehicle, vessel, 
aircraft, or premises at any time of the day or night, and examine, 
search, and inspect the same or any part thereof, and may seize 
anything found therein which he has reason to Ruspcct is being 
u sed  or intended to be used for any such purpose as aforesaid, 
or is being kept or used in contravention of these regulations 
(including, where a report or statement- in contravention of 
regulation 27 has appeared in any newspaper or other printed
publication, any typo or other plant used or capable of being 
used for the printing or production of the newspaper or other 
publication), and the competent naval or military authority may 
order anything so seized to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of.
55. Any person authorised for tbe purpose by the competent 
naval or military authority, or any police constable or officer of 
oustmns and excise or aliens officer, may arrest without warrant 
any person whose behaviour is of such a nature, as to give 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that he has acted or is acting 
or is about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety 
or tbe defence of the Realm, or upon whom may be found any 
article, book, letter, or other document, the possession of. which 
gives grounds for such a suspicion, or who is suspected of 
having committed an offence against these regulations.
Tf any person assists or connives at the escape of any person 
who may lie in custody under this regulation, or knowingly 
harbours or assists any person who has so escaped, he shall lie 
guilty of an offence against these regulations.
Supplemental.
50. The powers conferred by these regulations are in addition 
to and not in derogation of any powers exerciseable by members 
of His M ajesty’s naval and military forces and other persons to 
take such steps as may be necessary for securing the public 
safety and the defence of the Realm, and nothing in these 
regulations shall affect the liability of any person to trial and 
punishment for any offence or war crime otherwise than in 
accordance with these regulations.
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APPENDIX VII
Prisoners* organisations, Knockaloe Camp, 1917
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Source: HO 45/10947/266042
A PPENDIX VIII
Weekly Menu# Knockaloe Camp, January 1915
Sunday.
Breakfast: Porridge I pint, Syrup 2 ounces. Tea 1 pint, milk and 
sugar, Bread 8 ounces, Margarine 1 ounce.
Dinner: Meat 5 ounces, Potatoes 12 ounces, Bread 6 ounces, Cabbage 
or other Vegetable, Pudding S ounces.
Supper: Cocoa 1 pint, milk and sugar, Bread S ounces, Margarine 
1 ounce, Marmalade or Jam 4 ounces.
Monday.
Breakfast: Porridge 1 pint, Syrup 2 ounces, Tea 1 pint, milk and 
sugar, Bread S ounces, Margarine 1 ounce, Marmalade 2 ounces.
Dinner: Bread 6 ounces, Potatoes 12 ounces, Soup 1 pint.
Supper: Cocoa 1 pint, milk and sugar, Bread 8 ounces, Margarine 
1 ounce, Cheese 3 ounces.
Tuesday.
Breakfast: Porridge 1 pint, Syrup 2 ounces. Tea 1 pint, milk and 
sugar, Bread 8 ounces, Margarine 1 ounce.
Dinner: Bread 6 ounces, Irish Stew, consisting of meat and potatoes, 
18 ounces.
Supper: Cocoa 1 pint, milk and sugar, Bread 8 ounces. Margarine 
1 ounce, Marmalade or Jam 4 ounces.
\Y e d n e s d a v.
Breakfast: Porridge 1 pint, Syrup 2 ounces Tea 1 pint, milk and 
sugar, Bread S ounces Margarine 1 ounce. Marmalade or Jam 2 ounces
Dinner: Soup 1 pint, with Potatoes, Bread 0 oun^ s, Pudding 
12 ounces.
Supper: Cocoa 1 pint, milk and 3ugar, Bread 8 ounces. Margarine 
1 ounce, Cheese 3 ounce>.
Thursday.
Breakfast: P orr id ge  1 pint, Syrup 2 ounces. Tea 1 pint, milk and 
sugar, Bread 8 ounces. Margarine 1 ounce.
Dinner: Meat 5 ounces, Pouatc-vs 12 ounces, second vegetable Bread
6 ounces, Pudding 8 ounces.
Supper: Cocoa 1 pint, milk and sugar, Bread 8 ounces. Margarine
1 ounce, Marmalade or Jam 4 ounces.
Friday.
Breakfast. Porridge 1 pint, Svrup 2 ounces. Tea 1 pint, milk and 
sugar, Bread S ounce-, Margarine 1 ounce. Marmalade 2 ounces.
Dinner: Bread 6 ounces, Soup 1 pint, with potatoes, Pudding 
12 ounces.
Supper: Cocoa 1 pint, milk and sugar, Bread S ounces, Margarine 
1 ounces. Cheese 3 ounces.
Saturday.
Breakfast Porridge 1 pint, S\Tup 2 ounces, Tea 1 pint, milk and 
sugar. Bread S ounces, Margarine 1 ounce.
Dinner: Bread 6 ounces, Hot Pot or Stew, consisting of meat 
and potatoes, iS ounces.
Supper: Cocoa 1 pint, milk and sugar, Bread S ounces. Margarine 
3 ounce, Marmalade or Jam 4 ounces.
Source: HO 4 5/10760/269116
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APPENDIX IXa
Canteen Stock and Prices/ Knockaloe Camp# January 1915
C igarettes, Tobacco, &c.
Woodbines, per packet of 5: I d. — Gold Flake, per packet of 10: 
3d. — Capstan Medium ,per packet of 10: 3 d. — Egyptian, per packet 
of 10: 3 d. — Muratti, per packet of 10: 3 d. — Three Castles, per packet 
of 20: 9 d .— Coaching Club Cigarettes, per packet 3d. — Cheroots 
each id . — Cigarette Paper, packet id . — Nailrod, per oz. gKd. — 
Yankee Plug, per oz. 4 d. — Twist, per oz 3 V d. — Cake, per oz 3* j d. — 
Cut Cavendish, per oz. 3*9 d. — Chairman, per oz. 6 d. — Player's 
Medium Mixture, per oz. 6 d. — Craven Mixture, per tin 2/-. — Capstan 
M-dium Toba-'co, 2 oz. 10 cl. — Gold Flake. 2 oz. 5 d. — Two Blades,
1 o* 319 d. —  Silk Cut, 2 oz. 5 d. —  Coolu  Cut Tobacco. 2  oz. 3% d —
Glasgow Mixture, 2  oz 5 d — Country Lite. 2 0 7 .. 3 d. — ltrv.no. 2 oz 
4 1,9 d. —  Dills’ Cut P lu g ,  per tin 1 , - . — Bird.- Eye T obacco  1 oz. packer 
4 1/2 d. — Godfrey P h i l l i p s  G rand Cut, 1 oz. packet 5 d. — Hgar>, fcJri ,
2 d..— Marcella Cigars 3 c. each 5 for 1/-. — Matches, 3 b o x e s  1 d. — 
Clay Pipes, each 1 . d. — Wood, each 1 d. — Briar, each 6d. & 1 -. — 
Cigarette Holder*, each 3 d. & 6 d. — Pipe Hcaners, bunch 1 d.
S tationery and Sundries.
Writing Pads, each b d. — Ink, per bottle id . — Picture Post 
Cards, 4 d. per packet cf 6 or 1 cl. each. — Black Cotton, per reel id . — 
White Cotton, per reel id .  — Tooth Brushes, each 6 d. — Carbolic 
Tooth Powder, per tin 4}!. d. — Cherry Blossom Boot Polish (Black and 
Brown), per tin 1 d. Cl 2 d. — Black <5: Brown Laces, per pair id . — 
Vaseline, per tin id .  — Dale’s Dubbin, per tin 2d. — Pen & Pencils,
each id . — Playing Cards, per packet 4*9 d. — Sewing Needles, per
card id . — Black Wool, per card id . — Grey Wool, per card id . — 
Shoe Brushes, 1/3 set cf 4 or 2 brushes S d. —
Preserved Foods, &c.
Sliced Ox Tongue, in glass, each 1/4. — Lunch Tongue, *91b. tins, 
each 10 d. — Corned Beef, 2lb. tins, per lb. 1/4. — Salmon, flat tins, 
each yd. — Skipper Sardines, per tin 6 d. — Portuguese Sardines, 
per tin 5 d. — Peaches, per tin 6 d. — Pears, per tin 7 d. — German 
Sausage, per lb. S d. — Vienna Sausage, 2lb. tins 2/-. — St. Ivel Cheese 
(Lactic), per pkt. 6 h d . — Cream Cheese, per pkt. 6*9 d. — Granulated 
Sugar, per lb. 4 d. — Nestles Condensed Milk, per tin 4 d. —
B iscuits & Apples.
Tea Biscuits, per lb. 5 d. — Social Biscuits, per lb. 3 d. — Lemon Fingers
per lb. 5 d. — Seed Gikes, each 6 d. — Cream Crackers, per lb. 6 d. —
Apples, 2 for id . — Oranges, 2 for id . — Bananas, 2 for i 1., d., 4 for 
3d., S for 6 d.
Jams.
Strawberry Jam 'ilb  pots), per pot 7*/>d. — Raspberry Jam (lib 
pots) per pot 7 d. — Plum Jam (ilb pots), per pot 6 d. — Damson Jam 
(ilb pots), per po: 7 d. — Gooseberry Jam (1 lb pots), per pot 6 d. — 
Marmalade Jam (ilb pots), per pot 6d.
Chocolates.
Milk & Plain Chocolate per rak* . id 3 d 5- 6 d
Cocoa, Tea,  Coffee,  and Milk.
Cadbury’s Cocoa (’,4lb. tins), per 1'4ib. 7 ]^d. — Cadbury’s Cocoa 
$ d. packot>, per pkt. 3 d. — Tea, lb. packets, p> r pkt 6 d. — Coffee <Sc 
Chicory, per ’ Mb. tin jMd.  — Fresh Milk, per quart 3d.
Clothing.
Clogs, per pair 4'-. — Shirts  (Pure Manx Wool), eaeh 6/-. — Shirts 
each 4/-. — Socks, per pair 1 'j & 2/3. — Oilskins, each 6/9. — Sou’ 
Westers, each 1/3. — "Jerseys, each 6/-.
Wood Carving,  &c.
Mahogany, per super foot 1 /-. — Whitewood (Canary7), per super 
foot S d. — Birch, per super foot 6 d. — Cement for Modelling, per 
3 lbs. 1. —
S o u r c e :  HO 45/ 1 0 7 6 0 / 2 6 9 1 1 6
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Canteen Stock and Prices, Knockaloe Camp, November 1917
C ig a re t te s .
*. 4.
t C h . i r m .u  p e r  i b o u u s d  30  9
t  M u r t l t i  „  41 0
1 W .a v rrl ty  37 o
1 I’r u e  C ro p  „  31 I
1 S t J ti i . i t  „  31 I
t s n v  11 1
t  T h r «  N u n *  „  3* r
I T . h .  l |  |
t R ic h m o n d  C e n t „  31 8
i  V ir g m i t  C l»»»ic» „  37 3
T o b acco .
t  B in t .  F . 'e  S im *  pe r lb . 7 I
I II . n .  O ji . l f i i-»7 .. « 9
t C a n te e n  S h a g  8 9
t  1 >1:r  1* C u b e  C u t  16 10
t K iir iu U h if t T o b a c c o  8 9
t G la sg o w  M ix tu re  .S m ith '* )  „  to  o
t S t J u lu n  (O g d e n '* )  9 a
♦ T « i* t  T h ic k . T h in  & P n i in  ,. 7 5
f  Y an k e e  P lu g  (S m i th * )  .. 0 3
C i ^ a r j ,  &c.
♦ Cher**»ts pe r h u n d r e d  9  6 
f  C tg * rs  .. 13 9
.. M a rc ella  73 4
C leaner*  Pi|»e.
pe r d o t  L u n d ie s  o f  17 o  74
H o ld e r* . C ig a re t te  p e r  d o t  \ 5
t  M a tch e s  p e r  g ro*» 3 10
) 'j|> e r. C ig a re t te ,  p e r  doz  f»kt> 4 10 
P ipe*  Ur n r ,  1, - p c i J u z  9 3 
C U y . i d .  p e r  j r o * .  j  5
S u n d rie s .
* -
Bow l*. K i.am cl p e r  D oz 19 
B ru sh e * . C am el H a ir  o
.. H a ir  .. 5
1 N ail „  2
„  S h a v in g  :
S hoe  .. *
Tooth „ 5
b u c k e t*  19
C h a im , D eck , , / a  5
s tro n g  , . / a  12
C o m b s  „  4
C u p  a n d  S a u c e r  ,. 3
D ish e s , C h in a  M eat 7
D u b b in . D ale’s )>er doz  tin *  1 
F oo tb all* . c o m p le te  e ac h  17 
C lu e  j»er c w t £ \  a
Iron**, F l a t—3 lb* pe r d .«  / l  4 
L acen . HI ick a nd  llrow n
j * r  g»o*»s pair*  .0  10 Jit 17 '
M irro r* . H a n d  |*er d oz  11
P la te s , C h in n  D in n e r  3
P o lish  (H n n tj C h t r r j  Bb>**oni. 
B lack  & llro w n  |*cr d o /  tin*  1 
P o lish  F re n c h  Ib .m  1. )j#c» g j l!  2" 
W h ite  .. 31
P o ts . Coffee, a -p in i I 'n m i - l
p et d o /  / a  3
T t ..n t!
!*cr dt>* / I  )6 
S c isso r*  p c' clO/ JOHN 13
S o a p , M onkey B rand
j*er d o l  liar* 2
T a c k *  |»er doz . b o t e s  o  
W ire .  P 'lo » * r  ,. m il*  o
C h e m is ts ' S u n d rie s .
B nudngc-. am  G au z e , p e r  do/, t o  
H n lii.m iiu v  p e r  tin t . m»llIc* 4 3 
L in t,  lh .ru - p k ts . o  10
O il. C a*lur j»cr doz  10/. b lla . 2 2 
.. C<m! L iv e r 6oz. ,, 14 9
.. K ncjdym u*  .. i o z  .. 3 a
Pill* . Illnud  a.
r d o / .b u x e *  o f  100 4 7
P ia< ullicrs
j tc r  doz . boxe*  o  9 
P o w d e r. Iln r.ic ic  A cid
l* r  doz  I oz p k ts  1 4
. ,, CnrlM.iic T o o th ,p e rd o z  t in s  1 7
. S c u lli lz  pk t*  o  10
Sail* . Kno*s !»rn tt l»lj* 38 J
)-!|i*uni ., J 'k ts  o  6
('.'.n iln -r  p k t*  o  3
Soap . S h a v in g  .. s tick *  3 o
T .iile t .. ta b le t*  o  104
W rig h t '*  C oal T o r
j*er d o z en  ta b le t*  3 II
V u seh n c  tin *  o  10
W tirtl. C*»tt»m p a ck e t*  o  9
R e f r e s h m e n t s ,  F r u i t ,  & t .
F o r d a ily  Issue to  P r i s o n ­
e rs  o j W a r  em ployed on su c h  
w o rk  a s  th e  G o v e rn m e n t 
s h a ll  d e te rm in e . In no  o t h e r  
c ase  w ill th is  a d d it io n a l  fo u l  
be u>ven except on m ed ic a l 
c e r t if ic a te .
i K oll o f H read —a ounce*
C h e ese , C h e d d a r—oue o u n c e  
B iscu it* —4 ounce*.
A p a y m e n t o f  id . e a c h  w u i  be 
p a id  00  a li M in e ia l  B o ttle *  r e tu r n e d .
C lo th in g , D ra p e ry , &c. G roceries, P ro v is io n s . &c.
p e r  tlozen  p .m  * / i .  11; 1 cSt I t *3 3 ▼ A j.plc*. d r ie ii jw r c w t ^,7 7 2
S t a t i o n e r y  G o o d s . B race* j*vi do/.ein i a u *  , ’ C1 Ivc*C. Clic-dilfct , X 1 3
- H u tto n s , D11 k G rey L u g e * C h .w s  |u i  d i . /e u  lit* «3 3
B ooks. E x e rc is e  p e r d ozen
S k e tc h 4 3 D a ik  G ic y . S m all . . 7 10 to
K ra*cr» |>er g ro ss 10 b JKT d-Uv.11 kartj* 0 ’ t " l l u  l .ssc n v c  tin? h.U llcs 4
G u m  p e r  dozen  bu ttle* a 5 .sill it 0 8* J C iv.un n t T j r i a i  .. lbs 1 13 n
In k 1 7 c n .d k .  T a i lo r '* .  .... i 0 3 t 1 •* ' Ji-l t»%l 5 s 0
N ib s , I 'i i i  p e r  dozen  boxe* C logs >airs £ 7 •3 t  11.Mir, Mftize 1 » 7
Pad*. S k e tc h 4 9 C ollar* . Su it 4 11 * H oney  jic r  doz  ja r s • 5 tj
Pad*. W i . t in g  .. 4 9 C o t m u , lll .u k ree ls 2 • Mil s t .m l ,, tin* I 6
P a iu l, B lack  T u b e* I 9 VYhi.e ! Do ,. Ib* 13 II
W h ite l 9 G lo v e s  W oollen  .. p a ir* j ; 5 T D o 1 te n c h
B oxe* 1 3 a J l.i in lk  .'fCllici* 5 t  1 r .id y - ln is e tl in  bo ttle* .S
Pvnc tU 0 10 Je rse y * L l is 8 • N u tm v g s  ,. lb s 19 ItPen* 0  104 L in e n . B lack y ard* <> * U n. sahnil .. h o llie s
P in* . D ra w in g  „ boxe* 0 .. W h ite  
L in in g . I ll.u k IS
0 t U n n m s pe r c.i*c 1 
t  CMtuu-al jic r c w t 2
16
O
r r e t w o r k ,  W o o d  C a r v in g  
e t c .
S*Ke»e 
M e ts  e*. T a
M ulller* . W oo llen  pe r <to/eu IS
9
 ^ Be.»s b ju it a 
1 P u k le *  p e r  do/, bo ttle;
9
C
3
0
B lades. F re ts a w  pe r gro*» 5 10 N e e d le s  D arn in g . p a c k e ts  0 84 * Pow der. B a k in g  .. lb s 9 11
C einc M n le lh n g  p e r cw t 3 9 D>> S ew ing 0 b* f Do C u s ta rd  „  Bin 9 1 i
D « -i^n s. P re lw u ik  j»cr do z en 5 O ilsk in s e ac h 11 7 f D o C u r ry  .. b o ttle s 17 9
y  am e*. h 'e t.s a w  61 n 16 7 Pi 11* . s h e e ts 0 54 * Xivc |.c r J cw t tw g  3 1 11
F ic tw o rk  b e t*  j*er d o z en  *el» Snbol* . p a irs 15 T >k!}M>v.r* p e r d oz  tin s - to
O  7 3 & O 8 s Slu ie* . C snva*  , V 2 |h 9 r ^-..•.c• „  bo ille j • 3 8
K e ttle s . C lu e  pe r d ozen !3 10 S h ir t s L  ‘ 11 * d o .ia .B t-C a rb o n j ie  ,. lbs 10 C
Paper. S * n d  .. *hecl» 7 Do P u re  M anx  W o o l . U • II 1 b j» c e . P ic k lin g  „  lb s 9 1 1
T o o ls . W ood  C a rv in g SoC ks , 17 4 t  Do P u d d in g  „  lb* J3 3
p e r  d o z en  se ta  £ 3 9 9 St>n' W fs tc r*  , 9 T 11.) m e „  bo ttle*  3 b
W ood . B irc h , i in  th ic k . S u i t in g , T w ee d y r d . s / i  n 8 \  m tg a r  p e r 6 g a llo u  cask  c 3
j*er do z en  fee l 7 3 T ie* 17 7 Y east p e r  71b. 0 6 4
W ood T h r e e  p ly 6 T ii iu in i  igs. S u it ’ ^ t s / s 0 to
,. W h ite  A111ern.au. | i n T w ill,  Black . ) a rris 7 11
per doXen fee t 4 3 W o o l. B lock . card* 01
W ood . W h ite  C a n a ry , 1111 D o G ie y  , .. 0 Ci
pe r do z en  fee t 7 3 D o W h ile 0
I n d i c a t e s  n o  f u r t h e r  s u p p l i e s  of  t h i s  a r t i c l e  will b e  o r d e r e d  a f t e r  p r e s e n t  s t o c k  is e x h a u s t e d ,  
t  I n d i c a t e s  t h a t  a  r e s t r i c t e d  s u p p l y  of t h i s  a r t i c l e  vVill b e  i s s u e d  in fu tu re .
Source: HO 45/10947/266042
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APPENDIX X
Article 14B, Defence of the Realm Regulations/ 
as amended during the war
14B . W h ere  on the recom m endation of a com p eten t  naval or 
m ilitary au th ority  or of one of the advisory com m ittees  herein- . 
after m entioned  it appears to the Secretary of S ta te  that for 
securing the pub lic  safety  or the defence of  the Realm  it la 
expedient in v iew  of the hostile origin or associations of any per­
son that he sh a l l  l ie  subjected to such obligations and restrictions  
as are h ere inafter  m entioned , the Secretary of State may by 
order) require th a t  person forthw ith , or from t im e  to t im e,  
either to rem ain  in, or to proceed to and reside in ,  such place as 
m ay be specified in the order, and to com ply w ith  such directions 
as to reporting  to the police ,  restriction of m ovem ent,  and other­
w ise  as m a y  b e specified in the order, or to be interned in such  
p la c e  as m a y  be si>ecified in the o lder.
T h e  S e c r e ta r y  o f  S ta t e  m ay  m ak e  a n y  su ch  ord er  as a fore­
sa id  w i th  r e s p e c t  to a n y  a l ien  in a n y  case  w h e r e  in  h is  op in ion  
th e  m a k in g  o f  t h e  order is c a lcu la ted  to secure  t h e  sa fe ty  of a n y  
B r i t i s h  s u b j e c t  i n . a n y  fo r e ig n  c o u n tr y .
P r o v id e d  t h a t  a n y  ord er  u n d e r  th is  r e g u la t io n  s h a l l ,  in th e  
case  o f  a n y  person w h o  is not a subject o f  a s ta te  a t  w a r  w ith  
11 is M a je s ty ,  in c lu d e  exp ress  prov is ion  for  th e  d u e  con s id era t io n  
b y  on e  o f  su c h  a d v iso r y  c o m m it t e e s  o f  a n y  r ep resen ta t io n s  h e  
m a y  m ak e a g a in s t  th e  order .
I f  any person  in respect  o f  whom  a n y  order is m a d e  under tbis  
r e g u la t io n  f a i l s  to  c o m p ly  w ith  an y  o f  the  prov is ion s  o f  th e  order  
h e  sh a l l  b e  g u i l t y  o f  an offence a g a in s t  th ese  r e g u la t io n s ,  and  
a n y  person in ter n ed  u n d e r  such order 6hall be s u b j e c t  to th e  l ike  
res tr ic t io n s  an d  m a y  be d ea lt  w ith  in l ik e  m a n n e r  as a prisoner  
o f  w ar, e x c e p t  so far as th e  S ecretary  of  S ta te  m a y  m o d i fy  such  
re s tr ic t io n s ,  an d  i f  a n y  person so in terned  esca p es  or a t te m p ts  to 
esca p e  fro m  t h e  p lace  o f  in te r n m e n t  or c o m m its  a n y  b reach  o f  the  
ru les  in fo rc e  th e r e in  he  sh a l l  be g u i l t y  o f  an offen ce  a g a in s t  these  
r e g u la t io n s .
T h e  a d v is o r y  c o m m it te e s  for the  purposes o f th is  regu la t ion  
sha l l  be  su c h  ad v isory  co m m ittees  as are ap p o in ted  for the  p u r­
pose  o f  a d v i s in g  th e  S ecre tary  o f  S ta te  w ith  respec.t to th e  in te r n ­
m e n t  and d ep o r ta t io n  o f  a l ien s ,  or an y  c o m m it t e e  sp e c ia l ly  
a p p o in ted  b y  th e  S ecre ta ry  o f  S ta te  for  th e  p u rp oses  o f  th is  
r e g u la t io n ,  ea ch  of  su ch  co m m ittee s  b e in g  p res id ed  over  b y  a 
p erson  w h o  h o ld s  or h as  h e ld  h ig h  ju d ic ia l  office.
In  a n y  area  in re sp ec t  o f w h ic h  th e  op era t ion  o f  S ection  one 
of th e  D e f e n c e  o f  th e  R e a lm  (A m e n d m e n t )  A c t ,  19 15 ,  is for  the  
t im e  b e i n g  su sp en d e d ,  th is  reg u la t io n  sh a l l  a p p l y . in  re lat ion  
rn a n v  n erson  w h o  is su spected  o f  a c t in g  or h a v i n g  acted  o f  of
be in g  a b o u t  to  act in a m a n n er  p r e ju d ic ia l  to t h e  p u b l ic  sa fe ty  
or the  d e f e n c e  o f  the  R e a lm ,  as it ap p lie s  in re la t io n  to persons o f  
h ost ile  o r ig i n  01 a s so c ia t ion .
In t h e  a p p l i c a t io n  o f  th i s  reg u la t io n  to S c o t la n d  an d  Ire la n d ,  
referen ces  to  th e  S e cre ta r y  for  S co t la n d  and th e  C h ie f  S ecre ta ry  
r e f l e c t i v e l y ,  s h a l l  be su b s t itu ted  for re feren ces  to th e  S ecre tary  
nj S ta te ,  b u t  an  order  under thi s  r e g u la t io n  m a y  re q u ire  th e  
person to  w h o m  the order  re lates  to reside  or to be in tern ed  in a n y  
place in  t h e  B r i t i sh  I s la n d s .
N o t h in g  in  th is  reg u la t io n  shall  be con stru ed  to restr ict  or 
prejudice  th e  a p p l ic a t io n  and effect of R e g u la t io n  14, or a n y  
power of in t e r n in g  a l ien s  w h o  are su bjects  o f a n y  S ta te  a t  war  
with H i s  M a je s ty .
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